AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE CISKEI, 1848 - 1900

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ABSTRACT: Jack Lewis, 'An Economic History of the Ciskei, c.1848-1900.'

This thesis is a contribution towards the study of the transformation of African society in South Africa under the impact of colonialism and capitalist development. Its focus is on the group of Xhosa and Mfengu households which, with their chiefs, occupied land West of the Kei River. In the opening chapters the internal dynamic of Xhosa society is examined. In these chapters the concepts necessary for such an analysis within the problematic of historical materialism are examined for the purposes of this thesis. Two main theoretical positions are developed. Firstly, the place of the form of separation of the direct producers from the means of production and the political and ideological relations by means of which this separation was achieved in Xhosa society, is established. Secondly, the transition of Xhosa society from an independent social formation to its incorporation as a regional element in the dominant capitalist system is examined. The process of transition introduces a definite break with the old economic structure of Xhosa society. It introduces a qualitatively new system of economic relationships. This transition was achieved through an articulation of the economic systems of the Xhosa households and the Colonial capitalist economy. The transformation of the Xhosa economy is shown to lead to a corresponding transformation of the political and ideological relations of Xhosa society to correspond with the changed economic circumstances. The effects of conquest on the economic, political and ideological relationships of the Xhosa are examined with special reference to the critical importance of the cattle-killing of 1857. The incorporation of the Xhosa into the Colonial economy is analysed by means of extensive use of statistical material drawn from various national, regional and local censuses taken at different times. The use of computerisation in the analysis of census data allowed for more detailed knowledge concerning the distribution of productive resources between households to be established. Data drawn from these and other analyses is used to show that the majority of households experienced a declining level

of consumption in the 19th century. This finding stands in contrast to much of the extant literature in this field and is the major empirical contribution of this study. After showing how the economic organisation of the households was transformed by the growth of capitalist economy in the Cape Colony, an attempt is made to show how political and ideological relations were reshaped by this process. Particular attention is focused on the individualisation and differentiation of the households and the role of Government appointed headmen in politically supervising these new relationships between households. Finally, the way in which this new structure of economic, political and ideological relations supported the emergence of migrant labour in the 1890s is examined. In conclusion it is suggested that the relationships between rural households in the 20th Century must be more closely studied in coming to an understanding of migrant labour and the role of the dominant classes in the Reserves in perpetuating this system.

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
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
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Gatberg
Qumbu
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THEMBULAND
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White Kei
Indwe R.
Swart Kei
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Butterworth
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GCALEKALAND
Fort Warden
Kei
Gaika Location
Kabusie
Dohne
Stutterheim
Amathole
Tyumie
Winterberg
Glen Lyndon
Balfour
Somerset East
Little Fish
Heidtown
Fort Beaufort
Lovedale
Alice
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Fort Cox
Dabe Nek
Izeli
Peelton
King William's Town
Fort Murray
Fort Wiltshire
Mount Coke
Buffalo
Gwanggo
Tyhutyhume
East London
Fort Brown
Fort Peddle
Wesleyville
Tyutyunga
Grahamstown
Kaffir Drift
Sundays
Bushmans
Salem
Port Elizabeth
THE CAPE EASTERN FRONTIER
10 0 20 40 60 80 100 Kilometres
10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles

INTRODUCTION

This introduction outlines the structure of the thesis and indicates the main points that are made with a brief synopsis of each chapter. The main concern of this thesis is the structure of Xhosa society prior to its conquest and the implications of this structure for the subsequent course of the economic and political interaction of the Xhosa with the Settler Colonial society.

In Chapter 1 the Xhosa pre-capitalist mode of production is analysed in terms of the concept of the lineage mode of production. In establishing the economic and political nature of the Xhosa social formation it is necessary to state basic definitions of the concepts required for such an analysis. Hence, in Chapter 1 concepts such as 'mode of production', and 'labour process', are defined for the purposes of this thesis. Such theoretical discussion is incorporated with an interpretation of the historical dialectic and internal dynamic of the Xhosa social formation which forms the basis for an explanation of the succession and proliferation of chiefdoms from circa 1700 to 1848.

In Chapter 1, as in subsequent chapters, theoretical concepts are introduced as they are needed and when they are relevant to the particular stage of the overall exposition. There is thus no one single or unified theoretical statement in the present work, and new concepts are introduced from time to time. More general concepts, such as 'mode of production', the 'articulation of modes of production', 'transition' etc., are, however, defined in the earlier chapters, while in subsequent chapters specific typologies and concepts are introduced as they become relevant.

In Chapter 2 attention is turned to providing a brief overview of the economic development of the Cape Colony prior to 1848. It is argued that this development was essentially capitalist in nature, and special attention is focused on the extent of development of sheep farming, particularly in the Eastern Cape. However, the

dominant power in the Colony lay with merchant capital and the extent of trading contact with the Xhosa and its effects on economic relations between homesteads and the chiefdoms as a whole are also examined.

In Chapter 3 the extent of penetration by the essentially capitalist forces of Settler colonialism and mercantile capital outlined in Chapter 2 are further examined. The concept of the 'articulation' of modes of production is developed with special reference to the work of Harold Wolpe. This chapter is almost totally devoted to theoretical concerns and is placed after the Chapter dealing with pre-capitalist modes of production and trading contacts in order to emphasise the significant changes which had begun prior to the formal incorporation of the Ciskeian Xhosa into the Colonial State. The relative weight of economic, political and ideological levels of the social formation in the articulation of modes of production is discussed and it is suggested that 'articulation' must be understood first as a process of economic change and then as one of change in political and ideological relations, (hence, a 'dual transformation' of the mode of production).

Chapter 4 examines the first significant attempt at imposing direct Colonial domination over a previously independent social formation in South Africa, with the establishment of British Kaffraria as a Crown Colony in 1848. The conduct of this administration provoked a war, which broke out late in 1850. In this study, the effects of the British Kaffrarian Administration, at the level of the Xhosa homestead production units, are examined for the first time. In this chapter the way in which the interventions of the Colonial State interposed between the chiefs and the homesteads, through fines and confiscation of land and cattle, is examined. This is important in establishing the sudden and dramatic effect which direct Colonial domination had on the economic, political and ideological structures of the pre-capitalist mode of production.

After the war of 1850-53 the British Kaffrarian Administration was

re-established, and now began a critical phase of the transition process. Although militarily defeated, the extremely diffuse power base of the Xhosa chiefdom ensured that the imposition of Colonial authority remained problematic. The new Governor, Sir George Grey, recognised that the chiefs were indispensable in the short term, but desired to thoroughly and rapidly undermine their position.

The manner in which Grey set about this task, through economic and educational schemes and strong support for the extensions of the missions, is examined in Chapter 5. The regime of the second British Kaffrarian Administration under Colonel J. Maclean and C. Brownlee, is examined, as far as possible, from the point of view of the household which formed the basic production units of the Xhosa economy, the disruption of 'normal' conditions of production, the loss of cattle through drought and lung-sickness, and pressure of these developments on the relationships between homestead and the chiefs. The tensions and conflicts, which emerged because the chiefs were no longer in a position to fulfil the basic economic and political functions of chiefs in the lineage mode of production, also created the opportunity for the Colonial State to extend its patronage. This it did in two ways - through the extension of monthly salaries to chiefs and their councillors and by providing wage work at relatively high rates of pay near the worker's place of residence, Grey's so-called 'public-works'. The conflicts associated with the interruption of the normal conditions for the reproduction of the chiefdoms led to a growing belief in millenarian prophecies of supernatural deliverance from oppression - prophecies which were to culminate in the cattle-killing.

In Chapter 6 the general economic conditions in the Mfengu locations up to 1855 (prior to the cattle-killing) are examined. It is shown that there was very little commodity production, that conditions were generally depressed, and that the pre-capitalist mode of production, though weakened, was still dominant. For both Xhosa and Mfengu alike these circumstances were decisively altered by the effects of the cattle-killing. In this chapter the

consequences of the cattle-killing for the establishment of an internal market for grains and the effect of extraordinary high prices in stimulating production to meet the demand are examined in detail. This important economic context of the cattle-killing provides a new perspective from which to look at the cattle-killing movement itself and to attempt to provide a more satisfactory understanding of this critical historical episode.

This is undertaken in Chapters 7 and 8 in which the cattle-killing is re-interpreted in the light of our understanding of the deep historical break with the old mode of production. This break both preceded the cattle-killing and was irreversibly confirmed by its consequences. In these chapters the dynamic of the Xhosa lineage mode of production outlined earlier in Chapter 1 as one of struggle between generationally defined classes, is now applied to the interpretation of the cattle-killing. The origins, purposes and politics of the cattle-killing are re-interpreted as the last (and dying) convulsions of the dynamic of the old mode of production.

Having elucidated the rationale of the cattle-killing it is then possible to delineate the growth of what is, for all practical purposes, a new form of society within the cultural shell of the Xhosa social formation. Delineating this society begins with defining the economic position of the households, which were becoming increasingly independent of each other, with the breakdown of the pre-existing homestead structure.

In Chapter 9 the place of commodity production in accounting for the constitution of the total production of the homestead is examined. The dominance of grain production over pastoralism is demonstrated. However, along with the place assumed by arable agriculture and pastoralism, particular emphasis is placed on the very uneven capacity to increase arable production that existed between households. These unevenesses were such, it is argued, that the majority of households in fact experienced a declining nett level of consumption.

Some households, often those which had enjoyed a privileged position in the regime of the chiefs, did manage to prosper. It is contended, here, that despite some channels for upward mobility which did exist, the general trend in levels of economic well-being was negative, with a few clearly demarcated exceptions. In Chapter 10 the growth of the contradictory movement of the downward shift of the many, with a measure of economic prosperity for a few, is traced. This movement particularly supported the emergence of a class of larger producers from whose ranks the Colonial State recruited a group of 'headmen'. Under the supervision of this group the ideological and political transformation of the Xhosa was completed.

The process of transformation was greatly assisted by the 'boom' period which prevailed between 1865 and 1875 as a result of the movement of 40 000 Mfengu from the Ciskei back to the Transkei from whence they had come in 1835. The effects of this emigration, made possible by the removal of the Gcaleka from their ancestral lands by the Colonial State after the cattle-killing, was greatly to ease land shortages for arable, pastoral and residential purposes in the Ciskei. This was to lead to a genuine growth in production, based not so much on "positive attitudes to the market", as on the more extensive use of existing methods over a greater land area.

In Chapter 11 attention is focused more closely on defining the powers of the headmen and the class of larger households they represented. Their power stemmed from the unequal economic conditions that prevailed between households. In concluding this study, an examination is made of the way in which the larger, wealthier households were able to utilise such inequalities both for economic exploitation and for sustaining their political power in the locations over the mass of increasingly impoverished households. It is suggested that such unequal political and economic relationships between households in fact supported the rise of migrant labour, and that the poor households early on demonstrated a remarkable sensitivity to fluctuations in the wage

rate - which they struggled to maintain at as high a level as possible. In conclusion it is suggested that the political and economic dynamic of the relationship between households must play an important part in any explanation of the origins and persistence of the migrant labour system and the development of sub-states in terms of the policies of 'separate development' and 'apartheid'.

CHAPTER 1

THE XHOSA CHIEFDOM: MODE OF PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL FORMATION IN THE PRE-COLONIAL ERA

I The Concept of the Mode of Production

In this study of the economic history of the Ciskei, attention will be focused on demonstrating the transformation of the mode of production of the Xhosa social formation under the impact of Colonial conquest and the development of the capitalist economy.

To begin with, therefore, it is essential to consider, in precise detail, the Xhosa pre-Colonial social formation which dominated the present Ciskeian regions and its mode of production and characteristic social relations. To do this, however, it is necessary to have a workable and coherent theory of the constitution of a mode of production, conceived as a theoretical entity, and, in particular, of the special problem confronting the study of pre-capitalist modes of production.

In this chapter the theory of modes of production will be considered and its specific relevance to the pre-Colonial Xhosa social formation will be examined. A brief outline of the salient features of the history of the Xhosa social formations up to 1848, the true starting point of this study, will be given in the context of the analysis of the mode of production.

The work of the contemporary French school of Marxist scholars has influenced our concept of the mode of production, and the position of E. Balibar in Reading Capital on this question will be outlined in an attempt to relate this concept to the debate on the nature of pre-capitalist modes of production. (1)

Balibar conceives concrete labour processes to be at the heart of any concept of a mode of production. In giving theoretical expression to the concept of mode of production, Balibar has abstracted the general and persistent features necessary to any labour process. He has defined the basic elements of the labour process as:-

(1) labourer;
(2) Means of production;
which consist of (i) object of labour;
(ii) means of labour;
(3) non-labourer.

These elements may be combined together in different ways, the result being different modes of production. However, this combination is not, and never can be, something which is abstractly conceived or derived from some pre-given, a priori, theoretical category. For Balibar, the general form of connection between these elements must involve:-

(1) property connection;
(2) real or material appropriation connection.

This definition of the elements of the labour process is as given by Marx in Capital Vol. I. Balibar places great emphasis on the position of the non-labourer, and this forms the basis for the consideration of the two forms of connection between the elements of the labour process. (2)

It is important to understand Balibar's meaning in specifying two forms of connection between the elements of the labour process. By 'property connection' he means 'kind of ownership', but this is not the same as merely legal ownership. The 'property connection' refers us to the basic relations of production which is property in the means of production and in the product of labour. It is therefore a connection that defines certain rights of appropriation of the means of production and of the product of labour. The 'property connection' specifies control over and access to means of production that differentiates the direct producer (worker) from the non-producer, and therefore sets limits

to, or structures, the development of the productive forces.

The second connection, the 'real appropriation' connection, specifies, for Balibar, the productive forces "which are also a connection of a certain type within the mode of production ... in other words they too are a relation of production". The real appropriation connection refers to the way in which the economic life of any mode of production regulates the development of the social formation in which it is incorporated. The forces of production define certain forms of appropriation of nature, raw materials, (object of labour) and techniques of production, which in turn affect the form of the labour process and the property connection.

A relation of production is therefore a form of connection between elements of a labour process which designates a specific mode of production. The productive forces ('real appropriation connection') designate a relation of production because they determine the development of the social division of labour and define the role of the direct producers and the non-labourers in the production process.

For Balibar, the relationship between the two forms of connection between the elements of the labour process is constitutive of the relations of production of any given mode of production. The form of relationship between the two connections is fortunately limited to two possibilities - either there is a homology between them or there is a non-homology. (3) A homology between the real appropriation and property connection designates the overlapping of the form and structure of the two connections, such that the mode of appropriation of nature and the mode of appropriation of the product of labour are conducted within a single process.

This can only occur where the raw materials used in the production process, the means of production, and the final product itself are the property of the non-producer in the production process. It is immediately apparent that this homology, in which all possession

and ownership is vested in the non-producers, is only found under capitalism, where the direct producer (worker) is completely separated from any property relation in the elements of the production process.

Only under capitalism is there no spatial or temporal disjunction between the performance of necessary labour (labour necessary for the reproduction of the worker and the means of production e.g. wages, undistributed profit retained for reinvestment etc.) and surplus labour (the proceeds of labour appropriated by the non-worker in the labour process and used as distributed profits, interest, rent, some aspects of taxation etc.). The two conceptually distinct components of all concrete labour merge under capitalism into a single process of production. This homology, or merging of the performance of necessary and surplus labour into a single moment in the production process, reflects the dual determination of the economic under capitalism. The processes of production and appropriation are both conducted without any political or ideological intervention being necessary. This condition is unique to the capitalist mode of production and corresponds to the existence of 'free' wage labour completely separated from any property in the means of production.

The historically specific function of the concept of 'homology' between the two forms of the relations of production is explicitly formulated by Balibar who argues that:

> "... the homology between the two connections, the overlap between their forms, which characterise the capitalist structure, does not so characterise those earlier modes of production. Marx only finds it again in the hypothetical 'natural community' which inaugurates history: then the form of each of the two connections was, on the contrary, the union, the belonging together of the labourer and means of production." (4)

Non-homology correspondingly implies some type of physical, spatial and temporal disjunction between the performance of surplus labour

and necessary labour. Where some disjunction occurs there must correspondingly be some degree of possession by the direct producers of the means of production. But possession is not an absolute value. In pre-capitalist modes of production, possession may be partial, intermittent, and variable between different agents in the labour process and for the same agent at different points in time. The form of this disjunction is what differentiates one mode of production from another by defining the manner in which surplus labour is 'pumped out' of the direct producers by the ruling class. (5)

Thus it can be seen that the idea of a homologous or non-homologous form of the two connections refers, in effect, to the form or extent of separation or non-separation of the direct producers from the means of production. Only under the historically adequate form of the capitalist mode of production does this separation of the worker from the means of production become complete. In all preceding modes of production the form of the two connections has been non-homologous. (6) There has always been some (variable) degree of possession by the direct producers of the means of production.

In order to describe theoretically a specific mode of production, it is therefore necessary to analyse the forms of access to and control over the means of production retained by the direct producers as well as the forms of separation from the means of production achieved through determinate political and ideological interventions by the dominant class in the social formation. Terray seems to have adopted this position when he wrote that Marx's conclusion, that under feudalism the surplus labour can only be extorted by "other than economic pressure":

> "... may be extended to cover all pre-capitalist modes of production. In the latter, the extra-economic bonds, i.e. political and ideological, of which Marx wrote, are not just the realisation of the superstructural conditions of the reproduction of the relations of production, they are present in the very constitution of these

> relations, since in their absence, no surplus, regardless of the way it is used, could be drawn off. The political and ideological bonds are thus the preliminary conditions for the production process itself. In other words, the superstructure is introduced at the very centre of the economic base as a presupposition." (7) (emphasis added J.L.)

It ought to be added that the intention is not to reduce all possible modes of production to the operation of a simple structural duality - homology/non-homology. On the contrary, the intention is to emphasise the variability of possible forms of intervention of political and ideological relations between the direct producers and the means of production in the production process. It is necessary, however, to qualify Terray's view that the form in which surplus labour is 'pumped out' of the direct producers in the feudal mode of production through the conjunction of political and economic force, is applicable to all pre-capitalist modes. Feudalism is distinct because of the existence of private property in land linked to regular commodity production and independent towns. Thus the economic instance already has an autonomy which it did not have in the modes that dominated African social formations. (8)

Godelier has argued that, with feudalism, the dependence of the peasant producers on the lord who owned the land, was direct and individual and that this was this first time that the land and its products have taken the form of private property. This was, therefore, also the first time that the economic instance acquired a history of its own and each peasant household was a determinate centre of production and stood in isolation from the others. (9) The significance of this isolation will be considered below. It should be noted, at this stage, that a prime objective of this study is to chronicle in detail the way in which the mass of homestead units of production which had existed as inseparable elements in the composition of large chiefdoms, became isolated from each other during the course of the 19th century and

functioned as economically independent units linked, through petty commodity production, to the expanding capitalist sector, at the levels of both production and consumption. In the light of the above understanding of the concept of the mode of production and its constitution, abstractly considered, it is now possible to look at the more complex reality of the Xhosa social formation prior to the 19th century and to consider its history in the light of this conceptual framework.

II Perspectives on the Nguni Social Formations, Social Relations and Chiefly State Power

The Xhosa form part of a block of people which, by the beginning of the 19th century, occupied most of the eastern coastal plain of South Africa. They shared many characteristics with other groups from the Umzimkulu River to the Fish. One of their most marked features was the existence of centralised chieftaincies which ruled over the clans which constituted the nation. The degree of this centralisation varied, however, between the different chiefdoms. Production was based within families organised into hundreds of homestead units, which collectively constituted the chiefdoms.

The most intractable problem in the study of the Nguni chiefdoms, whether Xhosa, Mpondo or Zulu, has proved to be that of the relationship between these homestead based units of production and the chief. (10) It is intended to elucidate some of the issues involved in the analysis of this relationship, by examining the relations of production within the chiefdom as a whole, in terms of the forms of separation and non-separation of the direct producers from the means of production which characterised the mode of production.

To begin with, it is necessary to consider the relations of production of pastoralism and of agriculture based on sedentary local units of production. The individual units of production based on kinship groups were linked together through a variety of economic relations. But this was not a purely economic process. There were, in fact, very few purely 'economic' categories which were not simultaneously linked to the reproduction of the lineage structure. In this system kinship appears "not as a consequence, but as a pre-condition of the joint appropriation and use of the soil". (11) One of the defining characteristics of lineage based production is the existence of relations of personal dependence, based on age (seniority) and sex (patriarchal authority).

Lineages are usually organised into hierarchies, from junior to senior, with the heads of senior lineages controlling the conditions of access to means of production and reproduction of the junior males. The lineage mode of production, and the community of clans defined in it, is therefore an adequate basis for the emergence of a class system and of exploitation. (12) Thus it can be said that the independence of the unit of production in the linear mode of production as with its specific form of dependence, was determined firstly by relations of personal dependence which only secondarily developed an autonomous economic component.

In his recent work, Terray has confirmed that the linear mode of production remained the indispensable basis for kingdoms with developed military hegemony, domestic slavery and central control over long distance trade. Terray sees the latter as dominating the former. (13) Similarly, Guy has argued that the ability of the Zulu King to demand tribute from other chiefdoms, and to sustain the military system depended on:

> "day to day labour within these Homesteads and in the land associated with them, which from the time of Shaka to Cetewhwayo provided the subsistence and the surplus upon which the continued existence of the kingdom depended ..." (14)

Guy has seen the origins of the Zulu kingdom in terms of the necessity for ensuring the provisioning of means of production to the mass of homesteads. He sees the period of conflict between the Ndwandwe, Ngwane and Methethwa blocks, out of which the Zulu were formed, as a struggle for access to diminishing resources in a period of increasing population density, within the given limits of the forces of production. (15) The growth of these larger units did not constitute a break with the mode of production of the previous social formations. On the contrary, the innovations introduced by Shaka, the military and age set systems, and the large scale appropriations required to feed such standing armies, can best be seen as a solution to the contradiction between the mass of homesteads and chiefly state power, which ultimately ensured the continued reproduction of homestead based production units.

The growth of centralised kingdoms does not supersede the lineage system; it develops the basis of its reproduction by establishing more sophisticated forms of political and ideological intervention between the means of production and the mass of homesteads. Thus the emergence of the Zulu state and the rigid enforcement of age sets for both males and females gave the Zulu King control over:

> "the rate and direction of the fundamental social process within the kingdoms, those of production and reproduction ... in Zulu society, where marriage was linked with the creation of new production communities, the King's authority to hold back marriage gave him a significant degree of control over the rate at which production communities were formed and therefore over the intensity with which the environment was exploited ..." (16)

In achieving a much higher degree of control and centralisation of marriage through the age sets, the Zulu state was building on the basic relations of production of the homestead which require control over female labour.

Unlike the feudal peasant household, homesteads in Nguni society were not isolated centres of independent production. They entered into relations with each other through the exchange of women for cattle. Women were divorced from all relations involving cattle, and this established an internal social division of labour within the homestead. Once cattle were in regular circulation through the exchange of women, it became possible to control both men and women through the imperatives involved in the acquisition of cattle. This circulation thus defined a sphere of appropriation that lay outside the individual Homestead, in the exchange of cattle and women which formed the basis for accumulation by the heads of homesteads, and the chiefs.

In conditions of over-utilisation of limited natural resources of arable land, pasturage and hunting grounds, such as existed in 18th century Zululand, the dependence of young men on the accumulated wealth of their elders was intensified and hence the sphere of appropriation by these class forces was enlarged. It is important to reiterate that the basic movement of centralisation of power served to reconstitute the conditions necessary for the reproduction of the homestead based system with access to means of production within each homestead. This access, however, was now mediated by new forms of political and ideological intervention between the direct producers and means of production. As Godelier has observed, in a slightly different context;

> "The emergence of the State and of the exploitation of the communities does not change the general form of property relations, it remains one of communal ownership; this time ownership by the higher community, while the individual remains in possession of the soil as a member of his particular community. Thus a transition to a State society and to an embryonic form of class exploitation has taken place without the development of private ownership of land ..." (17)

What emerged, in the Zulu example, could thus be seen as one specific, conjunctural solution to a basic problem of all lineage

based systems with centralised chiefdoms - i.e. to ensure the unity of the means of production and subsistence within the homesteads, given limited resources and population growth within a fixed technological base. Within these constraints, some central regulation and control was necessary over the rate at which new homesteads were established and over the expansion of existing homesteads. The basic theoretical proposition is, therefore, that chiefly power operated to affect the rate at which new homesteads were established and, therefore, the rate at which existing homesteads expanded and increased their productive capacity. A chief's ability to operate in this way is premised on the production relations internal to the individual homesteads, through the fundamental division between women and cattle. By inhibiting the formation of new homesteads as separate units of production, the chief was able to increase the intensity of exploitation within the existing homesteads. On the other hand, the formation of new homesteads on newly occupied territory decreased the extent of surplus production and of the appropriation of surplus labour.

The specific conditions under which such movements of centralisation were effected, were partly determined by the existing basis of chiefly power and in part by the nature of productive resources and the environment. The essence of the problem is to specify the contradictory relationship between the demands of reproduction of chiefly state power on the one hand, and of the individual homesteads on the other. It will be argued that, in the Xhosa social formation, the primary contradiction was that between the local community of homestead production units and the higher community represented by the chief. The function of the 'higher community' was to ensure and regulate the access to means of production and means of subsistence of the individual units of production of the 'lower community'.

In the Xhosa social formation the primary aspect of this was to maintain the national territory of the chiefdoms in such a manner as to include adequate access to four distinct types of

territory. These were hunting grounds, pasture lands, agricultural lands and residential sites. (18) In achieving this, the chief had to intervene between the local community and the unity of the means of production. These forms of intervention were variable and uneven (resting more at one point on cattle or agriculture and at another point more on place of residence or hunting etc.) because they were the primary lines on which the class struggle was based. (19)

Looking beyond the Xhosa, this contradiction between the power of the centralised authority and the mass of homesteads is expressed in different African social formations in the ubiquity of lineage based production units on the one hand, and the numberless shades of difference which constitute the basis for individual ruling classes on the other. This has mistakenly led some theorists to suppose that each must be assessed in terms of a unique mode of production. The differences between the Xhosa and certain West African Kingdoms, for example, are great indeed, yet they have more in common at the level of production than with any variant of European feudalism. The extent of these differences between social formations is, in this view, the consequence of the almost infinite variety of possible forms of intervention by the ruling class against the conditions of effective possession of means of production and subsistence by the homestead production units, which are compatible with the maintenance of the basic structure of the lineage mode of production.

This inherent variability is the result of the non-homology between production and appropriation in the absence of feudal forms of land ownership. Thus any <u>given stage</u> in the development of a kingdom based on the lineage mode of production assumes a conjunctural character which has too often been mistaken for a fundamental difference in mode of production. Indeed Terray seems to have been struck by this possibility when he wrote that pre-capitalist modes of production:

> "... may undergo, and may actually have experienced, periods of growth and rapid transformation preceded and accompanied by an intensification of exploitation. But these periods are the result of determinate historical conjunctures: in contrast with the capitalist mode of production, the worsening of exploitation does not constitute a tendential law inherent in the structures of these modes of production. On the other hand, one may also witness a general deterioration of the relations of production forming the mode of production and of the situation of the classes it entails ..."(19)

It has been argued that the relative non-separation of the direct producers from the means of production forms the primary lines on which the class struggle is based. From this it follows that, in the lineage mode of production, when the degree of separation of the direct producers from the means of production and subsistence was large, the rate of appropriation of surplus labour was high and exploitation more intense. Where exploitation (thus defined) of young men, women and others, was more intense, it was harder for men to acquire wives, and once acquired, to establish homesteads of their own. Such men were forced to work not primarily for their own aggrandizement but for that of the head of the homestead to which they were attached.

Where exploitation reached this intensity, struggles were engendered against it. In the case of the Xhosa, these struggles most often took the shape of the establishment of a new chiefdom in which access to necessary resources was the return that young men, women and other exploited people gained for assisting the pretensions of an aspiring chief.

It is, therefore, in the light of this contradiction within the individual units of production that historical developments at the level of the chiefdom as a whole must be understood.

The Xhosa economy depended on the availability of land to absorb the conflicts generated by the struggle to control the two most important resources - cattle and people. Both of these were highly mobile. In an area of wide climatic variation and environmental diversity, transhumance is usually essential and requires assured access to extensive pasture. The primary function of the Xhosa chief was to symbolise the attachment of the people to their cattle and their lands. Land, however, is a fixed resource and ensuring the availability of adequate land (both qualitatively and quantitatively) was the most immediate problem confronting the chief in maintaining the political unity of chiefdom.

It is suggested here that there existed, within the Xhosa social formation, a generational cycle which led to the political and territorial redistribution of people and cattle when the prevailing distribution on the available land, over which a particular chief held dominion, had reached the maximum limits of its capacity to provide for the younger generation wishing to establish independent homesteads. The effect of this socially created 'land scarcity' was not something which operated in a mechanistic and unmediated way. The existence of pressure on available resources was manifested in the increasing ability of the chiefly hierachy to appropriate surplus from the mass of households through the expansion of the number of workers in each homestead unit of production, and through greater incidence of cattle indebtedness. (21)

Peires has presented the view that:

> "... The Xhosa nation is heterogeneous in origin, rather than from the first a defined 'tribe' clearly distinct from its neighbours, and that it expanded and incorporated rather than migrated ..." (22)

He has emphasised the political domination of the amaTshawe clan, (to which all Xhosa chiefs, with one exception, belonged) over the mass of homesteads as the key to this process of expansion,

and linked it to the need to maintain ecological balance with the increase in population and inter generational conflict between chiefs:

> "... The tensions of the intergenerational conflict were relieved to a large extent by the dispersion of young chiefs and their followers to territories of their own ... The dispersion of the young chiefs benefited the polity as a whole ... Apart from extending the territory over which the amaTshawe reigned, it assisted in the subordination of commoner clans. Against these advantages was the disadvantage that increasing decentralization ... must inevitably have led to decreasing political cohesion and the ultimate break up of the polity, unless checked by the growth of political institutions at the centre ..." (23)

Perhaps the best known case of increasing intensity of appropriations is that of Ngqika (1778-1829) (24). He pursued a policy of concentrating power in his hands by forbidding private revenge for adultery - substituting, instead, fines given by his court; developed the custom of death dues (isizi) in cattle which was widely adopted by the other chiefs; took over the people and cattle of homesteads whose heads had died or had been deposed by him - amongst other things. While these developments were important they were not unique to Ngqika. (25).

The Xhosa never developed the sort of centralised control over age ranking that characterised the Zulu formations, because of the success of countervailing struggles that tended, instead, to expand the kingdom and to subdivide political authority. The basic pattern of the conflict between centralisation and decentralisation of power in the Xhosa chiefdoms is represented in the myth of origin of the amaTshawa Royal clan. The myth of origin of amaTshawe is built on the conflict between sons of chiefs. Tshawe, reputedly representing a minor house of his

'father' 'Nkosiyamantu', came into conflict with his two senior brothers, Cira and Jwara. Cira is represented as the senior heir of 'Nkosiyamantu'. The myth, as related, concerns the refusal by Tshawe to pay the tribute of the hunt to Cira. Tshawe had killed a blue-buck and Cira demanded his portion, usually the breast of the animal. Cira asked for the assistance of Jwara, chief of the Right-hand House, but, with the assistance of the Pondomises, Tshawe overcame his brothers and 'usurped' the chieftainship of the Xhosa. (26)

Peires has interpreted this myth as one of indigeneous clans being conquered and incorporated by invading clans. However he has not specifically questioned why the myth of origin of the Xhosa chieftaincy is represented in terms of a conflict between brothers. In a suggestive note he commented that:

> "The apparently frivolous argument (over the blue-buck J.L.) which Soga does not explain, is in fact the crux of the Tshawe justification for the usurpation. Cira, as the chief, was entitled to demand his portion of the blue-buck, but since the blue-buck was too small, there would not have been enough for the rest of the people to eat. By insisting on this Royal prerogative at the expense of his people's well-being Cira contravened the ethic of generosity and therefore merited deposition ..."(27)

In fact the conflict over the buck, as a conflict between chiefs and brothers, could very well be held to represent a conflict over the rights of appropriation of a chief, expressing the way in which these rights are limited by the resulting conflicts they engender. The 'ethic of generosity' which was the ideological form in which the chiefs' dominant control over cattle was represented, may in fact be seen as grounded in the need to disguise the extent of a chief's wealth. (28) The significance of the myth lies in its legitimisation of resistance to unfair, or excessive, appropriations by a chief and the support of

another claimant to the chieftaincy in order to right this unacceptable situation. As Peires justifiably argues, the myth of origin also legitimates the existence of a dominant lineage and ruling class as the basis of the Xhosa chiefdom. At the same time it expresses the dialectic of the establishment of chiefdoms and the supercession of one chief by another.

The history of the Xhosa may, in large measure, be viewed as the process of the creation of chiefdoms in response to the intensification of the contradiction between the chief and the mass of households. More specifically it may be viewed as the outcome of the contradiction between the chief (and his supporters amongst the rich heads of households, who enjoyed a close political relationship with him) and the poor indebted members of these households and young men who wished to marry and establish households of their own.

This contradiction was developed by the ecological constraints of the limited territory of the chiefs' domain. By virtue of the control which they exercised over the rate at which new homesteads and households could be established, and by restricting these processes, the dominant class in the chiefdom was able to exercise decisive control over the chiefdom as a whole. However this control invited a response. It invited young men to seek to support the claim of a son of a chief to aspire to the rank of chief himself. They could organise around him politically, and eventually precipitate a split in the chiefdom as they moved off to fresh territory where the new chief and his supporters would themselves be able to supervise the settlement of the new territory, mark out the best bits for themselves, and in turn gather supporters and indebted followers. This was the essential dialectic of Xhosa history.

This view can best be examined by looking in closer detail at the chronology of the formation of the different chiefdoms which emerged, and which occupied the Ciskei from the Kei river to the Sundays River between 1670 and 1800. The characteristic "splitting" of the Xhosa polity will be seen to be neither the

mechanistic anthropological abstraction as which it is sometimes presented, nor a chance political happening. (29) It will be argued that the formation of chiefdoms was precisely the outworkings of an objective contradiction in the lineage mode of production of the Xhosa social formation; a contradiction founded on social relations internal to the mode of production and therefore based on its units of production - the individual homesteads. Before going on to examine the structure of the homesteads in more detail, the chronology of the formation of the chiefdoms will first be outlined.

III From Tshiwo to Sandille - The Emergence of Xhosa Chiefdoms

The first known split from the main line of Xhosa chiefs traced from Tshawe, was Ntinde, the brother of the chief Ngconde, (mid-17th century possibly 1670-1700). The precise causes of this break are not known. It seems, however, as if the authority of the supreme chief had developed considerably under Ngconde's rule. Ngconde fought with his brother Ziko. Ziko subsequently harboured a grudge against Ngconde and his heir, Tshiwo, and helped Gwali, Tshiwo's son, against the infant chief Phalo, some years later. The Ntinde were the first branch of the Xhosa to cross the Kei in the 17th century and to settle in the area occupied by the Khoi. (30)

Xhosa nationalism

The reign of Tshiwo appears to have marked a period of chronic instability, which may be evidence of the conjunctural result of increasing population and deteriorating ecological conditions and drought. Peires has noted that Tshiwo had to ward off a challenge to his chieftaincy from the amaNgqosini chief Gaba, and he did this with the help of a powerful councillor, Khwane. In recognition of his assistance, Khwane was made a chief over the amaGqunukwebe, a group which had a considerable Khoi admixture.

There is evidence that there was a definite drift of support from Tshiwo to Gaba and that Gaba was leading the penetration of the Ciskeian areas. (31)

Further evidence on conditions in Tshiwo's time comes from a tradition recorded by the Rev. John Bennie in 1838. Bennie records Tshiwo as having moved across the Kei in search of game to hunt. Such extension is highly suggestive that existing game land was exhausted. Any movement across the Kei was, however, bound to bring conflict with the Khoi who sparsely occupied the country up to the Kei. It seems as if Tshiwo was motivated in this by a great drought which would, naturally, have made the Xhosa more dependent on hunting and on the gathering of wild roots. Bennie records that there was 'great drought and hunger':

> " ... They stole the property of others: cattle and corn they destroyed one another ... their cattle were gone on account of their plundering one another. He that stole was not fined, all his cattle were taken from him. Part of the people left their homes, and became wanderers, those that had cattle fought with one another, some served these. Tshiwo alone had cattle and cow. Tshiwo gave the following order to his people; he said "seek the wanderers, take them home with you, bring them to my kraal that I may give them food". This was duly done ... he chose great men to distribute food to the destitute. He threw away his cattle in slaughtering for his people. The niggardly rich man would be reported to the chief. Tshiwo would call him, blame him, caution him ... at length it rained. The land became rich and had plenty. Tshiwo collected his cattle and distributed them amongst his destitute. Peace came, corn was sown. Tshiwo said, cut the horns of your calves, do justice, let there not be a person who takes the property of another ... the cattle increased and bred and outnumbered the people ..." (32)

The tradition conjures up a vivid picture of the manner in which the concentration of cattle in the hands of a minority of influential men may come to combine with a particular ecological conjuncture to create conditions where the majority of the nation are left without access to cattle. The impression is also created that strife, bordering on complete civil disorder, may be engendered by this when the usual rules of property are suspended. Significantly, the solution to such strife is chiefly intervention to restore the internal balance of people and cattle on the land, through the agency of his class allies, councillors or 'great men' of the various clan sections, who were brought more firmly under his hegemony by this means, as all service and work for a chief was usually rewarded.

Although it is important to guard against extending the interpretation of a tradition beyond the limits which it will bear, there are certain observations about the reign of Tshiwo that lend added significance to the circumstances described. Tshiwo succeeded his father, at the earliest, in 1686 - and he died in 1702. (32) Soga claims he was "middle-aged" at the time of his death. At all events, he was not old and definitely had not ruled for a long time. Thus the circumstances described would have taken place in the early years of his rule which were periods of great vulnerability for a chief, when he needed to forge new alliances and create a class of supporters indebted to him and his councillors.

If the early years of the reign of a new chief happened to coincide with a period of ecological extremity, it could most plausibly be productive of attempts at usurpation of the chieftaincy such as that of Gaba, and necessitate the young chief attempting to decisively break the power of the old councillors of his father. The possibility that Tshiwo was faced with these characteristic political problems which confronted a new chief, is supported by Bennie who records that Tshiwo held the 'great men' (probably heads of clan sections) responsible for deaths through witchcraft - in an attempt to get control over them and

the cattle confiscations this would entail. (33) That such attempts were necessary demonstrates a fact of the lineage mode of production as inscribed in the Xhosa social formation: that the succession of chiefs marked the shift of class rule from one generation to another. Each succeeding generation had to re-establish the basis of its rule in production by restoring the unity of homesteads and the means of production where this unity had become broken through the 'bottlenecking' of cattle and access to lands in the hands of homestead heads, councillors and 'great men' of a previous chief. Where this combined with relative overpopulation of the fixed or bounded land resources of the nation, considerable opportunity existed for political intrigue and the building up of a following by individuals with a claim to the title of chief.

From the time of Tshiwo, there was a marked speeding up of the process whereby new chiefdoms, related to the Xhosa Paramountcy, were created. The establishment of the amaGqunukwebe under the councillor Kwane has already been mentioned. Tshiwo defeated Gaba with Kwane's aid in the vicinity of the Keiskamma River. The amaGqunukwebe were formed from the mixture of Kwane's people, the conquered amaNqosisni and Khoi. This must have in itself reduced the pressure on resources in Tshiwo's country east of the Kei.

With the restoration of a more favourable balance between people, cattle and the land, the power of rich homestead heads over local followings was greatly reduced. Although a great many young men who needed to acquire a wife would still have been dependent on older and richer homestead heads, and ultimately on the chief, for acquiring cattle, the extent to which homestead heads could control the labour of a man's wife and children and command his political support was greatly reduced. Our supposition is that this was reflected in a decrease in the number of families concentrated in individual homesteads. Peires has similarly emphasised the aspect of spatial differentiation in considering the effects of the segmentation of political power amongst the Xhosa. (34)

The reduction of the pressure of population on the land, in the country defined by the chieftaincy, did not mark a mere spatial differentiation and political segmentation only. It had effects on the entire process of reproduction of homesteads, and therefore of the chiefdom as a whole. The entire tradition relating to Tshiwo emphasises the ability of a chief to command, expecially in times of crisis, the distribution of cattle over the chiefdom as a whole. By removing an imbalance in this distribution, Tshiwo was able to maintain the unity of the chiefdom.

Tshiwo's son by his first wife was Gwali, who in the absence of an official heir, assumed the Regency. When Mdange, Tshiwo's brother, brought forward a child, Phalo, who he claimed was the son (born after his death) of Tshiwo's Great Wife, Gwali rejected the contention. This led to a conflict between Mdange and Gwali, the defeat of Gwali and the establishment of the amaGwali chieftaincy in the area of the Khoi chief Hinsati, whose people and cattle were conquered in the process. (35) In the conflict between Gwali and Mdange, the operation of the struggle between generations may be clearly seen. Gwali was Tshiwo's son, Mdange his brother, and (as Holden has commented) "the old councillors of the tribe, well knowing the advantages of a long minority, rallied around the infant chief Phalo, and the ambitious Gwali was defeated ..." (36)

Mdange ruled as Regent until Phalo was ready to assume his chieftainship - whereupon Mdange relinquished rule, and with his followers went to live west of the Kei, where he joined the amaNtinde, amaGqubukwebe and amaGwali already in the region. The fact that Mdange's Regency, and his subsequent removal from the main branch of the Xhosa chieftaincy, was peaceful and that he remained on good terms with Phalo, points to the significance of the conquest of the Khoi and the removal of any obstacle to further expansion west of the Kei.

During and after the reign of Tshiwo, the Xhosa had begun to move over the Kei in earnest, and there seems to be no doubt that the

Marginal notes

motive force behind the move was the need to expand the physical resource base of the chiefdom. Each major migration may be seen to correspond to a political crisis, first Khwane and the amaGqunukwebe, then Gwali, the defeated presumptive heir, and finally, if peacefully, Mdange, the representative of the new Paramount's father's generation. However, none of these migrations was as traumatic or as significant as the split that occurred between the sons of Phalo - Gcaleka and Rarabe.

The rise of the ideology of the Right-hand House, Peires has convincingly argued, grew out of the political need to explain the split in the chiefdom that occurred, in the reign of Phalo, between Gcaleka (d.1778), the 'Great son' of Phalo and his brother Rarabe (d.1787) - who henceforth was designated the son of the Right-hand House. (37)

In the polygamous homestead of a Xhosa chief, from then on, one wife was to be named the Great Wife and the lobola marriage cattle were to be provided by the tribe. This wife's first son was to be the legitimate heir. The Great Wife was usually one of the last to be married. Another wife was to be named the wife of the Right-hand, and other wives were then attached to these houses as their supporters, constituting the minor houses.

The conflict between Gcaleka and Rarabe thus assumed great importance because it proved a watershed, beyond which the possibility for centralising power over the Xhosa homesteads in the hands of one great chief was to be abandoned, and the process of decentralisation markedly speeded up. The effect of the Right-hand House institution was to determine that a part of the nation became the acknowledged following of the son of the Right-hand. (39) As we have seen, however, the fact of segmentation under half-brothers of the chief was present before the ideology of the Right-hand House, at least from the time of Tshiwo. The sons of chiefs are all potential chiefs and this alone was a sufficient basis to cause the heads of certain homesteads to foster their ambitions through alliance with such

chiefs without the ideology of the Right-hand House. The institution of the Right-hand House therefore only expressed the dominant reality of struggle between homesteads and the chiefs for optimising the conditions of production within homesteads.

Little is known about the conflict between Gcaleka and Rarabe, except that it occurred during Phalo's life time. (40) The fact that it did so is perhaps indicative of how urgent the need for further expansion was. The outcome of the struggle was that Rarabe settled west of the Kei along with his father Phalo. This consolidated the process of penetration and occupation of the Ciskei, and the displacement of the Khoi under Hoho that had begun with Tshiwo's defeat of the amaNgosini and the creation of the amaGqunukweve.

The amaGwali recognised the chieftaincy of Rarabe, and Peires supposes that the Ntinde also did so, although the imiDange did not, largely because of their historical opposition to the amaGwali. (41) The amaGqunukwebe did not recognise Rarabe. One of the sons of Phalo from a minor house, Langa, also established for himself a strong following and crossed the Kei, and his chiefdom, the amaBalu, did not recognise Rarabe's Paramountcy west of the Kei. (42)

Thus before the rise of Ngqika, by the end of the 18th century, there were at least six chiefdoms which had penetrated and occupied the Ciskeian areas previously occupied by the Khoi. These were the Ntinde, Gqunukwebe, Gwali, Mdange, Mbalu and Rarabe. The area was rich in good pasture land, filled with game, and had many perennial streams and forests from the Amatola catchment area. The divided allegiance of the junior chiefdoms, between the Rarabe and the Gacaleka as well as the ambivalent relationship between the Rarabe and the Gacaleka themselves, were to provide the background to economic and political developments in the 19th century.

Mention has already been made of the increased level of

appropriations that Ngqika was able to introduce. In order to understand this it is necessary to look at the conditions of his rise to power. Rarabe's son of the Great House, Mlawu, died in a war against the Thembu, and his heir Ngqika was then in his infancy. Thus, once again and as with Phalo, a long regency was necessitated, with all the consequences which that entailed for the enlargement of the homestead units of production and the concentration of cattle ownership. The regency was assumed by a brother of Rarabe's, Ndlambe. Under Ndlambe the forces of centralisation in the chiefdom combined explosively with the impact of Colonial trade and territorial wars which placed new and greater pressures on available production resources. Under the intensified conditions of struggle by the homesteads for access to means of production through a privileged relationship with a chief, the institution of the Right-hand House became generalised, so that in the Ciskei, all sons of chiefs attempted to gain a measure of independence for themselves. These were conditions under which the catastrophic internal struggles of the 19th century were played out.

During the reign of Ndlambe, the hegemony of the amaTshawe west of the Kei was established. In the earlier part of Ndlambe's regency he enjoyed the beneficial effects of Colonial trade, and consequently found Colonial allies in the Boers of the Agter-Bruintjies-Hoogte area. He used these allies to assist him in subduing those chiefdoms which resisted Rarabe domination - principally the imiDange. This group he pushed west of the Fish to join the amaNtinde and amaGwali who were already there. It was this concentration of population that led to the initial conflicts with the Boers, and in 1793 Ndlambe assisted van Jaarsveld in a commando against them. (43) However the main obstacle to Ndlambe was the Gqunukwebe. The significance of the Zuurveld lands, west of the Fish River was well expressed by Chungwa, the Gqunukwebe chief, who was intensely conscious of the long-standing historical right of the Gqunukwebe to the area.

He told Colonel Cyler in 1808 that:

> "he was in this part of the country before the Christians ... and that he now remains at Cosyla (between the Bushman and Sundays River J.L.) for the health of his cattle, that for sometime he was not able to raise a calf at his former residence (east of the Bushman's River J.L.) ..." (44)

In 1795 Ngqika rebelled against Ndlambe, who refused to surrender his regency to the young chief. Ndlambe found an ally in the Gcaleka regent (for the young chief Hintsa) but Ngqika defeated both Ndlambe, who moved towards the coast near the Kowie, and the Gcaleka - whom he drove over the Kei to the Jujura River. With Ndlambe's fortunes temporarily in reverse, he intensified the conflict with the Gqunukwebe, and in 1799, with the help of Boer Commandos, pushed them over the Sundays River. His success was shortlived, as British intervention subsequently allowed the Gqunukwebe to return to their lands between the Sundays and the Fish River, (from which the British were ultimately to drive them in 1812).

Ngqika established himself as the most powerful of the Ciskeian chiefs, and certainly increased the extent of territory under his control, which was an effective way of attracting followers. We have already mentioned the innovations which Ngqika was able to introduce in increasing the intensity of appropriations. By means of the high isizi (death dues) he inhibited the founding of new homesteads. The increasing difficulty in establishing independent homesteads made sense in a period of political pressure on the chiefdoms; it increased its cohesiveness and its capacity to absorb population. It is necessary to mention Ngqika's other significant innovation, which was the institution of the ixhiba, whereby one of his sons was put in charge of the corporate body of councillors of his grandfather's generation, which allowed them "to express their ambitions through boosting their charge at the expense of his brothers" (45) This institution was widely adopted by other chiefs since it attempted to resolve the structural conflict between a chief and his father's generation. The

introduction of the ixhiba may be understood as an attempt to absorb the tensions resulting from the expansion in size of the homestead units of production, and the demand for the establishment of new homesteads by young married men, and men seeking to acquire cattle and a wife.

Ngqika's early success in defeating Ndlambe and the Gcaleka and in institutionally entrenching his position, was therefore spectacular and it was this that encouraged him to regard himself as the supreme Xhosa Paramount west of the Kei. This pretension was to prove very costly, as he was aware that he could not exercise hegemony over men like Chungwe (amaGqunukwebe) and Nqeno (amaMbalu), or over the sections of the Rarabe under Ndlambe and his increasingly powerful sons Mdushane, Mhala and Mqhayi.

During Ngqika's reign the homesteads under Ndlambe grew further apart from the main body of the Rarabe under Ngqika. However no other chiefdoms were created. There was a continued movement of homesteads back and forth between Ngqika and Ndlambe. Ndlambe occupied the land along the coast from the Keiskamma River almost to the Kei. As Ndlambe enjoyed good relations with the Gacaleka over the Kei, a large part of the Rarabe split from Ngqika and followed Ndlambe. This conflict came to a head in 1807 when Ndlambe, with the assistance of his brother Mnyalaza and the amaMbalu, almost defeated Ngqika. However Ngqika managed to retain Ndlambe's recognition of his seniority as certain factions aiding Ndlambe crossed back to Ngqika. From then on Ngqika became increasingly dependent on the Colonial government to sustain his position.

With increasing Colonial pressure on the lands west of the Fish, which the Colonial government regarded as the boundary, many of Ndlambe's followers began returning to Ngqika, east of the Fish. At the end of the first decade of the 19th century, Chungwe and Ndlambe were the most powerful chiefs west of the Fish. Their presence there was ultimately to lead to the 'clearing' of the area of Xhosa by the Colonial government in 1812. This systematic

war saw the death of Chungwe and the confiscation of thousands of Xhosa cattle. Ngqika could not control the subordinate chiefs and required continual support from the Colony. The Colony expected Ngqika to suppress cattle theft, but this he could not do, as the primary culprits were the amaMbalu and the imiDange under Nqeno and Bhotomane, who were both seeking to expand their followings. They supported Ngqika politically against Ndlambe and his son Mdushane, provided Ngqika left them a free hand in their dealings with the Colony. (46)

East of the Kei, Hintsa, the Gcaleka Paramount, favoured Ndlambe over the aggressive Ngqika who seemed more intent on alliance with the colonists. This culminated in one of the bloodiest internal wars, between Ndlambe and Ngqika, in October 1818 in which Hintsa's forces directly aided Ndlambe. Ngqika was overwhelmed by Ndlambe. In Colonial eyes the more westerly Ndlambe were the prime antagonists in the battle over pasture land and cattle, and Governor Somerset used the Colonial 'alliance' with Ngqika as a pretext for attacking Ndlambe. Colonel Brereton took away more than 23 000 cattle from Ndlambe and his allies in December 1818. The war lasted until October 1819, and Ngqika found himself once again Paramount - but in a position of increasing subservience to the Colonial government.

After 1819 Ngqika was no more able to suppress 'cattle theft' than he had been before it. From then on there was a greatly increased rate of trading contact with the Colonial economy which both strengthened and undermined Ngqika's position. It strengthened materially and increased the patronage which he had at his disposal, through the appropriations Ngqika was able to levy on the trade at Ft Willshire between 1824 and 1826. (48) In greatly increasing his dependence on the Colony for a major source of income, however, Ngqika weakened his position politically - especially to non-collaborating chiefs such as his son Maqoma. At his death in 1829 Ngqika had lost most of his power and Maqoma was the obvious Regent for the young chief Sandille.

With the death of Ndlambe, and his heir Mdushane shortly thereafter, in 1828 and 1829 respectively, a struggle for control over the Ndlambe began with Mhala, a minor son, obtaining the chieftaincy and winning most of the Ndlambe from the senior son Mqayi. Mhala was to prove one of the most persistent opponents of Colonial aggression from his accession in 1830. The Mdushane retained their separation from the rest of Ndlambe, with Mdushane's son, Seyolo, being regent for his heir, Siwani - thus engendering bitter competition between them. Apart from Maqoma, the other sons of Ngqika also attempted to take part of the homesteads of the Rarabe into their control. Thus Tyali, Anta and Xoxo all held part of the nation as their following. This increased division was to make unity of the Xhosa against the Colony virtually an impossiblity, and in each war from 1818, viz, 1835, 1846 and 1851, part of the nation under particular chiefs would stay out, and sometimes actively assist the Colonial forces.

Thus by the time Sandille succeeded to the chieftaincy of the Ngqika, they were split into several factions, each with a chief. Some of these were men of ability like Maqoma and Tayli, others were weak and incapable, like Xoxo. Yet this did not stop them from drawing around them a set of followers. Maqoma, Anta and Tyali were all to succeed in finding bits of territory spatially removed from Sandille and the main body of the Ngqika, where they and their followers could settle. Anta and Tyali settled in the territory around the Winterberg, above present day Stutterheim; Maqoma occupied the Fort Beaufort district, before being evicted from it in 1853.

Amongst the Ndlambe, Mhalla held sway over most of his followers, but junior chiefs increasingly sprang up challenging his authority. The Mdushane grew furher apart from the Ndlambe, and themselves split between Mdushane's sons Siwani and Seyolo. The Amabalu developed, under the impact of eviction from their lands, into two opposed groups under Stokwe and Sonto. The Ntidne and Mdange crumbled and were increasingly absorbed into the Ngqika and Ndlambe fold. Even the strong Gqunukwebe force, under the

maverick Chief Phato, split with the emergence of Kama - the "Christian chief".

The emergence of Kama, Maqoma, Tyali, Anta, Siwani and Sonto as chiefs, in the 19th Century, must be seen in the context of war with the expanding Cape Colony and the effects of the Colonial boundary inhibiting further expansion. Within the logic of the establishment of Xhosa chiefdoms any restriction of expansion would exacerbate those conditions that lead part of the nation to support the aspirations of a young chief.

In examining this chronology of the formation of chieftaincies, it is extremely significant that new chiefs often appeared after a long regency. As has been emphasised, the effect of a long regency was to allow time for the maximum centralisation of power in the hands of one generation and the accumulation of large amounts of cattle in the kraals of the senior homesteads of the leading figures of that generation. This accumulation and concentration inhibited the formation of new households by young men seeking wives. It allowed for the filling up of the existing territory of the chief's domain, making it difficult for households wishing to establish their own homesteads, separate from that of the senior man of the lineage, to do so. This encouraged such households to support the claims of chiefs such as Gwali, Langa, Mdushane, Maqoma to part of the tribe, and to a separate territory from the main body of the Xhosa.

IV The Xhosa Social Formation and the Relations of Production

It has been mentioned that Ngqika modified isizi (death dues in cattle) by confiscating all cattle, (instead of some only), on the death of the head of a homestead. John Brownlee, who lived with Ngqika at that time, observed:

> "The great advantages which all chiefs, great and small, possess over the other classes is that the property of the former is hereditary, while that of the latter may be claimed on their decease, by the chief under whom they have lived. This pretension however is on many occasions only partly enforced, in others not at all, and amongst some tribes it has fallen entirely into disuse, as for instance amongst the Mandanka (imiDange) ..."(49).

The point to be observed is that the extent to which isizi were enforced, or indeed any other exactions of appropriations were made, was a function of the internal balance of forces within the chiefdom. This was determined by the extent to which resources had become concentrated in the hands of the homestead heads and the available political and economic possibilities for expansion of the chiefdom. It has been argued that the establishment of new chiefs must be linked to the dynamic of reproduction and establishment of new homestead units, and to the effect of the previous generation of councillors and homestead heads in "bottle-necking" access to cattle and land. In essence this position is a very old one. Dugmore wrote in 1856:

> "The rule of a young chief is thus in reality the rule of the old councillors of the tribe. The relative position of the two parties gradually changes. One after another the old Amapakati fall victim to an accusation of witchcraft, the Kaffir state engine for the removal of obnoxious, and by the time the young chief has grown old in his turn he has surrounded himself with another set of councillors ... enriched by the spoils of their predecessors ... to be in turn the victims of a system perpetuated from generation to generation." (50)

It is important to see that such generational conflict did not occur in a mechanistic or unmeditated way. The process of

accumulation was slow and it was only through the course of a lifetime that a homestead was established, cattle accumulated and a privileged position achieved. The conflict generated by this accumulation prepared the conditions for the establishment of a new chiefdom in opposition to the hegemony exercised by the councillors of an old chief. This thesis attempts to take Dugmore's observations further, by linking this process of change in the "relative position" of the two parties to the reproduction of the homesteads.

The principles of the Xhosa circumcision lodge have been rightly emphasised by Peires as having a great decentralising tendency on the chiefdom. The rite of circumcision initiated a boy into manhood, eligibility to marry and to take part in the military, political and juridical affairs of the nation. It was thus, potentially, a highly democratic principle that made all males equally entitled to be bearers of the property of a homestead. (51) A son of a chief would have a large number of sons of other prominent men and commoners as his age mates in the circumcision lodge, and the process was often delayed to allow boys of disparate ages to be initiated together. "Age sets" were thus very loosely determined through the initiation procedure. Those who were initiated with the son of a chief would always form his closest advisors, confidants and supporters. All initiated males were immediately drawn into the process of acquiring a wife and, ideally, of establishing a homestead. Not all young men could draw on the same resources, however, and those with the least resources often found it difficult to marry and impossible to establish a home of their own. This was the basis of the discontent which might subsequently lead them to support a young chief of a related age set to their own, in any contest with a superior chief.

This contrasts sharply with Zulu age sets which were directly supervised and subsequently controlled by the King, who was then able to control the rapidity with which new families and homesteads were formed. His power in this regard was based on the

abolition of circumcision rites, which removed that fundamental political equality of all men which characterised the Xhosa social formation. The continuity of Xhosa history rests on the fact that no chief was ever able to bring the process of the reproduction of homesteads permanently under his command, but several managed to do so temporarily while favourable circumstances prevailed during particular periods of their rule.

It is therefore necessary to examine the manner in which the process of the expansion of a Xhosa chiefdom was reflected in the social relations of production of the umzi or homestead. The homestead had a corporate character which allowed for the concentration of means of production for the group, beyond that necessary for the reproduction of individual families. The most pervasive division within the homestead was that based on sex. (52) This involved the division of homestead production into male and female spheres which broadly coincided with a distinction between cattle and agriculture.

Within each homestead the male and female spheres together constituted a unity of direct producers and means of production. The ideology of male control of cattle, however, made women dependent on the cattle of men. The separation of women from cattle was thus a separation of the level of access to means of production. Within the individual family (indlu) there was thus a patriarchal organisation of the labour process.

There is an ambivalance in the literature on the nature of the homestead. Sometimes the impression is created that homesteads consisted of a married man, his wives, and their unmarried sons only. (53) Married sons and the creation of new homesteads are not specifically located in this view, which rests on an overestimation of the extent of polygamous marriage amongst the Xhosa in the 19th century. (54) On this point Alberti observed:

> "Those with least resources must be satisfied with one woman, others have two and, rarely, more. only the chiefs are enabled, by their greater wealth, to

> own a greater number, and one finds those who have seven to eight ..." (55).

Those with the 'least resources' were certainly the majority of the married men. As Shaw observed:

> "A large number of the people, perhaps the majority, have not more than one lawful wife" (56)

Alternatively, other authors have recognised the importance of 'clients' or 'unrelated men' in the homestead, but are unsure as to which homestead such men belonged and whether such dependence was general or restricted to a few wealthy heads of clan sections and chiefs. The question of the position of adult married sons was also left unclear: Thus M. Wilson has written:

> "Each homestead was occupied by a man with his wives, his unmarried daughters, his sons and their children ... attachment of unrelated men was probably frequent in the homestead of a chief, but infrequent amongst commoners ..." (57)

Wilson argued this because of her over-emphasis of the busa (service) relationship whereby young men could obtain cattle from the chief. Peires has correctly criticised her for this, emphasising the impermanence of the period of service. In fact the poor did not attach themselves permanently to a chief, but, quite to the contrary, served him only for short periods. (58)

While Peires's criticism of Wilson is undoubtedly correct, he also fails to take a clear position on the constitution of the homesteads. For while the adherents of the Great Place did indeed constitute a shifting population, the adherents of a rich commoner did not. Such adherents tended to form part of the homestead to which they were attached, without any clear prospect of establishing themselves in a separate homestead. It would thus be wrong to create the impression that busa, whether for a chief or a rich commoner, automatically gave young men a sufficient number of cattle to proceed in establishing their own homesteads. While service for a chief might give a man sufficient cattle to marry, there were altogether separate obstacles to the establishment of an independent homestead.

Estimates of the size of imizi differ. In 1834 Döhne estimated that a 'kraal' (umzi) consisted of from 8-12 huts. (59) Dundas saw kraals of from 5 to 25 huts in 1827. (60) Other observers saw imizi consisting of only 2 huts. (61) Each wife built and maintained her own hut and domestic establishment. Excepting storage and guest huts, the number of huts indicates the number of wives co-habiting in the homestead. If one accepts that most men were monogamously married, and the majority of polygamists had two wives, this would mean that in a typical Ngqika umzi of 5 huts, in about the year 1830, one would have found a polygamist head of umzi with two wives and three or more married men with one wife.

The question posed concerns the form of control over such young married men, and young unmarried men seeking wives, exercised by the senior males, who controlled cattle and land, and indeed the supply of brides. Morgan, writing in 1835, seems to have provided one of the best observations of the nature of the umzi and its tendency to expand:

> "These in general are formed by the members of one family and by others united to that family in bonds of friendship or servitude, for there exists in Cafferland a state of vassalage. This kraal is under the control of a person who is generally the senior of the whole and always the father of many who forms this; to him belong the greatest flocks which are pastured near it, to him they look for assistance and advice - a sort of patriarchal authority exists in him and according to the extent of his fame as a man of judgement and equity, so is his advice sought after and followed by similar and surrounding kraals, and he becomes a sort of natural councillor to a portion of the nation ..." (62)

To understand the structure of the Xhosa homestead it is necessary to look in greater detail at the division of labour in both pastoral and arable agricultural and other domestic production.

(i) Cattle

Cattle had a multiple function in the Xhosa economy. Cattle acted as a means of subsistence, a means of exchange, and an object of accumulation. The social organisation of cattle keeping in the Xhosa homestead involved all three of these functions and they were not clearly differentiated within the homestead. Conceptually, however, the three aspects may be differentiated by their function within the homestead, and without, in the relationship between homesteads.

Cattle as a means of consumption and subsistence was the most basic level. Such consumption was usually performed entirely within the homestead . By contrast, cattle as means of exchange and object of accumulation were subject to economic and ideological relations which were constituted in relationships between homesteads that extended beyond the confines of any one homestead and linked them together in determinate relationships. The internal relations governing cattle within the homestead were, it will be argued, derived from those outside the homestead, because the exchange, circulation and accumulation of cattle was dependent on the circulation of women.

Milk was drunk as amasi or thick milk, and it was of undoubted importance as a primary object of consumption:

> "It (amasi J.L.) forms the chief article of food for all classes, who sometimes for months together use no other." (63)

The cattle were herded on the land in the vicinity of the cattle kraal and were kraaled each night. Herding was either carried out by the men themselves, or by clients, but most often the herders were boys. All the cattle of the families of a homestead were herded and kraaled together. Because of the uncertain condition of the pasturage and the changing seasonal condition of the veld, some transhumance was necessary.

Soga observed that chiefs placed their cattle in feed kraals so dispersed within their territory as to obviate the possibility of overcrowding. (64) It is likely that during times of drought, or war, or disease amongst the cattle, the cattle of the nation were managed collectively and the chief's far-flung cattle posts formed the basis for such management. (65)

While milk was a major food source, the rules pertaining to cattle inside the homestead were all designed to minimise contact between the women and the cattle. All milking was performed by men. Women were meant to avoid the right hand side of the hut where the milk sacks were kept; to avoid the gathering place of the men in the inkundla (the space between the hut and the cattle kraal) and never to enter the cattle kraal itself. (66)

All rules governing the utilisation of cattle emphasised the separation of women from cattle and the dependence of the people of the homestead on its cattle. Men and women were not supposed to drink the milk of a homestead with which they were not connected by lineal descent or marriage. (67) While a woman could consume milk from her husband's cattle from the time of her marriage, her parents did not consume milk from the lobola cattle received from her husband, until she produced her first child.

Cattle were removed from the sphere of consumption by the inviolable practice of lobola, whereby a certain number of beasts were given by a prospective husband to the parents of a prospective bride. With the regular payment of lobola, cattle entered the sphere of circulation. It was through this movement of cattle in one direction and women in the other, that cattle entered the sphere of circulation and therefore of accumulation. Lobola established long-lasting social and economic ties between homesteads:

> "The idea lying at the root of this custom is that the father suffers loss by the marriage of a daughter ... The essential feature of lobola ... is that there is no finality to it. Cattle pass from

> the husband to his wife's parents or their family throughout the life-time of the husband and beyond it, that is to the second and even the third generation. There is no fixed number of cattle among the ama-Xhosa which determine what is and what is not lobola, and consequently there is no time limit in which the custom must be completed ..." (68)

On arrival at her husband's homestead the new wife was required to practice ukuhlonipa, i.e. avoidance of all senior male relatives of her husband and especially her husband's father. She was never to utter the personal name of her husband's father and had to avoid words with the same syllables as those contained in her husband's father's name. (69) These avoidance taboos generally became less stringent with time, and fell away in the case of older women. The overall effect, however, was to support, at the ideological level, the separation of women from the cattle of the homestead. The taboos on women associating with the work of looking after the herds of the homestead were affirmed during the initiation ceremony for girls, when the women gathered and collectively attacked the cattle kraal, seizing a beast of their choice which was slaughtered for a feast. The very novelty of such an event could only serve to underscore the basic separation of women from all dealings with cattle. (70)

It was the principal objective of each man to acquire cattle:

> "for the well-being of the family, a sufficient number of cattle are required, whose attendance and treatment is the sole responsibility of the father of the family, in which he is assisted by his sons ..." (71)

The definition of what constituted a "sufficient number" of cattle was not only dependent on the need for cattle as a means of consumption, but had also to allow for the lobola payment necessary to the acquisition of a wife both by a father and his sons. The receipt and payment of lobola cattle was therefore a primary means of accumulation, and making provision for such

payment meant that a homestead had to try at all times to secure the possession of cattle over and above what sufficed for consumption requirements alone.

This system of circulation and accumulation of cattle rested on the separation of women from control or possession of cattle. This separation was maintained through complex ideological practices which were enforced within the homestead itself. With the separation of women from cattle, the control over cattle became the key to control over women. Because cattle were very unevenly distributed between homesteads, however, many households found themselves without sufficient cattle to meet the requirements of subsistence, lobola and other tributary payments which may have been required. The dependency of women on the cattle of men therefore also raises the question of the access of men to cattle. While ideology prescribed that every man should, on marriage, found his own homestead, most were not able to do so because of the effective limitations on the distribution of cattle posed by age differentiation. The dependence of a young man on the cattle of an elder defined not only the subordination of women in production, but the subordination of a man and his wife to the structure of the homestead of an elder.

Weakness of Economy

(ii) Agriculture

Just as men were enjoined, on initiation, to accumulate cattle, so a woman, on entering her husband's homestead as a bride, was enjoined by the women of the homestead to cultivate the ground.

Access to agricultural lands was vested in each homestead and, within each homestead, it was vested in each household. (73) A woman's right to cultivate a particular piece of ground was secured and could not be removed or in any way interfered with in the course of her productive life. All agricultural labour was performed by women with the exception of clearing and the building of fences around the lands. This heavy work was the task of the men. (74)

The choice of garden site was highly selective. Kay observed:

> "the valleys and low lands are generally selected as corn fields, on account of the soil being not only better, but possessed of much more moisture than is usually found in other places. The sloping and bushy sides of eminences and the bases of hills, where we frequently meet with a rich alluvial deposit, are also regarded as choice spots." (75)

Every household in the homestead usually had an additional small garden in which early crops and vegetables were planted in September. The gardens of the homestead were worked collectively by the wives and by the male and female children. The area under cultivation was determined principally by the number of women workers. For each wife approximately 2.5 to 3 acres were brought under cultivation. These larger gardens were usually dug up with a digging stick from the middle of October onwards.

Agriculture was extremely labour intensive, requiring two hoeings and repeated weedings of the fields. As the grain ripened, the fields had to be kept under permanent guard by the children to keep stray cattle, other animals, and birds from ruining the crop. (76) Morgan distinguished 7 stages in the agricultural production process:

1) clearing of weeds
2) spreading corn seed on the surface
3) covering the seed with soil, using small wooden spades
4) re-weeding when the seedlings were above ground and gathering soil around the stems
5) harvesting
6) hanging of seed mealies
7) storage of grain for consumption in pits.

This extremely labour intensive process meant that a large homestead, with more potential workers to share the labour amongst them, could produce more grain, both relatively and absolutely, than a small one. This led Shaw to observe:

> "One great object which the chiefs and wealthy men ... contemplate when multiplying wives, being to secure a sufficient number of women to supply their establishment with corn and other agricultural produce."(77)

Apart from the number of workers, the extent of ground under cultivation was also influenced by the length of the rainy season. Without any irrigation, and therefore dependent on natural precipitation, the Xhosa often found that if the rains were late the ground was too hard to hoe and no seed could even be planted. (78) The yields were generally not very high. Döhne observed that women had special access to grain before the heavy work of harvesting, when supplies were at their lowest. Some grain was specifically kept back for the use of people who might be sick and might require more nourishment, when the general supply was depleted. (79)

The balance between agriculture and pastoralism was determined by the prevailing ecological conditions within the territory of the chiefdom. There is no doubt that the people could fall back on pastoralism and harvesting almost to the altogether total neglect of agriculture, and this was especially true in times of war and drought. (80)

agronomy

Agriculture, unlike pastoralism, showed far more communal effort in both production and consumption of the product. As has been mentioned, the gardens of a homestead were managed collectively, although each wife still retained special responsibility for a particular garden site. There were no rules preventing the exogamous use of grain. In fact it was expected that assistance would be given on a generous scale, if for some reason (such as variable rainfall) one part of the tribe had crop failure while the other achieved normal yields. (81)

There is further evidence of the joint use and control over grain in the manner of its storage and distribution. Grain was stored off the cob, either in pits located in the cattle kraal or in

grain huts. The grain pits being located in the cattle kraal meant that maintenance and preparation of the pits was male work. Grain pits could be as large as six feet square, with a narrow neck about two foot in diameter. They could hold from ten to twenty-eight bushels, (approximately 560 to 1 570 lbs). The pits were sealed at the neck with a stone and dung. Once sealed, the pits were reasonably impervious to rain. It was thus common for neighbouring homesteads to share the contents of their grain pits - when one was empty they proceeded to open the next one, so as not to unnecessarily expose too much grain to the elements. (82)

The prominence of women's labour in agriculture did not therefore carry any of the prestige, or the economic or political implications of men's dominance over cattle keeping. Arable agricultural work was drudgery, and it fell to the lot of women to sustain it. Perhaps for this very reason, however, good agricultural sites were jealously prized, and once gained were not lightly relinquished. Land free of stumps, rocks and stones, of good fertility, and not too far from the site of the homestead, was highly prized. The absence of an abundance of such land, and the manifest advantages which possession of it gave to the homestead was an important factor in determining the change of the site of the homestead itself. As has been suggested, the absence of such sites in the bounded territory of the chiefdom as a whole could become a major factor im prompting a particular household to support the emergence of a new chief and the acquisition of fresh territory. As early as the 1820s Smith had observed:

> "... as population increases they will require more land and if they do not get that one of two things will happen, either wars or regular settlement and cultivation ... the want of more territory is what sets them often to migrate."(83)

Increasing the application of labour at a particular garden site was the only way, in the absence of any improvement in technology, to increase the productivity of a homestead. A large homestead with good garden land would be in a position to withstand deprivation in times of drought and would be able to allow for the

use of grain for ceremonial purposes and in beer making, as well as the possibility of supplying grain to the chief. Such households would therefore be able to utilise surplus grain for social and political ends. Small homesteads, especially if they had to make do with inferior soils, were in a far worse position. This militated against the breaking away of households to form independent homesteads. Thus by the 1850s Maclean noted:

> "While Kaffraria was but thinly populated, changes of residence, from various causes were common ... but a Kafir never left his home simply for the sake of change, except the change was for the better as regards cattle and cornfields." (84)

The choice of garden site was in fact a function of the choice of site for the homestead itself. The homestead had to be on a site which was well drained and free from subterranean water which could ruin the stored grain. The homestead occupied quite a large piece of land, consisting not only of the huts of the various houses (families) but the cattle kraal, ancillary kraals, store huts, guest huts, and the garden land itself. The availability of suitable sites for the establishment of homesteads was therefore an important constraint on the rapidity with which they could be established. If such sites were scarce, it would be more difficult for young married men to establish their own homesteads, and the size, power and prestige of existing homesteads, would be increased simultaneously, fueling the social antagonism thus created.

iii) Domestic Labour and Specialisation

Within the homestead a large variety of domestic manufactures were carried out. These could be more, or less, skilled, and each homestead would try to concentrate the requisite skills within its ranks. The preparation of clothing has already been mentioned. This was the most common manufacture and the skill to do it was possessed by every woman. In addition to clothing, women were

responsible for making clay pots, grass mats and baskets.

Clay working and the building of kilns was a specialised process. Different types of non-porous pots, with or without glazing, were made for different uses - such as carrying and storing water, beer and milk, and for cooking. Where a homestead was small, and no woman skilled in working with clay was found within it, pots could be acquired in exchange. Kropf noted that a clay pot with a volume of two buckets was obtained for an ox hide or, occasionally, a cow. (85) As with all occupational specialisation, this never became an exclusive field from which the specialists earned their subsistence. (86)

All women, generally, made sleeping mats and grain baskets and these were not highly valued. Large quantities of beads were utilised from a very early date in the decoration of clothing of women, girls and uninitiated males. The work of making beaded decorations was exclusively female. Another more specialised domestic occupation was pipe making, which was a craft practised by a few men. It gained significance in the light of the Xhosa reputation for tobacco growing. Peires has shown that there was a demand for Xhosa tobacco from as far afield as the Sotho in the Transvaal. (87) Tobacco smoking was very general and Alberti observed that everyone seemed to smoke, which presumably meant that the demand for pipes was quite large. The pipe maker was paid in beads, some metal article of value, or a goat. (88)

The most important specialisation was that of the metalsmiths. The Xhosa had to import iron ore through barter with the neighbouring Thembu, and possibly from Zululand. It seems that iron ore was often very scarce and insufficient for the needs of assegai manufacture. The local smiths were one of the only groups, other than doctors, to have a permanent specialisation in their craft. Because of the high value placed on assegais, they were frequently used in the settlement of debts - especially in the payment of doctors.

Assegais were not produced in a haphazard way, but were made to order. A cow would purchase six to eight assegais. For a man to be armed for warfare would require at least that many assegais as had to be thrown in large numbers to be effective. (89) A large trade in assegais must have existed, keeping the smiths constantly busy, if each male was to be equipped with the means of war. If there were, say, 25 000 married men in the Ngqika, Ndlambe, and allied chiefdoms (as estimated by van der Kemp during his visit of 1804) and if at the time of his visit each possessed a clutch of assegais, then the scale on which assegais were produced must have been very large indeed.

In addition the smiths produced a variety of metallic beads, bangles and rings, usually from copper, but later also from brass. They also made hoes and axes and solid metal shafts up to six inches long. The fitting of permanent handles to these implements formed a separate craft skill. (90)

Finally the practice of doctors and diviners formed one of the most extensive and specialised fields in Xhosa society. Doctors had to be paid in cattle, or with assegais, for their diagnostic and healing service. Doctors were frequently and extensively consulted on a regular basis by the members of all households. They would be consulted not only in times of ill health, but also in times of other personal crisis or calamity to the people or stock of the homestead. The nature of medical beliefs and practices will be more fully discussed below in the context of the war of Mlangeni and of the cattle-killing.

As can be seen at many points, whether for the work of pot making, the purchase of assegais and other metallic objects, consultation with a doctor, or the purchase of a pipe, a surplus was required within the homestead to make provision for these services. The smaller a homestead was, the less likely was it to have many of these skills concentrated within its ranks, and also the less likely it was to have the cattle resources necessary to purchase these services. The expansion of the homestead implied a more effective concentration of craft skill within the group.

Most work in the homestead was collective, women helping each other with different aspects of their several tasks at which each one was particularly adept. This was particularly so in the making of huts, clothing and pots. The productivity of labour, and the assuredness and quality with which basic wants could be met, were therefore better secured in a large homestead than a small one. Thus for basic economic reasons the heads of homesteads desired to obtain adherents.

V The Establishment of Homesteads and the Creation of Chiefdoms

As can be seen from the above consideration of pastoralism, agriculture and domestic crafts in the Xhosa homesteads, it was not an altogether easy matter for a young married man to begin a place of his own. He would often spend many years in his father's homestead. If his father was rich, he might be joined there by a variety of distant relations and other unrelated poor families who became part of his father's homestead.

The relationship between these large, rich homesteads and the chief was highly significant. The chief depended on them for a large part of his support. W. Shaw, in his reply to Sir Andrew Smith's questionnaire, was particularly struck by the role of the chief in supporting the ambitions of these key homestead heads. He wrote:

> "... while the chief frequently takes away cattle to (sic) those whom he chooses - he does not however always give merely to the poor, but also to his favourites and such as have obtained any particular influence in the tribe. They in their turn, in order to attach a portion of the poor people to their own immediate interests, frequently give them cattle ..." (emphasis added J.L.) (91)

Shaw's observation closely supports Morgan's view of how the homestead was constituted and enlarged by the accretions of poor and indebted households.

In this way a chief could influence the distribution of cattle across the whole nation, thus decisively influencing the number of families which were concentrated in individual homesteads. A chief had to be able to acquire cattle continually to meet the demands made upon him. This he did in the process of deposition of the old councillors of his father, through confiscations, and through the operation of his court. Dugmore perceptively suggested that the chief required a "constant fund" of cattle from which to satisfy his dependents and the amount of the fund required could be judged from the character of the demands made upon him. (92)

With many impoverished men seeking wives, the chief would tend to increase the rate of appropriation from the homesteads. But this, as has been seen, was not necessarily a process of equalisation - as the anthropological view of 'redistribution' has sometimes implied. On the contrary, it was primarily a process of increasing the size of homesteads. It was only in the early years of the rule of a chief, during the phase of the 'reconstitution' of the dominant class, that any real 'redistribution' took place and this, more or less rapidly, gave way to concentration of ownership of cattle. One can thus understand the significance of support for the claims of a son of a chief to a portion of the nation. Such support was offered in the hope of achieving more privileged access to the cattle, through the chief, and, with the expansion of territory, the hope of achieving the capacity to establish an independent homestead. As Smith observed:

> "They are in general much attached to the subordinate chiefs and will sometimes for him, risk all and stand up against the King (and) move off over the border." (93)

That groups of 'poor' existed is well documented; Alberti refers to:

> "The women belonging to the less well-off class of people ... performing services by being hired by persons who are better off to work the land ..."

and also to those who have "less cattle than is necessary for the maintenance of his family". (94)

Smith also observed:

> "Many families who have some means have sometimes relations or adopted persons in the capacity of slaves or servants and they find it the easiest way of supporting themselves, having no property or but little of their own." (95)

The possibility of a family that could not meet its requirements for reproduction was catered for by their joining the following of a more successful senior. By virtue of his following, the senior was ensuring himself a place in the councils of a chief and against the effects of demographic and ecological variables which could render him helpless in times of extremity. A man with a following was able to supply support to the chief. By participating in the judicial business of the Great Place he was also supporting the material appropriations of the chief and putting himself in a position to receive cattle from the chief. Peires has commented that of all the chief's councillors, the heads of clan sections and leaders of local followings were the most important for it was on them that the power of the chief rested. Such councillors who were heads of local followings, received cattle and other gifts without asking for them. (96)

The expansion of the homestead beyond the immediate nuclear family was inherent in the expansion of the chiefdom as a whole. Limitations on the availability of new homesteads combined with the increasing concentration of ownership of cattle caused expansion of the number of families in existing homesteads. It was thus the operation of this socially conditioned land scarcity that affected the rate of appropriation of surplus labour by the heads of such expanding imizi, and by the chief. Having more women within the umzi allowed the extension of collective cultivation at a particular garden site. The male work of fencing

garden lands, building cattle kraals, as with the female work of hut construction, was subject to extended co-operation, and there were thus definite savings in labour through the concentration of families within a homestead.

The number of families concentrated in an homestead could thus be held as the key indicator of the degree of centralisation of the control over cattle and land achieved within the chiefdom as a whole. It was indicative of the hegemony of the 'higher community' (in the persons of the chief and his principal supporters) over the 'local community' and reflects the intensity of exploitation. The number of wives co-resident in a homestead (i.e. the rate of polygamy) would be a further indication of centralisation. In the terms of the earlier discussion of the constitution of the lineage mode of production, it was at times possible for the 'higher community' to achieve a greater degree of separation of the direct producers from the means of production by means of their greater control over cattle and women. However this control was gradually eroded in an active process of struggle against it.

Our argument has been that the fundamental class relation was that which gave senior men, who had accummulated cattle and wives, control over younger men who wished to marry, and that chiefly power was vested in the political relationship between the heads of homesteads and the chief on the one hand, and the mass of indebted juniors on the other. Under these circumstances the heads of homesteads were able to preclude the setting up of imizi for a considerable period. It is by no means clear that all men found themselves in a position to establish an independent homestead. The specification of the conditions under which a homestead could be established, with access to cattle and land, therefore becomes a question of the greatest importance. It has been argued that it was with the establishing of a privileged relationship between a particular group of men and a chief that such possibilities emerged - as part of the nation moved out and established themselves in fresh territory. The effects of Colonial conquest and mercantile penetration on this dialectic will form the subject of subsequent consideration.

(1) Althusser, L. and Balibar, E. Reading Capital, New Left Books, (1972).

(2) Ibid. p. 235.

(3) The Oxford English dictionary defines Homology as: Correspondence; sameness of relation. The second sense conveys Balibar's meaning exactly.

(4) Slavery represents a possible exception. However a pure slave social formation was a very rare phenomenon; slavery was almost always associated with the existence of serfs, peasants and other forms of agricultural organisation.

(5) Balibar, E. op.cit. p. 216.

(6) Marx, K. Capital, Vol. 3. Lawrence and Wishart, (1959). p. 791.

(7) Terray, E. 'Classes and Class Consciousness in the Abron Kingdom of Gyaman', in Bloch, M. (ed.), Marxist Analyses in Social Anthropology. (1975). p. 94.

(8) Godelier, M. 'The Concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production and the Marxist Mode of Social Evolution', in Seddon, D. (ed.), Relations of Production, London, Frank Cass. (1968).

(9) The independence is the essential element of theories of the peasantry. It was first formulated in a systematic way by Chayanov in his On the Theory of Peasant Economy and has subsequently been elaborated by Shanin and others. This is also the basis for Marx's famous comment that the small holding peasantry is "formed by the simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes", Marx, K. Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Penguin (1968). p. 170.

(10) The principle works dealing with the Nguni and other Southern African formations, in which this problem has been considered are Guy, J. The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, Longman, (1979); Peires, J.B. 'A History of the Xhosa 1700-1835.', Rhodes University M.A. (1976); also published as Peires, J.B. The House of Phalo - A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of their Independence, Ravan Press (1981). All references unless otherwise stated are to the thesis (1976) version; Beinart, W. The Political Economy of Pondoland 1860 to 1930, Ravan Press (1982); Bundy, C. The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, Heinemann (1979); Kimble, J. 'Towards an Understanding of the Political Economy of Lesotho', Unpub. M.A. thesis, University of Lesotho, (1978); Burman, S.B. Chiefdom, Politics and Alien Law, Basutoland under Cape Rule, 1871-1884, Macmillan (1981); Delius, P. The Land Belongs to Us, The Pedi Polity, The Boers and the British in the Nineteenth Century Transvaal, Ravan Press (1983).

(11) Godelier, M. op.cit. pp. 221-225. The original, but in some respects inadequate, formulation of the basic relationships of the lineage mode of production may be found in Meillassoux, C. 'From Reproduction to Production.' Economy and Society Vol. 1 no. 1 (1972).

(12) Terray, E. 'Elements of an Autocritique.' Critique of Anthropology no. 13/14 (1979). Terray, E. op.cit. (1975).

(13) Terray, E. 'Long Distance Exchange and the Formation of the State: The case of the Abron Kingdom of Gyaman.' Economy and Society, V.3 No. 3 (1974) p. 339.

(14) Guy, J. op.cit. p. 10.

(15) Ibid. p. 9. See also Omer-Cooper, J. The Zulu Aftermath. London, (1966). p. 25.
"By the end of the 18thC. Zululand and Natal were becoming

overcrowded in terms of current methods of land use and warfare became frequent and severe.
The general conditions which favoured small-scale political organisation and encouraged fissile multiplication had been reversed. Lack of space and the demands of more serious warfare dictated larger units and a process of aggregation began ..."

(16) Guy, J. op.cit. p. 12.

(17) Godelier, M. op.cit. pp. 223-224.

(18) Derricourt, R. 'Settlement in the Transkei and Ciskei before the Mfecane.' In Saunders and Derricourt (ed.) Beyond the Cape Frontier p.69 "A regular pattern of fission as groups became too large for the hunting - gathering and pasture territory would be predictable." Also Sansom, B.A. Traditional Economics, in Hammond-Tooke, W.D. (ed.) The Bantu Speaking Peoples of Southern Africa. R.K.D. (1974). Both Derricourt and Sansom use the environmental factor in a functionalist and anthropological way. Our view is that it must be seen as a source of political strife and class struggle which cannot be deduced mechanistically, but must be related to the altered conditions of the mode of production.

(19) Marx, K. Grundrisse, Penguin (1978) p. 492. "Property therefore, means belonging to a clan ... we reduce this property to the relations to the conditions of production." Godelier, M. Territory and Property in Primitive Society, Social Science Information, V17 3. (1978). pp. 418-419.

(20) Terray, E. op.cit. (1975) p. 99. Similarly Marx has argued that "the same economic basis ... from the standpoint of its main conditions ... due to innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, racial relations, external historical influences (may show) infinite variations and graduations of appearance ..." Capital, Vol. 3. p. 792. Also Marx Grundrisse, (1978). p. 485.

(21) The position adopted here is different from that of Basil Sansom in his article 'Traditional Economic Systems' in Hammond-Tooke, W.D. ed. op.cit. Sansom has argued for ecological adaptations, but he presents this as a completely functionalist and formalist anthropological essence, which effectively removes any possiblity for a history of the pre-Colonial formations and their development.

(22) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 48.

(23) Ibid. p. 54. The Gqunukwebe chiefs were not from the Tshawe line.

(24) All dates for chiefs are taken from Peires, J. op.cit. Appendix III Genealogical Table, and Berg J.H. 'Die Lewe van Charles Pacalt Brownlee', Stellenbosch, unpub. Phd. thesis Appendix I, Stamboom van die Xhosa.

(25) Peires, J.B. op.cit. pp. 98-99.

(26) Soga, J.H. South Eastern Bantu, Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press (1930). pp. 104-105.

(27) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 40, note 3.

(28) Niven, Rev. to Capt. Stretch. Impartial Analysis of Kaffir Character, 1840 S.A. Pamphlets, Cory Library.

(29) Peires, J.B. ' The Rise of the'Right-Hand House' in the History and Historiography of the Xhosa', History in Africa Vol. IOI. (1975), Hammond-Tooke, W.D. Segmentation and fission in Cape Nguni Political Units, Africa no. 35. (1965).

(30) Peires, J.B. op.cit. (1976) pp. 62-63, Genealogy gives Ntinde as a brother of Ngconde, although Soga in amaXosa gives him as a brother of Gconde's son Tshiwo. Ntinde crossed the Kei and Sir Andrew Smith notes them as living near the Keiskamma in 1752. Smith, Sir A. 'Kaffir Notes', unpublished. Ms. S.A. Museum.

(31) Bennie, Rev. J. 'Iziqwenge Zimbali YamaXhosa', Ms. 157 Grey Collections, South African Public Library. For Peires's comments on Tshiwo, see op.cit. p. 85.

(32) Ibid. Bennie records Tshiwo's dates as 1670-1700; Peires says merely 17thC. while Wilson does not attempt a date. Harrinck in his revision of the dates of the Xhosa chiefs from the various genealogies arrives at the dates 1670-1701/2 for Tshiwo, without apparently having seen Bennie's reference. He adds,

"according to Soga, Phalo was born in 1702, the year of Paramount Tshiwo's death. Tshiwo's father Ngoconde, son of Togu, supposedly died in 1695 ... Tshiwo's reign must have been short indeed".

Harrinck, G. 'Interaction between Xhosa and Khoi', in Thompson, L.M. ed. African Societies in Southern Africa (1969), p. 154, note 30.

(33) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 88, notes the same phenomenon for Gcaleka, Tshiwo's grandson, who, as a qualified diviner, was able to bring witchcraft accusations against junior chiefs, thereby 'endangering the autonomy of the junior chiefs'.

(34) Peires, J.B. op.cit. (1975) p. 121.

(35) The tradition recorded by Bennie confirms criticism by Peires of J.K. Bokwe's version of the relationship between Tshiwo and Phalo. Bokwe has confused Phalo with Tshiwo. Phalo was Tshiwo's son born after the latter's death. Peires, J.B., op.cit. (1976) p. 85. Harrinck used Bokwe as his source on Tshiwo, (see Harrinck, G. op.cit. pp. 155-177.)

(36) Holden, W.C. Past and Future of the Kaffir Races, London (1866) p. 152.

(37) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 121. "Rarabe can be considered to be the only authentic case of Right-Hand fission ... In my view it was the charter case introducing a new institution".

(38) Maclean, Col.J. Compendium of Kaffir Laws and Customs, Pretoria, (1968). Rev. H.H. Dugmore's Papers. "The eldest son of the right hand is constituted as the head of a certain allotted portion of the tribe, and assumes, on the death of his father of the separate jurisdiction of that portion."

(39) Peires, J.B. op.cit. (1976) p. 68. Soga, J.H. op.cit. (1931) p. 17.

(40) Peires, J.B. op.cit. pp. 89-86.

(41) Mdange had defeated Gwali's claim to the Paramountcy and supported Phalo.

(42) Marais, J.S. Maynier and the First Boer Republic, Cape Town (1962) p. 9.

(43) Smith, Sir A. op.cit. Alberti also noted that, "It is due to the differences in the veld that the sort and number of animals on the other side of the Keiskamma varies so much. To the west of this river one finds a number of different kinds of Antelope, particularly an incredible number of Springbok of which I often saw more than a thousand together." Alberti, L. Account of the Xhosa, (1807). p. 17.

(44) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 99.

(45) Holden, W.C. op.cit. p. 151.
"The 3rd son thus invested was made the representative of his grandfather and the families of his grandfather's councillors were attached to him as standing in the place of their own chief ..." It was most likely this institution which enabled Ngqika to act in other respects to increase the rate of appropriation.

(46) Ibid. p. 155.

(47) The first trading fairs were in fact instituted in Grahamstown in 1817. Apart from their disadvantageous location they were prevented from getting off the ground by the wars of 1818-19. See Gitywa, V.S. Arts and Crafts of the Xhosa, Ft. Hare Papers Vol 5. p. 97.

(48) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 174; pp. 177 - 182.
Between August 1824 and March 1825 50 331 lbs of ivory, 15 000 hides and 16 800 lbs of gum was brought to the market. See also Cory, G. The Rise of South Africa, Vol. II, p. 179. Newmark gives the price of ivory at the fairs at 1 - 1,5 rixdollars per pound (1 shilling and sixpence); on the other hand buttons and beads could cost the equivalent of 4,5 - 20 rixdollars per pound. The terms of trade were not good. See Newmark, S.D. Economic Influences of the S.A. Frontier, Stanford, (1957). p. 64. Peires has similarly emphasised the effect of the terms of trade, and has argued that on the Xhosa side costs were rising because of increased distance from which ivory had to be brought and increasing exactions by Ngqika, whilst the price received was declining.

(49) Thompson, G. Travels and Adventures in Southern Africa, V.S. Forbes, (ed.), van Riebeeck Society Reprint, (1968). Appendix by J. Brownlee.

(50) Maclean, Col. J. op.cit. Dugmores notes, p. 28.

(51) Peires, J.B. op.cit. pp. 49-63.

(52) Sansom, B. op.cit. p. 158. Schapera, I. and Goodwin, A. (eds), The Bantu Speaking Tribes of South Africa, (1937) p. 150. Alberti, L. op.cit. p. 56, Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 156.

(53) Hoernlé, A. in Schapera ed. op.cit. p. 75.

(54) Hammond-Tooke, W.D. The Tribes of the King William's Town District, (1956) p. 53, p. 78. Hunter, M. Reaction to Conquest, Oxford, (1979) p. 17.

(55) Alberti, L. op.cit. p. 18.

(56) Shaw, W. Story of My Mission, p. 420.

(57) Wilson, M. in Wilson, M and Thompson, L. ed. Oxford History of Southern African, Vol. I. Oxford, (1969). p. 34.

(58) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 76 "Such service could take various forms. Some young men on completion of circumcision remained at the Great Place of the chief to look after the chief's cattle in return for which they receive cattle which will form part of their lobola cattle". See Alberti, L. op.cit. p. 41.

(59) Döhne, J.L. 'Das Kafferland', Berliner Missione Berichte, 1837.

(60) C.O. 2692, Dundas to Bourke, 3rd April 1827. Quoted in Shaw, E.M. and van Warmelo, N.J. Material Culture of the Cape Nguni, Vol. I, Annals of the South African Museum, (1972). p. 22.

(61) Collins, R. (1809) in Shaw, E.M. and van Warmelo, N.J. op. cit. p. 22.

(62) Morgan, N. 'The Amakosae', S.A. Quarterly Journal, Sept. 1836, p. 12.

(63) Maclean, Col.J. op.cit. Ayliff's remarks p. 155, Soga, J.H. op.cit. (1931) p. 393. Cattle were only eaten on occasions of feasting or when the older and unfit beasts of the herd were slaughtered for their skins, which were used for making karosses. Shaw observed that the herds were culled between June and August. In the winter months the supply of milk was scanty, the crops were at a low level, it was therefore logically the time to supplement the diet with meat from the beasts which, in any case, might not survive the winter. See Shaw, W. op.cit. p. 414.

(64) Soga, J.H. op.cit. (1930) pp. 122-123.

(65) Soga, T.B. In Tlako ka Xhosa, Lovedale (1937). Quoted in Shaw, E.M. and van Warmelo, N.J. (eds.) op.cit. p. 32.

(66) Hunter, M. op.cit. pp. 36-37. Maclean, Col. J. op.cit. Warner's Notes pp. 98-99; Soga, J.H. op.cit. pp. 354-355.

(67) Soga, J.H. AmaXosa Lovedale, (1931). p. 356; Alberti,L. op.cit. p. 64.

(68) Soga, J.H. op.cit. p. 166.

(69) See note 66 above.

(70) That is not to say that women could never possess cattle. Soga records that a woman could bring from one to three cows or heifers with her from her parents place on marriage so that "she is not wholly dependent on her husband for support". But once again such allowance only serves to emphasize where the real control over cattle lay. See Soga, J.H. op.cit. p. 356.

(71) Alberti, L. op.cit. p. 54.

(72) Maclean, J. op.cit. p. 53.

(73) Thus Soga commenting on the distribution of arable lands wrote:
"Each family constitutes an economic unit and the distribution of arable lands is considered according to the special needs of each. See op.cit. (1931) p. 383.

(74) Kay, S. Travels and Researches in Caffraria, London. (1833), p. 142.

(75) Ibid. p. 143.

(76) Morgan, N. op.cit. p. 33.

(77) Shaw, W. op.cit. p. 420.

(78) Alberti, L. op.cit. p. 24.

(79) Döhne, J.L. op.cit. p. 4.

(80) "If the tribe were at war, care was taken of the herds, but the crops were neglected and the tribe might thus be several years without agriculture" Provinci di Capelli - Quoted in Shaw and van Warmelo. eds. The Material Culture of the Cape Nguni, Vol. III. (1980)

(81) Niven, Rev. op.cit. pp. 7-8. It not infrequently occurred that drought was experienced on the coast; e.g. among the Ndlambes etc, while those groups nearer the Amatola catchment area received adequate rain and fair crops.

(82) Thompson, G. op.cit. and Bain, A.G. Journals of Andrew Geddes Bain (ed.) M. Lister, van Riebeeck Society. (1949). p. 100.

(83) Smith, Sir A., op.cit. p. 153.

(84) Maclean, Col.J. op.cit p. 153.

(85) Gitywa, V.S. op.cit. p. 94.

(86) Ibid. pp. 92-93.

(87) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 164.

(88) Gitywa, V.S. op.cit. p. 97. Alberti, L. op.cit. p. 11. Smith in 1827 noted extensive cultivation of tobacco. I. Wachope, in his The Natives and their Missionaries, Lovedale, (1908), recalls that in the early 19th century "a man planted a tobacco plot measuring 30 square feet and drew interest from far and wide ..."

(89) Alberti, L. op.cit. p. 89.

(90) Maclaren, J. 'Arts and Crafts of the Xhosa, a Study Based on Philology', Southern African Journal of Science. Vol. 15, (1919). p. 441.

(91) Shaw, W. Reply to questionnaire of Sir A. Smith. op.cit.

(92) Maclean, Col.J. op.cit. Dugmores Papers, p. 29.

(93) Smith, Sir A. Paragraph 61 and the comment of Rev. J. Brownlee (questionnaire). "The fear of desertion consequently operated as a considerable check on the arrogance and cupidity of the chieftain".

(94) Alberti, L. op.cit. p. 74 and p. 78.

(95) Smith, Sir, A. op.cit. para. 161.

(96) Peires, J.B. op.cit. pp. 76 -77.

CHAPTER 2

THE EARLY MERCANTILE ERA - ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS TO 1848

I The Conceptualisation of the Effects of Exchange on The Pre-Capitalist Mode of Production

Up to now we have concentrated on showing that land and land scarcity were indeed potent factors in pre-Colonial Xhosa economy. It was argued that land formed the middle term in the equation that linked commoner homesteads and their cattle to the chiefly hierachy. We must now briefly consider the effects which over 50 years of interaction with Colonists had on the structure of the Xhosa social formation from 1800.

The Colonial State, from the start, actively intervened in the conflicts over the distribution of resources between Nguni chiefdoms. The aim in doing so was to promote chiefs who would be dependent on it and thus would be unable to wage war or form alliances against Colonial expansionist interests. Thus although the Colonial State favoured a minimum of contact with the Nguni formations on the part of the Colonists, it nevertheless entered into alliances with various chiefs - the result of which was fundamentally to change the distribution of power amongst the Xhosa and Thembu social formations.

This is best illustrated by the conflict between Ngqika and Ndlambe in 1818. Ngqika, who had by this time become heavily dependent upon Colonial support, was defeated by Ndlambe, who had previously only recognised Hintsa (the Gcaleka paramount chief) as his superior west of the Kei. The Colonial State used the defeat of it's ally Ngqika as an excuse to attack Ndlambe, and Colonel Brereton took off 23 000 Ndlambe cattle. The main part of the Ndlambe force was decimated in the failed attack on Grahamstown under Nxele (Makanda). The visible support of the Colony for Ngqika reinforced his position over other chiefs (1).

However the Colonial State soon moved against Ngika himself, with Somerset's creation of a 'neutral belt' (known as the Ceded Territory) between the Kat and Keiskamma rivers.

Ngqika's sons learned the dangers of collaboration from Ngqika, having seen their father placed in such a position that he had 'voluntarily' to hand over this important piece of country. Ngqika's acts of betrayal did not undermine his sons' position. On the contrary, they encouraged the formation around them of strong followings which desired both to re-establish the former Ngqika hegemony and to free themselves of the Colonial menace.

At the same time the Colonial State continually pressed Ngqika on the perennial question of cattle thefts. Ngqika was no more able to act effectively on this in 1819 than he had been in 1812. He was increasingly isolated from the proliferating new generation of chiefs, amongst them his own adult sons, Maqoma and Tyhali, and Ndlambe's son Mdushani. The latter was reconciled with his father after a period of antagonism.

Into this situation of internal political tension two important new developments were introduced. The opening up of trade with the Xhosa and their hinterland, and the arrival of the Mfengu. The earliest trade dated from about 1750 and was based mainly on cattle. This trade was irregular and it is very difficult to assess its size or impact. In the late 18th century trade had been interspersed with 'wars' - those of 1779, 1793 and 1799 were more like rapacious commando raids against Xhosa cattle by mixed Boer, Khoi, Colonist and Xhosa forces undertaken with a view to the acquisition of cattle (2).

During the last two decades of the 18th century there was a dramatic increase in the amount of cattle bartered from the Xhosa. In July 1752 a petty chief who exchanged two cows told Ensign Beutler, when asked why other people did not come to exchange, that:

"we must not remain here any longer as other Captains will not exchange." (3)

By 1813 Capt. Alberti could write to the Governor that:

"Many Kaffirs asked permission to bring slaughter cattle to the Bay to exchange with us" (4)

Because of the shortages of meat at the Cape, barter with the Xhosa was officially permitted in 1781 - only to be closed again in 1786.

The loss of territory sustained by the Xhosa in 1812 and 1819, and the influx of settlers after 1820 stimulated the frequency of trade. In 1822 certain Colonial officials thought they could monopolise the sale of red clay (used extensively for cosmetic purposes) as some clay pits had come into Colonial hands as a result of the expulsion of the Xhosa over the Keiskamma in 1819. When the chiefs found that only red clay would be available for exchange very little ivory was forthcoming. When beads and buttons were included for exchange at the clay pits, 434 lbs. of ivory was offered (5).

Shortly thereafter in 1824 the first official market was opened, with the institution of the trade fairs at Ft. Willshire. These fairs were closely regulated but were initially very successful (6). The opening of this trade had significant effects in bolstering Ngqika's chieftaincy. He succeeded in gaining a high degree of control over the Xhosa traders and according to one contemporary observer:

"he levied on them an intolerably heavy tax, in consideration of the fairs being held in the borders of his domain. No sooner was a bargain struck, than he or his agents unceremoniously seized the choicest part of the proceeds" (7).

The Ft. Willshire trade fairs inaugurated a commerce that was to dominate the next thirty years, until the subordination of commercial interests to those of agriculture. The size of the trade was enormous. In the first months an estimated 32 000 pounds sterling worth of commodities was removed from Xhosaland (8). While the immediate effects of the trade fairs were to boost the declining authority of Ngqika in the closing years of his reign (he died in 1829), the long term consequences are perhaps more important.

Ivory was the main commodity required by the Colonists and beads were the principal means of payment. From 18th August 1824 to 12th March 1825, 50 331 lbs. of ivory were exchanged. In addition about 16 800 lbs. of mimosa gum and 15 000 hides were brought to the fairs (9). This massive increment to the trade of Cape merchants had a spin-off effect on the entire Cape economy. Traders purchased ivory for 1 to 1.5 rix dollars per lb. Beads by contrast sold for 4.5 to 20 rix dollars per lb. and buttons from 4 to 10 rix dollars. Approximately 4 lbs. of ivory was required to purchase one lb. of beads. The terms of trade were obviously not favourable to the Xhosa! In Cape Town traders obtained 3 shillings to 3 shillings and 9pence per lb. for the ivory (10). 132 traders took out licenses to trade, although the actual number trading must have been much higher because many people, including soldiers, who were officially debarred from the general trade, also participated at other sites (11).

It is important to see that the trade was not exclusively based on ivory. Hides, horns and aloes played an important part. The best statistics available on the trade up to the time of the closure of the fairs in 1828 are provided by Sir Andrew Smith who compiled the following table of exports for the period 1799 - 1828, in order to emphasise the importance of the trade with Xhosaland for the Colony:

Table 1 Exports of Ivory, Horns, Hides and Aloes from Xhosa Chiefdoms (1799-1802 and 1818 - 1828) (12)

YEAR	IVORY (lbs.)	HORNS (lbs.)	HIDES (lbs.)	ALOES (lbs.)
1799	1 481	-	2 or 3 000	126 684
1800	1 500	-	2 or 3 000	71 834
1801	1 500	-	2 or 3 000	32 181
1802	1 500	-	2 or 3 000	91 219
1818	3 815	-	4 560	-
1819	1 910	-	5 955	
1820	9 510	509	3 819	
1821	4 538	3 010	2 732	
1822	24 420	19 266	16 391	
1823	19 885	15 011	15 017	
1824	20 661	48 436	12 126	
1825	106 778	62 554	29 722	
1826	26 258	66 615	40 047	
1827	38 140	78 289	75 210	
1828	21 413	95 069	-	

From Table 1, it is also possible to estimate what the impact of the trade within the Xhosa social formation must have been. Between 1824 and 1828 a total of 213 250 lbs. of ivory, 350 963 lbs. of horn and 157 105 lbs. of hides were supplied by the Xhosa. Using an exchange ratio of 4:1 for ivory and beads, this means that the ivory alone must have secured some 53 313 lbs. of beads. If to this is added beads and other commodities received for the sale of horns and hides it is clear that a vast monetarisation of Xhosa economy must have occurred between 1820 and 1830, providing a new and independent basis for the accumulation of cattle in the Xhosa economy. It is impossible to really visualise how great the impact of this must have been. (13)

Peires has argued that the Xhosa traders were fulfilling the role of middlemen in the trade of beads. The beads were acquired at

the Ft. Willshire fairs principally to be re-exchanged further inland for more cattle - which was the primary form of wealth in which they were interested. For the beads acquired from the sale of a single hide, a live beast could be obtained inland. (14)

This was confirmed by the Rev. Shaw, who had himself assisted the growth of trade by opening up a shop at Wesleyville Mission Station among the Gqunkwebe of Phato. Shaw observed:

> "The trade among them was originated by that which commenced between the Colonists and the border Caffres, who at an early period of border traffic used to take part of those articles which they purchased from the English much further into the country, and therewith bartered for cattle with the tribes beyond them. They realised very considerable profits on those transactions and in that way it is that I would account for the great increase of the stock of cattle possessed by the Amagonakwaybie tribe living immediately on the border."(15)

The Ft. Willshire fairs began to decline because of growing resentment of the exactions which Ngqika made on the trade. These became more critical as profits on the trade declined because of a continuing debasement, through inflation, of the beads that formed the means of payment. This was caused by attempts to flood the market with cheap beads of a particular variety by the Colonial traders. This would lead to a drop off in demand and cause the Xhosa traders to switch to another sort of bead - which would then very rapidly in turn loose its value. (16) The decisive factor was almost certainly the exhaustion of local supplies of ivory, which became marked from 1825. In fact local supplies were almost entirely exhausted and ivory had to be brought from further inland. This obviously militated against the trade fairs, as the markets were now too far removed from the source of supply. All this, combined with economic depression at the Cape in 1826, was enough to cause the Colonial State to suspend the fairs.

By this time the trade had become a vital element in the Colonial economy and in order to save the trade the Colonial State began allowing traders to enter Xhosa country on a permit system from 1827. The fairs were finally abolished in 1830, and traders were allowed to penetrate the interior freely. These exchange relations provided the basis for accumulation prior to the establishment of commodity production within the Xhosa social formation. This penetration of mercantile activity coincided with the end of a period of centralisation in the Xhosa social formation and the beginning of a period of decentralisation which began with the deaths of the great chiefs Ngqika and Ndlambe.

We have already mentioned the split between Ngqika and his sons. In 1829, a year after the death of Ngqika, Ndlambe died. The potential unifier of the Ndlambe, his son Mdushane, also died in May 1829 while still a young man. This tragedy set off a series of conflicts over succession which saw the Ndlambe split into the imiDushane (under another of Ndlambe's sons Qasana) and the Ndlambe of Mhalla, a minor son who achieved chieftaincy through carefully manipulated witchcraft accusations. (17) The Mdushane split further between Siwani, who was Mdushane's Great Son, and Siyolo who was regent for him at the time of the 1835 war.

While hegemony in the Ciskei was unclear at this time, Hintsa had succeeded in re-establishing the power of the Gcaleka Xhosa paramountcy in the Transkei, after its earlier defeats by Ngqika during Hintsa's minority. It is not clear to what extent the exchange economy emerging in the west penetrated to Gcalekaland. The arrival there of thousands of refugees from the Mfecane provided an alternative basis for accumulation and the expansion of the economy of Gcalekaland.

The Mfengu (from the phrase "we are wanderers seeking service") were formed from a variety of clans who dispersed under the impact of the Mfecane. The original Mfengu clans, Hlubi, Zizi, Bele and Ngwane under Matiwane were dispersed among the Gcaleka and the Thembu. (18) These refugees were absorbed by the Xhosa

homesteads according to the model for expansion of homesteads, "a relationship wherein a Mfengu worked for an individual for food, shelter, the opportunity to acquire wealth ... and, eventually economic independence." (19)

The relationship between Gcaleka and Mfengu was antagonistic. Many heads of homesteads, who were suddenly elevated by the acquistion of clients much sooner than they might otherwise have been, pressed the greatest exactions they could from them. Mfengu accumulated cattle and hid their acquisitions from their masters to prevent them from being confiscated. This antagonism between a busa (service) client and his master was normal. What changed the situation for the Mfengu was their large numbers, and the fact that there was an alternative source of clientage and patronage in the Colonial State.

In terms of the Xhosa ruling class outlook on political relationships, they were time and again to make the mistake of seeing in the Colonial State only another chieftaincy, albeit a powerful one, with which they could deal in a manner comparable to other powerful chieftaincies they had encountered in the past and therefore broadly in conformity with existing Xhosa political and social concepts. (20) They did not and could not foresee the unending and novel demands that the Colonial State would make on them and that the Colonial State was the vanguard for a totally new system of society based not on mediation of the conflicts between people and the land through chiefs, but on the realisation of monetary profits, the expansion of monetary wealth and the inauguration of capitalist production. The significance of this for us lies not so much in the ruling class outlook itself (interesting and significant though it is) but in the effects of the real new system being inaugurated by the Colonial State and settlers on the internal matrix of relationships of the lineage mode of production in the Xhosa social formation.

The presence of at least 50 000 Mfengu in Gcalekaland and in other parts of the Transkei undoubtedly stimulated the pace and variety

of economic activity. (21) Being present in such large numbers hindered their absorption, and the presence of the Colony provided them with the economic stimulus to play the role of middlemen in the trade between the Colony, Gcalekaland and the interior.

Mfengu were particularly active in cattle trade. Moyers has argued from the evidence he found, that they traded tobacco locally for small livestock or skins, exchanged these items with Colonial traders for 'trade goods' and bartered the trade goods to the Xhosa and others for more or better livestock. Each transaction increased their relative wealth. (22) It thus seems possible that much of the ivory that made its way to the Ft. Willshire fairs was transmitted there by Mfengu middlemen traders. It is certainly in their role as middlemen traders that the Mfengu benefited from the differential terms of trade within the Xhosa formations, and between it and the Colonial traders. Thus in the 1820s and early 1830s they saw demonstrably the possibilities for accumulation inherent in allying themselves to the aggressive expansionist force of Colonial trade and arms.

This message must have been driven home with renewed sharpness in the wake of the collapse of the trade fairs in the late '20s. Receiving the protection of the Colony must have seemed an ever more realistic alternative to the Mfengu as the frontier drifted once more towards war in 1835. It certainly must form a major part of the explanation of why 30 000 Mfengu followed the missionary Ayliff out of Gcalekaland into the Colony during that war, where, once settled in the Ciskei, they formed a complicating factor in the struggle between the Colony and the Xhosa. Prior to their departure, the effect of the Mfengu presence in Gcalekaland was to increase the intensity of exploitation east of the Kei. In a similar manner, Ngqika pressed for ever greater exactions west of it.

In our understanding of the dynamics of the lineage mode of production, such increases in appropriation led to struggle and to the attempt to establish a more favourable relationship between

homesteads, cattle and the land through politically supporting the ambitions of a young chief. It is in this context of struggle that the complex series of internal conflicts and 'frontier' wars that mark the period 1830 to 1857 must be understood. It was also in this period that the basis for commodity production within the Xhosa social formation was established, and major aspects of the lineage mode were superseded.

The penetration of mercantile capital coincided with the end of a period of centralisation and increased exploitation of the homesteads within the Xhosa formation. This accentuated the capacity which exchange relationships inherently possess to transform the character of production. In commenting on the power of capitalist exchange relations to transform production Marx wrote that:

> "The exchange of the overflow is a traffic which posits exchange and exchange value. But it extends only to the overflow and plays an accessory role to production itself. But if the trading peoples who solicit exchange appear repeatedly ... and an ongoing commerce develops, although the producing people still engages in so-called passive trade, since the impulse for the activity of positing exchange values comes from outside and not from the inner structure of its production, then the surplus of production must no longer be something accidental, occasionally present, but must be constantly repeated; and in this way domestic production itself takes on a tendency towards the positing of exchange values ... The organisation of domestic production itself is already modified by circulation and exchange value; but it has not yet been completely invaded by them, either over the surface or in depth ... The degree to which the establishment of exchange value attacks the whole of production depends partly on the intensity of this external influence, and partly on the degree

> of development attained by the elements of domestic production." (23)

To this remarkable statement one can add that it is not only the intensity of the 'external influence' in trade that is important but the effects on domestic production of the entire Colonial State apparatus, military conquest, missionary ideology etc. It is necessary to see Marx's analysis as operating in the context of particular conjunctures both with respect to the capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production.

Exchange relations and use of money or a money equivalent are of course in no way unique to capitalism. However, the formula for merchant capital presented by Marx, 'M-C-M', does have specific and limited applicability. Although Xhosa homestead heads accumulated cattle, it would be a gross formalist error to see cattle as strictly speaking a money equivalent and the increase in cattle gained as an accumulation of capital as Marx understood it. This is the sort of formalism that has vitiated the work of functionalists such as Sansom. (24) Although there was accumulation and trade within the Xhosa social formation prior to Colonial times it has been shown that this was based on an entirely different dynamic in which the money equivalent, cattle, did not fulfill the function of money in Marx's scheme in which money is the universal store of value and all other products are exchangable against it as commodities.

With the introduction of beads and a wider range of commodities into which beads could be converted, the first alteration that trade had on levels of accumulation within Xhosa economy became apparent. Cattle began taking on the form of a universal store of value. It is here necessary to focus closely on the specific differences in mercantile interaction between a capitalist mode of production and a pre-capitalist mode of production when compared with the pre-existing situation.

Under capitalism, production, distribution, exchange and consumption have become broken up as different moments in the process of realising surplus value and capital accumulation. This differentiation is a necessary effect of the form of the specifically capitalist relations of production; the existence of the 'free' labourer and the owner of the means of production who fully controls the production process. The 'free' labourer is a very limited agent. His basic function is to produce, and his social talents are limited to the reproduction of his labour-power and the maintenance of a family in the interests of replacing his labour-power when it is worn out. His development is therefore one-sided. Under capitalist production, in contrast to pre-capitalist modes of production, there are no political and ideological interventions between production and consumption because consumption is itself determined by the place occupied by a particular agent in the structure of the relations of production. With consumption separated from production, exchange and distribution become separate moments that mediate between production and consumption.

Although the four moments of the capitalist process of production of commodities are analytically separated they must still be conceptualised as a totality. This very important point is strongly emphasised by Marx who wrote that:

> "The conclusion we reach is not that production, distribution and consumption are identical, but that they all form the members of a totality, distinctions with a unity ... A definite production thus determines a definite consumption, distribution and exchange as well as definite relations between these different moments." (25)

In cases of accumulation in pre-capitalist modes of production, political, social and ideological relations form constitutive parts of the relations of production. Production, distribution, exchange and consumption are not yet separated. The form this unity takes in the relations of production is the most complex

part of analysing the nature of pre-capitalist modes of production. The link between production and consumption is never in the form of a simple unity. There is always some form of intervention between production and consumption. These interventions are precisely political and ideological and their exact form cannot be determined in the abstract, outside of the analysis of a concrete social formation.

The significance of this in our consideration of the 'frontier' between Colonists and Xhosa is the effects of exchange relations and market relations, in inaugurating transformations within a pre-capitalist mode of production. This question is of particular significance in the light of much of the misplaced Marxist criticism of studies that have concentrated on the "the market" rather than on "production". While much work on 19th century Colonial economic expansion and the reaction of the pre-capitalist social formations has concentrated on exchange relations, the fault does not lie in that fact, but with the fact that the effects and functions of exchange relations have not been posed within the very specific theoretical framework within the materialist problematic for understanding these relations. (26)

Thus although certain revisionist treatments wished to break with the historiographic tradition of the 'dual economy thesis', they did so only by showing that African cultivators did respond to market opportunities and that the decline of this production was related to the rise of migrant labour. (27) They did not reveal the basis for this in the structure of the pre-capitalist mode of production itself. From the practical historical viewpoint however, the historian is often faced with the fact that it is exchange relations that leave the greatest impact on the available historical record and not the production process which preceded them. (28) In order to move from exchange relations to relations of production; in order to use exchange relations as keys to forming a view of the overall relations of production, it is first necessary adequately to conceptualise these relations. It is this crucial step which some otherwise important studies have omitted.

It is characteristic of capitalism that its radical abilities to transform pre-capitalist social formations are present precisely in the sweep of its circuit of circulation of commodities - regardless of any boundaries constituted by the pre-capitalist mode of production. Capitalist industry seeks to realise surplus value and obtain raw materials wherever its commodities can be exchanged for money or for other commodities that are of use in its own production process. Marx expressed this clearly in the following passage:

> "Within its circulation process, in which industrial capital functions either as money or as commodity, the circuit of industrial capital, whether in the form of money capital or commodity capital, cuts across the commodity circulation of the most varied modes of social production, in so far as this commodity circulation simultaneously reflects commodity production.
>
> Whether the commodities are the product of production based on slavery, the product of peasants (Chinese, Indian pyots), of a community (Dutch East Indies), of State production (such as existed in earlier epochs of Russian history, based on serfdom) or of half savage hunting tribes etc - as commodities and money they confront the money and commodities in which industrial capital presents itself, and enter into the latter's own circuit and into that of the surplus-value borne by the commodity capital ... The character of the production process from which they derive is immaterial ... Thus the circulation process of industrial capital is characterised by the many-sided character of its origins, and the existence of the market as a world market." (29)

Herein can be seen the effects of exchange relations that are specifically capitalist. By drawing pre-capitalist modes of production into the circuit of capital, they were then subject

to an exchange quite unlike any other that they had previously encountered. That is, a system of exchange relations based on the continual reappearance of the means of exchange in expanded form, this being the necessary consequence of capital accumulation. The penetration of merchant capital does not inaugurate capitalist relations of production. To suppose that it does was the mistake of A.G. Frank and others who reduced capitalist relations to exchange relations. (30)

What such penetration by merchant capital inaugurates is a period of transition and class struggle in which the class forces of the pre-capitalist mode contend with the Colonial representatives of capitalism. They contend both individually at the level of production, and collectively under the leadership of the ruling class of the formation. As we saw above, Marx explicitly states that it is the products of diverse modes of production that are initially converted into commodities for capital - the modes of production are not thereby themselves transformed. For Marx this period is one which necessarily precedes the process of transformation itself, in which commodity production is installed directly and production is now for exchange value. Marx observed that the tendency of the capitalist mode of production:

> "is to transform all possible production into commodity production; the main means by which it does this is precisely by drawing this production into its circulation process. The interaction of industrial capital everywhere promotes this transformation, and with it too the transformation of all immediate producers into wage-labourers." (31)

The circulation of commodities under capitalism is capable of "calling forth" exchange value where the production of commodities does not yet exist. Prior to the dominance of commodity production within the colonised social formation it is the lure of capitalist commodities, combined with specific internal conjunctures that elicits commodities for exchange from whatever

store of appropriated use values exists. In the case of the Xhosa social formation an example of this process would be:

(a) the inherent need from within the Xhosa formation for young men to find bases for accumulation outside the restriction of the dominance of homestead heads and

(b) the unique position of the Mfengu.

It is the endless search for money and commodities by mercantile capitalists that leads to the transformation of non-commodity producing social formations. However the exact form of this transformation and the historical struggles by which it was achieved can only be understood by reference to the main lines of struggle within the pre-capitalist social formation. It is only by relating observations about trade and exchange to observations about such struggle that exchange relations may be used as a key to an understanding of the dominant relations of production. (32)

Marx fully saw the importance of the structure of the pre-capitalist mode of production in determining the course of the interaction of the two modes.

> "Commerce, therefore, has a more or less dissolving influence everywhere on the producing organisation which it finds at hand and whose different forms are mainly carried on with a view to use-value. To what extent it brings about a dissolution of the old mode of production depends on its solidity and internal structure. And whither this process of dissolution will lead, what new mode of production will replace the old, does not depend on commerce, but on the structure of the old mode of production itself." (33)

It is then to the 'structure of the old mode of production itself' that one must look to find the secret of merchant capital's ability to transform the dominant social relations of production of the pre-capitalist mode of production.

II The Expansion of Capitalist Development and Colonial War 1820-1848

During this period of contest from 1820 to 1848 in the Cape Colony the dominant representatives of capital were the merchant connections which proliferated from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown. The Colonial agricultural sector was subordinated to them. The agricultural sector, both English and Boer, provided the backbone for the onslaught against the Xhosa. This was through service in the wars and more particularly through the 'commando' and 'patrol' systems that were widely used in settling (and provoking) disputes over cattle with whatever section of the Xhosa they came into contact with. (34)

Merchant capital's attitude towards these excursions was ambivalent. On the one hand they wanted to pursue the wars and depredations because they secured the Colonial boundaries and opened up trade, on the other hand the short term consequences were often disastrous. On balance the large mercantile interests favoured the setting out of farms for occupation by Colonists and the fostering of sheep farming. However as long as the viability of such colonising remained subject to threat by politically and militarily strong Xhosa chiefdoms they also desired a stable frontier which itself provided a large trade. Agricultural Colonists themselves had a totally different attitude based on their dependence on depredations for the acquisition of herds and, more importantly, land. (35)

It was not therefore until the 1870s, with the railway boom and the opening up of the diamond mines - when agriculture was able to expand at a significantly faster rate, that merchant capital began to tie its own path of development to that of mining and agricultural capital in South Africa. This had distinct implications for the attitude adopted towards the Xhosa and other indigenous social formations, which held a declining position in terms of political importance to merchant capital. This was reflected in the policy adopted towards the various sections of the Nguni which were annexed to the Cape. (36)

The period after the closure of the Ft. Willshire trade fairs and the opening up of free trade with the interior saw an acceleration of economic activity in the Colony and the beginnings of the internal transformation of the Xhosa social formation. The 1830s were boom times: "in the five years 1831-5 the value of hides and skins exported from the Colony doubled in value till they accounted for fully one quarter of the country's total exports; and it is evidence of the growing importance of the native trade, as well as of settler activities, that 19 per cent of this trade was now exported from the open roadstead of Port Elizabeth" (37). Not only did the trade in such traditional staples as hides and livestock expand but a new factor also began to make its presence felt - wool.

In 1822 only 1 460 pounds sterling worth of wool was exported from the Colony, out of total exports of domestic products worth 219 156 pounds. Wool thus accounted for 0.6% of total exports. By 1836 wool accounted for 26 169 pounds or 6.8% of total exports worth 269 008 pounds. 1835 also marked the beginning of the unreversed slump in demand for Cape wines following the raising of duties on them by Britain in 1831. This growth prior to the war of 1847-48 was itself to be outstripped, as the following table shows:

Table 2: Exports of Domestic Produce 1838 - 1850 (39)

YEAR	WINE POUNDS STERLING	% OF TOTAL	WOOL POUNDS STERLING	% OF TOTAL	TOTAL EXPORTS POUNDS STERLING
1838	102 433	41	26 627	11	252 035
1840	78 369	33	45 968	19	239 085
1842	43 140	17	72 497	28	258 207
1844	55 870	18	113 507	37	305 375
1846	40 433	10	178 011	45	398 766
1848	49 035	15	155 213	47	327 890
1850	35 890	8	285 600	62	462 818

From Table 2 it can be seen that wool and wine accounted for 52% of the total value of Cape exports in 1838 and this increased to 70% by 1850. The balance of the exports, in this period, were made up in large part by leather, hides, horns, some ivory and gum, most of which was obtained in trade with the Xhosa and other more easterly chiefdoms. However the growth of wool, which was in fact only beginning its period of expansion, had other implications. It was to lead to the absorption of the Colony into imperial trade on a large scale and create the possibility for capitalist agriculture in large parts of the agrarian economy of the 19th century Cape prior to the opening up of the diamond mines. (40) It was the demand for large and extensive farms for pasturage of sheep and cattle and the existence of a high and steady demand for Colonial wools that made the land grabbing of the 1835 and 1848 wars inevitable. (41)

Although the economic expansion of this period was small compared with what was to follow, its significance lay precisely in the obstacles that establishment of Colonial economy encountered in the continued occupation by the Xhosa of their lands. Some idea of the nature of investment in Colonial sheep farming is given in the evidence of a Parliamentary Select Committee, appointed in 1860 to investigate the compensation paid to frontier farmers in the war 1846-48. The Committee consisted of members of the border region such as Walter Stanton and T.H. Bowker. Bowker himself was one of the major sheep farmers who had suffered losses in that period. He told the committee that in 1846:

> "We had about 32 000 sheep ... at the close of the war they were about 6 000." (42)

The leading witness was a Lt. Daniel of Sidbury Park who started farming after the war of 1835. He claimed to have had 5 000 head of sheep, 150 cattle and 25 horses by 1846. He told the committee:

> "The sheep were highly improved merinos, worth fully 1 pound each. I had also many imported sheep, Saxons worth 20 or 22 pounds each ... I was at the time the largest proprietor of pure-bred sheep in

> the Colony and was supplying about 500 fine woolled rams through the various districts of the Colony yearly ... Between the wars of 1835 and 1846 I imported several Australian and Saxon merino sheep, which cost me 2 680 pounds, during the ten years." (43)

He claimed that most of his investment was lost in the 1846-8 war. In addition there were 22 600 head of sheep belonging to other parties on his farms. He possessed a total of 41 600 acres of land in several farms, and this gave him an income of 2 000 pounds per annum, when the wool price was between 1 shilling and tenpence halfpenny to 2 shillings per lb.

There were other farmers of similar substance in the midlands belt between Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown and the Albany district itself was also fast expanding. In the light of such developments in Colonial agriculture it is at once clear why military solutions were favoured by the Colonists.

Some of the early observers fully understood the implications of the depredations of land from the Xhosa carried on by the Colony in the wars of 1819, 1835 and 1848. The confiscation of land has to be seen in conjunction with the internal laws of motion of the lineage mode of production as inscribed in the Xhosa social formation. (44) Of all the Colonial observers the one who seems to have most closely understood the real nature of the dialectic of expansion of the Xhosa social formation was Sir Andrew Smith. He observed the relative importance of cattle as means of subsistence and drew from this certain important conclusions:

> "In a pastoral life where mankind depends in great measure for their food on hunting and the milk of cattle a vast extent of territory is necessary for supporting a small body of people in proportion as they multiply and unite. The wild animals diminish and fly to a greater distance from the haunts of their enemies and the increase of cattle necessary for the addition of population requires an

> extention of pasture ... The country which they inhabit is deemed the property of the tribe or nation from which it has a right to exclude every other rival." (45)

The 'national' nature of occupation of territory, the fact that the chief rules over a limited and defined territory, is the root cause of the cycles of relative land scarcity that lead to the expansion of chiefdoms through wars, the proliferation of chiefdoms through segmentation and the overall growth of the kingdom. By the late 1820s such expansion was blocked by Colonial land acquisition and occupation. Expansion in pre-Colonial times had mostly involved military and political contest with rivals bordering the areas of expansion. As a result it was inevitable that such conflict would continue despite the greater threat posed by the Colony. In short, the 'interchiefly competition' must be seen as integral to the laws of motion of the dominant mode of production, that would not be stopped merely by the presence of the Colonial interloper.

Reliance on cattle necessitated transhumance or removal of cattle to other areas in times of drought. In the most westerly reaches of Xhosa occupation the need for mixed grazing veld was essential. Without access to sweetveld grasses, which grow in the high altitude belts, the cattle would die in winter when sourveld grasses lose their nutritional value and become unpalatable to animals. Sourveld grasses are however the best grazing and stock thrive on them in spring and summer. Over-exposure to the winter sweetveld grazing may cause stock to deteriorate. (46) It was therefore essential to have access to both types of pasture. This continues to be the case today and Child has noted that "Winterberg farmers own sweetveld farms as well. These are used for winter grazing and the sourveld farm for summer grazing." (47)

With the loss of the 'Ceded territory' between the Keiskamma and Fish Rivers in 1819, in which the Winterberg is included, a large amount of the best sourveld was lost to the Xhosa. Thus apart

from the strain of providing residential and garden sites, pasturage that was vital to Xhosa economy was being threatened. In 1824 Sir Andrew Smith was already able to observe this and the inevitable effect on the mode of production it entailed:

> "As long as the Caffres do not take to agriculture they will never be able to live concentrated, as population increases they will require more land and if they do not get that one of two things will happen, either wars or a regular settlement and cultivation. Since we became familiar with the Caffres they must have more than doubled their population and certainly according to their mode of life Kaffirland is not at present sufficient for them. The want of more territory is what sets them to emigrate." (48)

Smith's understanding supports the view developed here of the nature of the historical conjuncture by 1848 - that the Xhosa social formation was entering a period of economic and ecological crisis in which the Colony constituted a barrier to the necessary expansion of the formation. The resultant conflict both between chiefs and with the Colony was thus, to a large extent, a product of the operation of the internal dynamics of the Xhosa social formation. It is therefore no longer possible to accept theories which hold that the 'frontier conflict' was the result of any one particular factor on the frontier. All particular factors: trade, cattle raiding, and agriculture have to be related to the struggle to secure the conditions for expansion and reproduction of the basic relationships of the lineage mode of production in the Xhosa social formation.

The events leading up to the war of 1835, and the following war in 1847-48, represent the acme of Colonial land greed. The deliberate shooting of several sons of chiefs was but the prelude to the shooting and injury of Sandille's brother Xoxo which signalled the start of the 1834-35 war, that ended with the assassination of the Xhosa (Gcaleka) paramount Hintsa by the arch expansionist Southey with the assistance of Imperial forces. (49)

The land in question in this war was the portion of the 'ceded territory' that the Ngqika had been allowed to continue occupying after 1819 - between the Tyhume (tributary of the Keiskamma) and the Keiskamma Rivers. Ngqika had his Great Place there, at the present site of Alice.

Maqoma, Ngqika's son, certainly never accepted the loss of the 'ceded territory' and made repeated attempts to recover it. These attempts led eventually to the war of 1835 and further loss of territory associated with it. After the war, in 1836 Governor D'Urban created the ill-fated Province of Queen Adelaide in the territory between the Keiskamma and Kei Rivers. Maqoma, who was in 1835 still regent for the young Sandille, wished to establish himself west of the Tyumie in the ancestral Xhosa lands. The need to do so was aggravated by drought in 1829. On that and two subsequent occasions in 1833 and 1834 Maqoma was forcibly evicted from his lands.

The missionary author "Justus", for one, saw the cause of Maqoma's reoccupation of the ceded territory in the necessity engendered by overcrowding east of the Keiskamma:

> "the inconvenience, distress and want, amounting to starvation, which they endured by being forced with their herds upon other clans already too closely condensed, and in dry season compelled them to return to the lands out of which they had been driven ... in the autumn of 1834 there took place the last expulsion with all that conflagration of huts ... so that in fact Macoma and his people were for a whole 12 months in a constant state of alarm; the patrols were continually harrassing, driving, burning and expelling." (50)

The methods employed by the Colonial forces in 1835 were an extension and refinement of those used against Chungwe when he was still on the Fish River in 1812; burning of huts, destruction of grain stores and confiscation of thousands of head of cattle.

D'Urban actually planned to expel all the Xhosa beyond the Kei, but this was not militarily possible. At the end of the war Maqoma's personal entourage still numbered 1 200 mounted cavalry. The Ngqika bore the brunt of the war, but the Ndlambe near the coast were hardly troubled by it. Peires has interestingly suggested that a:-

> "historical opportunity was lost when Glenelg reversed the decision to establish the Province of Queen Adelaide with magisterial rule over the Xhosa - an immediate uprising at that point could have been successful in overrunning the Colony." (51)

Both the wars of 1835 and 1848 were characterised by only partial unity on the part of the Xhosa chiefs. In 1835 Mqhyai, the Ndlambe chief, and Dyani Tshatshu (Ntinde) and Phato, chief of the Gqunukhwebe stayed out, though many of their followers deserted them for one of the belligerents. (52) The eclipsed Ndlambe chief Mgayi joined Phato in staying out of the war. As in the other conflicts this may have been partly by design as stock was sent to non-belligerent chiefs for safekeeping. It was in the aftermath of the Colonial attack on the Gcaleka that the Xhosa paramount Hintsa lost his life when he was taken prisoner by subterfuge after entering the Imperial army's headquarters for 'negotiations' and was then shot while allegedly trying to escape. The military had demanded 50 000 cattle as an indemnity to be paid by the Gcaleka.

The war hit the Gcaleka especially hard. In addition to the 50 000 head of cattle demanded by the Colony, the 17 000 Mfengu emigrants who were escorted out of Gacalekaland by the missionary Ayliff took with them at least 20 000 head of livestock. (53) The actual reasons for the Mfengu emigration which marked the beginning of their collaboration with the Colonists and the Colonial State are hard to specify. Moyers has pointed to the conflictual nature of their partial incorporation into the Xhosa homesteads and Peires has pointed to the increased exploitation they suffered as clients of homestead heads who would not normally

have acquired clients. Moyers has more specifically suggested that:

> "The turning point in relationships between Mfengu and Gacaleka came after the defeat of Ngwane in 1828 when Hintsa accepted Mfengu displaced by Ngwane ... this second wave had less chance of being absorbed, but arrived with more wealth than their predecessors" (54)

It is quite probable that most of the Mfengu immigrants to the Colony were drawn from this second wave of immigration to Gcalekaland.

The Colonial State saw the Mfengu from the beginning as providing a labour force for the increasing demands of Colonial agriculture, and as a buffer between the Colony and the Xhosa. D'Urban stated in his dispatch on the Mfengu that they were to be settled in the:

> "at present uninhabited and worse than useless district, between the Fish and lower Keiskama, they will soon convert it into a country abounding with cattle and corn, will furnish the best of all barriers against the entrance of the Kafirs into the Fish River bush ... and will besides afford to the Colonists a supply of excellent hired servants" (55)

Perhaps one of the more interesting comments on the cause of the undoubted demand for wage workers in the Cape Colony that was to be a constant factor from the 1830s through to the economic slump of the 1860s is suggested by De Kiewiet:

> "It is one of the neglected yet important effects of the Great Trek that it imposed a serious strain on the labour supply of the country by creating a demand for an unusual amount of cheap labour to work upon the vastly increased holdings of the European population. Ever since the Great Trek there has been a demand for labour in every section of the country" (56)

Peires confirms that there was a shortage of workers in the Albany district in the 1830s. After the war of 1835 there were 6 000 "native foreigners" in the district, 30% of the total population, most of whom, as well as being tenants on Colonists' land, formed the principal labourers on the farms as well as the towns and villages. (57) The wars of 1835 and 1848 are ascribable in large part to the Colonists desire to expand their sheep farming interests, in which many merchants from Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth were then investing.

The major merchant houses were actively involved during the 1840s in establishing the system through which wool was to be purchased for the rest of the century. Thus, for example, Mosenthal and Co. extended its operations to Port Elizabeth in 1842, established agents in "every town in the Eastern Province ... whom they supported in buying produce from farmers." (58) This system known as the Store Keeper System had distinct implications for all flock masters, especially African, in later years. A ruling price was accepted for all wool in the district for a particular season, and this price was then fixed. These agents were therefore able to effect a monopoly position for their merchant principals and prevent competition in wool prices. (59)

This expansive drive, based, as has been argued, mainly on merchant capital and the promotion of sheep farming, conflicted with the social and economic forces that were motivating a strong need to expand from within the Xhosa formation, a need which was intensified with every deprivation of pasturage and agricultural land they suffered.

III The Effects of Mercantile Expansion 1835-1848

The increased economic activity and the effects of the expansion of Colonial trade and agriculture within the Xhosa formation became apparent almost immediately after the war. As early as May

1836 a storekeeper from St. Thomas Mission (between old Lovedale and Alice) reported that "our new subjects daily evince a greater inclination in their dealings for useful articles of British manufacture, hats, spades, saddles and all kinds of articles of clothing instead of beads and wire ..." (60)

Maqoma apparently told A.G. Bain that Smith had rendered him assistance in making a watercourse on the Kei. Bain commented in his Journal: "This is one of the most important steps that could be taken for giving him an interest in the soil, and the only one likely to change the habits of a savage race, leading them imperceptibly from a pastoral to an agricultural life". (61) Indeed, after the reversal of the Province of Queen Adelaide and the Xhosa reoccupation of their lands the next loudest voice, apart from the Colonists' press shrill cry to be avenged, concerned the promotion of "an interest in the soil" amongst the Xhosa. It came from all sides, but especially from the missionaries. "One great object of our Missionary labours", wrote Stephen Kay in 1833, "is to turn his attention more fully to agricultural pursuits, and to attach him to the soil ..." (62)

There is some direct evidence that D'Urban's proposed annexation of the "Province of Queen Adelaide" was itself a spur to agriculture. The chief Tyali (a son of Ngqika) had expressed the desire to Bain to have a watercourse from the Tyumie similar to the one built for Maqoma. However before anything was done the annexation scheme was officially abandoned. Some of Tyali's oxen had meanwhile been trained for the plough. Bain reports that Tyali then abandoned the idea of using a plough on irrigated lands saying:

> "Tyali has altered his mind since he got his land back again. Tyali is a Kaffir, son of Gachabie and he is not going to spoil his oxen with ploughing while he has plenty of wives to till the ground for him. You must now pay me a cow for having had my oxen so long in your plough." (63)

However in the same year Bain reported that near the Tyumie

Mission Station "I saw two or three Kaffirs with six oxen yoked to a plough ... the ground had been very badly irrigated ... I told the Kaffir who held the plough, whose name was Soga that before he could expect to plough his ground to advantage it must first be properly irrigated." (64)

After the war of 1835 a period of internal adjustment within the Xhosa formation began. With the death of Hintsa, who since 1818 had rebuilt the power of the Gcaleka paramountcy, Sarhili succeeded to the chieftaincy. The conditions of insecurity within the Xhosa formation favoured strong attempts by the older councillors of Hintsa to control the new paramount. Peires has argued that as late as 1877 Sarhili was still trying to undercut the influence of the Great Councillors of Hintsa's generation. (65) If this was a difficulty in 1877, then its effect must have been of a greater magnitude in the early 1840s. It was, in this view, the obstacles and difficulties involved in establishing his own class basis that were behind much of Sarhili's expansionist tactics during his long reign.

Sarhili needed to bring new territory under his command. This could only be done by driving out the Colonists and thus giving the Ciskei Xhosa room to expand, or at the expense of some other grouping, either Thembu, Bacha or Pondo (66). This fundamental impulse of Sarhili is crucial to understanding his motivation and action towards the Ciskei Xhosa throughout the period under consideration. Sarhili's initial disputes with the Thembu in the early 1840s ended in disaster when he failed to dislodge Mtirara from the area around the White Kei river. However in 1843 he managed to gain a victory over some of the junior Thembu chiefs and Mtirara acceded to his conquest.

During these events on the Kei, Sandille, who had been 14 at the time of the 1835 war, succeeded to the chieftaincy of the Ngqika in 1841, taking over from the Regency of Maqoma and his mother Sutu. (67) This, in like fashion to Sarhili's succession, marked a period of intense struggle within the Ngqika. Colonial

administrators, especially Brownlee, were to complain, right up to the time of Sandille's death in the rebellion of 1879, of his fickleness and that his actions were dictated by conflicting councils and his desire and need to secure the support of his own age set. (68)

Brownlee's attitude reflected the interests of Colonial overlordship. In fact Brownlee himself had to a large extent been sucked into the paradigmatic conflict that was inherent in the struggle between the father's generation and that of a young chief. Colonial interests coincided more with the old seers such as Soga and Tyala and other old councillors of Ngqika, who indeed inherited from Ngqika a more co-operative stance towards the Colonists. A stance which first Maqoma and then Sandille were explicit in repudiating.

This conflict was given immediate expression in the rift that occurred between Sandille and Maqoma. Maqoma never accepted Sandille's authority and relations between them were always competitive and distrusting. This fact was deeply rooted in the forces which pushed both chiefs to strive to provide for the expansion of homesteads under conditions of fixed and ultimately diminishing resources. Almost immediately after the 1835 war Maqoma adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards the Colonial State. If 1835 was Maqoma's war, 1847 was Sandille's. Indeed Maqoma went as far as he could to keep out of the war without actually appearing traitorous.

Thus the decade of the 1840s saw the most important chiefdoms west and east of the Kei, the Ngqika and Gcaleka, grappling with forces and conflicts generated by the cyclical crises inherent in the dynamic of the mode of production, but intensified, modified and in many fundamental ways affected by the growing commerce with the Colony and the loss of vital lands to it.

Similarly the Gqunukwebe under Phato were soon to be split by the dispute between Phato and his younger brother Kama. Phato had

been loyal to the Colony in the 1835 war and he had been among the most eager to encourage missionary activity; although he never professed Christianity he attended Church services fairly regularly. The presence of missionaries in his chiefdom led to Kama becoming the first chief to convert to Christianity. As such Kama became a great favourite of the missionaries, who were continually to intercede on his behalf for favours from the Colonial State. Kama split from Phato in 1843, the land vacated being taken by the State and given to 'loyal' Mfengu. It is probable that this split led to Phato's participation in the war of 1848.

Further up the coast affairs were no better with the Ndlambe. Mhalla, who had established his claim to the chieftaincy by manipulating witchcraft accusations in about 1826, was faced with the revival of the Mdushane under Qasana, Mdushane's son. Two other of Mdushane's sons, Siyolo and Siwani, were further to split Ndlambe ranks, with Siyolo adopting the side of the belligerents in the war of 1848 and 1850, and Siwani distinguishing himself as one of the most reliable collaborating chiefs after 1848. In the 1840s the Ndlambes were increasingly coming to consist of accretions of Ngqika who had left Sandille in the hope of establishing themselves on better terms under Mhalla. There was thus a strong motive within Ndlambe for not recognising the authority of Sandille. (69)

The 1848 war, the so-called "War of the Axe", was one of the most costly in terms of men, land and cattle. (70) It marked the decision by the Colonial State to attempt to gain direct control of the Xhosa and the supplanting of the chiefs by magistrates and appointed headmen. The war followed the determined efforts of Governor Maitland arbitrarily to revise the existing treaties entered into after the war of 1835, citing 'stock theft' as the reason. (71) Stretch, who had been diplomatic agent with the Ngkika since 1835, was in no doubt as to Maitland's culpability in regard to the treaties:

> "The Acts of Sir P. Maitland decidedly were the cause of the war in 1846 - for after the first

> interview at Beaufort, all the chiefs declared "he smelt of war", and all his subsequent acts confirmed the worst fears of the Caffres." (72)

The early 1840s had been a period of intense drought, and many cattle died and others had to be driven to distant pasturage, which was scarce. Such droughts must always have necessitated expansion and movement. It was precisely this expansion and movement of Xhosa herds that the Colonial State was determined to stop.

Peires has pointed out that the Xhosa always found it necessary to halt fighting in the spring to allow for sowing of the summer harvest. (73) In both the 1835 and 1848 wars they halted belligerent activities in September - the last month in which sowing could be undertaken. To some extent this is in conflict with early observers who felt that they could, if necessary, survive solely off their herds, especially in times of war. (74) However three factors must be taken into account. Firstly, the greatly reduced size of the herds - many having died in the drought of 1842-43 or having been sent away - probably to Sarhili over the Kei for safekeeping. Secondly, the great number of cattle which had been captured and confiscated by the Colonial and Imperial armies, including the Mfengu regiment which was deployed in this war. Many estimates of the number of cattle taken exist. According to Appleyard's account he observed 40 250 head of cattle captured from the Xhosa. (75)

Probably 60 000 head were taken in all. In contrast to this, the Central Board of Relief appointed by Maitland to investigate claims for compensation arising from the war accounted for 66 806 cattle lost to Colonists and 586 096 sheep and 907 horses. (76) Thirdly, this war was the most costly in terms of people killed, partly because it featured one of the only set battles to occur on the frontier, the 'Battle of Gwanga' (a small tributary of the Keiskamma) in which 500 of Umhalla's and Siyolo's men were killed. Peires estimates the overall death rate amongst the Xhosa

as high as 5% of the population, the numbers being swelled by the numbers of women and children who succumbed to starvation because of systematic Colonial assaults on granaries and gardens. Probably 3 500 people died and many others were left destitute (77). In late October 1847 after a year of despoilation Appleyard wrote:

> "Our Troops ... commenced operation against the Gaikas, burning out their country and sweeping through the Amatolas" (78)

Sandille was taken captive and jailed in Grahamstown by Col. Bisset, by much the same underhand methods as Hintsa had been detained in 1835. That this was the case was confirmed when Sir H. Smith arrived on the frontier to replace Henry Pottinger as Governor, (who had previously replaced Maitland) and immediately ordered the release of Sandille (79). The war ended very indecisively. If the Xhosa were not defeated in 1835, then they were also not subordinated politically to the Colony in 1848. The main inroads had been made at the level of the economic substructure which was leading to an intensification of contradictions within the Xhosa formation. Sandille never admitted defeat in 1848, while Maqoma had ceased hostilities in 1846 and Phato had fought on late into 1847. This gives some idea of the lack of real co-operation between the chiefs. In fact most fought relatively independently of each other. In the end, war was brought to a close not by military victory for the Colony but by the economic exhaustion of the Xhosa. (80)

At the conclusion of the war the Ngqika were removed from the area between the Keiskamma and Tyumie Rivers and the division of Victoria proclaimed as part of the Colony. (81) The land between the Keiskamma and the Kei was proclaimed a Crown Colony, to be known as British Kaffraria which was to be ruled by martial law. It was through this structure (British Kaffraria) that the transformation of the Xhosa social formation under the force of conquest and subordination to the Colonial State was to be fought out. Certainly Peires, who is the most authoritative source for

the Xhosa in the first half of the 19th century, is in no doubt that the Xhosa social formation, as it existed at the time of the proclamation of British Kaffraria, bore a remarkably changed appearance to the same formation as it existed fifty years earlier. His conclusion is worth quoting at length:

> "By 1847 ... the Xhosa kingdom had shrunk, and in shrinking had lost vast tracts of its most fertile territory. The Xhosa were driven across the Fish in 1812, out of the Kat river valley in 1829, and right past the Keiskamma in 1847. None of the land which they still held west of the Kei was really secure. No longer did the sons of a chief found new Kingdoms in virgin territory. No longer did the summer pastures guarantee the health and well-being of the people and cattle. The most powerful of the chiefs' sons set up permanently in the summer grazing, (Anta); the less powerful stayed at home as a terror to the community ... Dwellings clustered closer together and not everyone lived near a river. The game was all shot out; the grazing patterns were all disrupted; a drought brought irreversible calamity ... In losing the Ceded Territory, the Xhosa lost much more than their land. Deprived of their means of subsistence many of them were forced into labouring for the very men who had supplanted them." (81)

Perhaps 3 000 men, women and children took employment with Colonists in the Eastern and Western districts of the Colony in the aftermath of the war of 1848. (82)

(1) Peires, J.B. 'A History of the Xhosa 1700 - 1835', Rhodes University M.A. (1976). p. 22 and p. 186. Peires emphasises that in his collaboration with the Colony Ngqika "always thought of the Colony as an equal and an ally and not as a superior whom he served". But at the same time he observes that "Ngqika was not the sort of man capable of saving his honour at the expense of his material and political well-being".

(2) Newmark, D. The South African Frontier, Economic Influences 1652 - 1836, Stanford, (1957). p. 103. In Newmark's opinion "by the end of the 18th Century some Bantu tribes, at least those within and on the borders of the Colony, had, to a considerable extent, already come within the orbit of the exchange economy of the Cape" and he notes the distinct speeding up of the cattle trade in response to Xhosa needs to acquire iron for domestic purposes. (p. 102)

(3) Smith, Sir A. 'Kaffir Historical Notices'. Ms. South African Museum Cape Town.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 174.

(6) There were strong restrictions on the sale of fire-arms, ammunition and liquor and in addition to the beads, at least one "useful" item from an approved list of things such as iron axes, pots, blankets and cloth had to be included in each transaction.

(7) Kay, S. Travels and Researches in Caffraria, London, (1833). p. 87.

(8) Chase, J.C. The Cape of Good Hope, Cape Town. (1843).

(9) Cory, C. The Rise of South Africa, Struik, (1965). Vol. II. p. 179.

(10) Newmark, D. op.cit. p. 68.

(11) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 168. Wilson, M. Oxford History of South Africa, Vol I. Oxford University Press, (1969). p. 234.

(12) Smith, Sir A. op. cit.

(13) Shepard, R. Lovedale South Africa The Story of a Century 1841 - 1941, Lovedale, (1940). p. 47.

(14) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 174.

(15) Evidence of Rev. W. Shaw to 'Select Committee on Aborigines' 1837. Para 1126/27.

(16) Newmark, D. op.cit. p. 154.

(17) Peires, J.B. op.cit. pp. 190-1.

(18) Ibid. p. 197. Moyer, R.A. 'A History of the Mfengu of the Eastern Cape 1815-1865.'. Phd. School of Oriental and African Studies, (1976). p. 73. The AmaNgwane under Matiwane were themselves refugees from Shaka and had been among the chief disruptors of the Hlubi and Zizi. They were finally destroyed in 1828 by a comined Thembu, Gcaleka and Colonist attack, prompted mainly by Col. Somerset who thought they were Zulu forces.

(19) Moyer, R.A. op.cit. p. 14.

(20) This is one of the most insightful points made by Peires, which ought to be developed further in the study of Colonial expansion. Peires observes that "Xhosa were prepared to conform to reasonable Colonial usages (e.g. renting grazing land) and expected the Colonists to conform to some of theirs (giving tribute to chiefs)" pp. 105-106. We have already noted Ngqika's view of his relationship with

Somerset as that between equals. It is undoubtedly a recurring and valid theme, and can be observed not only in the early land disputes of 1819 and 1835 with which Peires deals, but in the attitude towards missionaries and later towards magistrates.

(21) Moyer, R.A. op.cit. p. 109.

(22) Ibid. p. 135. "Ayliff described the trading activities of the Mfengu ... and how some were acquiring considerable wealth" while still in Gcalekaland.

(23) Marx, K. Grundrisse, Penguin, (1973). p. 256.

(24) Sanson, B. in Hammond-Tooke (ed.), Bantu Speaking People of South Africa, 2nd Edition, R.K.P. (1974).

(25) Marx, K. op.cit. p. 99. Later on Marx was to see this unity in terms of the three circuits of capital viz: productive captial, commodity capital and money capital. "The real circuit of industrial capital in its continuity is therefore not only a unified process of circulation and production, but also a unity of all its three circuits. But it can only be such a unity in so far as each different part of the capital runs in succession through the successive phases of the circuit, can pass over from one phase and one functional form into the other; hence industrial capital, as the whole of these parts exists simultaneously in its various phases and functions, and thus describes all three circuits at once" Capital Vol. II. (1978). p. 183.

(26) Palmer, R. and Parsons, N. eds. The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa., London (1977). 'Introduction' by Palmer and Parsons, p. 2. This problem, which we shall return to later, is also to be found in the more contemporary work by Bundy, Phimister and others.

(27) Bundy, C. The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, London (1979); Phimister, I. 'Peasant Production and Underdevelopment in Southern Rhodesia' in Palmer and Parsons (eds.), op.cit. Arrighi has provided the theoretical ground for these studies in his important article 'Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective : A Study of the Proletarianisation of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia', in Arrighi, G. and Saul, J. (eds.), Essays on the Political Economy of Africa. Monthly Review (1973).

(28) This problem, which is one that relates to the gathering of evidence, seems to have been overlooked in the enthusiasm for studying "production" not exchange, and the problems associated with it still need further theoretical investigation. On the purely practical level, it is clear that the Earls Court Motor Show is infinitely more visible than the many enterprises and production processes which precede it!

(29) Marx, K. Capital Vol. II, Penguin, (1978) p. 189.

(30) Frank, A.G. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Monthly Review Press, (1967).

(31) Marx, K. Capital Vol. II, p. 190.

(32) One of the best examples of such work is Gervase Clarence Smith and Richard Moorsam 'Underdevelopment and Class Transformation in Ovamboland 1844-1917' in Palmer and Parsons (eds.), op.cit.

(33) Marx, K. Capital Vol. III. Lawrence and Wishart (1959). p. 332.

(34) Saunders, C. 'The 100 Years War, Some Reflections on African Resistance on the Cape Xhosa Frontier.', in D. Chanaiwa (ed.), Profiles of Self-Determination, Northridge, (1979). "The Commando system permitted the commando to follow the spoor

of stolen cattle to the nearest homestead ... and to take Xhosa cattle in lieu of missing Colonial cattle ... The system was widely abused in replacing cattle that had simply strayed or as a system of outright plunder." p. 207.

(35) Legassick, M. 'The Frontier Tradition in South Africa Historiography', in Marks, S. and Atmore, A. (eds.), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South African London (1980) "Trade and war therefore, were but two sides of the same coin: so-called co-operation and conflict both entered simultaneously". p. 65.

(36) Saunders, C. 'The Annexation of the Transkeian Territories 1872-1895.' D. Phil. Oxford, (1972). de Kiewet, C.W. The Imperial Factor, Cass. (1937). p. 157.

(37) Macmillan, W.M. Bantu Boer and Briton : The Making of the South African Native Problem, Oxford, (1963), p. 86. The value of hides and skins exported rose from 37 454 pounds annually in 1826-30 to 62 829 pounds in 1831-35.

(38) Rush, D. 'Aspects of the Growth of Trade and Development of Ports in the Cape Colony 1795-1882.' Unpub. M.A., UCT (1972). Table VI. p. 26.

(39) Ibid. Total Domestic Product Exported is derived by subtracting from Total Exports the value of landed goods re-exported from the Cape. The value of this re-export trade was steady but increasing slowly; occasionally the value of goods re-exported exceeded the value of domestic goods exported.

(40) Morris, M. op.cit. (1979) "Commodity production in the countryside did therefore exist - being the most highly developed in the Cape where capitalist social relationships were clearly emerging." p. 3.

(41) Peires, J.B. Ch.10. Draft Chapters Phd.

(42) H.A. 19, 'Parliamentary Select Committee on Kaffir War Compensation 1860.'

(43) Ibid.

(44) In Chapter 1 above we delineated the dialectic of expansion and struggle which centres around the provision of land by the chiefs for the establishment of new homesteads, with their own garden lands and sufficient pasturage and hunting grounds. In the 1820s these struggles intensified as the effects of a phase of centralisation began to result in the corresponding centripetal tendencies (decentralisation/ disestablishment).

(45) Smith, Sir A. op.cit.

(46) Childs, N.T. 'The Geography of the Bedford, Adelaide, Ft. Beaufort, Stockenstrom and Victoria East Magisterial Districts.', M.A. Rhodes (1971). p. 59. Childs explains that sourveld grasses such as Themeda Trianda loose their nutritive value as winter approaches because the protein, carbohydrates and fats are used up in the formation of seeds and the mineral salts return to the roots, while the remaining foodstuffs are enveloped in cellulose and lignin. In this form they are unpalatable and indigestible to animals.

(47) Ibid. p. 67.

(48) Smith, Sir A. op.cit. para. 123. In a questionnaire circulated by Smith the missionary Shaw estimates the total population at 114 000.

(49) Peires, J.B. op.cit. pp. 208-212. A son of Ngeno was shot and killed in 1825, the death of Chungwe was still freshly remembered, Siku a brother of Ndlambe was shot dead in 1830

and Magugu a petty Ndlambe chief was captured. Brownlee, who was a supporter of Nqeno fully supports that the son of Nqeno was shot in cold blood, while some of his father's racing oxen were being taken by a Commando, and that this son was actually the Great Son and heir to Nqeno. See Brownlee, C. Reminiscences of Kafir Life and History, 2nd ed. Lovedale Press, (1916). p. 331.

(50) Justus (Pseud.) The Wrongs of the Kaffir Nation, London, (1937). p. 166. Beverley's report is supported by another missionary, James Clark, who in dispatches to the Colonial Office confirmed these views. Macmillan op.cit. p. 94.

(51) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 248.

(52) Tshatshu (Tzatzoe) told the Select Committe on Aborigines (1837) that the amaNtinde assisted the Colonists for ± 3 weeks and that he received 120 head of cattle for his force of 400 men, "many of my people got nothing" he said. It seems clear that his support, as in all these cases, was motivated by the need to acquire cattle in order to retain his following, see para. 4772-4783. It is also possible that Phato's non-participation may be linked to the benefits that his people were receiving from Colonial trade.

(53) Ayliff, J. and Whiteside, J. History of the Abambo, Transkei (1912) p. 32. Ayliff claims that they left with "not less than 15 000 cattle". Monica Wilson in the Oxford History of South Africa, Vol. I estimates 22 000 head were taken. p. 249.

(54) Moyers, R.A. op.cit. p. 144.

(55) D'Urban, despatch May 3rd 1835, reproduced in Ayliff and Whitesi de op.cit. pp. 28-30.

(56) De Kiewet, op.cit. p. 156.

(57) Peires, J.B. Draft Chapters p. 261.

(58) Anon, The House of Mosenthal - A Brief History of a Century of Progress, Port Elizabeth (1945).

(59) Geldenhuys, S.M. 'A Study of the development of the Wool Industry of East London, The Position of the City as a Wool port and its Relation to its Wool Hinterland.' Honours Dissertation UNISA (1952) p. 19.

(60) Bain, A.G. Journal of Andrew Geddes Bain. (ed.) M.H. Lister, van Riebeeck Society Reprint C.T. (1949) p. 168.

(61) Ibid.

(62) Kay, S. Travels and Researches in Kaffraria, London (1833) p. 86.

(63) Bain, A.G. op.cit. p. 186.

(64) Ibid. Appendix Letter from Bain to Grahamstown Journal July 1836.

(65) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 249.

(66) For a biography of Sarhili see Soga, J.H. Ama-Xosa : Life and Customs, Lovedale, (1931). pp. 99-123. Soga believes that the circumstance of the death of Sarhili's father (Hintsa) "affected Kreli during the whole of his life ... and Kreli could never overcome his distrust of Europeans." p. 100.

(67) Brownlee, C. Reminiscences of Kafir Life and History Second edition. Lovedale, (1976). p. 290.

(68) Ibid. p. 294. "Sandille was greatly under the influence of young men of his own age, who in many cases looked rather to benefiting themselves and their chiefs by fines and

confiscation than to giving decisions in accordance with justice."

(69) Peires, J.B. op.cit. p. 192.

(70) For a good account see, Appleyard, Rev. J.W., The War of the Axe and the Xhosa Bible, C. Struik, Cape Town, (1971).

(71) Peires attributed this frontier war to "naked aggression by the Colony. Behind the incident of the Axe lurked settler land greed and the unilateral Maitland treaties." op.cit. p. 327. See also Macmillan op.cit. p. 290.

(72) Correspondence between C.L. Stretch (late diplomatic Agent to the Gaika Tribe of Kaffirs) and the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Colonial Government of Cape of Good Hope. Port Elizabeth (1851) p. 14.

(73) Peires op.cit. (1981).

(74) Smith, Sir A. op.cit.

(75) Appleyard, op.cit., p. 42, p. 86, p. 92, p. 95, p. 102, p. 104, p. 105, p. 106, p. 107, p. 108, p. 109, p. 111.

(76) These claims were naturally exaggerated in many cases. Sir H. Smith himself estimated that all claims could be reduced by a third on aggregate. This would make the real loss about 46 745 cattle.

(77) Peires, J.B. op.cit. (1981) p.346.

(78) Appleyard, J.W. op.cit. p. 111.

(79) Brownlee, C. op.cit. p. 294.

(80) Macmillan, W.M. op.cit. p. 305.

(81) The district of Victoria occupied some of the area of the present Victoria East.

(82) C.O. 6155, Census of the Gaika District, 1848, in which 1 651 people from the Ngqika district alone, are stated as being in employment in the Colony.

CHAPTER 3

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF ARTICULATION OF MODES OF PRODUCTION

I The "Cheap Labour Power" Thesis and the Development of Capitalism in South Africa

In looking at the period preceding the formation of British Kaffraria in 1848 we have concentrated on the expansion of the agricultural and commercial economy of the Cape. It has also been suggested that these changes, initiated mainly by merchant capital, had a 'transforming effect' on the mode of production of the Xhosa social formation.

It is now necessary to try, theoretically, to conceptualise these effects and the subsequent 'transforming effects' in greater detail. In seeing the history of the 19th century expansion of the Cape Colony as having wrought a 'transformation' of the Xhosa social formation in the face of this Colonial conquest, there is an implied criticism of a range of scholarship on South Africa.

The first attempt to conceptualise the interaction of the capitalist economy of South Africa and the lineage based economy of the indigenous African social formation, was in the seminal work of Wolpe and Legassick. (1) Wolpe tried to establish that a break occurred in the 20th century in the relationship between the expanding capitalist economy and the increasingly impoverished reserves. For Wolpe, there occurred in the 1930s a sharp decline in the productive capacity of the reserves. (2) This decline he saw as marking a change in:

> "the nature of exploitation, and transfers the major contradiction from the relationship between different modes of production to the relations of production within capitalism." (3)

This change in the locus of the contradiction, from one between two modes of production - capitalist and pre-capitalist - to one within a unified capitalist mode, Wolpe saw as the historical reason behind the shift from the 'segregation' policies of the Pact Government, to the 'apartheid' policies of the Nationalist regime.

For Wolpe, the continued existence of the African 'Reserves' was the condition for a major factor facilitating South Africa's industrial expansion. They served to maintain the rate of surplus value (profit), and capital accumulation, by suppressing wage levels. In the first phase of industrial expansion (associated with the policy of segregation), the Reserves performed this function through the contribution of their productive capacity in providing part of the subsistence requirements of workers. In the second phase, in which (for Wolpe) production had fallen away as a major factor, the Apartheid State applied sufficient coercion to use the Reserves as rural sites for the reproduction of a politically divided and fragmented working class.

In the second phase the Reserves functioned to inhibit the struggle to raise wage levels to those comparable with other developed capitalist countries elsewhere. (4) Wolpe's economic arguments were supported by Legassick, who provided a more general analysis of 20th century class struggles in terms of the break down of "vestiges of rural bargaining power" and the growth of "extra economic coercion." (5)

In this theoretical perspective, the two stages of South African economic development, - segregation and apartheid - are both derived from the basic need of capital accumulation: to maintain the rate of surplus value, this being the prime condition for the sustained growth of the capitalist mode of production. All that is held to differ between the two 'stages', is the means which the capitalist class (here more or less identified with the State) used to achieve this end. The policy of the State is therefore derived in an instrumental manner from the needs of capitalist

expansion. The specifics of racist ideology are thereby explained as functional to capitalist growth, as well as the actual realities which are legitimised by these ideologies - specifically the migrant labour system.

The migrant labour system assumes a particularly important place in Wolpe's explanation of the growth of the South African economy. For Wolpe, capitalist development initially required the suppression of wage levels because of the extremely labour intensive nature of deep level mining which developed early in the history of the gold mines of the Witwatersrand. The migratory labour system fulfilled this need, because the worker derived part of his subsistence from the domestic production in the Reserves - his family was housed and their other social overhead costs were met from within the Reserve economy. These costs did not form part of the determination of the value of a migrant worker's labour power. The Reserves lowered the cost of the reproduction of the worker and thus served to lower wages.

For Wolpe, the goal of state policy in the 20th century was to ensure that production in the Reserves remained low enough to force rural workers to migrate to the urban centres for employment, but not to let it fall so low that it ceased to provide the essential supplement to wages earned in the capitalist sector. However the effect of capitalist development in the urban centres of South Africa led to the continuing decline in the productivity of the Reserves. (6) It was therefore the economic decline in the Reserves which, for Wolpe, was above all, responsible for the inadequacy of the segregation policy of the Pact Government from 1924 onwards:

> "In South Africa, the development of capitalism has been bound up with, first, the deterioration of the productive capacity and then, with increasing rapidity, the destruction of the pre-capitalist societies. In the earlier period of capitalism (approximately 1870 to the 1930s), the rate of surplus value and hence the rate of capital

> accumulation depended above all upon the maintenance of the pre-capitalist relations of production in the Reserve economy" (7)

There is, therefore, in the thesis of "Cheap Labour Power" a distinct periodisation of the history of the interaction of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production into two phases, i.e.

(i) 1870 - 1930s
(ii) Post 1930s

For Wolpe, the development of the South African economy in the first period is clearly very closely influenced by the evolution of the interaction between capitalism and the indigenous pre-capitalist economies. In order to sustain the importance placed on the subsidisation of capitalist development by production in the Reserves, it was necessary for Wolpe to present a theoretical formulation of the nature of the Reserve economy. However in his original article, and subsequently, Wolpe has failed to develop a theoretically convincing analysis of the "pre-capitalist mode of production" which is presumed to have prevailed in the Reserves up to 1930s.

Indeed, the main criticism that may be made of the conceptualisation of the interaction of the capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production in "Cheap Labour Power", is that it fails to take account of the nature of the pre-capitalist mode of production at all. In so doing, certain serious distortions are brought into the overall picture which emerges of the model of capitalist development in South Africa. The role of social classes in the "Reserve Economy" in influencing the course of its articulation with the capitalist mode of production, is left entirely out of the picture. This, in turn, occurs because the determination of policy (e.g. the Pact Government) is assumed to be the inevitable outcome of objective economic processes and the role of class struggle is not considered at the political and economic level.

While Wolpe did not primarily intend to explain the structure of the economy in the rural Reserves it is methodologically unacceptable to make an entity, e.g. "the Reserve economy" a major part of a theoretical exposition when the nature of the object in question is left unexplicated. For Wolpe to have attempted to conceptualise the class structure of the Reserve economy, it would have been necessary for him to examine the nature of the mode of production of the indigenous social formations as they were prior to the impact of conquest, colonialism and capitalism. It would then have become immediately apparent that there exists an important rupture and discontinuity between the economy of those fragmented bits of territory which become the "Reserve Areas" under the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, and the indigenous pre-capitalist modes of production.

The object of the present study is to investigate in detail the course of this rupture and the transformation of the pre-capitalist mode of production that occurred.

There is no recognition, however, of any such transformation in the thesis of "Cheap Labour Power". The "Reserve Economy" functions as a theoretical "black box" which produces certain effects, but its structure and contents are unknown, except for the most superficial external wrapping. Because of the central function of the "Reserve Economy" in his exposition, Wolpe was forced to make certain theoretical assumptions about the pre-capitalist mode of production which are extremely misleading.

Firstly, it is incorrectly assumed that there was a strong continuity between the pre-capitalist mode of production of the pre-Colonial era and the "Reserve economy" which prevailed up to the 1930s. For Wolpe:

> "What must be stressed, however, is that in the period of capitalist development (from say 1870), African redistributive economies constituted the predominant mode, of rural existence for a substantial (for much of the period a majority), but continuously decreasing number of people". (8)

In discussing the concept of the "articulation of modes of production" and in the subsequent analysis presented in this study, it will be shown that there was an effective discontinuity between the structure of the pre-capitalist mode of production and that of the "Reserve economy" which subsequently emerged. Secondly, even assuming the integrity of the so-called "redistributive economy", Wolpe did not put forward any coherent theory of the pre-capitalist mode of production. He presented, instead, a few a-priori assertions:

(1) that there existed land which was held communally by the community and was worked by social units based on kinship, and

(2) that the products of labour were distributed not by exchange, but directly by means of allocation through the kinship units in accordance with certain rules of distribution. (9)

In Chapter 1 above it was shown that the lineage mode of production in the Xhosa social formation was a complex structure with specific laws of development unique to its own conditions of existence. Legassick, with his background in 19th century history, was one of the first to question the adequacy of the concept of the pre-capitalist mode of production and the transformation undergone by these modes:

> "what Wolpe's initial argument ... does not take into account is the prior articulation of redistributive modes in South Africa both with mercantile capitalism and with post-slave agricultural capitalism in the Cape. Certainly these forms of articulation were acting to dominate and dissolve the redistributive mode already." (10)

The considerable impact that mercantile capitalism had on the Xhosa up to 1848 has already been shown in Chapter 2 above. The experiences after 1848 were to be many times more intense in their impact on the Xhosa - resulting in military and political defeat and the death of the old Xhosa social formation and mode of production.

The inadequacy of Wolpe's conceptualisation of the pre-capitalist mode of production, and the real course of its interaction with the developing capitalist mode, was not purely fortuitous. It has already been suggested that lack of a proper awareness of the place of social classes and class struggle was one root of the problem. The other may be found in the logical relationship which the thesis of "Cheap Labour Power" assumes to exist between the political form of white "racial" domination in the South African state and the requirements of capitalist development.

There is within the arguments of the "Cheap Labour Power" thesis a certain tendency to explain the particular racial form assumed by capitalist development in South African as having arisen from economic necessity in the development process. Specifically, that capitalist development required "cheap" (migrant) labour - a necessity induced in the fist instance by the labour intensive nature of deep level mining. While the importance of the latter development cannot be denied, it is impossible to explain the persistence of migrant labour, and the continued existence of the "Reserve economy" in the 20th century and the policies of the State to enhance that system, purely on the basis of the needs of mining capital.

Legassick, without actually formulating the objection in precise theoretical terms, clarified Wolpe's basic thesis and pointed to some of the difficulties associated with it. Commenting on the work of F. Johnstone and Wolpe he wrote that their paradigm:

> "takes as its starting point exploitations rather than domination, so that domination comes to be the form in which a particular set of exploitative relation of production is reproduced." (11)

In adopting this view of the primacy of exploitation in explaining the system of racial domination in South Africa, however, it is not so much the system of domination that is explained, as the <u>necessity</u> for the system to exist if the rate of surplus value and capitalist development is to persist. In short, the argument is inevitably <u>teleological</u>. To quote Legassick once more, the

policies of segregation and apartheid are seen "as the means for maximising the rate of surplus value for capital in South Africa". (12)

This weakness has been succinctly commented on by Morris, who, in his work on the development of capitalism in agriculture, has emphasised the transformation of class relations as a process of class struggle. He specifically criticized the implicit teleology in the work of Wolpe, Legassick and Johnstone:

> "Arguing backward historically, a reverse historicism, one could say that the articulation of modes of production and the partial proletarianisation of the migrant worker was from the start a necessary consequence of accumulation in the mining industry. Ultimately, however, the problem with such teleogical answers is that the actual course of the class struggle, indeed of history itself, is fundamentally eliminated. For what was, was and furthermore could only be". (13)

It will be argued below that the source of the difficulty in Wolpe's position stems from his faulty concept of the articulation of modes of production, (the interaction of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production and the transformation of the former under the development of the latter), in which the pre-capitalist mode of production is held to be an essentially passive vehicle providing certain inputs for the development of the capitalist mode - which inputs are determined by the latter's requirements. It is a fault which, it will be argued, has important implications for the analysis of capitalist development and State intervention in the areas of non-capitalist production in the 19th and 20th centuries. It is therefore necessary to look more closely at the question of articulation itself.

II The Origins of the Problem - Against an 'Inputs' Theory of Articulation

In introducing this study, and considering the lineage mode of production in Nguni formations, the concept of the mode of production was set out. It was shown that the basic forces and relations of production are defined by a set of elements, the arrangement of which depended crucially on the form of the separation of the direct producers from the means of production in the production unit. It was observed that the form of separation produces necessary political and ideological correlates regulating appropriation, the intensity of exploitation and the establishment of new productive units. These political and ideological conditions have to be continually secured if the mode of production is to be reproduced. Thus the economic conditions of the mode of production are inseparable from their conditions of reproduction.

The process of reproduction, of securing the political, ideological and economic conditions of the functioning of the mode of production is also the site of the major class struggles which determine the history of the social formation. It is always in the process of opposing the pretensions of chiefs, lords, and other embodiments of State power seeking to perpetuate systems of exploitation, that the history of particular social formations are written. These struggles are ultimately determined by the form of separation/non-separation of the direct producers from the means of production.

There are thus two basic elements of the mode of production: the productive unit and the conditions for the reproduction of the productive unit, or its dynamics. The dynamics are crucial to perpetuation over time of the separation of the direct producers from the means of production in the production unit, which characterises the mode of production - in short for the reproduction of social classes which form an integral part of the mode of production. In the light of this, the conceptualisation

of the 'articulation of modes of production' has to be able to give a theoretical specification of the place of the class relations involved in the articulation. Without this the concept of articulation must become teleological, as well as economistic and reductionist.

Wolpe's argument is specifically designed to show that the existence of migrant labour corresponded to the needs of capital accumulation under the hegemony of imperialist mining capital. In this, he is in fact following a tendency within the literature on modes of production to see the structure of the articulation in terms of the inputs which the pre-capitalist mode of production provides for the capitalist mode. The logic of this analysis can be seen to be basically teleological; that we can identify the form of dominance of the capitalist mode of production in the social formation by reference to what capitalism has "taken" from the pre-capitalist mode, so that here labour, there commodities and other raw materials, elsewhere land etc, form the object of capitalism's need - and the conditions of fulfilment of this need somehow become the metronome of history.

This emphasis is consonant with a variety of different treatments of the articulation theme. Thus Frank, Wolpe ,and later Banaji have seen the operation of an undifferentiated capitalism which subordinates non-capitalist elements to the laws of motion of capitalism. (14) This is made possible precisely by concentrating on the inputs which the capitalist world market obtains from the pre-capitalist mode of production, while at the same time reducing the non-capitalist elements to the level of units of production only.

Wolpe and Banaji, for example, disagree fundamentally on the question of the constitution of a mode of production. For Banaji, the mode of production refers to determinate laws of motion which define heterogeneous relations of production. Nevertheless, they both analyse the relationship between capitalism and pre-capitalism, solely in terms of the enterprise, the productive unit, and in terms of that which is squeezed out of the

pre-capitalist productive units for use within the capitalist mode of production. The real difference between them is that where Banaji is primarily concerned with petty commodity production and the subordination of this production to capitalism, Wolpe is concerned with the 'production' of wage labour for capitalist enterprise within the non-capitalist enterprise. (15) Banaji's specific error is his failure to conceptualise the conditions for the reproduction of the pre-capitalist mode of production or how these conditions were displaced by colonialism. Thus, for Banaji, the Colonial period is characterised by a sort of inter-relationship of enterprises (articulation!):

> "an enterprise of formally independent small producers functioning according to its own labour-process, inherited from the conditions of a patriarchal economy, and according to its own economic conceptions, also patriarchal in their determinations, but no longer as a totally independent unit of production. The social process of production incorporating the immediate labour-process of the small peasant enterprise is governed by the aims of capitalist production; namely by the compulsion to produce surplus-value. Within this social process of production dominated by the capitalist enterprise, the economic conceptions of the small households, and their formal possession of a portion of the means of subsistence enter as regulating elements only as a function of the law of surplus-value production." (16)

Nowhere does Banaji conceptualise the process of transition by means of which this subordination and incorporation of pre-capitalist production units into the relations of production of the dominant capitalism was achieved. It is for this reason that he cannot conceptualise the reality of the articulation of modes of production i.e. that the Colonial social formation consists generally of a multiplicity of class forces, not all of which are regulated directly by the laws of motion of capitalism.

For Banaji, in the end, the domination of capitalism is purely formal and in this sense Wolpe is quite right to argue that he reintroduces the dual-economy thesis, which is inadequate precisely because of its failure to conceptualise the articulation of modes of production.

This method of posing the question, based on units of production and on the form of inputs from the pre-capitalist mode of production cannot answer the question of how the dominant social relations which prevail in the areas of non-capitalist enterprise were determined historically. Their survival can, on this assumption, only be attributed to the needs of capital - an attribution which effectively blocks all futher historical analysis. For Wolpe, as for Banaji, the question of why, and indeed of how, capitalism failed to eliminate the non-capitalist elements and to conserve them instead, remain a mystery. The form of current world economy, the forces holding advanced and backward areas together, as well as the direction of change, cannot be conceptualised within this limited framework, except by resorting to labelling capitalism as a system which always develops in a 'restricted and uneven' manner. The mechanisms of this restriction, as well as the totality of forces working to undermine it, cannot be analysed, because the precondition for such analysis is to understand the class struggle of the masses involved.

While it is impossible here to present a comprehensive survey of all the different critiques of the concept of articulation of modes of production, the point which should be emphasised for present purposes, is that widely differing conceptualisations of the mode of production have been consistent with the adoption of a reductionist and teleological understanding of the relationship between the capitalist and the pre-capitalist modes of production. This has usually resulted in the obscuration of the importance of social classes in the pre-capitalist mode of production, and their part in determining the manner in which pre-capitalist elements are incorporated into the structure of the dominant capitalism.

In further developing the concept of articulation of modes of production, however, it is necessary to take into account the work of P.P. Rey, whose perspective will be seen to lead directly to our criticism of Wolpe. (17) For Rey, articulation was essentially linked to the "problematic hitherto known as the transition to capitalism", and Rey, more than any other theorist, emphasised the role of the indigenous social classes in determining the nature of the articulation. As Rey put it:

> "the idea of two modes of production, one of which establishes its domination over the other ... not as a static given, but as a process, that is to say a combat between the two modes of production, with the confrontations and alliances which such a combat implies: confrontation and alliances essentially between the classes which these modes of production define." (18)

Rey provided a theoretical periodisation of the stages of the process of the articulation of modes of production:

(1) An initial link in the sphere of exchange, in which the interaction with capitalism reinforces the pre-capitalist mode.
(2) Capitalism 'takes root', subordinating the pre-capitalist mode but still making use of it.
(3) The total disappearance of the pre-capitalist mode, even in agriculture.

The third stage has not yet been reached outside the capitalist centres. (19) In the first period, for Rey, the influence of the capitalist mode of production "is exercised through the instrumentality of the dominant instance of the lineage social formation itself; and this remains no less dominated by the lineage mode of production." (20) In the second period capitalism "takes root" - to quote Rey again - "it is a matter of using the economic basis characteristic of lineage society to establish the conditions of transition to capitalism." (21) This is the period of colonialism, in which the imperialist centres expend vast sums of money to conquer and subordinate the peripheral social

formations. This period is, for Rey, a transitional stage, and it should therefore be compared with the transition from feudalism to capitalism in the metropolitan centres of capitalist development.

Foster-Carter, in his analysis of Rey, shows that the crucial difficulty with his concept of articulation is that it sought to show, in a purely orthodox Marxist way, the "homoficence" of capitalism. (22) That is, that the development of capitalism has the same effect in the peripheries of the world economy as it had in the centres where it originally developed. If this is so, then the "transition phase", which certainly starts with colonialism, must still be underway. Nowhere in the Third World, to date, has the development of capitalism proceeded to eliminate the vestiges of the old mode of production in a way comparable with the elimination of feudal relations in Western Europe.

This consideration leads Foster-Carter to conclude that there is something wrong with Rey's conceptualisation of articulation. Where capitalism is installed by force from the outside, a fundamentally different transition ensues from that which characterised the development of capitalism out of the interaction of the elements of the feudal mode of production. (23) For Foster-Carter, the role of violence in the initial establishment of capitalism in the Third World, in forcibly appropriating land, labour and raw materials, distinguishes the articulation of modes of production in the periphery from the articulation which characterised the spontaneous development of capitalism.

Rey stands in danger of becoming the victim of an endless transition in which all social formations are held to consist of an "articulation of modes of production". For Rey, "articulation" applies only to the transition phase before capitalism becomes exclusive. Yet the transition in the peripheral economies of the Third World seemingly never ends. On the contrary, the non-capitalist elements are reinforced, re-organised and incorporated at a higher level. How can this be explained, if capitalism acts everywhere in the same way and if there are not, in fact, deep-seated causes for the blocking of the productive

forces of capitalism expanding throughout the social formations it dominates? This Rey does not answer except by reference to an eternal transition.

However on the nature of the transition phase itself (stage 2) Rey has provided very important guidelines. Specifically he has argued:

> "that the transition phase can only be understood on the basis of the internal characteristics of the mode of production dominant before the intrusion of capital. The social formation has to bring forth its own form of the transition towards capitalism. Thus is the transitional social formation subject to a double history, where the contradiction bursts forth between two orders of necessity: on the one hand the history of capital itself, which for the most part is written outside such social formations; on the other hand the history of the transition, specific to the modes of production which are there articulated." (24)

This view appears to be entirely correct; it allows for the growth of capitalism without artificially eliminating the dynamics of the pre-capitalist mode of production in determining the nature of the articulation. The step which Rey fails to take, is to recognise that the transition phase does in fact come to an end, while, as he correctly maintains, sustaining the articulation. (25) However the articulation should no longer be seen as a question of sustaining the pre-capitalist mode of production, but precisely the creature of the transition; a set of relations and forces of production and their dynamics which complement the dynamics (laws of motion) of the capitalist mode of production. It is precisely this mutation which accounts for the deformed, restricted, uneven and extroverted nature of the capitalist mode of production in the Third World. (26) The path to full capitalist development is blocked by the form of capitalist relations of production themselves which have come to include aspects of non-capitalist relations in their reproduction. The immediate problem is to specify how this system was created.

Bradby, in her research on the destruction of pre-capitalist modes of production, has seen the teleological problem in arguing from the needs of capitalism. She shows that the global expansion of capitalism in its Colonial phase cannot be explained by reference to such supposed "needs"; whether they be the need for an external market (Luxemborg), the need to export capital (Lenin), or the need to acquire cheap labour (Meillasoux, Wolpe). (27) For Bradby, the question of 'needs' can only be determined conjuncturally:

> "Capitalism has different needs of pre-capitalist economies at different stages of development, which arise from specific historical circumstances e.g. raw materials, land, labour power and at times of crisis, markets" (28)

Bradby has, however, criticised the idea that violence is a necessary concommitant of capitalist development arising "from the outside" in the colonised formations. For her, the use of force is purely a contingent phenomenon with no important, theoretically justifiable, reasons for being placed at the centre of the theory of articulation of modes of production. She has argued:

> "Force is used when either land, raw materials or labour power is needed quickly in certain places by capital ... The role of force is not in introducing commodity exchange, but in forcing people to give up natural resources by any other means than a fair exchange ... the use of force arises out of the concrete needs in different branches of capitalism at different times, and not out of any necessity." (29)

While it may be conceded that force and violence used against the independent social formations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America depended upon the conjuncture of capitalist development at a particular point in time, this does not lead to the conclusion that violence is purely contingent.

Indeed, Bradby's argument against the necessity of force in the installation of capitalism in fact supports the latter contention. What she shows is that when other means are available such as the importation of slave labour from China, then these alternatives will be used if the costs of using direct military force are too great. But this only shows that capitalism, in its Colonial phases, makes labour power an internationally mobile commodity. In the end the theoretical justification for the necessity of force resides in the fact that the internal dynamics to provide for the creation of a proletariat, or the provision of raw materials for capitalist exploitation, do not exist within the mode of production of the pre-capitalist social formation - as was the case with European feudalism. Capitalist relations of production could only begin to develop within these social formations, once a large part of the population has been deprived of access to the means of production and the old ruling classes had been brought under the control of a Colonial bureaucracy. If force was only the result of capitalism needing specific things "quickly", as Bradby would have it, then it must be true that capitalism was everywhere in a hurry!

The view that the origins of capitalism within the social formations of Western Europe have to be distinguished from those cases in which capitalism arrived from the outside, is borne out by the analysis of the former transition itself. Robert Brenner, in an important article, has argued that:

> "the historical problem of the origins of capitalist development in Europe comes down to that of the process of 'self- transformation' of class relations from serfdom to free wage labour - that is of course, the class struggles by which this transformation took place." (30)

By contrast, in the social formations of the Third World there was no "self-transformation" of class relations to produce a proletariat and initiate a process of capital formation and accumulation. It was precisely the incorporation of the formations into the world capitalist system, and the forcible destruction of the pre-capitalist modes of production that initiated the process of transition.

III The Transformation of the Dynamics of the Mode of Production

The importance of focusing on the role of violence is that it redirects attention to the ongoing consequences of violence in the transformation of the pre-capitalist mode of production with the growth of capitalism. It has been argued above that the transformation inaugurated by conquest marks a different course of development - one which produces only a partial development of the capitalist forces of production and retains non-capitalist elements as a permanent feature of its development. How is this to be conceptualised? Foster-Carter, when considering this problem in relation to the work of Rey, directed attention to an observation by Balibar which he believed to be of great importance. Dealing specifically with conquest Balibar observed that the 'event':

> "constituted by the meeting of these societies and 'Western' societies in transition to capitalism, (in conquest, colonization or the various forms of commercial connection) is obviously part of the diachrony of those societies, since it determines - more or less brutally - a transformation of their mode of production: but it is no part of these societies' dynamics. This event in their history is produced in the time of their diachrony without being produced in the time of their dynamics."(31)

What Balibar is here suggesting is precisely that conquest, foreign domination in the Colonial phase, inaugurates, relatively quickly, a change in the mode of production considered purely at the level of relations of forces of production. There occurs a change in the structure of the elements of the labour process, and hence in the structure of the productive unit, and in the very nature of the production carried on. This is quite clearly a change at the level of the mode of production. Because of the nature of these changes as transforming rather than eliminating the pre-capitalist mode of production, elements of the dynamics of the pre-capitalist mode of production persist and are perpetuated - the dynamics being those political, ideological and economic

relations which govern the reproduction of the productive units and relate the agents in them together in a determinate class structure. (32)

We can now go further and suggest, on the basis of Balibar's observation, that not only is the mode of production transformed, but the dynamics themselves are transformed, albeit more slowly, in conformity with the restructured non-capitalist elements in the articulation of modes of production. Balibar has thus provided a valuable periodisation of the manner in which colonialism initiates a transitional conjuncture which goes through two distinct phases. First, the transformation of the structure of production, the productive unit in a direction ultimately dictated by the interests of capitalism whatever these may be. Secondly, a transformation of the ideological, political and economic relationships which structured the reproduction of the production units of the old pre-capitalist mode of production. The formation of social classes cannot be determined solely at the level of the production unit, and it seems, therefore, entirely correct to distinguish between the transformation of production and the transformation of the basis of the social classes defined by these production units. Furthermore, it is this second transformation, which conserves many pre-capitalist appearances, that is primarily responsible for the persistence of areas of non-capitalist enterprises as a permanent feature of the structure of peripheral social formations.

It is through the continuation of the dominance of elements of the old ruling classes of the pre-capitalist mode of production that many individual aspects of the old mode of production persist and thus 'conserve' the appearance of the old mode in the new structures which emerge under the impact of colonialism. Without reference to this second transformation, which can only be analysed on the basis of a theory of the pre-capitalist mode of production, the whole process of articulation is rendered unintelligible. This process, which in fact actively conserves the modified non-capitalist enterprise even as the pre-capitalist relations and forces of production are disappearing, is crucially

linked to the political level of the colonial-imperialist state and cannot therefore be deduced purely from the 'objective needs' of capital accumulation. As was suggested above, it is only by developing a theory of articulation that is able to specify the structure of class relations within the non-capitalist arena, and their forms of dependence on the capitalist mode of production, that the process of class struggle thrown up by the articulation of modes of production, can be analysed. Any attempt to avoid analysis of such struggle must inevitably result in an economistic theory subordinated to the needs of a pre-given capitalism.

The word "transformation" does not really denote a concept which can be applied in the theory of modes of production. It denotes a difficulty that has beset historical materialism in coming to terms with the problem of transition from one mode of production to another. The reason for the word continuing to be meaningful is that it carries, in untheorised form, the implication of internal process - of something relating to the basic laws of motion of the mode of production. By referring to the 'transformations', the assertion of new functions, which override their received historical form, seems to be implied. It is at these effects which one must look in theorising the nature of a transitional conjuncture.

Taylor, in his survey of the theory of modes of production, has most clearly specified the nature of the articulation of modes of production as a transitional state:

> "In general terms, then, the reality that has previously been approached via the notion of 'underdevelopment' or 'modernising society' will be analysed here from within historical materialism as a social formation that is 'transitional'. The specificity of this transition lies in it being brought about largely by capitalist penetration, and more particularly by one of its forms, imperialist penetration, which as we shall see, has as its specific effect a separation of direct producers from their means of production" (33)

This emphasis correctly focuses attention on the way in which the impact of Colonial conquest, finding in the pre-capitalist mode of production a particular form of separation of direct producers from the means of production, proceeds to interpose its own form of separation, by superior force. This may be achieved through land confiscations, through the confiscation of other assets such as cattle, or through the use of forced labour and taxation. At the same time the dominant class forces within the conquered social formation are able to utilise whatever opportunities may present themselves to continue the process of internal appropriation and accumulation from the productive units, even though the basis on which those units generate surpluses for appropriation has begun to change.

Taylor has provided a very clear statement of the economic basis of articulation. He correctly argues (following Rey) that the early years of commodity exchange (in which capitalist commodities are exchanged for the surplus product of the pre-capitalist mode of production) reinforced the pre-existing relations of production. (34) He then describes the process whereby the consumption of capitalist commodities becomes necessary for the non-capitalist enterprises. (35) Once such commodities become necessary, then acquiring the means for procuring them also becomes necessary. Hence the production of commodities for the capitalist market becomes necessary. A clear case of articulation conceived solely at the level of forces of production. Productive activity and the structure of the production unit is transformed in the direction of petty commodity production for the capitalist markets. The basic idea presented in this way makes out a strong theoretical reason for expecting the pre-capitalist enterprise to respond to the existence of a market for its commodities, and to produce for it.

However, in restricting the concept of the articulation of modes of production to the level of the transformation of the productive unit, it is really only echoing, in more complex ways, the basic idea put forward by Giovanni Arrighi in his seminal article on

proletarianisation in the then Rhodesia (36). Arrighi argued that cash requirements changed from being "discretionary" to being "necessary". When the need for capitalist commodities, or the cash wherewith to aquire them, becomes necessary there are only two means of obtaining them - either through the sale of commodities produced within the pre-capitalist mode of production or through the sale of labour power. Arrighi then argued that as the "effort price" of participation in the produce market rose, so wage labour became the only alternative. (37)

Arrighi's conceptualisation of the origins of proletarianisation are consistent with the first level transformation of the mode of production in a transitional conjuncture. It is necessary, however, to go beyond Arrighi, and to show how the class relations of the mode of production were transformed under the impact of the dynamic that Taylor and others have outlined. This is a change that has to be analysed in terms of the redefinition of the basic labour processes, the reconstitution of the productive unit, and the transformation of the form of separation of the direct producers from the means of production. For Arrighi, as for the reductionist view of articulation, there is only the capitalist market, the tribal-peasant producer, and state policy aimed at raising the effort price of participation in the produce market (through taxation, dispossession of land etc) in order to secure workers. The process of formation of a migrant proletariat cannot be analysed, however, without reference to the class forces within the pre-capitalist mode of production.

Taylor's formulation of the theory of articulation of modes of production represents an advance on the reductionist and teleological positions because he does make allowance for the class forces within the dominated social formation and their effects on the nature of the articulation. (38) Taylor follows Rey, however, in seeing the articulation of modes of production as inaugurating a transition which is a permanent state of affairs as long as the articulation continues.

It is necessary to explain the historical origins of the co-existence of capitalist and non-capitalist elements because there is no sign that the development of the capitalist mode of production in the peripheral economies is leading to the elimination of the non-capitalist elements, but that, on the contrary, such elements - small parcellated and isolated rural property etc - will continue to co-exist with more or less isolated enclaves of capitalist development. To view the articulation of modes of production as a permanent transition state extends the concept of transition and makes it vacuous. Instead, it will be argued that, in fact, the period of transition to capitalism in the Third World comes to an end with the creation of a new and relatively stable articulation of relations and forces of production unique to the form of capitalist-imperialist domination in the social formation.

In this view, the blocking of the productive forces of capitalism by the conservation of non-capitalist enterprises rests on relations and forces of production unique to the transition that produced them. In Taylor's view of transition the possibility still remains open for the full development of capitalism in social formations dominated by imperialism. (39) This is believed to be an unwarranted and unnecessary theoretical diversion. The only prospect for the resolution of the contradiction between the existence of non-capitalist modes within social formations dominated by the laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production, lies in the total overthrow of the capitalist system which sustains this contradiction. However this is a transition of a totally different order to that which engenders the articulation of modes of production under capitalism. (40)

In both the earlier views of "underdevelopment" as exemplified by Arrighi, and in the subsequent development of the theory of articulation of modes of production there is a failure to conceptualise class struggle within the subordinate non-capitalist enterprise, or, indeed, to allow for the existence of classes at

all, except in the most pre-emptory way. It is necessary to overturn this idea and to show that, although they were by no means the determinate force, the struggles of the rural producers, and strategies adopted to cope with the growth of capitalism were based on the persistence of effective class forces. The articulation of modes of production represents not only the changed function which the received historical form of the pre-capitalist production unit incorporated, (the so-called "shell" of the pre-capitalist mode of production). In determining a change in the structure of the production unit (determinate "transformation"), this transition does not do away with the dynamics of the pre-capitalist mode of production, leaving only a "shell" - an agglomeration of production units. It transforms not only the structure of the productive units and their labour processes, but also the dynamics of the ensemble of pre-capitalist relations of production. As with all periods of transition, this is a period of intense class struggle in which a variety of pre-existing and new social relationships concerning commodities and their production, appropriation, distribution and consumption are brought into contention.

Thus it is inadequate to look only at macro structural trends for the 'peasant' or non-capitalist sector as a whole as correlated with the macro tendencies of the capitalist mode of production. It is also necessary to be able to specify how the pre-capitalist units of production were themselves transformed, what classes were then to be found dominant within them, and how they facilitated, or struggled against, the reproduction of the entire ensemble of relations and forces of production of the dominant capitalist mode of production. The two levels of analysis thus complement each other - on the one hand the transformation of units of production in a period of transition, on the other the transformed class position of the agents in ensuring the reproduction or non-reproduction of the productive units and the dominant relations of production.

It will be useful to clarify this formulation of the concept of the articulation of modes of production by contrasting it with Wolpe's latest contribution to the conceptualisation of the articulation of modes of production. (41) Wolpe has identified two prevailing concepts of mode of production. First, there is the definition wherein the relations and forces of production in combination define the mode of production. This Wolpe has called the restricted concept of the mode of production. Secondly, there is the definition in which the relations and forces of production "provides only the essential foundation upon which the mechanisms of reproduction, and the laws of motion, are formulated and the mode of production is held to be constituted by the combination of the relations and forces of production, together with the mechanisms of reproduction derived from those relations and forces of production". (42) This Wolpe calls the extended concept of the mode of production.

In trying to give a more definite meaning to the concept of articulation, Wolpe suggests three cases:

(1) a social formation comprising a combination of modes of production restrictively defined,
(2) a social formation comprising a combination of extended modes of production,
(3) a social formation constituted by a dominant extended mode and a subordinate restricted mode.

What is meant by 'dominant', in the third case, is not clearly spelled out. However, it is the form of conceptualisation of articulation in which Wolpe is interested. 'Domination' is, for Wolpe, an inference, the fact once having been established that the subordinate mode involved is no longer capable of generating its own laws of motion - it is dependent for its reproduction on the reproduction of the dominant mode, to which it is therefore subordinate.

The third case is clearly the one which applies to the relationship between the capitalist mode of production and the

forms of the lineage mode in Southern Africa. In Wolpe's work, as in much of the literature based on it, the analysis of this articulation and its effects on the growth of the capitalist mode of production is carried on in terms of the assumed subordination of the (unspecified) 'pre-capitalist mode of production', which is 'transformed' by the fact of its articulation. However, to quote Wolpe, "the nature of the transformation and its significance is rarely analysed with any precision."(43)

Wolpe's own analysis of the manner in which domination and subordination are achieved, remains at the level of relations and forces of production. He is concerned to show that pre-capitalist enterprise may persist, where the laws of motion of the mode of production of the pre-capitalist mode of production (its dynamics) have been displaced by capitalism. (44) It is difficult, however, to accept Wolpe's definition of the "restricted mode" as designating a real theoretical object of analysis. In fact, it appears to be an arbitrary construct explicitly designed to be consistent with what we have identified as an "inputs" theory of the articulation of modes of production. This can be more clearly seen when one considers the concept of the restricted mode which:

> "does no more than identify the possible relation between agents and the means of production within individual isolated enterprises. The mechanisms by which enterprises are linked (i.e. brought into relationship with one another) and the process by which the relations and forces of production are reproduced, are not at all encompassed in the restricted concept." (45)

In Wolpe's case 3 articulation, the reproduction of such non-capitalist enterprises becomes a moment of the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. It is therefore possible to conceptualise the non-capitalist mode as a 'restricted' mode without its own laws of motion. Thus it is, for Wolpe, this loss of capacity for self-reproduction that is the defining characteristic of the articulation of the (restricted)

pre-capitalist mode of production with the dominant capitalist mode of production. It has already been shown, however, that this view leaves out of account the transformation of the erstwhile pre-capitalist mode of production and the manner in which its dependent reproduction is achieved. It has been argued that the determination of the form of dependence of the transformed pre-capitalist production unit on the capitalist mode of production requires the specification of the class forces present in these units. Wolpe's concept of a restricted mode makes it impossible, however, to grasp the existence and the effects of such classes.

Wolpe's distinction between a 'restricted' and 'extended' mode of production now begins to look a lot less like a solution to the problem of articulation than it appeared to be at first. In fact, the idea of a 'restricted' mode, in his terms, is an impossibility, which only becomes possible if one accepts the teleological and functionalist argument that the subordination of the pre-capitalist mode of production must be seen in terms of the direct subordination of the productive units to the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production; a subordination which can only be determined by the 'needs' of the capitalist mode of production. By restricting analysis to the inputs which the non-capitalist enterprises make to the dominant capitalist mode of production, the lines of articulation are reduced to functional ones. The source of the problem is in seeing the reproduction of the non-capitalist productive units in terms of the reproduction of forces and relations of production only, without any associated ideological, political and economic dynamics inherent in them. In this analysis we have sought to establish the legitimacy of retaining, in the concept of "articulation", the dynamics of the subordinate economic structure. It has been argued that the theoretical and historical problem is to determine how the dynamics of the ersthwile pre-capitalist mode of production were transformed to make them compatible with the development of a dependent and stunted capitalist economy in the social formations on the periphery of the global economy.

In Wolpe's theory, the non-capitalist mode is reduced to an agglomeration of productive units with no internal relationship other than that of their common (or rather, joint) subordination to capital. The crucial question of the economic 'transformation' of the pre-capitalist mode of production by conquest has to be posed directly. Most authors have assumed that changes were effected in the pre-capitalist mode of production by developments outside of them. They have not allowed for a specific 'internal' dynamic based on real class forces, and struggle within the dominated mode, playing a mediating, and at times determining, role in shaping the transformation and, therefore, the historical nature of capitalist domination. These two transformations - transformation of the forces and relations of production, and the transformation of the dynamics of the pre-capitalist mode of production, are therefore the most basic theoretical starting point in analysing the articulation of modes of production. The possiblity of a dependent class structure which is reproduced through its articulation with capitalism has therefore to be posed.

It may now be seen that in order to understand the articulation of modes of production, it is necessary to have an adequate analysis of the class forces of the transition period which engendered this articulation. Perhaps the most concise formulation of the requirements for conceptualising the transitional conjuncture and the articulation of modes of production is that given by B. Hindess. He has written:

> "The structure of the social formation in transition must therefore be conceived as a determinate structure of social relations in which a specific dominant set of relations of production are subject to transformation and to the non-reproduction of its political, economic and ideological conditions of existence ... A transitional conjuncture is one in which the transformation of the dominant relations of production is a possible outcome of the class struggle ... At no point in the transition period is the final outcome a pre-given certainty ... The closure of the period of

> transition occurs only when the structure of social relations in the conjuncture is such that the dominant relations of production are no longer subject to transformation, to the non-reproduction of their political, economic and ideological conditions of existence ... The concrete analysis of the transition period in a determinate social formation therefore consists of the analysis of its transitional conjunctures, and of the specific class struggles which effect movement from one conjuncture to another." (46)

The important part of Hindess's formulation of the nature of a transitional phase, quoted above, is the emphasis on class struggle. In order to understand the classes in contention in a period of transition to capitalism, one must first have a theory of the pre-capitalist mode of production; secondly an analysis of the determinate transformation of the dominant relations of that mode in the transitional period, and, thirdly, an analysis of the specific structure of social classes that are the outcome of this process of transformation and transition and their relationship to the dominance of the capitalist mode of production.

In order to develop a theory of articulation of modes of production, it is therefore necessary to allow for the existence of social classes within the dominated non-capitalist mode of production. The question of the existence and place of such classes has to be posed directly, although, as has been argued above, it cannot be posed within the framework of Wolpe's problematic of articulation. (47) Working within this framework, it is only possible to come to the conclusion that the nature of the articulation was such as to dissolve all economically dominant classes within the pre-capitalist mode of production. (48) This fails to account for the survival of the non-capitalist elements, however, except by way of a teleological argument, which avoids the history of the rural masses, preferring to maintain an idea of a 'tribal' pre-capitalist essence which somehow survives, and whose struggle is essentially written outside of it.

It is crucial to look at the nature of possible exploiting classes and to posit the existence of relations of production and their dynamics outside of the capitalist mode of production which do not necessarily challenge the dominance of the capitalist mode of production. This can be done only by a concrete analysis of how in the transition period the growth of the capitalist mode of production actually modifies the elements of the erstwhile pre-capitalist mode. Our most basic assumption therefore is that while the relations and forces of production of the pre-capitalist mode of production are extensively transformed by the loss of its capacity for self-reproduction, and the pre-capitalist ruling class is itself transformed, it is not abolished, and continues to exercise crucial functions that have everything to do with the reproduction of the 'transformed form' of the productive unit. Our second premise is that what emerges from this transition is something sui-generis that has only an historical and empirical relationship with, (in South Africa, for example), the 'tribal' or lineage mode of production. The new ensemble of relations and forces of production and their dynamics is an articulation of modes with elements of the lineage mode still present within a system that emerged under the unique conditions of the transitional conjuncture which it faced.

IV Social Classes and the Articulation of Modes of Production in Recent South African Historiography

To conclude this chapter, a brief examination of recent trends in South African historiography will be made in order to situate the views presented here relative to certain other complementary studies. Of concern will be the work of Michael Morris, William Beinart, and Peter Delius. The work of Colin Bundy, which is directly connected with the topic of research of this thesis, will be evaluated separately in the presentation of the conclusions of this research.

Morris, more than most others, has refocused attention away from abstractly conceived "modes of production" and towards class struggle, in the determination of the form of dominance of capitalism in South Africa. In his work, however, there remains a strong tendency to underestimate the extent of capitalist development in the 19th century, with the concommitant tendency to ascribe to mining capital and the state in the 20th century the policy of "maintaining and reproducing such an overlapping of modes of production and the specific migrant labour system consequent on it ..." (49)

Morris is particularly concerned with the transition to capitalism in agriculture. He is concerned to show two features of this process: that capitalisation 'from above' (the Prussian Path) by white landowning farmers was only secured as a result of intense class struggle; and that the share-cropping system ('squatting') of Africans on white owned land became transformed into a labour rent system, (a disguised form of wage labour), thus finally destroying any basis for African accumulation outside the Reserves. (50) The Reserves themselves do not form part of the object of analysis. Nevertheless Morris takes cognisance of the Reserves in so far as their maintenance or destruction affects the possibility for transition to capitalism in agriculture 'from below'. As this thesis will concern African producers both within the Reserves and 'squatters' on white land, it is important to look critically at Morris's conceptualisation of this.

Morris has shown that the form of bourgeois rule in South Africa cannot be deduced "purely by reference to an idealised essence of capital". (51) His own analysis of the transition from share-cropping to labour rent, in which the latter undergoes an 'internal transformation' is clearly constructed.

> "the transformation occurred both by a distinct political break - the direct intervention of the State against the squatter peasantry which transformed them into labour tenants and by a number of quite imperceptible transitions as labour tenancy was itself internally transformed ... why

> labour tenancy was no longer a pre-capitalist relation, from the point of view of the relation of possession, is very apparent from the distinction made earlier by Lenin. It has already been pointed out that the labour tenant in the period under discussion did not perform his 'labour service' with his own means of labour (implements, oxen etc). The union of the direct producer with the means of labour has been severed. The labour process was clearly capitalist in nature, irrespective of the low degree of development of the productive forces. We can only repeat with Lenin that labour service under these conditions is clearly capitalist in nature." (52)

The problem that occurs is that the question of the origins of the 'squatter peasantry' is not dealt with, nor therefore is their relation to the African producer in the Reserves. Finally, therefore, the question of the real transformation of relations of production in the Reserves is not posed, for it is as a result of this transformation that the 'squatter peasantry' emerged.

These gaps are clearly interrelated and they lead to the question of the conservation of the Reserves and the destruction of the rich'squatters', which are complementary, being seen in a purely 20th century context. (53) It is hoped to show that this is incorrect, at least for the Cape (and probably Natal and Lesotho as well). The difficulty is not only one of periodisation. It affects our understanding of the nature and specific mechanisms of capitalist domination and bourgeois rule in South Africa. In so far as the question of the origins of the 'squatter peasantry' is posed, it is only from the point of view of the penetration of monopoly (mining) capital in the Transvaal itself. (54) The process in the Cape Colony is left entirely unexplicated, although, in several places, note is taken that the Cape did present a more advanced capitalisation of agriculture at that stage. (55) In the Cape Colony the origin of rent-paying 'squatters' on Colonist farms is related simply to the 'embryonic

and infantile' tendency towards capitalism in agriculture. (56) This view is based on a failure to conceptualise the real links between the Colonial economy and the transformation of the structure of production in the Reserves. This can perhaps be more clearly seen in Morris's analysis of the Glen Grey Act of 1894. In briefly considering some critical points in the evaluation of this Act, it can perhaps be indicated how an adequate analysis of social relations and class forces in the "Reserve Economy" will affect the evaluation of State policy in respect of these areas.

To all outward purposes, the Glen Grey Act marked an attempt to eradicate non-capitalist relations of production in order to create a labour force. This is the aspect on which Morris focuses in order to emphasise the contrasting policy of conservation of the non-capitalist modes which prevailed in the 20th century. Thus, in reference to the dissolution effects of the Glen Grey Act, he argued:

> "the bill was a direct attempt to transform tribal pre-capitalist social relations of production into individual peasant relations" and the "Glen Grey Act sought the economic, political and ideological destruction, (i.e. primarily dissolution effects) of the tribal pre- capitalist mode of production in the Reserves." (57)

Nowhere is cognisance taken of the fact that the Glen Grey Act was being applied to an area which had already been extensively transformed by over one hundred years of contact with mercantile capitalism and Colonial settler agriculture, backed by the Colonial state. Failure to take account of these crucial transformations leads to a wrong understanding of the nature of resistance to the Act and subsequent measures. It is necessary to consider the different interests which combined to oppose the Act. In order to make the point, but without anticipating the subsequent analysis, one can consider the following possibilities:

(1) Chiefs and headmen (paid) who already had individual tenure on surveyed lands in terms of earlier moves in that direction, always strongly resisted the imposition of such

tenure for the masses. Opposition from them to the labour tax in the Act was premised on the fear of disruption of the gains they had made at the expense of the poor and landless.

(2) Households, with and without the ownership of ploughs, harnesses and trek oxen, would find it more difficult to enter into the hiring and renting agreements which were crucial to the form of commodity production which prevailed.

(3) Households with small holdings of land and little or no stock, were in danger of losing these to larger households and thus of being forced into category 4.

(4) People, landless at that point in the life-cycle, would have their ability to accumulate through borrowing and share-cropping, while awaiting entry into the productive cycle, cut off. They would be faced with little choice but to leave the district and face a new life as proletarians.

Clearly these various interests cannot be reduced to some 'tribal' essence, "re-distributive" mode, etc. The objective of our subsequent analysis will be to show how the characteristic pattern of class division of the pre-capitalist mode was transformed (but not abolished) with conquest and colonisation, and to show the transformed economic, political and ideological dynamics of the relations of production of the non-capitalist productive units.

The basic theoretical perspective, outlined here, derives support from areas of widely differing historical experience in South Africa. Beinart in his study of Pondoland has concluded:

> "the analysis of the origins of migrancy from Pondoland ... indicates that migrancy, as one specific form of wage labour on which much of the early industrialisation in South African was based, was not simply determined by needs of capital. The mines and farms of South Africa transformed the rural societies from which labour was drawn, ... at the same time the nature of accumulation in South Africa was deeply affected by the dynamic of relationships in African societies ..." (58)

Not only the timing, but the nature of the imposition of Colonial rule in Pondoland differed vastly from that of the Xhosa in the West. (59)

Migrant labour, when it arose in Pondoland, was closely linked to the continued reproduction of the homesteads. Beinart is unfortunately not able to show how the changing dynamic of reproduction was affected by the existing stratification and differential levels of accumulation between homesteads. It is clear, from his study, that there was a wide spectrum of levels of accumulation between homesteads, and that "migrant labour" meant different things (in economic terms) to each worker, depending on the vantage point from which he entered the system. (60) The experience of wage work in turn "tended to reinforce the divisions within rural society". (61) This present research supports the view that:

> "the system of migrancy can only be understood in the context of the rural household and its control over the labour and earnings of its members." (62)

While the absence of military force used against the Pondo was in marked contrast with the experience elsewhere, the nature of economic and political relationships was ultimately subject to transformation and a break with the past - which was "forced" in so far as the Pondo chiefs were left with no option but to renounce most of their former powers. The dominant class in Pondoland had, as elsewhere, to seek ways of establishing its political and economic power within the confines and characteristic opportunities which were presented by the new economic relationships introduced by colonialism, taxes, migrant labour, money and the exchange of commodities, land allocations, and so on.

Peter Delius has noted a very different pattern of migrant labour from that of the Pondo, in his analysis of the Pedi social formation. In the 1860s and 1870s, sustained violence, first by the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek, and then by the British (both

with Swazi assistance) was a very prominent feature. (63) The Pedi, who had, like the Sotho, Tswana and Zulu, a more centralised chieftaincy than the Xhosa, made use of migrant labour from an early date as a means of acquiring fire-arms and cattle. Groups of from one hundred to five hundred proceeded to the Cape Colony for work on the farms, railways and diamond mines.

Delius has indicated that post Difiqane (i.e. Tshaka) cattle raiding by the Swazi, Ndebele, Boers and others, the persistence of tsetse fly and the emergence of lung-sickness, all led to a shortage of cattle for the proper functioning of Pedi political and economic relationships. The people migrated, therefore, for the twin purposes of acquiring cattle and guns wherewith to defend the lands. The numbers of Pedi society were swelling, especially with refugees, and the cattle resources were static. To cope with this, migrant labour emerged as a way of fulfilling the needs for the reproduction of the Pedi households and villages. Migrant labour was thus guided by chiefs like Sekhukhune and Moshoeshoe, and it supported the expansion of their chiefdoms up to the time of their military defeat by the combined forces of Colonist and Imperialist arms.

After conquest, the centripetal forces at work became dominant. The large homesteads became increasingly individualised into their constituent family units. No longer did the old ruling class directly control the proceeds of migrant labour. The appropriations formerly exacted by them were now appropriated by the Colonial State in the form of taxation. Lands which the Boers had claimed (and even issued title to) but had never effectively possessed, were occupied and taken over. With most of their cattle lost, and land now a scarce resource, migrant labour became a matter of survival.

The essence of this process of transformation is the existence of a discontinuity between the pre-capitalist mode of production, and the mode of production under Colonial domination. In a fairly short period of time the organisation of the basic structure of production changes, and, in the longer term, new political

relationships within the dominated mode of production emerge and adapt themselves to these changes. Where active violence in the form of Colonial arms was used, the break with the previous mode was sharper, and the discontinuity more readily discernible. While it was true that physical violence was not used, in every area (Pondoland - to name one example) most of the larger formations (Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa, Pedi, etc) were subject to such violent intervention. Jeff Guy has clearly drawn the conclusion that such a break was evident in the Zulu social formation:

> "It seems to me invalid to conceptualise the Zulu social formation in the 1890s as a pre-capitalist mode of production coming into articulation with the capitalist mode. To do this is to confuse form and content. One would have to accept the official rhetoric of the time, for the continuities with the pre-capitalist past were superficial ones" (64)

(1) Wolpe, H. 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid,' Economy and Society, Vol. 1 No. 4, (1972).
Legassick, M. 'South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence', Economy and Society, Vol. 3 No. 3, (1974).

(2) Even this claim of a decline in the productive capacity of the Reserves is now open to empirical doubt - see the useful work by Simkins, C. 'Agricultural Production in the African Reserves 1918-1969', DSRG Working Paper No. 10, (1979). He tries to show that:
(1) Total output did not fall over the period 1918-1965
(2) One must locate the really dramatic decline in production per capita in the period after 1948 rather than in the period before that date. p. 8.

(3) Wolpe, H. op.cit. p. 432.

(4) Ibid. p. 447.

(5) Legassick, M. op.cit. p. 265 and p. 276.

(6) Wolpe, H. op.cit. p. 447.

(7) Ibid. p. 432.

(8) Ibid. p. 432.

(9) Ibid. p. 432. Unlike the theoretical basis for the c.m.p. which is established in the long line of research and the theoretical refinement stemming from Marx's Capital onwards, (and for which Wolpe provides a similar terse summary), no comparable body of theory yet exists for most pre-capitalist modes of production. It is therefore all the more dangerous to treat formulations pertaining to the pre-capitalist modes of production in a superficial way.

(10) Legassick, M. 'The Analysis of Racism in South Africa: The Case of Mining Economy.', U.N. Seminar on Socio-Economic Trends and Policies in Southern Africa. Dar-es-Salaam, December (1975). p. 26.

(11) Ibid. p. 13.

(12) Ibid. p. 17.

(13) Morris, M. 'The State and the Development of Capitalist Social Relations in the South African Countryside. A Process of Class Struggle'. D. Phil. Sussex, (1979). p. 38. See also "it is an error to teleologically argue, on the basis of the dominance and functional nature of this system to mining capital in the 20th C., that there was an inherent necessity for State intervention, under the hegemony of Imperialist mining capital to bring about such conservation/ dissolution effects in the Reserves" p. 48.

(14) Banaji, J. 'Modes of Production in a Materialist Conception of History.', Capital and Class, no. 3 (1977). p. 34; Frank, A.G. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Monthly Review Press, (1967). Banaji differs from Frank in his periodisation of the process of world capitalist domination. In particular, he does allow for the existence of relations in the countryside, which Frank disallows.

(15) For Wolpe's criticism of Banaji; see Wolpe, H. (ed.), Articulation of Modes of Production, Monthly Review Press, (1980) pp. 27-34. That the difference in the social formations with which they were primarily concerned - those of India and Southern Africa - may to some extent have influenced their theoretical perception, is indicated by Wolpe's failure to address or mention Banaji's excellent analysis of petty commodity production in the colonial world - concentrating only on his conceptualisation of the mode of production.

(16) Banaji, J. op.cit. p. 34. He has in mind specifically the commodity producers of "West Africa, Uganda, Mozambique, Bengal, Burman, Cambodia ..." see p. 35.

(17) This account of Rey's concept of the articulation of modes of production is based on that given by Foster-Carter, A. 'The Modes of Production Controversy', New Left Review, No. 107; and Bradby, B. The Destruction of Natural Economy, Economy and Society Vol. IV no. 2 1975, pp. 142-152 and Duprey, G. and Rey, P.P. Reflections on the Pertinence of a Theory of the History of Exchange, Economy and Society Vol. II. No.2 1973.

(18) Foster-Carter, A. op.cit. p. 56. Translated from P.P. Rey; Les Alliance de Classes, Paris (1973). p. 15 (emphasis in original).

(19) Ibid. p. 56 and Bradby, B. op.cit. p. 114.

(20) Duprey, G. and Rey, P.P. op.cit. p. 157.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Foster-Carter, A. pp. 57-59. "Homificence" is defined in the O.E.D. as: "doing the same thing".

(23) Foster-Carter first developed this view of the conjunctural nature of the needs of capitalism in a paper 'Marxism and the Fact of Conquest', African Review Vol. 6 No. 1, (1976). In his more recent contribution he wrote: "Capitalism (in general, abstract) must be distinguished as a level of analysis from its concretizations, plural, as capitalisms (e.g. national and rival); that capitalism(s) should be seen as not merely processual and developmental, but also relational and interactional; and above all that there was, and is, a crucial distinction between where capitalism arose internally within a social formation ... and where it was imposed from the outside". Foster-Carter, A. op.cit. pp. 66.

(24) Foster-Carter, A. op.cit. p. 64.

(25) Foster-Carter was entirely correct to criticise Rey for presenting a view of an "eternal transition" and therefore an "eternal articulation", which failed to take the blocking of the development of capitalist forces and relations of production in the social formations dominated by colonialism into account as a permanent feature of their structure. But this was, however, based on Rey's earlier work, and Foster-Carter did not, perhaps, pay sufficient attention to Rey's position presented in his 1973 article; Reflections on the Pertinence of a Theory of the History of Exchange, in which Rey introduces a fourth stage - that of neo-colonialism. "During this period" writes Rey, "social formations of the colonised country appear as a complex articulation

i) of the Lineage system still in existence,

ii) of the politico-administrative system inherited from the colonisation which rests on the lineage system,

iii) the capitalist system itself."

This is still consistent, however, with his concept of a homificient capitalism and an extended transition.

(26) Amin, S. Accumulation on a World Scale. A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment, Monthly Review Press, New York (1974). p. 42 "Aggression by the capitalist mode of production from the outside, against these formations, constitutes the essence of the problem of their transition to formations of peripheral capitalism". p. 42. This course of transition initiated "from without" through external coercion, leads, for Amin, to the distortions of capitalist development on the periphery as compared with capitalism at the centre:

(1) towards exports, which absorb the majority of capital arriving from the centre;

(2) towards tertiary (service) activities;
(3) a distortion in choice of branches of industry, towards light manufacturing.

"This threefold distortion reflects the asymmetrical way in which the periphery is integrated in the world market ... resulting in the end in the blocking of the economy's growth." ibid. p. 70.

(27) Bradby, B. op.cit. p. 140.

(28) Ibid. p. 129.

(29) Ibid. pp. 140-141.

(30) Brenner, R. 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of neo-Smithian Marxism', New Left Review No. 104.

(31) Althusser, L. and Balibar, E. Reading Capital New Left Books (1970) p. 306. For Foster-Carter's comment on this passage see op.cit. p. 67.

(32) One can now therefore distinguish between pre-capitalist - that which precedes colonial conquest and transformation - and non-capitalist - that which is the product of transformation brought about by conquest and capitalist domination. This terminology will be used to distinguish between the two.

(33) Taylor, J.G. From Modernization to Modes of Production, London, (1979). pp. 102-103.

(34) Ibid. p. 193.

(35) Ibid. p. 201.
"The circuit of commodity exchange within the non-capitalist mode is increasingly inserted into the circulation of commodities produced by the capitalist mode of production. Raw material commodities required as constant capital in the capitalist mode leave the circuit of commodity exchange in

which they were previously confined and department II commodities (consumption goods) previously circulating within the capitalist mode enter into the circuit of the non-capitalist mode, where they are unproductively consumed".

(36) Arrighi, G. 'Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective : A Study of the Proletarianisation of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia', Journal of Development Studies, No.3, April. (1970).

(37) Arrighi defines the category "effort-price" as 'the quantity of labour-time of a given drudgery necessary to obtain a unit (measured in real terms) of cash income" op.cit. note 29. It then becomes a strict exercise in comparative advantages as to whether the "effort-price" of participation in the labour market is less than that of the produce market, and consequently towards which market labour-time is directed.

(38) Taylor, J.G. op.cit. p. 229.

(39) Bill Warren caused a flurry of concern when he asserted the principle that the capitalist mode of production may yet, and in fact was, actively fulfilling its mission of unlimited development of the productive forces in the Third World economies, with the abolition of material deprivation for most of the world's population. Despite numerous criticisms of this "New Jerusalem" thesis, Warren touched a raw nerve in exposing how many theories of "underdevelopment" are conceptually compatible with his formulation of the path of economic development.

(40) The same possibility - of a capitalist solution to the contradictions of capitalism - is implicit in Wolpe's concept of articulation, which remains primarily an economic mechanism. Why the development of capitalism has not, and apparently will not, abolish areas of non-capitalist enterprise, cannot be answered within a theory of articulation that looks only at the needs of capital.

(41) Wolpe, H. (ed.) Introduction to Articulations of Modes of Production, Monthly Review Press, (1980).

(42) Ibid. p. 7.

(43) Ibid. p. 38.

(44) Ibid. p. 39.

(45) Ibid. p. 36.

(46) Hindess, B. Introduction to Bettelheim, C. Economic Calculation and Forms of Property R.K.P., (1976). pp. 4-5.

(47) Interestingly, in an earlier criticism of the work of B. Hindess and P. Hirst, Wolpe and Assad argued that their failure was due to their not theorising "the relationship between the components of the mode of production and between the mode and its conditions of existence". See Economy and Society V.5 No. 4 1976.

(48) The effects of this approach may be seen in the work which has been inspired, in this regard at least, by Wolpe's attitude to the place of the "Reserve Economy" in the growth of the South African Economy. Thus Kaplan has written:
"In class terms the nature of the articulation was such as to exercise a particularly severe dissolution effect in respect of the economically dominant classes in the pre-c.m.p. ... the existence of any economically dominant classes within the pre-c.m.p.was rendered extremely precarious and the possibilities for their expanded accumulation were virtually non-existent" While it is undoubtedly true that the economically dominant classes in the pre-capitalist mode of production were "dissolved" it is also true that they were reconstituted in a "transformed form", the effects of which are still being felt to the present day.

See Kaplan, D. 'Class Conflict, Capital Accumulation and the State: An Historical Analysis of the State in Twentieth Century South Africa.', Phd. Sussex, (1977). pp. 8-10.

(49) Morris, M. op.cit. p. 46.

(50) Ibid. p. 141. Share-cropping required that a rent for a part of the land was paid in a share (up to half) of the product realised. The "share-cropper" thus worked for himself. Labour rent meant that the "tenant" had to work for the landlord for a certain number of days. In return he got a piece of land which he could work for himself. However as the labour required by the landlord was likely to be needed at the same time as that required for own production there was an inevitable conflict. Landlords consistently extended the labour requirement to include members of the worker's family and this often became a condition for retaining the land.

(51) Ibid. p. 164.

(52) Ibid p. 141 and p. 147.

(53) Lacey, M. Working for Boroko, The Origins of a Coercive Labour System in South Africa, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, (1981). Lacey recognises the importance of the Location Acts passed periodically from 1878 to 1899. She sees the transformation of tenants into agricultural workers ("squatters" into "labour tenants" in the confusing nomenclature of this thorny subject) primarily as a result of the 1913 Land Act. See pp. 120 - 180.

(54) Morris, M. op.cit. p. 32.

(55) Ibid. c.f. pp. 22,32,133.

(56) Ibid. p. 22.

(57) Ibid.

(58) Beinart, W. The Political Economy of Pondoland 1860-1930. Ravan Press, (1982) p. 164.

(59) It may of course reasonably be suggested that the different character of the process of incorporation of Pondoland depended on the lateness of this process. Unlike the Zulu, Pedi, Sotho and other groups the Pondo escaped all major military resistance to and conflict with, the Colonial State or Boer Commandos. However this makes their experience more, rather than less, unique.

(60) Beinart, W. op.cit. p. 131.

(61) Ibid. p. 150.

(62) Beinart, W. Joyini Iinkomo: Cattle Advances and the Origins of Migrancy from Pondoland Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 15. No 2. April 1979.

(63) Delius, P. The Land Belongs to us, The Pedi Polity, The Boers and the British in the Nineteenth Century Transvaal, Ravan Press, (1983) For the Swazi role in the defeat of the Pedi see p. 243.

(64) Guy, J. 'The Destruction and Reconstruction of Zulu Society.' Unpub. mimeo. January 1980. p. 25.

CHAPTER 4

THE FIRST BRITISH KAFFRARIAN ADMINISTRATION 1848 -1850

I Direct Rule and the Drift to War

Sir H. Smith issued a proclamation on 23rd December 1847 establishing British Kaffraria as a separate Crown Colony and stipulating the conditions under which the chiefs and their homesteads held their 'locations' in British Kaffraria. They were to occupy their land:

> "From and under Her Majesty, under such service, and under such rules and regulations as Her Majesty's High Commissioner, or other representative who shall be the great chief of the territory, shall deem best calculated to promote the civilisation of the benighted humans subject to her rule." (1)

The new dispensation was officially conveyed to the chiefs on the 7th January 1848 by Smith himself at a meeting that is now notorious in the annals of Colonist excesses. (2) Apart from the paranoid behaviour of Smith at the meeting, he made the chiefs swear to uphold an absurd list of conditions, including the abolition of lobola (bridewealth) payments, the outlawing of 'witchcraft' and to promise to obey the commands of the High Commissioner and to compel their people to do likewise. (3)

The conditions imposed by Smith resolved most chiefs to make immediate preparations for war. In 1848 Kama of the Gqunukwebe, Mqhayi (who had only a very small following at that stage) of the Ndlambe and Maqoma had been the only chiefs not participating in the war. The experience of 1848 had shown the necessity for unity and the possession of guns for success in war with the Colonists. The conditions that prevailed in British Kaffraria between 1848 and 1850 finally decided most chiefs that war was the only option in dealing with the Colonial State.

British Kaffraria was essentially a military outpost. In 1848 additional forts were established, including Ft. Hare on the Tyhumie, at Keiskamma Hoek and, most significantly, at Ft. Hill where the newly established King William's Town was laid out as the military and administrative centre. (4) Rule was to be by martial law, with a Chief Commissioner at King William's Town. Colonel G. MacKinnon was appointed as first Chief Commissioner. He was directly responsible to the High Commissioner of British Kaffraria who was the Governor of the Cape Colony. Two "Native Commissioners" were appointed to assist the Chief Commissioner. These were Captain J. Maclean at Ft. Murray for the Gqunukwebe and Ndlambe and Charles Brownlee at Ft. Cox with the Ngqikas. W. Fynn was appointed Government Agent with the Gcaleka chief Sarhili, over the Kei. (5)

Exactly how British authority was to be enforced was not spelled out. Initially it was assumed that the chiefs would continue to rule and the commisioners would act as magistrates to whom appeal could be made. Smith instructed Mackinnon that rule was to be "through the medium and instrumentality of the chiefs". (6) The commissioners were to hear all cases brought on appeal from the chief's courts and were to have the right to impose fines which they appropriated directly.

As we shall see, the system imposed by Smith was to have a far greater impact on the chiefdoms than a mere system of judicial appeal would suggest. In important ways, which shall be examined, the system developed into an impediment on the ability of the chiefs to accumulate cattle. As such accumulation was essential to the process of establishment of new homesteads, anything which interfered with it was a direct attack on the basis of the chieftaincy and the mode of production which supported it. In the existing literature the political and economic effects of the British Kaffrarian administration on the Xhosa chiefdoms have not been examined in any detail. The contribution of this regime to the formation of the economic and political responses of the Xhosa to conquest and domination have therefore been underappreciated.

The ability to accumulate cattle was particularly crucial in the early years of a chief's rule. At this time there were in fact a number of young chiefs who had assumed their chieftaincy in the inter-war period between 1835 and 1848. Taking the list of ages of chiefs provided by Maclean in 1855, the median age of all the principal chiefs was 47. (7) This included some very old chiefs whose position was on the wane, like Botomane of the Imidange, then 80 years old. More importantly it included a group of younger chiefs, Sandille, Anta, Toyise (Ngqika), Siwani and Siyolo (Mdushane), who were all under 45 years old. Most of these chiefs were still struggling to establish their positions within their sections of the Xhosa, and to maintain the adherence of the mass of their homesteads. They could therefore least afford interference from magistrates imposed on them by the Colonial State.

The struggle of these chiefs was not only against the Colony but also against the older rival chiefs and their supporters. The conflict between Maqoma and Sandille has already been mentioned. There was a similar antagonism between Siwani and Umhalla, the latter favouring Siwani's elder half-brother Siyolo. Both Maqoma and Umhalla had shifting degrees of alliance with the younger chiefs immediately connected to them.

The attitude of the chiefs towards the Colony or any innovations imposed by the Colonial State was fundamentally determined by the way it affected their ability to fulfil the basic function and obligations of a chief towards the mass of homesteads and young men. If the existence of a group of old entrenched councillors was a barrier to accumulation the young chiefs could well understand, the intrusion of the Colonial State was not - especially when the Colonial State attempted to interfere in the very mechanisms whereby the class struggle within the Xhosa chiefdoms was carried on. The only solution to this imposition was to try to overthrow it. For this reason the young chiefs were the main protagonists of the 1850-53 war. In addition there were the chiefs such as Phato and Kama (Gqunukwebe) and Tsaeshu

(Ntinde) who had actively collaborated with the Colonial State and hoped to gain further security for their position by that means.

To say that the Colonial State intervened in this way is to assume that the first administration in the new Colony of British Kaffraria from 1848-1850 was highly effective. A close examination of available resources reveals that in certain important respects the administration was indeed highly effective, even though it never succeeded in its objective of taking over all the powers of the chiefs over their people. Mackinnon claimed in a letter written shortly before the outbreak of war in 1850 that:

> "Wherever we employed the chiefs to act for us either in exacting reparations for thefts committed by their people on the Colonists or in disputes which their people referred to us in preference to referring them to the chief for decision, there was some dishonesty or violence committed by them. The result of this was an appeal from the decision of the chief and an overturning of his award, he being generally obliged to disgorge cattle which he had seized and appropriated to himself. This is all connected with the hereditary privilege of 'eating up', which has from time immemorial been enjoyed by the chiefs. We have deprived them of this privilege; we have taken the settlement of all disputes which are referred to us into our own hands, and we act directly, without reference to the Chief, when a theft is committed by his people in the Colony ...." (8) (emphasis added)

The last point is of particular significance because it affected one of the most important weapons in the hands of the chief, namely the direction of raiding parties into the Colony to appropriate Colonial cattle. The capacity to direct raiding activities against Colonial cattle and to provide protection to the parties undertaking such raids was very important for the chiefs. In this way they were able to counteract the effect of

the Colonial capitalist economy in providing alternative bases from which young men and homesteads could accumulate cattle through trade or wage labour. As much as trade and wage labour was regulated by Colonial farmers and merchants, so raiding depended on the active support of a willing chief without whose protection it was altogether too risky a business. Raiding required that a chief be prepared to organise and defend the homesteads adhering to him which participated in these raids. Thus commisioners acting as magistrates directly taking up all cases of cattle theft, impaired the ability of the chief to direct these operations.

Brownlee, the other commissioner along with Maclean, has also represented their intervention as highly effective.

> "The power of the chiefs was greatly circumscribed. All their decisions were liable to review, and if found inconsistent with justice, to be reversed by Colonel Maclean and myself ... Numerous appeals came against the decisions of Sandille." (9)

As will be shown, the most serious consequence of the proclamation of British Kaffraria for the Xhosa was the effectiveness of the magistrates in inhibiting organised cattle theft, even if in other respects they did not exercise much authority. As Mackinnon later claimed:

> "I may also say it is generally acknowledged that at no former period have the frontier Colonists enjoyed such security from marauding as during the present year" (10)

Mackinnon realised that the presence of the magistrates in the territory of the chiefs and their direct action in cases involving cattle theft from the Colony was causing a serious loss of revenue to the chiefs and this resulted in the increasing unpopularity of British rule. He suggested "making compensation for the privilege of which we have deprived them." (11) Some form of 'compensation' was in fact already being paid in the form of an annual

distribution of 'presents'. The purpose of the presents is not clear, for (as both Smith and Mackinnon recognised) they were not compensation for loss of revenue.

The 'presents' consisted of a list of Colonial merchandise from clothing to nails. (12) It seems likely that they were intended to stimulate the displacement of domestic production with commodities. If the chiefs were seen to be using such commodities it would encourage others to do so, and thus greatly expand the market. However, the chiefs found little use for the commodities and only distributed them. By October 1850, Mackinnon admitted that "It appears that they rarely retain any of these presents for themselves and do not attach much importance to being made the medium of delivering them to the people." (13) The presents were of no use in creating a fund through which chiefs could assist and control the process of accumulation of cattle and homestead expansion. They were therefore no compensation at all for the loss of income that the chiefs experienced. Two distributions of presents actually took place, one in February 1849, and the other in March 1850; the value of each distribution being about 600 pounds.

At the end of 1849, Mackinnon wrote a self-congratulatory report to Smith:

> "Have we succeeded in giving the inhabitants of the frontier district of the Colony protection against the marauding of the Kaffirs?"

he asked rhetorically. His answer:

> "The Colonists have enjoyed during the last two years the most unparalleled impunity from marauding and in every case where stolen property has been traced to the Kaffirland, ample compensation has been obtained." (14)

Despite Mackinnon's repeated claims for the effectiveness of his administration in stopping cattle theft, he had, a mere six months earlier, complained of a high rate of theft of Colonial cattle by

the Ngqika, and stated that Brownlee was enforcing compensation payments from kraals. (15) From these contradictory statements, it can be concluded that it was not so much the rate of thefts that dropped but the value of compensation gained that increased, which lead Mackinnon to be well satisfied with the system. The commissioners were encouraged in their confiscation of Xhosa cattle by the knowledge that much of the money realised from the sale of the confiscated cattle went towards the Kaffrarian revenue.

That British Kaffraria be self-supporting financially was of cardinal importance to the Colonial State and thus all means of gaining revenue were followed up enthusiastically. Mackinnon, explaining the operation of the system of cattle confiscation in June 1848, wrote:

> "I may therefore say that the amount arising from this source during the expired portion of the year is at about 500 pounds, and that this sum will be considerably increased from time to time, though it would be difficult to make any estimate of what it will come to yearly. It will, however, always be considerable as we exact a fine for the Government in cases of theft of double the amount of stolen cattle, after compensating the owner for his loss. The chiefs are on some occasions obliged to pay for the spoor of stolen cattle traced into their locations, and all horses and cattle found straying by the police are sold for the public benefit if not claimed within a reasonable time". (16) (emphasis added)

In this first six months of 1848, 419 pounds 8 shillings was raised in the sale of confiscated cattle. A further 100 pounds worth of cattle were then in the Government kraals awaiting sale, giving the approximate figure of 500 pounds referred to by

Mackinnnon. It is obviously of very great significance that he admits that a fine of double the amount stolen was levied after compensation had been paid. (17) It is important to obtain some idea of the actual numbers of cattle involved in order to assess the extent of the impact of these confiscations on the Xhosa.

By October 25th 1848, 630 pounds worth of cattle had been sold, exceeding Mackinnon's wildest expectations. Taking an average price per head of cattle obtained on auction at 1 pound 7 shillings, this represented 468 head of cattle. (18) However, to this must be added cattle taken as direct compensation for the Colonists, perhaps another 250 head or a total of 718 head. These fines must have been a significant burden on the Xhosa who had few cattle left after the war, and must also have been an intolerable injustice for any people who were, as has been seen, by no means yet militarily conquered. Injustice apart, the dynamic between chief and the mass of homesteads still prevailed as the dominant relationship. The crisis produced in this relationship by the deprivations imposed on them by the British Kaffrarian administration was enough to produce a crisis in relations with the Colony.

Later on, in 1855, Brownlee estimated that Sandille's annual income of cattle from fines was 300 head a year "and as many more ... passed into the hands of his councillors". (19) However, it is unlikely that, in the period from 1848 to 1850, his ability to appropriate cattle was anything as great because of the severe conditions then prevailing. In clamping down on stock theft with fines and compensation confiscations, the effects of British rule were to produce a crisis in the Xhosa formation when chiefs could not provide their homesteads with cattle, or protection from the Colonial State, thus undermining the entire basis of the chieftaincy.

Between October 1848 and January 1849 a further 119 pounds was raised through the sale of cattle, or approximately 88 head of cattle. (20) Between January and September 1849 Maclean records

forwarding 179 head of cattle for sale on the King William's Town market, which fetched 265 pounds, or 1 pound 9 shillings per head. Between January and October 1850 he records forwarding 152 head of cattle which fetched just over 1 pound each. (21)

There is some evidence that an increased incentive for cattle theft resulted from the need experienced by young men to acquire cattle for lobola (bridewealth) payments, which in the prevailing circumstances they could not obtain in any other way. Writing in the 1850s Napier, who had been a British Commander on the frontier, claimed that the value of cattle had depreciated as a result of the presence of Colonial cattle. This depreciation was reflected in an increase in lobola cattle demanded by the family of a prospective bride. "Burrow states that the amount paid in his time for a wife was 'an ox, or a couple of cows.' Of late years, the price of a bride has increased to ten oxen for commoners." (22)

The effects of the war had severely limited the ability of the Xhosa to feed themselves from domestic production. Mackinnon himself noted:

> "The state of distress in which a great number of the kaffirs are, from want of food. The country and particularly the Gaika district was overrun by the troops at the sowing season, and the usual supply of food therefore does not exist." (23)

In fact many thousands of Ngqika who had been dispersed during the war had not yet returned. In March 1848 Mackinnon began making preparations for a comprehensive census of the Ngqika and Ndlambe tribes. He noted in early 1848 that "a great many Kafirs have located themselves during the war at a distance from the tribes to which they properly belong, and having sown their seed there, cannot be induced to forsake the places where they now are till their crops are gathered." (24) By late December 1848 the census had been taken and the results revealed 35 179 Ndlambes and 27 179 Ngqikas, a total of 62 358. The number of cattle was only 0.9 per

capita. In response to these results Mackinnon wrote:

> "Mr Brownlee calculates that from 20 000 to 25 000 of the Gaikas are absent, this being principally occasioned by the scarcity of food in that country. Large tracts of it were depopulated when it was over-run by the Troops during the sowing season of 1847 and the Natives have not yet returned. The greater part of these are in Kreli's country, some in Tambookie Land, some in the Tslambie District and a good many wandering about the Colony without passes." (25)

The immediate cause of this dispersion was the shortage of maize and sorghum grains. The more important cause was the shortage of cattle. The number of cattle in the Ngqika and Ndlambe districts represented the minimum required for the support of the population resident there. While it is certain that wealthy homestead heads had cattle elsewhere with clients and relatives, this does not in any way alter the fact that there was a great scarcity of cattle and consequently an urgent need to build up the cattle herds. The fact of dispersal of homesteads was complementary to intensified cattle raiding as a way of balancing the available resources of cattle over the number of homesteads. However, dispersion of people to Sarhili over Kei was one thing, dispersion into the Colony quite another.

From January to June 1848 many families moved onto Colonial farms in the Ft. Beaufort and Victoria East districts. Despite attempts to enforce pass laws which required any Xhosa proceeding into the Colony to have a signed document stating the purpose of his visit, farmers in search of tenants allowed Xhosa to reside on their farms. (26) These first squatter movements were complex in character. One type of squatting was an independent arrangement between a homestead head and a farmer; however at this stage these were certainly in the minority. The more important phenomenon was squatting <u>controlled and directed by chiefs.</u>

This type of squatting was motivated purely by the need to find adequate residential and garden sites for the homesteads. It involved nothing less than the unauthorised occupation of land and there was no question of production being undertaken for the Colonial landowners. In some cases, as in the Blinkwater valley (Ft. Beaufort district) the landowners received some rent for the land, but more often not even this was received as the border farms were unsurveyed and unoccupied. Nevertheless this type of land occupation was the forerunner of the more general squatting movement that characterised the decades after the 1850s.

As early as June 1848 Brownlee wrote in a state of alarm:

> "many Kafirs are settling down about Ft. Beaufort, without right or authority and I believe many more are on the same footing in the Blinkwater and various parts of the Kat River Settlement." (27)

He also appealed for the introduction of an effective pass law, because the free movement of Xhosa combined with squatting led to increased theft.

The specific links between squatting and cattle theft were the Mfengu. There was, averred Brownlee, a bilateral trade in stolen cattle between Mfengu resident (legally) in the Colony and the Xhosa squatters. (28) The Xhosa most involved in this were those of Maqoma. Maqoma had all but stayed out of the war in 1848. This was motivated by his belief that by remaining out of the war he would be allowed to continue occupying his country between the Tyhumie and the Kat. In June 1848, six months after the proclamation of British Kaffraria, Maqoma was still occupying this land west of the Tyhumie. He at first attempted diplomacy in his efforts to have his presence there recognised. He tried to pursuade Brownlee that he wished to move to the Blinkwater accompanied only by "5 wives 17 head of cattle and 2 of his men, while his people remained in British Kaffraria". (29) This petition was rejected, but this does not seem to have influenced Maqoma, as large scale squatting in the Blinkwater and Waterkloof areas of Ft. Beaufort continued until 1850. The Ngqika under Maqoma were in effect refusing to recognise the right of the

Colony to possess the land between the Tyhumie and Kat rivers by retaining occupation of it for themselves. It was ultimately the expulsion of these 'squatters' in 1850 that led to the preparations for war. (30)

Apart from squatting in the Colony and dispersal of homesteads to other chiefs, one other very important phenomenon occurred in the inter-war period, namely labour migrancy. (31) The demand for labour in the Colony at this time was very strong. (32) The first group of 170 destitute Xhosa were forwarded to the Colony in 1847. (33) The 1848 census showed 1 651 persons absent from the Ngqika alone, who had left for the Colony and there was probably a similar number from the Ndlambe. (34) It is important to understand that these were not movements of families - they were specific individuals who had left 'Kaffraria' as contracted workers to specific employers in the Midlands district, and more frequently to the Western Cape. Ordinance 3 of 1848 required Xhosa youths to be indentured to particular employers before they entered the Colony.

Smith's system of indentured labour, supposedly approved by the Xhosa was aimed at getting young children to come and work in the Western Cape. When no children were forthcoming, the Ordinance was altered, so that whole families could be indentured. As Mackinnon wrote:

> "There is a disinclination on the part of the parents to part with their offspring for this purpose, particularly for the purpose of proceeding to the districts remote from the border". (35)

In order to 'encourage' people to go to the Western Cape, Mackinnon advised against allowing Xhosa from 'Kaffraria' to work in the border districts. Peires has commented "that so many went, is a testament to the starvation of the Xhosa, newly resettled in their remaining possessions". (36) The following table reveals the composition of indentured workers in 1849 and 1850.

Table 1 - Contract Workers from British Kaffraria 1849 and 1850 (By District) (37)

DISTRICT	1849				1850				GRAND TOTAL
	MEN	WOMEN	CHILDREN	TOTAL	MEN	WOMEN	CHILDREN	TOTAL	
NDLAMBE	155	51	88	294	116	46	55	218	512
NGQIKA	124	81	120	325	132	83	109	324	649
	279	132	208	619	248	130	164	542	1 161

From the table it can be seen that men were in fact the dominant participants in this early contract labour and not children as the Colonists had hoped. However these official statistics grossly underestimated the actual numbers employed because they reflected only indentured labour aimed mainly at meeting the labour needs in the Western Cape. Many more people worked on the burgeoning sheep farms of the Border and Midlands districts. This group had the opportunity to enter into varying types of arrangements with farmers that fell short of wage labour. It was from this point on that the different forms of tenancy began to make their appearance. (38)

It is necessary to distinguish between 'squatters' who occupied Colonial land illegally, whether they paid rent to the farmers or not, and labour tenants who actually worked for the Colonial farmers. While squatting was widespread in this period, tenancy with labour rent or crop rent (share-cropping) was still in its beginnings. We will reserve the term squatting for the type of occupation in which the occupiers carried on their productive activity without reference to the owners of the farms; adopted whatever production processess they wished, and had only to pay an annual rent. (39) In subsequent years squatting had a political importance in excess of its actual extent. Far more common, and

economically far more significant, was labour rent or crop rent which required that the tenant actually work for the farmer, whether using his own implements or not; whether using his own labour or family labour; and required that the farmer be in actual possession of the farm and be working it himself.

Many of these workers on the Colonial farms did in fact enter into some form of tenancy system with their Colonial employers. This group is of exceptional importance, for it was they who returned to the districts still occupied by the Xhosa in the 1850s and '60s and who began the large scale transformation of domestic production in the Xhosa homesteads. This was accomplished both by the effect of exposure to new techniques and, more importantly, by the accumulation of money and cattle by workers on the Colonial farms, which began to link the process of homestead production and reproduction to accumulation outside of its own structures, in the broader Colonial economy.

Such bases of accumulation were, however, not located exclusively outside the districts occupied by the Xhosa. There was also some direct stimulus to commodity production in this period from within the confines of British Kaffraria. As has been mentioned, over 2 000 military personnel were retained in Kaffraria and the small community of traders and artisans at King William's Town and East London was growing quickly. As early as the meeting of 7th January 1848 Smith had informed the chiefs that the Army Commissariat would purchase their surplus grains (towards maintaining the occupation force) "at the average price of the Colonial Market". (39)

Mackinnon believed that the adoption of the plough and the encouragement of agriculture was the duty of the missionaries and the chiefs. The first permanent mission station had been established in 1820 on the Gwali tributary of the Tyhumie River by the Rev. John Brownlee. The people surrounding this station were mainly Ntinde and it was Brownlee's influence on the chief Tshatshu that was partly responsible for his general collabora-

tionist attitude towards the Colony. However the weak position of the Ntinde, living directly in the most disputed territory and sandwiched between Maqoma and the Colony, was no doubt a more important factor in determining Tshatshu's political strategy. It was a strategic spot for the location of the first mission station. In 1825 the second station was established on the Inchera stream. This became known as Old Lovedale. The first pre-occupation of the early missionaries was translating the Bible into Xhosa and establishing themselves with the people. The latter objective was accomplished by gaining adherents through the technological innovations which they introduced.

In 1821 the first irrigation furrows were constructed at the Tyhumie station and ploughs were made available to people who worked there. (40) In this way they brought 300 acres under cultivation at Tyhumie. Old Lovedale was destroyed in the war of 1835, but in the 1840s several new stations were established so that by 1848 there were six mission stations in British Kaffraria. (41) Lovedale was reconstructed on a new site on the Colonial side of the border, but had extensive agricultural land inside British Kaffraria.

The building of military forts and the spread of mission stations paralleled each other. The presence of missionaries both preceded and followed the path of the gun. There is no doubt that most chiefs such as Ngqika, Maqoma, Tyali and Phato saw missionaries in a strategic light. Prior to the war of 1835, Maqoma had professed interest in Christianity in his attempt to secure his occupation of lands in the 'ceded' territory. When Maqoma was driven out of his lands a contemporary observer recorded him as saying:

> "I am glad I have heard there is a God. The teacher has told me that God will judge all men according to their deeds. You have overcome me by weapons that are in your hands. But you must answer for this. You and I must stand before God. He will judge us. I am a man who does not know God yet I rejoice He will be judge." (42)

Tyali's motivation was almost certainly the same when he made a grant of about 40 acres to the old Lovedale station. In 1848, Fort Hare was erected adjoining Lovedale, and 500 men were stationed there. On the Colonial side of the Lovedale mission was the new district of Victoria, where farms were given out to Colonists and part of the dense Mfengu population of Peddie was resettled there. The Pirie mission was strategically situated near Fort Stokes and Burns Hill station was on the Keiskamma River near Fort Cox. They were all in areas of high population concentration and therefore ideal for propagating new ideology and technology.

After the war of 1848 Smith realised the potential of the missionaries and in a Government circular he asked all the missionaries to submit memoranda on the best methods "to inspire in the Bantu a desire to cultivate their land by ploughing and to induce them to follow habits of industry - the first step to civilisation and equally so to their embracing the Christian faith". (43) In response to this, the Reverend Warner suggested a tax of 4 shillings to 5 shillings on each adult male, others suggested the establishment of mocel farms and irrigation furrows. Most of this Mackinnon rejected as he regarded the mission stations themselves as the best means of encouraging more intensive agriculture:

> "I conceive that the best means we can supply to encourage agriculture amongst the Kaffirs is by furnishing the missionaries with ploughs, seed corn and agricultural implements, such as spades, hoes and axes to ... be used for the benefit of the Kaffirs in the neighbourhood of their stations. In some cases too when the chiefs show desire to cultivate the soil independent of the missionaries, ploughs and seed should be given to them." (44)

The chiefs Sandille, Phato, Toise, Siwani, Siyolo and Namba and the councillors Soga and Sonta each received 5 yokes, a plough

trek chains and one muid of seed wheat, oats and barley. Sandille received 4 oxen in addition and certain other people were also given seed corn. The mission stations all received seed grains, ploughs and yokes. In addition, some special distributions of grain and spades or hoes were made to destitute people in Sandille's country. (45)

At the time of the distribution of presents in 1849, 30 hand saws, 11 ploughs and a large number of other implements were given to the mission stations. (46) In April, 1849 Mackinnon again requested Smith to supply seed wheat from Cape Town asking for 10 muids each for the Ngqika and Ndlambe districts. (47)

Although Mackinnon claimed that his assistance to the missions in getting them productively involved in agriculture was in order to promote them as model farms to 'benefit' the surrounding Xhosa, the establishement of a cheap supplier of food for the army was as important a function. Writing about the distribution of ploughs to the mission stations, he noted:

> "This has given a great impulse to industry and agriculture, and already has a great deal of corn and other produce been raised at two of the mission stations, Burns Hill and Kaysers. I understand that about 12 000 lbs. of oat hay are ready for sale to the commisariat." (48)

In this way, military occupation encouraged the first large scale production of agricultural commodities and assisted in turning the mission stations into magnets which attracted the destitute and displaced Xhosa who worked there and encouraged the spread of commodity production.

The imposition of the British Kaffrarian administration also had a stimulating effect on trade. Each trader had to pay 50 pounds per annum for his trading license. Despite this Mackinnon was able to report that:

> "A very considerable Kaffir Trade has sprung up and is duly on the increase. The effect of this will

> be to benefit materially the Colonial revenue ... We have forty-three general traders in Kaffraria each of whom has paid 50 pounds for his license ... These traders must sell largely, or they could not pay so high a rate of license." (49)

Increasing the extent of trade was one of the main concerns of the Colonial merchant houses in Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown. The Colonial State also benefited from it. As Mackinnon pointed out, "the Colonial Revenue benefits largely by the Kaffir Trade", as all articles imported were subject to duty. British manufacture goods were charged at 5%, but the large quantities of beads which were still sold were of Italian manufacture, and as with all other non-British manufactured goods were charged at 12%. The main trade item, however, remained blankets. The scarcity of cattle for any but the most basic food requirements during this period directly encouraged the adoption of blankets for clothing on a massive scale. "Blankets they buy in great quantities, and the sale of these is one of the great sources of profit to the Traders". (50) However most of the trade at this stage was still carried on by "means of an interchange of commodities and there was little use of money." (51)

It has already been mentioned that Mfengu because of their position in the Colony were ideally placed to participate in cattle raiding operations. They were also ideally placed to participate in the other great object of trade which dominated the inter-war period, namely firearms. Almost immediately after the close of the 1848 war trade in firearms became a feature of the frontier. The reasons are not hard to find. It appears that Colonial merchants were importing muskets for 7 shillings or 8 shillings each from Britain and selling them for 1 pound to 1 pound 10 shillings on the frontier. (52) By the time the war actually began in December 1850 (with an armed ambush of a Colonial patrol) the main force of the Xhosa were fairly well armed with guns. (53) The illegal nature of the trade naturally created a role for Mfengu as middle-men between merchants and Xhosa.

The extent of Mfengu participation in trade went beyond the illegal arms trade. There appears to have been a considerable trade in other commodities as well. This trade was not in the interests of the licensed traders, and they were quick to try and force Mfengu traders out. In September 1848, Mackinnon received a petition complaining about "the inconvenience that is occasioned by Fingoe from the Colony trading in British Kaffraria and beyond the Kei." (54) Fynn, the Government agent with Sarhili, had apparently detected some Mfengu selling arms and seized 15 cannisters of gunpowder and a large number of bullets. Mackinnon on the strength of this, requested permission to "seize all wares in the possession of Fingoes proceeding towards Kafferland, and to make them prisoners if they had no passes, sending them back under escort to their location." (55) It is clear that he was using the trade in firearms as a pretext to force the Mfengu out altogether. Although this permission was never granted attempts were made to enforce more strictly licensing provisions which effectively excluded small Mfengu traders, but did not affect the trade in firearms which was illegal in the first place.

The main force at the disposal of the new commissioners was two divisions of 'police' which had been recruited from the Xhosa themselves. There were 400 in all, 200 in each division. It was these police, under the command of two British Army officers who were responsible for following the spoor of stolen cattle and attaching cattle confiscated in fines and compensation. The continual presence of these forces was backed up by over 2 000 troops stationed at King William's Town and at other military forts. (56) The main purpose of the forts was to keep track of all movement into the Colony. However the presence of the forts also ensured complete access to the interior for traders, and trade benefited most from the short lull between wars.

This, in brief, was the system established by Sir H. Smith, and it is of some importance as it was the first formal attempt anywhere in South Africa to directly impose Colonial domination. In order

to be 'successful', the Colonial State had to achieve a major dislocation of the mode of production and for that it had to break the fundamental relationship between the four pillars of Xhosa society - the chief, the homestead, the cattle and the land.

This it had done by radically reducing the available land through conquest, and by reducing the cattle-holding of the Xhosa through the confiscation of vast herds as booty in the wars. The Colonial economy, by providing opportunities for trade and wage labour made it possible for homesteads, and more particularly the young and the poor, to be drawn into the accumulation of cattle and money in the Colonial economy where the chiefs had no control over the accumulation process.

At the same time the contradictions within the chiefdoms were intensified. By restricting access to cattle, by reducing the overall number of cattle at the disposal of the chiefs and by restricting the land available for residential, arable and pastural purposes, a crisis was engendered in the basis of chiefly authority. There occurred an intensification of the 'bottle-necking' effect, whereby the concentration of resources in the hands of established homesteads increased. This made it all the more difficult for the normal process of the establishment of new homesteads by the younger men to continue. If the chief could not provide cattle and facilitate the establishment of new homesteads, there was no longer a basis for his position and authority. However, the chieftaincy was a great institution and chiefly ideology was extremely powerful. Belief in the efficacy of the chiefs was not lightly to be dispensed with. It was thus inevitable, operating under such restrictions, that the popular sentiment would be for war.

The chiefs never accepted the new dispensation of Colonial rule. While it has already been mentioned that they almost immediately began military preparations mainly aimed at acquiring guns, they almost certainly still hoped that, as in 1835 with the renunciation of the Province of Queen Adelaide, the British

Government would remove the burden of British Kaffraria. Thus in February 1849, at a meeting for the distribution of 'presents' it became apparent that a rumour had been spread that "the present system of government was to be abandoned and that they would be allowed to reoccupy the country taken from them at the close of the war". (57) Sandille, Mhalla and Seyolo were present. They addressed the meeting and complained specifically about the small size of the country they now occupied. There can be no doubt that for the operation of the Xhosa economy according to its own laws the country was too small.

After only a year of operation of the first administration set up to govern formerly independent Xhosa chiefdoms, another war seemed inevitable.

II The War of 1850 - 1853 and Economic Dislocation

The war in 1850 is unique in that it followed directly from the imposition of British Sovereignty in Western Xhosaland. If the treaty system of 1835 had failed to bring a 'secure frontier' in the eyes of the Colonial apologists for the war of 1848, neither did the imposition of British military rule, and it brought another war in its wake. As chiefs watched the increasing dispersal of homesteads and the insidious growth of wage labour and trade, it became increasingly clear that they would soon no longer be able to control the process of accumulation of cattle and expansion of homesteads within their sections of the nation. Alternative and radically new bases for accumulation had begun to emerge.

At the same time the new opportunities were not open to everyone. For many the conditions of life with Sarhili or Mhalla as immigrants must have been scarcely any better than with Sandille. Work in the distant western districts for all but the

most desperate was an unwelcome prospect. That there were many such desperate people is attested to by the relatively large numbers who went to work as contract workers, and the fact that Mackinnon made a special distribution of seeds and spades to the 'destitute' in Sandille's country. Working locally or squatting on Colonial farms on the border brought with it insecurity and conflict. There were therefore ample grounds to ensure continuous pressure on the chiefs from the mass of homesteads to fulfil their duties as chiefs; that is to provide the homesteads and the young men in particular with cattle and land in return for their loyalty and support. The more the chiefs delayed, the more the people were bound to become dispersed and the nation weakened. This would make it more difficult to defend existing cattle and land and to fight to regain lost resources.

In 1849, Sandille (who it will be remembered had been absent from Smith's meeting of chiefs in January 1848) publicly rejected the system, declaring bluntly that "the country was too small". (58) 1849 was a year of drought which intensified the demands being made upon the chiefs. The drought continued from the sowing season of 1849 through to 1850, and was of such severity that pasturage was affected, leading to a serious drop in the milk yield. (59) Merriman, who toured the frontier and British Kaffraria in 1850, observed that because of: "the excessive drought which has been of such long continuance, there was much distress in Kaffirland, and the people were almost perishing from hunger." (60)

In August 1850, Commissioner Maclean first reported the presence of a prophet called Mlanjeni, of Mqhayi's tribe. Ordered to appear before Maclean, Mlanjeni declined and in retaliation the police seized two head of cattle from his father's kraal (where he lived). (61) They also took down the special poles erected at Mlanjeni's kraal indicating the place of a prophet. Mackinnon's reaction to the increasing dissatisfaction of the people was to recommend the abolition of 'presents' and the substitution of cash payments direct to the chiefs. He proposed payment to all the senior and junior chiefs at 20 pounds and 10 pounds per annum

respectively. (62) While he declined to arrest Mlanjeni he contemplated the removal of Sandille as chief, (who he thought was the source of disaffection) although he recognised that this step would be purely nominal and would intensify opposition to British rule. (63)

The exact nature of Mlanjeni's prophecies is uncertain. To place them in proper context it is important to understand the general nature of prophecy and the role of the war doctor in the Xhosa social formation. The war doctor was one of a hierarchy of priests or diviners who collectively held power over, and could explain the workings, of all important phenomena including sickness and rain. (64) Without going into the question of the relationship between Xhosa religious ideology and chiefly power, it has already been mentioned that the witchcraft accusation was the most powerful sanction in the hands of the chiefs. (65) Such accusations lead to the calling in of a specialist doctor to find the witch. The essence of the belief in witchcraft is that no serious illness, death or other material calamity can take place except through the evil influence (u-posela) of some living individual usually termed igqwira (witch or wizard). (66)

Soga has explained that the role of the war doctor (Tola), such as Mlanjeni, was based on an extension of this cosmology. "They doctor the army and use their power to "tie up" the enemy of a particular person or thing in such a way as to render it innocuous ... this power to control is call u-mabope - the tier-up. This tying power is not confined to the war priest, even the i-xwele or herbalist is said to have it." (67) Sacrifice of cattle was carried on within each umzi in cases of illness or bad fortune and every homestead was completely used to the process of divination and being called on to sacrifice cattle. Usually some attempt was made to keep a particular line of beast in the family herd which was purer in strain than the rest. This was kept for sacrificial purposes. For a war doctor to call upon the nation to sacrifice cattle, was merely extending the normal practice of doctoring. (68) Warner has described the position of the war doctor in somewhat exaggerated but basically accurate terms.

> "The people pay great deference to all the priests, but they yield unbounded obedience to the national priest: and to disregard his injunction, and to neglect, or to refuse to conform to all the rites and ceremonies he may think it proper to institute ... would be considered a capital offence." (69)

While disobedience to the war doctor may have been serious, it is also certain that great chiefs promoted doctors, so that should anything go wrong in the war, the blame would fall on the inept doctor rather than on the chief. For these basic reasons, it is easy to understand that the word of a prophet calling on the people for sacrifice was not lightly dismissed.

Mlanjeni's early activities were those of a conventional doctor. He lived in his father's kraal in the small location of the chief Mqhayi. According to the census of 1848 Mqhayi's chiefdom contained only 47 homesteads, containing 191 households. (70) This made it the smallest of all the Ciskeian chiefdoms, accounting for only 1.4% of all households. This is of some significance because Mqhayi was the senior son of Ndlambe who had been defeated in the power struggles after Ndlambe's death, in which Mhalla gained the Ndlambe chieftaincy. That the prophet of the 1850 war should emanate from the areas in closest contact with the Colony and from the weakest chiefdom in Xhosaland certainly favoured the emergence of the widest interest from other chiefs. It made it easier to allay suspicions that Mlanjeni was in any way the tool of any particular great chief.

Mlanjeni was young, about 20 years old, at that time, and shortly before he started prophesying he had been in the Colony as a worker. He had thus direct experience of the Colonists and Colonial servitude. (71) He declared that his father's kraal was bewitched. Shephard claims that the crucial step taken by Mlanjeni was to declare that the land itself was full of bewitching substances and in order to rid it of them the people had to come to him to be cleansed. It was this revelation which caused huge crowds to gather at Mlanjeni's kraal. Mlanjeni's

innovation was that the normal process of divination, which any household would resort to through the intermediary of a doctor in times of adversity, was made into a national crusade. Initially these meetings did not involve any direct talk of war and were sufficiently akin to the normal practice of a doctor for the Colonial authorities not to feel warranted in taking drastic action against Mlanjeni. This they realised would only increase mass interest in him.

It is of particular importance to observe the part played by cattle sacrifice ordered by Mlanjeni. As part of the cleansing process Mlanjeni ordered people to kill the dun (red, ochre or yellowish brown) coloured cattle. After August 1850 he began prophesying that war with the Colony was inevitable and enjoined people to sacrifice cattle to ensure victory - promising them that the cattle of the Colony would be theirs. The Rev. Garvin of Ann Shaw mission station writing to Colonel Maclean in 1855 stated:

> "When I was in the interior during the last war in several conversations with intelligent natives on the subject of the ... coloured cattle having been ordered to be destroyed by Umlanjeni I ascertained that circumstances somewhat similar had occurred in previous years." (72)

In fact it appears that the equally famous war doctor Nxele (otherwise known as Makanna) who led the attack on Grahamstown in April 1819, had also ordered the killing of cattle. He has been reported as ordering the slaughtering of all red cattle and goats but that any that had the least patch of white were not to be slaughtered. (73)

In view of the subsequent cattle-killing episode that followed defeat in the 1850-1853 war, it is important to see that cattle-killing was a form of sacrifice which every homestead was used to and which had been used previously in mobilising the nation behind the chiefs in preparation for war. The practice thus must have had a high level of acceptability for the mass of Xhosa.

It is not clear from what point the chiefs started taking a direct interest in Mlanjeni; however, even Colonist ideologues such as Brownlee concede that Mlanjeni was an authentic prophet of the nation and was not a mere pretext established by the chiefs themselves. The turning point appears to have been the attempts made to remove those of Maqoma's homesteads 'squatting' in the Blinkwater area. It has already been discussed that since 1848 Maqoma had been leading an attempt to occupy the Blinkwater and Waterkloof areas around Ft. Beaufort. In June 1850 a large raid was made by Lt. Davis using the Frontier Police force. At the end of the raid Davis reported that "all unlawful squatters were sent to their respective chiefs." (74) The expulsion was undoubtedly serious; altogether 350 women, 145 men and "a great number of children" were removed. Most of the people affected were adherents of Maqoma. Although Maqoma's chiefdom was small, accounting for only 429 households or nearly 10% of the Ngqika chiefdom as a whole, his influence and reputation throughout the chiefdom was great. The area he was occupying was a valuable source of sourveld grazing and it is likely that many of the 2 347 cattle belonging to the squatters had been sent there to survive the drought which had greatly reduced available pasturage.

A crucial feature of the raid was that it adversely affected a number of Khoi who had previously lived in the Kat River settlement. Many of them were removed and forced back to the overcrowded Kat River settlement. This seemed to be one of the immediate causes that stimulated most of the settlement to join the war on the side of the Xhosa. This was a significant development and it was not lost on the Colonists that those groups on which they thought they could rely, such as the Khoi and the Mfengu, could in fact never be fully trusted to protect Colonial interests. The Khoi rebellion along with the mass mobilization achieved by Mlangeni marked the war of 1850, more than any other, as a war of national resistance to defend the right of the mass of homesteads to the land in the face of Colonist usurpation.

It is perhaps significant that it was only a month after this raid that the first report by Commissioner Maclean, concerning Mlanjeni's activities, was registered. Godlonton claims that after the removal of the people from the Blinkwater, Maqoma made a personal visit to Phato, Mhalla and Mtirara (Thembu chief). He also claims that he tried to organise a combined attack, but this claim is not supported. However his other claim, that Maqoma prevailed on them to send delegations to hear Mlanjeni's prophecy is almost certainly true. (75) The existence of the prophet and the large numbers of people who believed in his prophecy seems to indicate that the war was motivated by popular sentiment. This, combined with the realisation by the chiefs that after nearly three years of British domination British Kaffraria was not going to be deproclaimed as had occurred in 1835, resulted in the preparation of definite plans for war.

In late October 1850 the Governor Sir H. Smith was on the border and called a meeting of chiefs at King William's Town - which Sandille did not attend. Chagrined by this, Smith issued a notice deposing Sandille, as Mackinnon had earlier contemplated doing, and appointed Brownlee as the new chief. (76) Nothing further was done immediately. Smith spent November 1850 making his views on the economic and political problems of the frontier known to the Colonists. He specifically wished to encourage a dense Colonist population on the frontier. Speaking to a delegation of Colonists which included Godlonton, the proprietor of the Grahamstown Journal, he declared:

> "One thing I must say, all of you commit a grave error in keeping so many black and so few white servants. A black costs you 23 pounds 9 shillings a year, not reckoning his thieving. A white will cost you 38 pounds 15 shillings, but will steal nothing. Now the least sensible among you must see that the difference of 15 pounds between a faithful white servant and a black thief, is more than twice eaten up every year by the robberies committed upon you, under the present system of

> employing native labour, and further, the one would betray you, whilst the other would defend you." (77)

However the question of employing black workers was not based on considerations of cost or sentiment, it was based on the fact that only their labour had the necessary skill to work in the rugged conditions of frontier sheep and cattle farms; as Godlonton put it in reply to Smith:

> "black labour cannot be entirely dispensed with, as no immigrant is willing to act as sheep and cattle herd, neither do they understand the management of wagons and oxen as well as the natives do. In the case of lost or stolen cattle, a coloured man will follow up the spoor through bush and brake, and frequently recover them under circumstances in which a white man would be baffled, and his labour would prove utterly in vain." (78)

The employment of blacks on the Colonial sheep farms was therefore related not only to the cheapness of their labour but also to its quality. As sheep farming expanded so did the need for skilled herders. As most such workers were still in close contact with their homesteads and chiefs, it is also true that they were in an excellent position to direct cattle theft operations. By late 1850 most workers in the border districts were returning home in response to the injunction of Mlanjeni, and the news of the prophecy reached the Western districts bringing indentured workers back from there.

As a result of Smith's attempts to pacify Colonial feeling most farmers who had fled their farms in October had returned. However in early December Smith was again on the frontier and at a further meeting of chiefs, Smith and the Ndlambe Commissioner Maclean attempted to encourage the Ndlambe under Mhalla to stay out of the war, should it come. By December 1850 the alliance of chiefs had taken shape. Phato, the Gqunukwebe chief sent to Maclean saying:

> "all the Hlambie chiefs and their people are slaughtering cattle, except Toise and myself. This

> sacrifice of cattle commenced with Sandille and has spread over the whole land. The reason given is, that by sacrifice of cattle, much plunder will be got from the Colony, and never recovered and that those who slaughter goats will only be able to take goats from the Colony." (79)

By this stage most of the Ngqika force under Sandille had withdrawn to the Amatola Mountains which were to be the focus of the war. The Amatolas are a range in which the headwaters of the Keiskamma rise and they overlooked the main Ngqika territory. The forests of the Amatolas were a sure source of grazing for the Ngqika in even the most severe droughts in the lowlands and possession of them was symbolic of Ngqika power and definitive of their country. It was from the Amatola that access could be had to the Tyhumie and from there to Ft. Beaufort and the rest of the Colony. In a highly significant comment Mhalla mockingly asked Smith at the last meeting of chiefs called by him in December 1850, "If he had any ships that could sail up the Amatolas" (80)

On the 24th December Smith decided to make a show of force and he despatched about 500 men up the Keiskamma. This force was successfully ambushed by Sandille, and 36 men, including 12 officers and a number of Colonials, were killed. (81) With the outbreak of war most of the police and the Kat River Khoi under Uithaalder joined the Xhosa forces.(82) Colonial troop strength was further weakened by the removal of the Boers, and those that remained declined to take part in the formation of commandos. These factors assisted the Xhosa forces in the early part of the war and saw many Xhosa successes in ambushing convoys, attacking farms and capturing cattle.

One of the most noteworthy of these successes was to have far-reaching consquences for all the chiefdoms in the 1850s. At the commencement of the war Smith was at Ft. Cox, from which point Mackinnon's column had set out in December. Between December 25th 1850 and January 1st 1851 Smith was besieged at Ft. Cox and

was very nearly defeated there. He made an ignominious escape to Grahamstown disguised as a trooper. His detention at Ft. Cox evidently made a great impression on him. It also revealed the shallow hollowness of his racist character. No sooner had he met Maclean at Ft. Murray after having made his escape than he stated:

> "That matters were in such a critical state ... that he saw clearly that some concession must be made to the chiefs, and that he intended to acquaint them that henceforth the Government would not interfere with their native laws and customs." (83)

As a result of one narrow escape Smith was prepared to make an about turn on the policy of complete dispossession of the chiefs, which he had previously upheld so loudly. Nothing better reveals his lust for easy domination, which crumbled in the face of determined resistance, than his response to Maclean's objection that his proposed new policy would be "striking our colours". Smith replied "something must be done, for the Kaffirs of 1851 are not the Kaffirs of 1835, and that he felt quite satisfied that our form of Government had been too stringent." (84)

This major change of policy, taken in such unceremonious haste while the Colonists and their Imperial protectors were on the run and disorganised, was in fact an event of major importance in the historical determination of the form of subordination of the Xhosa social formation. That same day Smith personally informed Toyise that he would no longer be subject to review in respect of decisions affecting internal affairs in his chiefdom. Maclean was despatched to deliver the same message to Phato and Mhalla.

It was almost certainly the immediate effect of this about turn, coming as it did within the first week of hostilities, that kept Mhalla and Toyise out of the war. It is probable that Phato, Siwani, Mqhayi and Kama would have stayed out anyway, but this decision by Smith must certainly have strengthened their resolve, given the early successes of Sandille and Maqoma in the war.

The war disrupted all the major chiefdoms and saw enormous movement of homesteads that had been settled for generations. In the vicinity of each major group of belligerents there were strategically placed collaborationist chiefs. These formed a nucleus around which homesteads not participating in the war, or homesteads which had suffered loss of members through war and had therefore to retire, could gather. In this way the collaborating chiefs found that not participating in the war gained them new adherents, over whom they would enjoy complete control free from Colonial interference, in terms of the January decision. Their tactic of collaboration with the Colonial State must have seemed, to them, much more profitable than war. By consistently extending support to the collaborating chiefs the long process of the growth of hitherto insignificant chiefdoms now subordinate to the Colonial State was begun.

Many people in the following of the collaborating chiefs participated in the war. In some cases this was by the design of the chief, as with Mhalla, whose son Mcota, (alias Mackinnon) and nephew Siyolo took an active part in the war. (85) In all cases the participation of some homesteads or households of the collaborating chiefs and the accretion of new adherents retiring from the war intensified the struggle by the chiefs for the loyalty and support of homestead heads . Certain chiefs such as Phato adhered to the Colonial State out of conviction; most were motivated by strategic considerations, hoping that the war would weaken their rivals and benefit them. The collaborating chiefs were required to perform certain duties. For example Phato was required to ensure the safety of convoys on the King William's Town - East London Road. In return for this work Phato and the collaborating Ndlambe chiefs Siwani and Mqhayi received payment in captured stock. On one occasion in March 1851 Phato received 159 head while Siwani received 135 and Mqhayi 141. (86) The collaborating chiefs received regular, but ad hoc, payments from Cathcart, which was he felt "indispensable to keep them steady". (87) These cattle payments were taken from the "Kaffrarian Fund" which was established from the sale of captured cattle.

There was some active internal opposition within these chiefdoms to the mercenary role their chiefs were playing. Xosa, a prominent councillor of Phato repeatedly tried to raise a war party within Phato's ranks. Although the Ndlambe Commissioner Maclean wanted Phato to destroy Xosa "as an example", Phato, who understood the weakness of his situation more surely than Maclean, declined, agreeing only to "watch him closely." (87)

For much of 1851 the Xhosa enjoyed the best of the war, having infiltrated and occupied a massive area of the Colony. It was only in late 1851 that the Colonial counter-attack began. As in previous wars the first target of the Colonists was the Gcaleka chief, Sarhili. Towards the end of 1851 Smith led an attack on Sarhili which resulted in the loss of about 60 000 head of cattle. (89) Early in 1852 Smith was recalled as Governor because of dissatisfaction at Whitehall over the huge cost of the war. (90) His replacement was General G. Cathcart who arrived in the war zone in April 1852.

He immediately consulted with Maclean and Mackinnon and stated his opposition to the system established by Smith in 1848. In his view chiefs could not be dispensed with "unless by a thorough and unmistakable conquest of the whole of the Amaxosa nation ... which he considered impracticable with the means at his command." (91) Cathcart then instructed Maclean to repeat to the Ndlambe chiefs his confirmation of the reversal of policy previously decided on by Smith; that they would be free to determine their own internal affairs and to appropriate fines and settle cases according to Xhosa practices. This step was of the utmost significance for it influenced the future course of relationships between the Colonial State and the chiefs. Many chiefs and their supporters looked on these statements as a sort of charter which crucially affected their future assessment of the political situation. Thus Cathcart remained insistent in his view:

> "against any premature interference with or disparagement of the authority and influence of chiefs in respect to government of their clans,

> because I am convinced that to remove one means of governing before you can possibly supply another can only be productive of anarchy; whereas if the chief be supported in the government of his clans, it is easy to govern the chief and his people through him." (92)

Cathcart had been very keen to raise a Colonist force to assist British troops. The war had been characterised by the non-participation of Boer Commandos and the traders and English Colonists were mostly content to profit by contracts for war supplies, without committing themselves to active combat. Cathcart missed no opportunity to praise the Commando system and urge its revival. The second raid against Sarhili provided the opportunity he was looking for. British troops under Lt. Colonels Michel and Napier teamed up (in the euphemistic language of the time) with a "public-spirited body of volunteers, armed, mounted and equipped by voluntary subscriptions raised by the more wealthy part of the community, to whom it was not convenient to render personal service." (93) Setting out in pursuit of a fine of 1 500 head of cattle (originally imposed by Smith on top of the 60 000 already taken) this "public-spirited" force took off 15 000 head of cattle! The cattle booty plundered from the Gcaleka was divided at Balotta "among the Colonists who had assisted in its capture." (94) It was clear that Colonial war was a profitable undertaking for the Colonists. In addition 7 000 Mfengu accompanied the Colonial and Imperialist forces from Gcalekaland. That so many came at this stage is testimony to the fact that far from all Mfengu chose to leave Gcalekaland at the time of the original exodus in 1835. (95)

The war itself consisted of intermittent attacks both by the Xhosa and Colonist forces, punctuated by alarms as further contingents of Khoi recruits defected to the Xhosa side. Cathcart's main military effort consisted of the building of roads in the Amatolas and the sending of regular patrols through both the Amatolas and the Waterkloof - thus preventing Sandille

from moving from the mountains. As in previous wars, patrols burnt huts and destroyed gardens wherever they found them. By June 1852 the war had deteriorated into a series of skirmishes.

The Xhosa, noted Cathcart, "are starving, they evade any hostilities unless forced in self-defence to resistance, but it is only by occupation and temporary destruction of their pasturage, and consequent starvation, that they can be compelled to retire." (96) As late as February 1853 Cathcart reported that "their gardens and crops of Indian corn have been partially destroyed, but so early in the season that a second crop, it appears, had sprung up, which natural consequence was artfully taken advantage of by the prophet Umlanjeni, who claimed the fact a miracle worked by his powers." (97)

III The Settlement of the 1850-1853 War

Those Nqqika under Sandille who had fought to the end were forced out of the Amatolas and the Blinkwater-Waterkloof-Kroome mountains. Most of the Ngqika under Sandille and Maqoma were forced beyond the Kei into Gcalekaland by about November 1852. Cathcart became obsessed with the idea of "clearing the Amatolas". By January 1853 Cathcart could report that the Ngqika district was entirely evacuated and Sandille himself was beyond the Kei. (98) Sandille was unable to move further into the Transkei, because Sarhili apparently would not have him, and he was unable to return to his old country which Cathcart was occupying. Cathcart decided that as the remaining Ngqika could not be exterminated, (a possiblity that Smith had earlier entertained) (99) he would:

> "collect them, place them in a new country where they can be more easily dealt with ... and unite them under the responsibility of a recognised chief who

> should have power to control them, and be held responsible for their conduct." (100)

In March 1853 Sandille surrendered. The settlement reached by Cathcart at the end of the war is of particular significance because it established the first real "locations" in which Xhosa, Mfengu and Thembu held land and lived under sufferance of Colonialist overlords, while retaining a measure of internal autonomy. What gave these new settlements the character of "locations" was that Cathcart used the mass displacement of population caused by the war to move people around and change the geographical positions of many sections of the Xhosa. This allowed him to reward those who had collaborated at the expense of those who had fought.

Sandille was to be allowed to occupy the area between the Amatolas and the Kei. The boundary on the west, which was the most crucial consideration, was the road leading from King William's Town to the Windvogelberg through the Döhne mission station (near present day Stutterheim), thus skirting the Amatolas. The land between this line and the Kei was very inferior, the parts near the Thomas River in the east being almost useless and impenetrable.

The conditions of Sandille's return to the Ciskei were that he and his people "shall in all things remain true and faithful to their allegiance to the Queen and to her Majesty's commands conveyed through the Governor and the Chief Commissioner, Colonel Maclean." (101) Apart from this he was to enjoy the same internal autonomy that had been granted to the collaborating chiefs. In addition a large number of guns had to be surrendered. Sandille was however to be in charge of making allotments of land to each minor chief and was to be responsible for their future conduct. These apparently simple conditions conceal the heart of the regime Cathcart installed as the 2nd British Kaffrarian administration.

The Amatolas, which had been the centre of the old Ngqika country, were created by a Government Notice of March 8, 1853 into a "Royal Reserve". This comprised the area between Ft. Hare on the Tyhame River and King William's Town. The area was to be occupied by "Fingoes and other loyal natives". Strict conditions for occupation of land were laid down. All huts were to be in villages of not less than 20 huts, free pasturage was allowed, but no group of 20 huts could have more than 20 stock per hut. Each village was to have a headman answerable for all people and cattle of his village. Most importantly, 10 shillings quit-rent per year was payable for each separate dwelling and a Superintendent was to be appointed to administer the Reserve. (102) The Crown Reserve, as it was known, was a prototype rural 'location' and the rules governing it are of great importance. The Crown Reserve was important in another respect, in that it was the first large gain by the Mfengu at the expense of the Xhosa. Needless to say the Colonists were not altogether happy as they wanted the Amatolas laid out as farms for themselves. They were mollified with ample 'compensation' in another direction - namely at Thembu expense.

The Thembu had participated in the war, and the chief Qesha had been a close ally of Maqoma, helping him to hold the Blinkwater area. The Colonists had attacked the Thembu paramount Mapassa and he and many of his people were killed. The section of the Thembu under Mapassa was completely dispersed. In numerous dispatches Cathcart never missed an opportunity to point out to Whitehall that Thembuland was "underpopulated". (103) All this provided excellent grounds for the Colonists confiscating Thembu land and proclaiming the new district of Queenstown. With the death of Mapassa the chieftaincy passed to Mtirara who was a minor, and the chieftainess Nonesi, who had remained loyal to the Colonists during the war, was appointed regent. The Thembu were now confined to what became the district of Glen Grey. If they were not short of land before, the limited area available in Glen Grey ensured that they soon were.

The Mfengu, apart from gaining access to the Crown Reserve also gained new locations at Alice, Ft. Beaufort, Tarkastad and Whittlesea. (104) All these lands were occupied on similar terms to the land allocated in the Crown Reserve. Apart from these major developments there were numerous lesser changes that, considered together, had a crucial influence on the development of political and economic relations in the '50s and '60s. The land previously occupied by the Mdushane chief Seyolo, who was imprisoned in Cape Town for his part in the war, was given to his brother Siwani. The Gqunukwebe chief Kama was brought back from his remote position at Whittlesea near the Winterberg and was given a large location along the Keiskamma River. From Middle Drift he occupied an area of about 250 square miles. (105) This territory adjoined that of Siwani and displaced the Mbalu chief Stokwe. The chief Mqhayi was also installed between Siwani and the sea thus "filling up the border with faithful and friendly Kafirs in its whole extent from the sea to the base of the Amatolas." (106)

Although the Ndlambe had lost no territory as a result of the war, the density of population in Mhalla's country was considerably increased by the presence of many Ngqika refugees. While the main burden of the losses had fallen on the Ngqika, many junior chiefs benefited from the new dispensation. In August 1853 Cathcart authorised payment for the collaborating chiefs: Phato and Toise were to receive 15 pounds, and Siwani Mqhayi and Kama 10 pounds per quarter. (107)

While the land losses were a crushing blow, the Colonists were well aware that the reversal of Smith's policy and the granting of internal autonomy to the chiefs was a concession of considerable importance. As Brownlee commented:

> "Sandille had lost the best part of his country, but the concession made to him was what he had fought for." (108)

There is evidence that chiefs were unsure how literally to treat the concession made to them in regard to internal autonomy. In one case at least Mhalla reported to Maclean, asking him how he

ought to punish one of his men guilty of bewitching his cattle. Maclean replied, in the spirit of the new policy, that he never interfered with native customs as long as they did not involve acts of cruelty. (109)

The reason behind Cathcart's move in allowing internal autonomy to the chiefs was made explicity clear shortly before his departure. He wrote to Maclean:

> "I must remind you that military control and not Colonization, is the principle of policy which has induced me to advise the retention of Kaffraria as a separate Government, indpendent of the Colony." (110)

For Cathcart military occupation with the retention by the Xhosa of sufficient land for subsistence and internal self-management was essential,

> "Until it may be safe to trust to a sufficient moral influence over them to obtain which can only be the work of time ... and the acquirement of property by the Kaffirs by means of agriculture and a taste for the wants and luxuries of civilized society." (111)

The war of 1848, the imposition of direct British rule and the war of 1850-1853, may be seen as accomplishing the effective conquest of the Xhosa formation by Imperialist colonialism. In Cathcart's view, however, the outcome of the war was only a partial conquest, if one is to understand by conquest the complete absorption of the conquered by the conquerors. Imperialist conceptions apart, this was indeed the concept of conquest that prevailed in many African formations, conquest being seen as a process of the absorption of the conquered. Xhosa resistance to absorption by the Colony was complemented by the fact that the Colony could not afford the military force that would have been required to achieve such control. It may be suggested that Xhosa military decisions were to some extent determined by the pay off betwen further resistance to, and accommodation of, the Colonists.

It is clear than even in 1853 the Xhosa were not completely defeated militarily. Defeat once again came through the inability of the Xhosa to sustain a fighting force over an extended period. Economic exhaustion was leading to more and more households retiring from the war. It was therefore optimal to end the war. The relatively good terms on which it ended stemmed from the fact that the Colonists could not afford to impose harsher terms.

The outcome of the war was definitive in a more general understanding of the effects of war. The economic exhaustion of the Xhosa resulted in three definite responses between 1848 and 1853 - the dispersal of households to other chiefdoms, the dispersal of households into the Colony as squatters and tenants, and the growth of wage work on the Colonial farms.

It is necessary to understand how these developments affected the homestead economy of the Xhosa. In the following chapters the development of these tendencies will be related to the internal transformation of the Xhosa economy.

(1) Proc. December 23, 1847. Laws and Regulations of British Kaffraria Previous to its Annexation to the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. (Cape Town), 1869.
The Letters Patent establishing British Kaffraria as a Colony and inaugurating its Government were never promulgated owing to the outbreak of war again in 1850. Smith's successor, Sir. G. Cathcart, only discovered this in late 1852. Owing to the lapse of time he was reluctant to promulgate them. Sir G. Grey, not wishing to be bothered with the encumbrance of a "regular government" failed to promulgate the second Letters Patent issued for the establishment of British Kaffraria, prefering to rule by proclamation. After much delay Letters Patent establishing British Kaffraria were finally issued in 1860, 12 years after its actual inauguration. The territory was effectively ruled by martial law from first to last, in all a clear case of juridical forms legitimising post-hoc that which had been achieved by quite other means.

(2) The meeting involved Smith ordering Maqoma to the floor and putting his foot on his neck, tearing up the 1835 treaties, blowing up a wagon to 'impress' the chiefs, and generally revealing his megolomaniac personality.

(3) du Toit, A.E. The Cape Frontier: A Study of Native Policy With Special Reference to The Years 1847 - 1866. Archives Year Book For South Africa, (1954). p. 29. du Toit gives a full account of the demands. He is wrong in saying that the Ngqika Chief Sandille was present. See also Godlonton, R. and Irving, E. Narrative of the Kaffir War, 1850-51-51. Facsimile Reprint Edition Cape Town 1962. pp. 20-21, -46.

(4) Burton, A.W. The Highlands of Kaffraria., Struik C.T. (1969). pp. 31-40.

(5) A separate peace was made with Sarhili, recognising his independence subject to certain conditions.

(6) du Toit. op.cit. p. 31.

(7) Maclean, J. A Compendium of Kaffir Law and Customs State Library, Pretoria, Reprint, (1968). pp. 131-139.

(8) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, October 21st 1850. There is often much too much emphasis placed on the practice of cattle confiscation following witchcraft accusations. In the first place, even when an accusation was succesfully proved, most often the accused was allowed to 'escape' - sometimes taking his cattle with him. In the second place the number of accusations is almost certainly exaggerated in the Colonial mind. It is very important to realise that the punishment for witchcraft, namely death by torture, was very rarely carried out - Soga found that throughout the sixty years of the Xhosa Paramount Chief Sarhili's reign only five cases of the death sentence being carried out in connection with witchcraft are known. Soga, J.H.: The Ama-Xosa: Life and Customs, Lovedale Press (1931) p. 108.

(9) Brownlee, C. Reminiscences of Kaffir Life and History. Lovedale Press (1911) p. 168. and p. 294.

(10) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, January 1st 1849.

(11) Ibid.

(12) A full list included:
Cloth Jackets- 12, Corduroy Trousers- 12, Check Shirts- 162, Neckerchiefs- 136, Glengary Caps- 12, Saddles and Bridles- 12, Female Dresses- 22, Shawls- 22, Moleskin Jackets- 44, Moleskin Trousers- 44, Blankets- 425, Spades- 450, Pole Axes- 80, Sickles- 45, Felling Axes- 20, Cooking pots- 90, Basting Spoons -99, Hand saws- 30. B.K. 371, 'Schedule of

Presents Distributed to the Hlambie and Gaika Tribes, Chief Kreli and the Mission Stations.'

(13) B.K. 317, Mackinnon to Smith, 21st October 1850.

(14) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, December 31st 1849.

(15) G.H. 14/9, Mackinnon to Smith, 25th June 1848.

(16) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, July 2nd 1848.

(17) Godlonton claims that the compensation was "something like the proportion of three to one". Godlonton and Irving. op. cit. p10.

(18) The actual prices obtained at these auctions per head could not be found. The figure of 1 pound 7 shillings per head is derived from the amounts obtained per head of cattle at the several auctions in King William's Town of cattle supplied by Sarhili as part of the fine imposed on him for participating in the war of 1852. B.K. 371, Return of Cattle Auctioned, 30th November 1852.

(19) G.H. 8/27, Brownlee to Maclean, July 18th 1855.

(20) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, January 1st 1849.

(21) B.K. 76, Ndlambe Commissioner to Chief Commissioner, n.d.

(22) Napier E. Elers, Excursions in Southern Africa, Volume II, London (1850), p. 134.

(23) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, June 25th 1848.

(24) G.H. 14/9, Mackinnon to Smith, March 23rd 1848.

(25) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, December 20th 1848.

(26) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, June 25th 1848. Passes were then issued in terms of Ordinance 49 of 1828 which allowed missionaries, traders and farmers to issue passes.

(27) G.H. 14/9, Brownlee to Mackinnon, 23rd June 1848.

(28) Ibid. "the Fingoes receive stolen property from the Kaffirs and the Kaffirs receive the same from the Fingoes".

(29) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, June 29th 1848.

(30) See below Chapter 4.

(31) Judy Kimble has distinguished between seasonal migration - the process of ebb and flow of homesteads that also occurred within the chieftaincy and labour migrancy. The latter has in turn to be distinguished from labour migrancy "specifically to obtain certain goods which would further enable them to participate in agriculture commodity production." Kimble, J. 'Towards an Understanding of the Political Economy of Lesotho. The Origins of Commodity Production and Migrant Labour 1830 - 1855.', Unpublished M.A. Thesis, National University of Lesotho 1978. p. 163.

(32) du Toit. op.cit. p. 140 and p. 250. He notes "receipt of a petition from 197 Landowners, and Agriculturalists of Caledon ... complaining of the great want of reliable labourers in June 1848.

(33) Peires, J. History of the Xhosa. Chapter 10 (draft chapter) p. 363.

(34) There is some conflict here with the figures given by Mackinnon to Smith vide B.K. 371, 10th January 1849. Mackinnon refers to 922 people sent into service in 1848. However, the census figure represents those actually absent from Xhosa homesteads as workers in the Colony. As the

contract periods were 2 to 3 years, the balance probably consisted of people who went into the Colony in 1847 for which no separate figure is available.

(35) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, July 21st 1848.

(36) Peires op.cit. p. 364.

(37) B.K. 371, Quarterly Return of Kaffirs forwarded to the Colony for Service, Return of Maclean and Brownlee up to 30th September 1850.

(38) The distinction between squatting and tenancy of different kinds is admittedly awkward, but no simple solution exists and extra words must be coined to convey the different meanings involved. The definitional distinctions proposed here will be adopted in subsequent usage in this study. Marion Lacey in her recent study Working for Boroko, Ravan (1981), p. 125, has lumped "half-share farming, share-cropping, rack-renting" all into the term "squatting", which she sees as describing the "tenant who lived on an occupied farm and paid for the privilege in cash or produce". In so doing she ignores the important distinction observed by Morris (see Chapter 3 above) between share-cropper and labour tenant. However there is also a historically earlier distinction that ought to made between squatters who occupied entire farms for their own benefit. Although tenants were later described as "squatters" it seems that a distinction can be made between different forms of more or less disguised wage labour and the earlier "squatters" who took land, often illegally, with or without the consent of its nominal Colonial landlord.

(39) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, July 25 1848.

(40) Shepherd, R.H.W. Lovedale South Africa: The Story of a Century 1841 - 1941, Lovedale Press, (1940). p. 66.

(41) These were Perie, Burns Hill, Umgwali (Free Church of Scotland) Peelton, Bethel, Knapps Hope, King William's Town and Lovedale.

(42) Shepherd op.cit. p. 73.

(43) Ibid. p. 130. du Toit op cit. p. 233. Government Circular, April 17th 1848.

(44) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, July 2nd 1848.

(45) B.K. 371, Appendix enclosure, Mackinnon to Smith, July 2nd 1848. "List of articles ordered for the Kaffirs for the promotion of agriculture". A supplementary list September 26th 1848.

(46) B.K. 371, Schedule of presents distributed to the Hlambie, Gaika and Tambookie tribes, Chief Kreli and the Mission Stations.

(47) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, April 1st 1849.

(48) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, January 1 1849.

(49) G.H. 14/9, Mackinnon to Smith, February 25th 1849.

(50) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, January 1st 1849.

(51) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, July 2nd 1848.

(52) 'Report of the Select Committee on the Kaffir Tribes.' Imperial Blue Books August 2nd 1851. Evidence of Sir G. Napier. Para. 167/8.

(53) du Toit op.cit. p. 61.

(54) G.H. 14/9, Mackinnon to Smith, September 1st 1848. Mackinnon confirms that Mfengu traders were taking a large quantity of blankets over the Kei for sale.

(55) Ibid.

(56) du Toit. op.cit. p. 31. Burton A.W. op.cit. pp. 35-39.

(57) G.H. 14/9, Mackinnon to Smith, February 25th 1849.

(58) Ibid.

(59) du Toit op.cit. p. 55.

(60) The Kaffir, the Hottentot and the Frontier Farmers. Passages of Missionary Life - From the Journal of Archdeacon Merriman, London, (1853). p. 71.

(61) B.K. 74, Maclean to Mackinnon, August 26th. 1850.

(62) B.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, October 21st 1850.

(63) Ibid. He recommended that no new chief be appointed.

(64) Soga op.cit. pp. 145-182. Maclean op.cit pp. 78-109.

(65) See Chapter 2 above.

(66) Soga op cit. p. 156. "Death and sickness in human beings are never ascribed by Xosas to natural causes, but always to human instrumentality." See also p. 179.

(67) Ibid. pp. 173-174. The Tola is supposed to have the power to "tie up" a river in flood, so as to enable the war-path to cross it in safety.

(68) Soga, J.H. op.cit p. 389.

(69) Maclean op.cit. p. 85.

(70) Census of the Gaika and Hlambi Districts in Maclean's Compendium pp. 149-150.

(71) Shepherd op.cit. pp. 122 - 125.

(72) B.K. 23/91. Reverend Garvin to Maclean, November 1st 1855.

(73) Manuscript letter from G. Cyrus, Superintendent Fingoe Location, Grahamstown, to R. Graham Esq. CC. Albany, January 10th 1857. Cyrus's information came from interviews with two old Mfengu headmen, Gwija and Danga. Grey Collection, South African Public Library G. 10C 13.

(74) du Toit op.cit. p. 50.

(75) Godlonton and Irving op.cit. p. 15.

(76) With typical bombast, Smith put a "price" of 500 pounds on Sandille's head.

(77) Godlonton and Irving op.cit. p. 25.

(78) Ibid. p. 26.

(79) G.H. 14/9, Message from Phato to Maclean in Maclean to Makinnon, 2nd December, 1850.

(80) Godlonton and Irving op.cit. p. 46.

(81) Ibid. p. 105.

(82) du Toit op.cit. p. 58. 365 of the 400 "Kaffir Police" joined the Ngqika with their arms and ammunition. The Kat River Khoi were led by Hermanus Matroos who was killed in January 1851. After that the brilliant guerilla fighter

William Uithaalder led over a thousand Khoi against the Colonist and Imperialist forces. One of the best descriptions of the recruitment, organisation and discipline within Uithaalder's forces can be found in the statement made by Johannes Fortuin who deserted the Cape Corp. See Cathcart,G. Correspondence of Lt. Gen. the Hon. Sir George Cathcart K.C.B. relative to his operations in Kaffraria until the termination of the Kaffir War. London, (1856). pp. 219-227.

(83) G.H. 8/28, Maclean to Liddle, February 15th 1856. Enclosure: "Notes of what passed between His Excellency Sir H. Smith and myself of 1st January 1851."

(84) Ibid. du Toit op cit. p.56. He has represented Smith's about face as a rational decision brought on by the realisation that the administration "had been too stringent in attempting to suppress so many important native customs". In fact it was nothing of the kind. It was a panic measure which recognised the reality of the continuing power of the chiefs within Xhosaland. du Toit was still trying to protect the image created for Smith by Colonial apologists of a pugnacious but kind soldier. In fact Smith was beset by illusions of a paranoid nature. When his self-deception was pricked, as at Fort Cox, he revealed his utter lack of political integrity.

(85) G.H. 14/9, Mackinnon to Smith, November 16th 1851. Godlonton and Irving op.cit. p. 268.

(86) G.H. 14/9, Mackinnon to Smith, March 8th 1851.

(87) Cathcart, G. op.cit. p. 360.

(88) G.H. 14/9, Mackinnon to Smith, November 12th, 1851.

(89) Shepherd. op.cit. p. 125. Young op.cit. p. 57.

(90) du Toit. op.cit. p. 65.

(91) G.H. 828, Maclean to Liddle, February 15th 1855.

(92) Cathcart, G. op.cit. Dispatch to Secretary of State for Colonies, Rt. Hon. Sir John Packington, May 20th 1852. p. 57.

(93) Cathcart, G. op.cit. p. 117

(94) Ibid. pp. 118-119.

(95) Moyers, R.A. 'A History of the Mfengu of the Eastern Cape 1815-1865.', Unpublished Phd. Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1976. p. 386.

(96) Cathcart, G. op.cit. p. 75.

(97) Ibid. p. 8.

(98) Ibid. p. 262.

(99) Godlonton and Irving op.cit. and Cathcart, G. op.cit. p. 22.

(100) Cathcart, G. op.cit. p. 2.

(101) Laws and Regulations of British Kaffraria op.cit. Proclamation March 2nd 1853.

(102) du Toit. op.cit. p. 79.

(103) Cathcart, G. op.cit. Disptach, November 29th 1852. p.158 and February 11th 1853, p. 17.

(104) Moyers. op cit. p. 227.

(105) Holden, Reverend C.W. British Rule in South Africa. London, (N.D.) State Library Reprint. p. 18.

(106) Cathcart, G. op.cit. October 12th 1852. p. 130.

(107) G.H. 8/25, Cathcart to Maclean, August 25th 1853. See also note 63 above. The salaries actually given were much larger than those proposed by Mackinnon in 1850.

(108) Brownlee, C. op.cit. p. 297.

(109) B.K. 371, Maclean to Liddle, March 26th 1853.

(110) G.H 8/23, Cathcart to Maclean, January 19th, 1854.

(111) Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

BRITISH KAFFRARIA - SECOND ADMINISTRATION JANUARY 1853 - JUNE 1856

I Conquests, Chiefs and the Colonial State

In Cathcart's view the outcome of the war of 1850-53 was only a partial conquest. Conquest, however, does not necessarily require the complete dismantling of the class structure and civil order of the conquered in order to achieve domination over them. It is sufficient that the institutions of class power of the conquered people be incorporated into the system of class rule of the new dominant power. For this to be achieved, military conquest has to extend far enough to ensure that the necessary conditions for the self-reproduction of the mode of production of the conquered social formation be thoroughly disrupted. This is what had been achieved by the series of Colonial wars culminating in the war of 1851-53.

The crucial theoretical point to observe in analysing this sort of conquest is that, while the loss of capacity for self-reproduction (which was an accomplished fact at the economic and political levels) made the pre-capitalist economy 'dependent' on the Colonial economy, the form of this 'dependence' still had to be determined. This could only occur through the class struggles necessarily engendered by the interactions of the capitalist and pre-capitalist forces of production. The definition of conquest (in the Colonial context) as the loss of capacity for self-reproduction by the pre-capitalist mode of production, merely indicates that this process had begun and was irreversible.

On the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony, conquest was a lengthy process. The first Xhosa land losses occurred in 1812 and further losses occurred at intervals through to 1857. It has been seen,

above, that a process of change in the class structure, and the nature of class struggle in the Xhosa social formation, was occurring in the thirty years prior to the cattle-killing of 1856-57, which marked the end of the period of conquest. These changes can be observed at least since the Fort Willshire trade fairs of the 1820s. The first attempts to create a Colonial state apparatus intended directly to supersede the autonomy of the Xhosa chiefs in 1848, immediately brought on another war. After an initial retreat, with the concession of full internal autonomy to all Xhosa chiefs, the Colonial State once again prepared to advance on the political and economic position of the chiefs. In order to be able to follow this process and understand the position of the various contending forces, the nature of the Colonial State must be further examined.

The Colonial State was born out of the conditions of conquest, and these were, in the first instance, military. However the Colonial State was not merely an instrument of martial law. It was a special form of the capitalist state, a specialist outgrowth of the metropolitan state adapted to the work of colonialism and imperialism. (1) After securing military domination, the Colonial State had to ensure a basis for the regime, and this was not a task that could be left to the influence of missionary work alone. The persistence of the power of the chiefs in terms of the internal autonomy concession granted to them was symptomatic of the new relations of subordination which were being forged. The chiefs were ceasing to be chiefs in the traditional sense. They were becoming "brokers" - links in the exercise of the patronage of the Colonial State. The chiefs were now only one source of patronage among others.

The Colonial State is unique in this respect, in that it intervenes directly in the structure of production through the effects of land confiscation and relies on this intervention to create its political and social domination over the masses. In this we are only taking the representatives of the Imperialists at

their word, for they never tired of repeating that to gain a political hold over the people they would first have to make them consumers of their commodities. (2)

The partial separation of the economic and political levels in the Colonial State, stemming from conquest and the power over the disposal of the land this gave it also presented it with a dilemma. In so far as the Colonial State allowed the conquered peoples to retain possession of land on which they organised their own production, more or less free of servitude to Colonists or the Colonial State, the State could not fully control the direction of economic development in these areas. It could thus also not control or prohibit the resumption of political power by elements of the ruling class of the conquered social formation. The political conquest, won at such pain and expense, could thus easily be undermined. (3)

In many parts of Africa where the Colonial State was too weak to deprive the (militarily) 'conquered' people of access to all or part of their land, this dilemma was inevitably confronted. The solution, as often as not, was to delay the imposition of direct political domination until such time as the economic weakness of the conquered people forced them to comply with Colonial control. In this way Colonial domination in Africa was extraordinarily uneven in the extent of the penetration of its real political control over the peoples it had conquered. Where the Colonial State recognised its lack of real control over the social formations it dominated, it was necessary to search for a class of collaborators amongst elements of the indigenous ruling class.

What was the situation in British Kaffraria at the end of the war of 1851-53? The Chief Commissioner Maclean, for one, was in no doubt that a basis for chiefly power still existed:

> "While called British subjects they are not subjects ... so far even as the Fingoes are, and in like manner we have stated to them that we allow them to rule themselves in all internal matters ... and so it is in reality, for our control is not simply

> direct ... but it is in a great measure nominal, and resembles more the influence which a powerful and civilised nation exerts over a neighbouring tribe of barbarians." (4)

It has been seen that Smith's policy, in the first British Kaffrarian Administration, of simply eliminating the chiefs and attempting to establish political domination directly over the masses was clearly unworkable and led directly to war. The settlement at the end of the war of 1851 resulted in an important concession to the chiefs - the granting of internal autonomy. However it is necessary to understand what the nature of this 'autonomy' was, and to examine how the exercise of power by the chiefs had already begun to change.

The autonomy granted to the chiefs did not mean the restoration of the status quo ante. It meant that the chiefs, rather than the Colonial State, would directly have to absorb and fight the contradictory demands on the State engendered by the new economic conflicts which conquest and Colonial domination brought. The position of the chiefs was therefore very different to anything they had experienced before. They enjoyed 'autonomy', but the basis for their 'autonomy' had been radically changed. The basic requirements of the old mode of production (cattle and land) were now in permanent short supply and their acquisition was crucially influenced by the presence of the Colonial interloper.

The settlement achieved at the end of the war represented what the chiefs assessed to be the optimal trade-off between continued war and the advantages of achieving some accommodation with the Colony, short of total capitulation. Yet the social formations which the chiefs presided over by 1853 had been thoroughly invaded by the development of Colonial economy and the political demands associated with it. This growth had made the continued reproduction of the old mode of production an impossibility. New productive forces were daily emerging, with profound consequences for the position of the chiefs. An examination of the responses of the chiefs to this situation is one way of gaining an insight into the intensity of the dislocation which was experienced by the mass of households in this period.

MAP 1


DISTRICT OF CRADDOCK
Forfeited Tambookie Land formerly Mapassa now part of British Kaffraria but proposed to form part of a new Dist of Queenstown or North Victoria
OPEN COUNTRY
KRELI'S COUNTRY
Kreli's Great Place
REGENT
Present Tambookie Location
Queens Town
50 Mounted Police
Whittlesea
Tambookie already allotted
Forfeited Land
Tambookie Location
NEW CALKA LOCATION
Tsomo R.
Kei R.
Tsomo
Kei
Tabo Berg Range
Hunds Post
Fingo
Kromme
Waterkloof Range
Fort Beaufort
Alice
Fort Hare
Middle Drift
Kabousie Peak
Dinner post
Block House
Block House Peak
Block House Drift
Tea Tree post
Royal Engineer
Commando Peak
Colonial Road
Line of Road
Line of Road to Fort Beaufort
Line of Road to Fort Hare
Line of Road to Block House
Line of Road to Tea Tree post
Line of Road to Dinner post
Line of Road to Royal Engineer
Line of Road to Commando Peak
Line of Road to Kabousie Peak
Line of Road to Middle Drift
Line of Road to Alice
Line of Road to Fort Beaufort
Line of Road to Kromme
Line of Road to Waterkloof Range
Line of Road to Fingo
Line of Road to Fort Brown
Line of Road to 50 Mounted Police
Line of Road to Graham's Town
Line of Road to Fort Peddie
Line of Road to Trumpeter Drift
Line of Road to Peddie Road
Line of Road to Kentaburnie R.
Line of Road to Buffalo R.
Line of Road to Fort Murray
Line of Road to Fort Grey
Line of Road to East London
Line of Road to Equitable
Line of Road to Somerset
Line of Road to Fingoes
Line of Road to Line of Road
Line of Road to Line of Road
Line of Road to Line of Road


Scale of English Miles.
10
20
30
BRITISH KAFRARIA
Estimated Extent 3050 Sq:M?
ANTA.
85, Sq. Miles
Dontebok Flats
SANDILE.
MAKOMA.
BOTUMANE.
500, Sq. Miles,
ROYAL RESERVE
600, Sq Miles.
KAMA.
160, Sq. Miles.
CAPE COLONY
TOYISE.
25, Sq. Miles.
SIWANI.
180, Sq. Miles.
TSHATSHU.
25, Sq. Miles.
UMHALA
525, Sq. Miles.
Great Kei R.
Riv.
Kelskama
UMKAYI.
125, Sq. Miles
Buffalo R.
P A T O.
825 Square Miles
I N D I A N O C E A N

MAP 2

(6)

The losses and gains of the various chiefs as a result of the settlement of 1853 at the end of the war, may be seen in a comparison of Map 1 and Map 2 above. The Ngqika under Sandille and Maqoma had lost the whole of the Amatola highlands which were then designated a 'Royal Reserve', (later changed to Crown Reserve). This was an area of rich fertile soil and fine summer grazing, and its loss was a severe blow to the Ngqika. They were now confined to the area east of the King William's Town to Queenstown road.

Into about 160 square miles of territory vacated by the Ngqika, Kama, the estranged half-brother of Phato, returned from exile to occupy the land from Fort Hare to Fort White and down the Qibira to the Keiskamma River. This established in a prominent position, a chief who would never have amounted to anything without the assistance and favour of the Colonial State and its missionaries.

Siwani controlled a similar extent of territory from the Keiskamma to King William's Town. Siwani was regent for Seyolo, the heir of Mdushane. By exploiting his position and consistently supporting the Colonial State, even when most of his people deserted him for the fiery and combative Seyolo, he emerged as a chief of greater importance than he could ever otherwise have been. The Colonial State even tried to revive Mqayi (Umkai) the son of Ndlambe who had been defeated by Mhalla to gain control of the Ndlambe. However, because they did not participate in the war of 1851-53, the Ndlambe were least affected by the land losses, and Mqayi remained a nonentity. Tshatshu and Toise retained control of small areas around King William's Town, the latter increasing his autonomy from the rest of the Ngqika.

While it is clear that the position of the collaborating chiefs improved at the expense of others, it does not follow that the households resident in their territory were any better off. In fact their expanded territory attracted many of the impoverished households from other chiefs, who joined the followings of established homesteads there. Except for a small class of established homestead heads, most of the households of the collaborating chiefs were not in a much better position than those

elsewhere. The exception to this was the Mfengu whose gain in territory in the Crown Reserve more than offset any influx of population.

The period between the end of the war in 1853 and the onset of the cattle-killing episode in 1856 is crucial. The death throes of the old mode of production produced intense struggles, the resolution of which could only be found outside the relations of production which dominated the Xhosa homestead economy. The adoption of commodity production within all homesteads, and the resultant changes in the structure of the labour process and the transformation of the relations of production, were to prove far more lethal to the old chiefdoms than uncertain military conquest. (7) However it must not be lost sight of that it was the fundamental effect of land deprivation through war, which brought on this process of transformation.

At the close of the war the administrative apparatus of the Colonial State was partially restored. Brownlee was retained as Ngqika Commissioner, based at the Dohne mission station in Sandille's new location (8). Maclean was appointed Chief Commissioner to replace Mackinnon, and retained special responsibility for the Ndlambe district.

Immediately peace was restored, steps were taken to reactivate trade. All the traders had been forced to leave during the war, and most stores had been destroyed by fire. Traders' licenses were reduced from 50 pounds to 20 pounds, and traders again had free access to the interior, well protected by friendly chiefs and military forts. By the end of 1853, Maclean estimated the value of goods coming into Kaffraria at over 100 000 pounds (9). Some idea of the nature of the trade in the early 1850s is given in the compensation claims of Blaine and Jeffries who had traded at Butterworth until they abandoned their store in January 1852. Commodities in stock included 718 muids of sorghum, 60 000 lbs of gum, 10 000 hides, 1 500 horns, 90 sacks, 320 spades, 308 plates. The price they paid per muid of sorghum was probably between 4 shillings and 7 shillings and 6 pence. (10) With the customs

revenue of 5 000 pounds, which trade through East London at that stage brought in, the cost of the Colonial State was almost fully met out of its own revenues.

In the Ngqika location there was immediate and great dissatisfaction over the condition of the territory they were now forced to occupy. Maqoma received the worst of the move, being placed in the infertile, dry, and rocky region on the Thomas River. At the peace meeting in March, Maqoma had spoken on behalf of the absent Sandille and had told Cathcart:

> "this young man (Sandille) erred, has been punished, and is now forgiven, but the country you give him is too small. Toise, who formerly occupied it had but a small tribe. Sandille has a large one, which will not find room there". (11)

Maqoma saw the immediate threat, in their condensed location along the Kei River and its tributaries, of conflict both with Sarhili and with Mhalla and Toise. (12) The period 1853 to 1857 was a most uncertain time for Sandille and the Ngqika chieftainship. He was subjected to continual harassment and manoeuvering by Maqoma, who still hoped to oust Sandille with the help of the old guard of Ngqika homestead heads and councillors, and to wrest the chieftainship of the Ngqika from him. As will be seen, a major impetus to the cattle-killing itself stemmed from this dynamic.

Maqoma wanted Sandille to take a more active part in the struggle against the Colony, and, if unable to do so, to give way to him. Shortly after the meeting with Cathcart, Maqoma sent messages to Brownlee complaining of Sandille's lack of "energy" in exercising "proper authority over his people ... in matters of importance, Sandille acted without the counsel and advice of other chiefs and men of influence who ... he was bound to hear." (13)

Maqoma was here referring directly to those older councillors whose interests Sandille had to oppose, in extending patronage and support to young married men seeking cattle and place to start homesteads of their own. Brownlee declined to intervene, in terms

of Cathcart's policy of non-interference. This however, did not discourage Maqoma from his efforts to utilise the Colonial State and Sandille's weak position, in his attempts to improve the position of his section of the chieftaincy. Worried about the future, he repeatedly returned to the idea of his son Namba establishing himself in Kama's enlarged location.

Namba explained the motivation for this to Maclean in terms of his desire to "separate from the Gaika tribe", and referred to Maqoma's abstention from the war of 1848. Maclean estimated that Maqoma had 680 households under him and that he wished to expand his influence. "I am satisfied that Macomo has pushed Namba forward to gain some advantage" he wrote. (14) That Maqoma should seek to expand into territory occupied by Kama is easy to understand as Kama's new location bordered on the Amatola Crown Reserve which the Ngqika had just been deprived of. Maqoma's efforts were an attempt to achieve by diplomatic means, and at the expense of Sandille, what was an urgent necessity for all Ngqika households - an extension of territory. All eyes inevitably turned to the more than 700 square miles of Kama's location and the Crown Reserve.

In July 1853 Brownlee wrote: "the occupation of parts of the late Gaika District by Kama and the Fingoes is causing considerable sensation among the Gaikas". (15) During this period the contradictions between chiefs and the young and impoverished households intensified. It was absolutely imperative for the chiefs to take action to improve the situation of the mass of poor households. Unlike in previous years, in which military alliance seemed to be effective in retaining the necessary resource base for the chiefdoms, military action was no longer an immediate possibility. Relationships between the chiefs became more and more competitive. Despite the official policy of the Colonial State of non-interference, the State's presence was a far more crucial inhibiting factor in the struggle to maintain the base of the chiefdoms than in any previous period.

At a meeting of the Ngqika held at the Great Place shortly after the proclamation of peace, Sandille had announced that he would punish all cases of thefts from the Colony very severely. (16) Sandille was bound to appease the Colonial State by the suppression of cattle theft - a duty which conflicted directly with the interests of many of his followers who would rather he supported them. At the same time, the policy of non-interference, which left all matters of discipline and justice in the hands of the chiefs and their hierachies of councillors, led to an intensification of internal appropriations. This was a necessary consequence of the shortage of cattle and the pressure on land. Brownlee observed these deteriorating conditions and noted:

> "the plundering of women, of their seed, spades and household utensils, which is almost invariably done when a kraal is eaten up for theft or any other offence." (17)

As such confiscations were not normally imposed for mere theft, and the appropriation of other useful goods such as seeds and spades even more rarely, this would indicate an extreme level of conflict. Under these conditions there was obvious scope for the Colonial State to increase its influence as a source of patronage. As Brownlee pointed out, "it is quite necessary that we establish a system for promptly rewarding persons who make themselves useful to us". (18)

It has been seen that the confiscation of <u>all</u> cattle and property was only resorted to at times of extreme distress and disequilibrium in the Xhosa homesteads - as for example when Tshiwo resorted to this in the 1700s. (19) The intensification of the level of appropriations as a means of acquiring cattle redistribution had definite limits. By driving out of the chiefdom, households or homesteads that had committed thefts or other offences, the chief could extend his support to other homesteads that would be indebted to him. This form of appropriation, through confiscation or banishment, had obvious negative consequences. There were definite limits to which the chief could redistribute resources within the chiefdom without

gaining access to fresh resources. Redistributed resources were consumed in the establishment of new households and homesteads. While the chief could act against certain households, he had to retain an alliance with the other heads of large homesteads, without whose support his position would have been untenable.

While chiefs tried to prevent their people from becoming more involved in the Colonial economy, conditions in the homesteads deteriorated. This made the Colonial farms and mission stations ever greater attractions. Some chiefs used force to exert control over the homesteads. In one instance, Mhalla's son Moto seized the cattle and all the corn of Makopiya, a Mfengu attempting to leave Mhalla's location to join Mfengu at Mount Coke mission station. Cathcart, commenting on this incident, noted "This appears to be an affair of Kaffir Government with which we cannot interfere". (20) Brownlee reported that the Ngqika were feeling the loss of land and that there was an air of apathy and hopelessness about recovering it. This was associated with rumours that the prophet Mlanjeni was alive and in the land. (21) Commenting on the popular mood, he wrote:

> "The bulk of the people are heartily tired of war, and if war or peace were decided by their decision, we might hope for permanent peace, but though opposed to war, it is not probable that they would desert their chiefs should they take up arms against us, though at present the chiefs have their doubts of this, from a powerful inducement to break through their rule held out to the Kaffirs by the wealth and prosperity of those chiefs and common people who remained faithful to the English Government." (22)

Further evidence of the building up of tension and conflict in the chiefdoms between 1853 and 1856, was the high incidence of witchcraft accusations. It has been seen above that witchcraft accusations tended to increase during periods of change in composition of the dominant power block within the chiefdom, and

when the level of appropriation of cattle by the chief was on the increase. Witchcraft accusations and the subsequent confiscation of the cattle of the accused was a major means of acquisition of large numbers of cattle by the chief. One of the most famous cases concerns a rich councillor actually put to death by the chief Toise. In this incident he gained 80 head of cattle which were distributed amongst the younger councillors who Toise wished to support. (23) Witchcraft accusations were always a sign of social distress, a symptom of the conflict between a chief, the rich councillors, homestead heads, and the mass of households.

The apparent root cause of this intensification of appropriation by the chiefs, was the confined size of the locations which made it impossible for the normal process of homestead expansion to continue. The presence of large numbers of Imperial troops manning fortified posts along the 'boundary' proclaimed by the Colonial State, effectively prohibited any of the movement onto the Colonial farms which was to be such a feature of the period 1848-1850.

In 1854, the chiefs, bottled up in their locations, sought frantically for solutions. In September Cathcart met with Sandille and Maqoma who requested repossession of the Amatola and the Tyhumie valley. They told Cathcart that the land on the Kei was hard and less fertile than that on the Keiskamma. These representations were to no avail. (24) But for the collaborating chiefs many things were possible. Where Maqoma failed to get his son Namba land in Kama's location, Phato managed to arrange this for his brother Cobus Congo. (25)

In his efforts not to convey the impression that he in any way accepted his new restricted 'location', Sandille attempted to use the Church and the missionaries to bring pressure on the Colonial State, a strategy which had underlain Xhosa attitudes to the missionaries since the time of Ngqika. He continually delayed choosing a site for the building of a mission station in his new location, claiming that "he was still talking to the Government

about the land" (26) By their activities, the missionaries had so strongly associated themselves with the Colonial State that it is not surprising that in the eyes of many Xhosa there was hardly any difference between the two. Reporting on his work in the new Ngqika location in January 1854 the Rev. Niven noted that there were only two Xhosa Christians in Sandille's location and that Sandille and the mass of Xhosa:

> "will believe in spite of our protestations to the contrary that we are limbs of the administration, and that we can as well as ought to work for them in things temporal, above all on territorial subjects - I found only one person, a councillor, who said that the desire to get back the forfeited country is not universal." (27)

Niven further observed that very many of the Ngqika were scattered among the Ndlambe and Gcaleka homesteads "with a few head of cattle or as servants to the Fingoes". This dispersion of households was extremely detrimental to the authority of the chiefs and it intensified the urgency with which they looked for new ways to assert their control over the mass of households. As Niven observed, "One meets with many well disposed persons who would be glad to be relieved of feudal servitude and be subject to British Authority alone". (28)

If there was any doubt about the dissatisfaction within the Ngqika at this stage it was settled by the missionary Shaw, who wrote to Maclean telling him bluntly "that the Gaikas are much dissatisfied at the loss of their country, and are reported to express a hope of ultimately regaining their forfeited possessions". (29) There were thus two clear tendencies at work within the Ngqika and (as subsequent events proved) within the Ndlambe chiefdoms. On the one hand there was support for the regaining of lost territory and the strengthening of the chieftaincy through increased appropriations in favour of the younger households, on the other, disillusionment with military means of achieving this goal. Amongst the disillusioned there was a growing number of those who were prepared to come more fully within the orbit of the Colony and the Colonial mercantile and agrarian economy.

Not least among these were the chiefs themselves, some of whom took the lead in devoting more labour to arable agriculture. In January 1854 Maclean reported that many of the prominent chiefs were using ploughs for the first time:

> "Crops are in first rate order, and many influential men amongst the Gaikas are desirous of having oxen trained for plouging ... Botman, Macomo, ... Namba and Umhalla have hired people to plough for them and Namba is purchasing a plough for himself. Siwani and Jan Tzatzoe also Cobus Congo have ploughed extensively. I therefore trust that as the chiefs are taking the lead in an improved mode of cultivation, that the people will not be long in following the example." (30)

These developments were restricted in scope and reflected the shortage of cattle and the limited basis of appropriation by the chiefs and the need to find means of subsistence. Nevertheless they reflect the continuity of a trend, apparent since at least 1835, for greater concentration on arable agriculture and commodity production.

II The Arrival of Sir G. Grey and the Growth of Commodity Production

The conflicting tendencies within the Xhosa economy intensified in the two years following Cathcart's departure from the Cape in 1854. These conflicts culminated in the cattle-killing episode, which must be seen as nothing other than the literal explosion of the contradictions between a given set of relations of production and the non-fulfilment of their conditions of reproduction.

Sir G. Grey arrived in the Colony in late 1854. Since the 1840s the Colonial State had been headed by a string of appointees who were essentially military rulers - Pottinger, Maitland, Smith and Cathcart. Like the others, Grey was also supreme military commander, this being an essential feature of the head of State.

However he was not a military governor. Cathcart did not believe that beyond the immediate conditions of conquest the Colonial State could intervene directly in the day to day economic and social organisation of the Xhosa. Grey, by contrast, was from the outset obsessed by a firm interventionist policy.

Grey did not advocate a return to the straightforward interventionism of Smith, whose suppression of the chieftaincy was nothing more than the imposition of external authority, without any other development of institutions which could effectively replace those being superseded. Grey's attitude to British Kaffraria was based on a determined reorganisation of the social and economic structure of the Xhosa homesteads. His plan for the new Colony had been succinctly summed up in the following terms:

> "... undermine the power of the chiefs, break up the larger tribes into smaller more manageable units, ... remove large numbers of natives out of the province altogether, concentrate the rest in village settlements under European officers, and convey large areas of the best land to European farmers ..." (31)

The departure of Cathcart had encouraged expectations that something might still happen to reverse the settlement that he had reached. Grey's late arrival in the Cape encouraged such rumours. In December Anta, a brother of Sandille's, made an armed foray into the newly established Crown Reserve to test the State's reaction. That resentment was growing amongst the mass is illustrated by an incident that occurred in late 1854. A party of young men from Sandille's location organised a mounted expedition to attack two farmers on the Thomas River. They took away with them a number of cattle and ordered the farmers to quit their farms. In response to this Sandille organised a large party of over 200 armed men to go in pursuit of the thieves. This group failed, apparently deliberately, to capture the 'thieves', (a concession to popular sentiment) but confiscated 59 head of cattle and 2 horses. Only a small part of this cattle was handed over to the Colonial State. (32)

By the end of 1854 Maclean was highly alarmed and thought another war was imminent. In January Stretch, the former Ngqika Diplomatic Agent in the 1830s, was in Sandille's location having meetings with Sandille, Maqoma and other Ngqika chiefs. These meetings further alarmed Maclean, because Stretch informed Sandille of opposition to the war of 1850-53 in Whitehall, of Stockenstroom's feelings about the war and settlement and that "the war was begun without the knowledge of the Home Government, that a great council had sat across the seas to investigate into the case of the Kaffirs, and that they had come to the conclusion that the war was an unjust one on the part of the Colonists ... and that the whole country as far back as the Kat River was to be given back to the Ngqika nation". He consequently advised them to "press the Governor for the return of their land." (33)

Grey, so far from intending to return any lost territory to the Xhosa, was fully determined to push ahead with his plans. Early in 1855, after returning from a tour of British Kaffraria, Grey addressed Parliament, calling for support for his policy of creating "institutions of a civil character suited to their present condition", - precisely the step Smith had failed to take after 1848.

> "we should try to make them a part of ourselves, useful servants, consumers of our goods, contributors to our revenue, in short, a source of strength and wealth for the Colony, such as Providence designed them to be". (34)

The central part of Grey's plans was the introduction of a series of public works centred mainly on road-building, the construction of irrigation furrows for the chiefs and the building of Government buildings. In addition he promised State support for industrial training schools and grants for the establishment of further mission station farms. Grey obtained 40 000 pounds per annum for three years from the English Treasury to finance his schemes. Thus, even before he conceived his plan for the payment of chiefs and the appointment of magistrates, Grey had broken with

Cathcart's policy of limiting State intervention to pure military control. His policy did not represent a return to that of Smith. In a crucial sense he retained Cathcart's realisation that the chiefs could not be dispensed with at once. What he wanted to achieve was the breaking of the old relationship between chief and homestead. For Grey, the chief had to be primarily dependent on the support of the Colonial State, and the homestead dependent on the Colonial economy. The one would complement the other and both were a necesary part of the assertion of Colonial control over the mass of the conquered Xhosa.

Grey undoubtedly possessed, to a greater degree than his predecessors, an ability to understand the basic elements of the conflicts that confronted him and the social forces that lay behind them. (35) There were however more important objective factors that supported Grey's initiatives. First among these was the lung-sickness epidemic which had been gaining ground in British Kaffraria since 1863. The lung-sickness (bovine pleuropneumonia) was the first of the great cattle epizootics which decimated herds all over South Africa during the remainder of the 19th century and into the first decades of the 20th century. (36) The effects of such diseases (including red water, foot-and-mouth, East Coast fever and rinderpest) are widely recognised as having had an important effect on the rate and timing of the development of migrant labour in Southern Africa, especially from the East Coast. (37)

The first reports of the lung-sickness epidemic were made before the end of the war. In August 1853 Richard Taylor, the Resident Magistrate in King William's Town reported that he was setting up a place where afflicted cattle could be impounded. (38) The disease made steady progress, affecting the Mfengu cattle of the Crown Reserve most severely. In December 1854 Brownlee reported that the "Xhosa were greatly afraid of the lung-sickness and every exertion is made to keep healthy cattle separate from those that are diseased." (39) In the Crown Reserve, Ayliff reported to Maclean that lung-sickness had affected the Mfengu very badly "sweeping off nearly the whole of their cattle". (40)

Maclean, who thought the conditions right for the outbreak of war, saw as one of the factors mitigating against such an eventuality, "the depression consequent on the spread of the Cattle Epidemic (so-called lung-sickness) in spite of their fears and precautions". (41) Maclean fully appreciated the implication of the loss of cattle by disease for the Xhosa, and the favourable opportunity it created for the implementation of Grey's plans. (42)

Grey wished for Government sponsored works to begin immediately to take advantage of the favourable conjuncture. By April 1855 the first workers were being recruited. It was only possible for Grey to begin his road-building and other schemes because he knew sufficient labour would be available for work which did not require long absence from the homestead or travel to distant places. Brownlee informed Grey that:

> "Kaffir labour can be obtained to any extent in the Gaika District, the usual rate of payment being sixpence a day with food." (43)

Rations provided were to consist of 1½ lbs of beef and 2 lbs of sorghum so that "a man on first being employed would cost 1/. per diem." (44) This rate of pay was considerably higher than that generally prevailing in the Colony. Brownlee estimated that in the Colony a farm worker could expect to earn 6 shillings per month with food. He proposed appointing some workers as overseers at 2 shillings and 6 pence per day and sub-overseers at 1 shilling and 6 pence per day.

The chiefs initially supported the idea of the 'public works' and acted as recruiters, encouraging people to take employment. Their motivation was two-fold. First, it was a way of relieving the distress of many households; secondly they were the direct beneficiaries of the irrigation furrows which were being built for them. Sandille was to be provided with an irrigation furrow from the Kabousie River about 1½ miles long and about 3 feet wide and 2 feet deep. This project would irrigate about 30 acres of land, which Sandille intended to have worked for him with the plough he had been given. It is clear the Sandille did not intend

that his wives should work this land, although it was usual for young women to assist the wives of chiefs with their lands, and he could easily have obtained labour through this means. Sandille told Brownlee that he would retain the gardens at his old kraal for his wives, and Brownlee promised to have the land there manured and ploughed, "exemplifying to the natives the advantages of manure." (45)

Sandille evidently took a great interest in this project, accompanying Brownlee on his supervision of the work and "standing and watching from morning till evening even in the cold and drizzle." He even picked up the name "Umjelo" (the water furrow). (46) Apart from Sandille's furrow, money was allocated for furrows for Xoxo, Sandille's brother and for the Chief Tola. All the chiefs were making use of the ploughs they had received from Cathcart.

Sandille was not blind to the implications of this building programme and asked Brownlee whether providing roads and water furrows was an attempt to prevent him getting back his old country. (47) What the official reply was, is not known. However Maqoma, who did not benefit directly from the building programme, was quick to reach the conclusion that the intention behind it was to prevent their return to the Amatolas. He lost no opportunity to publicly and loudly raise the question, asking Sandille:

> "if having water courses made was advocating the case of his people for land, was it not saying to the Government he was satisfied where he is". (48)

Altogether, between April and November 1856, three separate water furrows irrigating over 150 acres of land were provided for Ngqika chiefs. These projects employed 231 men, and cost 140 pounds 4 shillings, most of which was absorbed as wages. (49) In addition to these projects, Government buildings were constructed at Döhne, where Brownlee was stationed, and a large water furrow was built for the benefit of the mission station land there. Two road building projects, one in the Windvogelberg and one connecting

Döhne to King William's Town, were undertaken. Altogether these projects cost 909 pounds 4 shillings and 2 pence and employed a total of 480 men.

There was undoubtedly a great demand for the employment offered on the works. At the opening of recruitment, Brownlee had to refuse 100 work-seekers. (50) By November 1855 over 950 men had worked for some period of time on the works. (51) Brownlee had anticipated the ease with which it would be possible to find wage workers, and had informed Grey in February that "labour can be obtained to any extent in the Gaika District." (52) In the event he attributed the large numbers that turned up not so much to chiefly recruiting, as to the pressure exerted by economic conditions:

> "there being no sale for cattle (due to the lung-sickness J.L.), the Kaffirs find it difficult to obtain the articles usually bartered for cattle, they may now obtain those without parting with their cattle, and a market has been opened for their Kaffir corn (for sale to the people on the works) which this season would have been almost unsaleable as almost all the stock purchased last season is still on hand." (53)

If the poor economic condition of many households and the difficulty of obtaining manufactured goods was the cause for some men taking on wage work, this tends to show that the consumption of such goods was already becoming a practical necessity. Beyond this, the existence of the works created for the first time the need to supply grain for food purposes to a substantial number of people who were not being fed from the production of their own household. It therefore expanded the market for grain and thereby stimulated commodity production.

The question of supplying food for the newly created workforce had been carefully considered. Traders agreed to sell grain at 6 shillings per 180 lb, which was the price Brownlee had

conventionally paid directly to the Xhosa producers for grain for the Government establishment. If the grain was now to be supplied through traders at that price, this would force down the price to Xhosa producers who sold to the traders. To purchase grain from the traders was obviously more convenient for Brownlee. He observed that as there was only one trader in the vicinity, a Mr Vice, and "from the absence of competition he may be able to obtain it at such low prices as would hardly compensate the natives for carrying 30 or 40 miles to market, which was the case last season, when the quantity now offered for 6 shillings was sometimes purchased for 2 shillings and 6 pence or 3 shillings." (54)

In the end it appears that both systems of grain purchase prevailed, but regardless of whether purchase was made direct from the producers, or from the trader, the practice of glutting the market immediately after harvest had a depressing effect on prices. Thus, by November 1855, Brownlee was not paying more than 5 shillings per muid, which is less than a half penny per lb. (55) These prices were confirmed by the Rev. Birt, who felt that such low prices must ultimately reduce supply because "the Caffre-Corn brought from over the Kei does not pay the labour of scuffling alone, not to mention the sowing and harvesting. From 4 shillings to 6 shillings per muid is the price which the natives obtain." (56) These prices were far under the market rate at King William's Town, or elsewhere in Kaffraria where grain fetched an average price of 1 penny per pound or 15 shillings for a muid of 180 lbs.

Apart from the trade in grain stimulated by the public works, there was a large increase in the volume of trade in manufactured goods. An increase in this demand, both for consumption and for productive purposes, was an essential element in expanding the position of the commodity over the units of production, linking them together in a wider economic system. The effect of this was to transform an occasional trade in surpluses into the regular production of commodities for the market.

Black traders and artisans were keen participants in this expansion of commodity production in the mid-1850s. The Rev. Birt of Peelton wrote at length to Maclean urging that the 20 pound fee for a trader's licence be abolished, or lowered, to allow more Xhosas to trade legally. (57) His suggestion for the formation of "native companies" was regarded as controversial, but he provided some evidence of what were quite possibly the first non-itinerant black traders working in the area:

> "Three natives on this Station did trade to profit previous to the war of 1846 and left no debt unpaid - while there are several other who are more competent than they". (58)

His suggestions were resisted for the obvious reason, which he himself pointed out, that "on the part of the Europeans it would be widely clamoured against." (59)

These early incentives to the acquisition of money, either as wages or from the sale of agricultural commodities, were overshadowed in this period by the sale of hides of the cattle which had died of lung-sickness. In fact it seems that there was, between March 1854 and June 1856, a commodity boom in British Kaffraria with the sale of hides leading to the most extraordinary expansion of trade. The new-found place of money in the Xhosa homestead was evidenced by the marked tendency to hoard silver that took place at this time. Hoarding is an important stage in the development of commodity production, and a stimulus to the modification of the relations of production in accordance with the requirements of commodity production. It is particularly important to notice that this was present in the Xhosa homesteads to a marked extent; the hoarding of silver, it appears, became the rage!

In 1855 MacLean had already reported that:

> "The drain of specie has been very great in consequence of the increase of Trade in Hides and Horns with natives who lay up in store all the silver they secure." (60)

The Treasurer's Office in King William's Town expanded on this in an internal memo to Maclean a month later:

> "As you are aware specie has become very scarce and this is to be attributed to the hoarding among the Natives into whose hands most of the specie now finds its way, from the large disbursements on account of Roads and public works, and in the purchase of Hides, which are to be purchased to an incredible amount from the lung-sickness among the cattle. From this cause very little of the specie returns into general circulation." (61)

How far the tendency to hoard silver influenced the commodity transactions of this period was illustrated by an interesting report by Chalmers during the height of the cattle-killing which was shortly to break over the Xhosa (and, as a by-product, was vastly to stimulate the sale of hides):

> "on several occasions the police have examined, in my presence, the bags, tinder-boxes etc of those who have come for Registry, and each of these people have had sums of money varying from 1 shilling to 10 shillings. On two occasions my attention was attracted by a kind of necklace made of beads, worn by different parties. Examining these, I found the part worn next to the body was lined with skin, and that between this skin and the beads ... were arranged several half-crown pieces ... or several pieces of coin ... so carefully were these put up they could not possibly be detected except by handling the necklace". (62)

There can be little doubt that the main spring of this drive to accumulate was the desire to secure the means of acquiring cattle and other livestock. Manufactured goods, while of growing importance, were still a secondary consideration. Brownlee commented on the motivation of those employed on public works:

> "they always seek employment for a specific purpose, such as obtaining blankets, cattle, horses and

goats, others for the purpose of obtaining wives."
(63)

Most households were simply adapting a new means of accumulation to try to serve the ends which accumulation of cattle served in the Xhosa social formation. Monetarisation could not, at one stroke, remove the influence of the pastoral economy of the Xhosa. However, the changes in economic orientation induced by hoarding were invidious. Once introduced, the mechanism of accumulation of money as opposed to cattle increasingly becomes an end in itself and would, more or less rapidly, induce other more fundamental changes in the structure of production.

The accumulation of money required not only that sources of money be available but that the old mode of production no longer be able to provide an adequate basis for accumulation. With its fundamental process of accumulation interrupted and stunted, this it could no longer do. However at this point it is necessary to be very careful in observing the meaning of the distinction that was made earlier between the relations of production and the dynamics of the mode of production. (64)

While conquest and the interruption of the normal conditions of accumulation and reproduction of the mode of production and its constitutive units of production were interrupted, this does not mean that the class structure and ideology of the old mode of production had been abolished. In the response of the mass of homesteads to the conditions prevailing in the post-1853 period can be seen the operation of precisely this crucial disjunction. The class structure and ideology of the dominant class persists despite the fact that the old mode of production is rapidly fading away. The leading elements of the dominant class in the old mode of production become the key figures in the adoption of new technological and organisational changes imposed by the dominant position of the Colonial State, and the capitalist economic organisation it supported. In this way, the structure of differentiation associated with the lineage mode of production fundamentally influences, and even determines, which elements amongst the conquered peoples were to be able successfully to

adapt their economic activity to meet the new conditions.

Generally speaking, the mass of poor and indebted Xhosa households which were unable to establish themselves as independent homesteads in the old lineage mode, were in a weak position to attempt to do so on the basis of commodity markets in livestock, hides and grain. By contrast, those who had successfully accumulated cattle and had many indebted adherents were able to grasp such new economic opportunities as were available. The structure of differentiation which was associated with the declining of the lineage mode of production, was integrated into the new structure of production that was growing up.

The persistence of this structure of differentiation meant also the persistence of certain regulatory and coercive apparatus associated with the Xhosa homestead structure. This regulatory and coercive apparatus, involving both ideological and physical powers of control, allowed for the performance of both necessary and surplus labour under the direction of the head of a household. The class position of the larger heads of households thus remained very constant, despite the changes that occurred at the level of production. With the integration of the differentiated household structure that had prevailed up to the 1850s in the Colonial capitalist economy, it became possible for the dominant households to continue to reproduce their position because they still enjoyed the necessary ideological and coercive power to direct the utilisation of labour within the domestic economy.

In subsequent chapters the ability of some poor households successfully to accumulate cattle and sheep through wage work on Colonial farms will be examined. However, even here it will be seen that the basic structure of household differentiation was not overturned. Those who accumulated wealth outside the confines of the locations were most often reincorporated into the structure of household differentiation. Although, in time, almost all practices and internal transactions between households themselves

became monetarised and subject to exchange value, some of the mechanisms of appropriation and control persisted and reinforced the structure of household and homestead differentiation.

The interaction between land scarcity and the loss of cattle through war, lung-sickness, increased demand for hides, and the availability of wage labour, all produced an ineluctable trend towards the transformation of the old mode of production. This involved a change - or, rather, a break, in the old relations of production which linked and subordinated the homestead production unit to the chiefdom as a whole. The tightly structured entity of the homestead was being dismembered. The effects on the mass of households must have been distressing in the extreme. The entire sense of Xhosa nationhood was now at stake. The idea of the Xhosa nation had always merged seamlessly with the integrity of the homestead and its cattle, and as the latter came apart, so the need to reach out and secure the former became more and more intense. Perhaps this was in the vain hope that a reconstituted Xhosa chiefdom would recreate the homestead in an act of divine restitution. While there were precedents for this, for example Shaka and the more nearby Moshoeshoe who had made chiefdoms from nothing, in this case the time and place were quite wrong for such developments. This was so if for no other reason than that, even in the case of Moshoeshoe and Shaka, it was the homesteads that lent integrity to the chiefdom and with these weakened and unable to carry on the economic process of independent accumulation of cattle, there was no earthly way in which the chiefdom could be reformed. (65)

In the face of the contradictions inherent in the process of the clash of two worlds of accumulation, and the actual ramifications of this, there came the first manifestations of that frame of mind which was ultimately to lead to disaster. In July 1855 one of Maclean's informers brought him definite information concerning a rumour about the prophet Mlanjeni: *

* Mlanjeni was the prophet who doctored the armies in the war of 1851-53. He was greatly revered, on a par with Makana (Nxele) who doctored the army prior to the unsuccesful Ndlambe attack on Grahamstown in 1815.

"There is a rumour in Kaffirland that "Umlanjeni" was

> seen at Keiskama Hoek a short while ago by a Fingoe, that "Umlanjeni" told the Fingoe the report which was spread that he had died, and was buried, is untrue, a grave was made ... to deceive the people but that he has been alive and living in Mosheshe's country. He also told the Fingoe he intended visiting Fort Hare and Fort Beaufort. It is also said "Umlanjeni" said that if the Kaffirs make war with the English they will get plenty of cattle and that all the cattle that have died of the Lung sickness will come to life again." (66)

This is the earliest mention of a prophecy of the rebirth of cattle that appears to have been made. It was prophetic indeed. That Moshoeshoe was mentioned as an element of this rumour is of some importance. His name crops up again and again in the run up to the cattle-killing and in the subsequent investigations. There is no doubt that Moshoeshoe's tactical victory over Cathcart at Barea in 1853 had a tremendous impact all over Kaffraria, and raised Moshoeshoe in the estimation of many people. Maclean had heard of Cathcart's defeat through a special runner who was broadcasting the news to chiefs and people all over Xhosaland, before Cathcart's own express messenger to Maclean had arrived! (67) To the down-hearted Xhosa, Moshoeshoe represented the sort of leadership that was necessary - he ruled and dominated a united kingdom and was clearly achieving some sort of diplomatic and military accommodation with the Colonists and Imperialists, goals for which the Xhosa chiefs had long striven in vain.

It had become more and more apparent that a divided chiefdom such as the Xhosa were could not achieve either diplomatic or military accommodation with the Colonists. The basic organisation of the nation had to be preserved and reinforced if this was to be achieved. But how could this be done? One way was to invoke the guidance of the prophets and doctors who had always guided the Xhosa chiefs in their hour of need. That the rumour current in

1855 should have had Mlanjeni residing with Moshoeshoe is an effective marrying of two crucial elements: belief in the efficacy of the Xhosa doctors, diviners and prophets and a realistic assessment of the demands of the current conjuncture which undoubtedly required that some move in favour of a more centralized chiefdom emerge - a model well-represented by Moshoeshoe.

In the next chapter we will be taking some themes further in our specific examination of the cattle-killing and its impact on the economic life of the Xhosa. However, the nature of the present period forms indispensable background to an understanding of the cattle-killing itself.

III Grey's Crucial Intervention

The further development of Xhosa response to the imposition of British Kaffraria was affected at this stage by Grey's unveiling of his plans for the territory and his proposal to overturn Cathcart's decision on internal autonomy for the chiefs. Grey was determined that there should not be dual power in Kaffraria, in the form of the jurisdiction of both the Colonial State and the chiefs. He recognised that the chiefs could not be done away with or simply overlooked, as had been Smith's approach in 1848. The only alternative therefore was to incorporate the chiefs and their councillors into the Colonial State.

Grey first mooted his plans in a long memorandum to the Secretary of State for Colonies, in October 1855. He envisaged that the chiefs should become part of the Colonial State by making:

> "every chief of importance look to the Government for his remuneration and requiring them to carry on those duties of magistrates, police etc. which they exercise at present under the direction of British Officers." (68)

The immediate advantages that Grey foresaw were an improvement in the conditions of tenure creating a "vested interest in the soil" and an improved volume of trade. The end result of incorporating the chiefs formally into the Colonial State apparatus would be to "gain a hold over every part of British Kaffraria". As Grey put it:

> "The Government may make the Kaffir system a part of the Government of the country, with which the whole of the native chiefs may, by degrees, become so interwoven that they will, in fact, be, as it were, incoporated or adopted into Government, of which they will form a necessary and important part." (69)

By December 1855 Grey had finalised his proposals. He would offer the chiefs a salary based on an estimate of their current revenue, and an additional allowance for each councillor resident at the chief's place. The chiefs and councillors were to sit and hear all cases, but all fines imposed by them, and fees of the court were to form part of Government revenue. They were to be assisted by a Colonial magistrate.

Maclean was initially thoroughly opposed to Grey's scheme, both on the grounds that it overturned part of Cathcart's policy, which Maclean had supported, and that it was impracticable because the Colonial State did not possess sufficient force to make it work. (70) Brownlee was convinced that the proposed rate of payment was inadequate as compensation for the loss of revenue that the chiefs would suffer. He estimated Sandille's annual income from fines at 300 head of cattle "and as many more may have passed into the hands of his councillors." (71) Yet even then Sandille did not directly retain 300 head of cattle, as many of these were given out to clients. Brownlee estimated that Sandille had at the most 120 head of cattle in his personal possession in late 1855. (72) That a great chief should have so few cattle is indicative of the extreme measures which Sandille had to resort to in order to sustain his following, keeping very little for himself but resorting to immediate distribution of income.

In Table 1 below the Authorised Schedule of payment to chiefs and the number of paid councillors to be allowed to the various chiefs is shown.

Table 1: Authorised Schedule of Pay to Chiefs and Councillors - August 1855 (73)

CHIEF	SALARY POUNDS	NUMBER OF COUNCILLORS	SALARY POUNDS	TOTAL FOR COUNCILLORS POUNDS	TOTAL COST FOR EACH CHIEF POUNDS
PHATO	96	10	18	180	276
UMHALLA	96	10	18	180	276
MACOMA	84	6	18	108	192
BOTMAN	48	4	18	72	120
SANDILLE	96	10	18	180	276
ZALI & TATAI	48	2	18	36	84
TOISE	48	2	18	36	84
KAMA	84	4	18	72	156
TZATZOE	36	2	18	36	72
ANTA	84	4	18	72	156
SIWANI	84	6	18	108	192
T O T A L	804	60		1 080	1 884

While the ravages of the lung-sickness must have made the lure of cash income all the more attractive to the chiefs, the key question was control over confiscated cattle which were appropriated as fines. If this control passed from the chiefs to the Government, then one of the pillars of chiefly authority was removed. The reduction in the number of cattle as a result of the lung-sickness emphasised the role of money in accumulation, and Brownlee therefore suggested to Grey that he first introduce his scheme in the areas worst affected by the lung-sickness. In these areas fines would have to be appropriated in money, or a prison

sentence substituted for the traditional fine of cattle, because in these areas, "even where the people are wealthy, individuals will be found who have not ten shillings worth of property." (74)

There can be no doubt that poverty and the economic crisis of the chieftaincy and the homesteads favoured the introduction of Grey's plans. In August 1855 Grey issued definite instructions to Maclean and Brownlee. "The Kafir Chiefs you must endeavour to induce, one by one, to adopt the proposed system." (75) The chiefs and councillors were to be paid monthly, and the salaries of the councillors were to be paid only to the persons who performed the duties of the office. The first two magistrates seconded from the military were Captains Gawler and Reeve. In the next chapter we shall examine the imposition of the Magisterial system and the beginning of the cattle-killing.

(1) Lonsdale, J and Berman, B., 'Coping With the Contradictions : The Development of the Colonialist State in Kenya 1895-1914.', Journal of African History, Vol. 20 No. 4, (1979). Lonsdale and Berman have described the Colonial State as a "variant of the capitalist state". p. 489.

(2) As for example, when Cathcart, just prior to his departure, sent the Rev. Birt of Peelton 10 pounds towards the establishment of a "Civilization Society". In his letter to Birt he put forward his view that the Bible has to follow the path of commerce and industry. "I have always thought they can only be reclaimed by first training them to civilised habits and works of art ... then and not till then, will they be capable of being benefited by the reading of the Bible and the preaching of the Gospel."
BK 23/90, Cathcart to Birt, 18th April 1854.

(3) Lonsdale and Berman, op.cit. p. 491.

(4) Grey, Sir G. Correspondence between His Excellency Sir George Grey K.C.B. and the Secretary of State for the Colonies London, (1857). Maclean to Grey, 4th August 1855.

(5) Cathcart, Sir. G. Correspondence of Sir G. Cathcart, 1853, London (1856).

(6) Theal, G.M., History of South Africa, Cape Town, Struik, Facsimile reprint 1964, Vol. 7, pp. 187-188.

(7) Marx drew attention to the effects of the growth of commodity production on the pre-existing relations of production of the pre-capitalist mode of production: "The organisation of domestic production itself is already modified by circulation and exchange value; but it has not yet been completely invaded by them, either over the surface or in depth. This is what is called the civilising influence of external trade. The degree to which the movement towards the establishment of exchange value then

attacks the whole of production depends partly on the intensity of this external influence, and partly on the degree of development attained by the elements of domestic production." Grundrisse, (1976). p. 256.

(8) The term 'location' is used intentionally in referring to those areas marked for the occupation of the tribes by the Colonial State. Prior to their creation as locations these areas may or may not have formed part of the original country occupied by the various chiefdoms. 'Locations' are therefore what preceded the less ambiguous word 'reserve' in reference to such areas.

(9) Cathcart, Sir G. op.cit. p. 268. G.H. 8/23, Chief Commissioner British Kaffraria Letter Received. 1846-1852.

(10) G.H. 8/25, Maclean to Cathcart.

(11) Cathcart, Sir, G. op.cit p. 266. Maqoma's address to Cathcart, 12th March 1853.

(12) Ibid. p. 266.

(13) B.K. 1, Brownlee to Maclean, 24th March 1853. See also B.K. 371, Maclean to Liddle, 26th March 1853.

(14) G.H. 8/25, Maclean to Liddle, 6th August 1853.

(15) B.K. 1, Brownlee to Maclean, 14th July 1853.

(16) G.H. 8/25, Brownlee to Maclean, 4th March 1854.

(17) B.K.1, Brownlee to Maclean, 23rd September 1853.

(18) Ibid.

(19) See Chapter 1 above for the story of Tshiwo.

(20) G.H. 8/25, Maclean to Cathcart, 13th August 1853. Marginal note by Cathcart.

(21) G.H. 8/25, Brownlee to Maclean, 15th August 1853.

(22) B.K.1, Brownlee to Maclean, 15th August 1863.

(23) G.H. 8/26, Maclean to Grey, June 1855. This lengthy letter contains a fascinating account of the operation of a witchcraft accusation. It was only the second case since 1847. The councillor Kolosa was said to have killed Toyise's brother, Gasela, and tried to bewitch Toyise by placing a hare outside Toyise's hut. The victim was virtually pre-selected as he was the only one not informed of the impending accusation. When Kolosa arrived at the divination he was already partly excluded from the function. Thus a virtual consensus concerning the witchcraft practised by Kolosa had first been obtained before any action was taken against him. One of Toyise's Great Councillors was a bitter enemy of Kolosa, and he had chosen the doctor for this case. The doctor was Maqutyana, a Mfengu from the Crown Reserve. He was himself a Great Councillor of the Mfengu Chief Mhlambiso, and was married to his sister. All these facts and circumstances show the truth of Dugmore's observation that the witchcraft accusation was the "state engine for the removal of the obnoxious."

(24) Cathcart, Sir. G. op.cit. pp. 371-374.

(25) G.H. 8/25, Maclean to Cathcart, 14th January 1854.

(26) G.H. 8/25, Rev. Niven to Maclean, January 1854.

(27) Ibid.

(28) Ibid.

(29) G.H. 8/25, Rev. Shaw to Maclean, 24th February 1854.

(30) G.H. 8/23, Maclean to Liddle, 12th January 1854.

(31) Rutherford, J. Sir George Grey 1812-1898. A Study in Colonial Government. London, (1961). p. 329.

(32) G.H. 8/25, Maclean to Grey, enclosure, Brownlee to Maclean, December 1854.

(33) G.H. 8/26, Maclean to Grey, January 1855. Information concerning these initial meetings was brought by Toise who was very worried by the prospect of any overturning of the peace settlement of 1853 as the collaborating chiefs would undoubtedly have suffered by it. Both Stretch and Stockenstroom were members of the first Cape Parliament which was elected in 1854.

(34) C.O. 48/365, Speech to Parliament, Grey to Secretary of State for Colonies, 17th March 1855.

(35) For an example, see the long dispatch Grey wrote to the Secretary of State for Colonies, Molesworth, on the economic and political basis of the chieftaincy. He was certainly the first governor capable of producing a report like this I.P.P. 1856 XXXIX (223), December 1856.

(36) Epizootic: "Diseases temporarily prevalent amongst animals" (O.E.D)

(37) Beinart, W.J. 'Production and the Chieftaincy in Pondoland 1830-1880' in Marks, S and Atmore A, (eds.), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, Longman, 1980. pp. 36-37.

(38) B.K. 65, Taylor to Maclean, 21st August 1853.

(39) G.H. 8/25, December 1854, Maclean to Grey, enclosure Brownlee to Maclean.

(40) B.K. 24, Ayliff to Maclean, 16th June 1856.

(41) B.K. 413, Maclean to Sir George Clerk, 17th March 1855.

(42) Ibid.

(43) G.H. 8/25, Brownlee to Maclean, 3rd February 1855.

(44) Ibid.

(45) G.H. 8/26, 24th March 1855.

(46) G.H. 8/27, Brownlee to Maclean, 14th July 1855.

(47) G.H. 8/26, Brownlee to Maclean, 24th March 1855.

(48) B.K. 10, Brownlee to Maclean, 15th November 1855.

(49) G.H. 8/27, Return of number of men employed on Public Works, Charles Brownlee to Maclean, 13th December 1855.

(50) G.H. 8/26, Brownlee to Maclean, May 1855.

(51) G.H. 8/27, Brownlee to Maclean, 10th November 1855.

(52) G.H. 8/26, Brownlee to Maclean, 3rd February 1855.

(53) G.H. 8/26, Brownlee to Maclean, May 1855.

(54) G.H. 8/27, Brownlee to Maclean, 18th July 1855.

(55) G.H. 8/27, Brownlee to Maclean, 10th November 1855.

(56) B.K. 23, Rev. Birt to Maclean, 27th July 1854.

(57) B.K. 23, Memo., Rev. Birt to Maclean, 6th July 1854.

(58) B.K. 23, Birt to Maclean, 27th July 1854.

(59) Ibid.

(60) G.H. 8/27, Maclean to Sir George Clerk, January 1855.

(61) G.H. 8/28, Treasury Office to Maclean, 5th January 1856.

(62) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 30th September 1857.

(63) C.P.P. 4/1/1/1 (Native Affairs 1849-1862), Brownlee to Maclean, 11th December 1855.

(64) See Chapter 3 above.

(65) There was one other solution, and that was the course of ideological capitulation that led to the maintenance of the chiefdom on terms dictated by the Colonial State. Such was the option exercised by the "Christian chief", Kama, of the Gqunukwebe. This was only a partial solution as he was now faced with the understandable hostility of his brother chiefs and with the influx of the dispossessed of their people.

(66) G.H. 8/23, Maclean to Liddle, 28th July 1855.

(67) B.K. 10, Maclean to Liddle, 2nd June 1855 and G.H. 8/31. Maclean to Grey, 20th March 1857.

(68) Grey, Sir. G. op. cit., Grey to Laboucher, 18th October 1856. p. 159.

(69) Ibid. p. 160.

(70) Ibid. p. 95.

(71) G.H. 8/27, Brownlee to Maclean, July 1855.

(72) Grey, Sir. G. op.cit., Brownlee to Maclean, 8th August 1855, p. 99.

(73) Ibid. p. 105.

(74) Ibid. p. 100.

(75) Ibid. Grey to Maclean, 17th September, 1855. p. 104.

CHAPTER SIX

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE CATTLE-KILLING

I The Mfengu

One of the greatly complicating factors in the economic history of the Ciskei is the existence in the period up to 1855 of two distinct political communities, Xhosa and Mfengu. It has previously been mentioned that the Mfengu came from Gcalekaland after the war of 1835 and settled under Colonial protection in the Peddie district. Here they stagnated and slowly atrophied in the period between 1835 and 1848. As a reward for their loyalty to the Colony in that war, land concessions were made to them in Fort Beaufort and Victoria East. This was the beginning of the reawakening of the Mfengu. The end of the 1850-53 war saw further land concessions made to the Mfengu in the Crown Reserve and elsewhere. These grants of land were at Xhosa expense and did nothing to heal the rift between Xhosa and Mfengu.

Up to 1855 the two communities were increasingly differentiated economically as well as politically. Mfengu communities paid hut tax, acquired ploughs and wagons, and were generally more involved in the production of commodities for sale on Colonial markets than the Xhosa. It was only through the drastic consequences of the cattle-killing for both communities that they were brought into the orbit of a single economic system. It was the cattle-killing more than any other cause that was responsible for the growth of African agriculture in the subsequent decades. If it were not for the cattle-killing there is little doubt that agriculture based on commodity production and the sale of surpluses would not have become widespread as early as it did.

In this chapter the history of the Mfengu districts, (the Crown Reserve, Victoria East, Fort Beaufort and Peddie which are today all geographically part of the Ciskei) will be considered in totality with that of other groups living and labouring in the Ciskei. It is precisely when this is not done that an incorrect picture emerges of 'progressive' Mfengu and "backward" Xhosa in the 19th century, as projected by some missionary authors, and more lately, by those who have discerned the growth of a 'prosperous peasantry' in the 19th century Eastern Cape.

Bundy, who was foremost amongst contemporary authors in pointing out the growth of productivity in African agriculture in the second half of the 19th century, did not specifically focus on the differences that have existed between Mfengu and Xhosa communities. This has had the unfortunate consequence of glossing over the different experiences of the two communities and of generalising from examples drawn mainly from Mfengu sources (also Thembu and Sotho in Queenstown and Herschel) for all households in the Ciskei. The moment the effects of the cattle-killing on the development of production are taken into account it is no longer possible to generalise in this way. The historical experiences of the Mfengu and Xhosa, the two most important groupings west of the Kei River, have to be interrelated in terms of their specific experiences shaped through these dramatic events. As Bundy has commented, "the effects of the cattle-killing on African peasant production awaits detailed archival investigation." (1)

One of the most marked consequences of the cattle-killing was its effects on the productivity of Mfengu agriculture and subsequently (but in different ways) on that of the Xhosa groups, so that the differences between them did diminish as they became part of a single economic system. To understand Mfengu responses to the cattle-killing it is necessary to have some acquaintance with the position of Mfengu households up to 1855.

In the same way as Grey had plans to bring the Xhosa chieftaincy under his control, so he wished to eliminate the Mfengu

chieftaincies, replacing them with paid officials, headmen, and police. This move he hoped to make acceptable by rewarding Mfengu loyalty with land.

The oldest Mfengu settlements in the Colony were those established around Peddie after the war of 1835. With each succeeding war further land was made available for Mfengu occupation. After the war of 1848, with the establishment of the district of Victoria (East), the Mfengu occupied the area around Healdtown in the Gaga river valley. From 1848, when they were settled, each grantee of an allotment had to pay a 'quit-rent' (hut tax) of 10 shillings per year. This was the first tax imposed on Africans in the eastern Cape by the Colonial State.

The relatively easy introduction of the tax after 1848, which was collected in cash, was permanently to tinge the view of the Colonial State on the desirability of taxation of Africans. In 1848, the first full year of taxation, 1 013 pounds was realised, meaning that approximately 2 026 households paid the tax. In the following year 1 250 pounds was paid by approximately 2 500 households. (2) Clearly the taxation was a highly attractive proposition. It was also an incentive to the laying out of individual allotments which facilitated the imposition and collection of taxation.

The biggest Mfengu land grants came after the war of 1850-53. The area around Healdtown was extended so that they then occupied an area of about 28 square miles. The Mfengu settlements in the Victoria - Peddie area covered some 517 square miles. To this was now added Mfengu settlements in the newly-created Crown Reserve.

Mfengu locations were also established in the newly-proclaimed Queenstown district at Lesseyton, Kamastone and Ox-Kraal as well as in the Windvogelberg. All these districts also contained many large farms laid out for occupation by Colonists. In Victoria 200 farms of 1 000 to 1 400 acres were laid out and 400 farms of similar size were laid out in Queenstown. (3) This meant that

Mfengu stock owners were limited in the extent to which they could expand their stock and other agricultural activity. However this proximity also gave the Mfengu communities close access to work on the Colonial farms, markets for the sale of their grain and the acquisition of sheep.

The Crown Reserve that was opened to Mfengu occupation was essentially part of the King William's Town district comprising the area from the Amatola mountains to Fort Hare. The Crown Reserve was a large area of uneven agricultural potential with a lot of excellent pasturage and some good agricultural land capable of bearing a high density of population. It also embraced the former site of the chief Maqoma's Great Place and had for years been the epicentre of the Ngqika territory.

The Crown Reserve is of particular interest because of the rules that were introduced governing the occupation of land. It was specifically reserved for Mfengu occupation, with Colonists only being located in the vicinity of the only town at Keiskamma Hoek. A yearly quit-rent of 10 shillings was required from the owner of each separate dwelling - to be collected by the Superintendent of the Crown Reserve. Dwellings were to be grouped together in villages of not less than 20 huts. Each village would receive garden ground allocated to it by the Superintendent. Pasturage was to be free but the whole amount of cattle belonging to each village could not exceed ten head per house. Each village was to have a headman elected by the village, but subject to the approval of the Colonial State, which could remove him and appoint another. (4)

These regulations were unique, this being the first time that the Colonial State was attempting to lay down the manner in which land utilisation and allotment was to occur. (5) These rules promulgated in 1853 by Governor Cathcart pre-date the arrival of Sir G. Grey who succeeded Cathcart. While Cathcart accepted the internal autonomy of the Xhosa chiefs and the sanctity of their internal organisation of their affairs, this did not apply to the

new Mfengu settlements. Grey's subsequent overturning of Cathcart's stand on internal autonomy might have been encouraged by the introduction of direct Colonial superintendence over the Mfengu. There was a definite build-up of resentment and dissatisfaction with the rules governing Mfengu settlement which Cathcart imposed. The idea of villagisation was particularly unpopular. (6) The hut tax, which was first imposed in 1848, had not been collected in 1851 and 1852 as a result of the war in which many Mfengu men participated in the Colonial levies, thus disrupting production. The reintroduction of the tax after the war was deeply resented. The terms of Cathcart's settlement of Mfengu in the Crown Reserve were already leading to a reawakening of the Mfengu and the emergence of a less servile leadership more prepared to make itself heard.

The principal groups of the Mfengu that moved into the Crown Reserve were the Hlubi under a chief, Mhlambiso; the Amaxosana who had an influential headman, Njikelana, but no legitimate chief; the Amazizi under Socitshe; the Amakuzi under Mhlehle; the Amabebe under Yontela. Only the Hlubi still retained its chieftainship, although the powerful headmen of the other Mfengu clans functioned as de facto chiefs. Nevertheless the relative weakness of the Mfengu chieftainship was a major factor differentiating between Mfengu and Xhosa.

These various clans had no sooner settled into the confiscated Xhosa lands when the lung-sickness disease struck their cattle. As a group they were amongst the first to suffer its effects. By June 1856 it was reported from the Crown Reserve that:

> "They possess several wagons but unfortunately the whole of their cattle with a few exceptions were swept off by that dreadful scourge the Lung sickness, so that their wagons are quite useless ..." (7)

Apart from adversely affecting those few people who had wagons, the loss of cattle also made the paying of the quit-rent very much more difficult. Whereas Mfengu in 1853 and 1854 had managed to pay their tax by selling "one or more of their cattle", they could now only find the money through seeking work on the public works in British Kaffraria, or on the Colonial farms and in the towns or by selling their grain. (8) In 1855, of an expected revenue of 600 pounds from the Crown Reserve only 400 pounds was obtained. The figure for 1856 was expected to be "less than half" of the estimate.

On his arrival Sir G. Grey wished to speed up the surveying of allotments in the Crown Reserve. It was this step which from 1854 to 1856 united the Mfengu and caused a revival in the Mfengu chieftainship. (9) As will be discussed in detail below, it was vital for the existing patterns of accumulation and production within Mfengu homesteads that the strict allocation of limited allotments and the restriction of cattle-holding not become effective. (10) Grey's decision to implement individual tenure for the Mfengu was to have the most far-reaching consequences for the economic transformation of the domestic household production unit. One of the important points that must be stressed, in considering the impact of the cattle-killing on production in Mfengu and Xhosa households, is that the response made by individual households was a response to a total political, economic and social conjunction of circumstances. The response of the households expressed at the level of production was not itself determined at the level of production.

The political threat to the existing clan structure in the Mfengu communities implied by the terms of settlement in the Crown Reserve, and Grey's eagerness to proceed with the surveying of individual allotments were in themselves a definite stimulus to expand agricultural production. Most importantly this stimulus was present prior to the beginning of the cattle-killing. This was soon to combine with the many new opportunities created by the cattle-killing to change the role of agriculture in Mfengu

domestic producion. The way in which this occurred is the central problem of the transformation of domestic production in both Mfengu and Xhosa households.

Up to 1855 Mfengu agriculture and pastoralism differed little from practices already described for the Xhosa. It is possible to learn more about the position of the Mfengu prior to the cattle-killing by looking at some of the early census data that is available. The earliest pre-cattle-killing census of the Mfengu was a count made in July 1854 by N. Edye, the Resident Magistrate at Peddie. The census is of special interest as it is earlier and more comprehensive than the more well known census prepared for Henry Calderwood in January 1855. By looking at some of this early statistical material we can get a rough idea of conditions amongst the Mfengu prior to the cattle-killing.

In Table 1 below the basic population break-down and the number of stock and other assets are given for the Peddie district in July 1854.

Table I (i) : Census of the Peddie District July 1854 (11)

NAME OF HEADMAN OR CHIEF	MEN	MARRIED WOMEN	MALE CHILDREN ABOVE 16	FEMALE CHILDREN ABOVE 16	MALE CHILDREN UNDER 16	FEMALE CHILDREN UNDER 16	WIDOWS	TOTAL POPU-LATION	HUTS	HOME-STEADS
JOKWENI	478	653	125	58	544	538	100	2496	716	89
MATOMELA	475	625	130	70	621	624	108	2653	721	80
NZULU	285	273	105	62	363	371	50	1509	431	89
KWANKWEZI	85	115	27	14	94	83	21	439	130	12
KAULELA	96	132	48	26	129	131	33	595	163	21
M'THONHLI	86	121	45	12	110	120	27	521	321	14
FT. PEDDIE LOCATION	17	20	11	2	28	25	9	113	27	1
O'URBAN MISSION STATION	36	26	15	17	53	43	25	215	48	1
NEWTONDALE MISSION STATION	34	26	4	7	39	31	6	147	28	1
T O T A L	1592	1991	510	253	1981	1967	379	8688	2585	308

Table 1 (ii) : Stock, Wagons, Ploughs and Guns in Peddie District July 1854

NAME OF HEADMAN OR CHIEF	OXEN AND BULLS	COWS	BULL CALVES	HEIFERS	GOATS	SHEEP	HORSES	WAGONS	PLOUGHS	GUNS
JOKWENI	839	1564	839	629	616	11	183	3	4	235
MATOMELA	859	1423	904	426	485	106	123	14	13	186
NZULU	699	1201	699	390	514	46	162	8	2	174
KWANKWEZI	163	310	178	124	173	16	32	1	-	46
KAULELA	281	404	237	147	185	20	36	3	4	55
M'THONHLI	159	297	178	121	92	-	17	1	1	41
FT. PEDDIE LOCATION	65	80	39	34	40	-	1	1	1	8
D'URBAN MISSION STATION	134	144	73	61	108	2	18	5	5	19
NEWTONDALE MISSION STATION	125	73	47	31	91	-	7	6	9	6
T O T A L	3324	5496	3194	1963	2304	201	579	42	39	770

From Table 1 (i) it can be seen that the Mfengu population of Peddie reflected a community in which polygamous households still formed an important feature. The 1 991 married women exceeded the number of married men by 339 (20%). Relatively few girls over the age of 16 remained unmarried, reflecting the importance of marriage in the life of the community. The high number of children relative to the number of married adults indicates that the population was increasing rapidly. The census reveals that the population still lived in groups of households maintaining a communal existence in homesteads (kraals) under the direction of a senior member of one of the constituent households.

From Table 1 (ii) it can be seen that investment in sheep and ploughs had hardly begun. There were approximaately 40.8 households per plough. (11) If the two mission stations are left out of account, the number of households per plough declines even further, to 60.8. It is clear that in the mid-1850s most agriculture was still undertaken with an iron hoe or with a digging stick.

Investment in sheep was, if anything, even less advanced. Of 201 sheep, 106 (52%) were in Matomela's location. His was a large location with 475 households and it is most likely that the majority of these sheep were in the hands of a few individuals who were experimenting with sheep and wool.

The cattle cover of 13 977 head of all kinds for a total population of 8 688 represents 1.6 head of cattle per person. This cover is in fact very high compared to the cover revealed in the 1848 Census of the Xhosa where the ratio was approximately 1:1. The Mfengu were in a favourable position in regard to cattle and this is hardly surprising since between 1848 and 1854 the Mfengu had been a large recipient of Xhosa cattle.

There were however fluctuations between the different areas. Table 2 gives a condensed version of Table 1 allowing a comparison of the various groupings in terms of the per capita distribution of resources. An approximate rate of polygamy is given for each area, this being the difference between the number of men and women as a percentage of the number of women.

Table 2 : Comparison of Key Resources in Relation to Total Population : Peddie District 1854

	AREA	CATTLE PER CAPITA	CATTLE PER HOMESTEAD	PEOPLE PER HOMESTEAD	HUTS PER HOMESTEAD	PERCENTAGE OF POLYGAMOUS HOUSEHOLDS	PEOPLE PER HOUSEHOLD
1)	JOKWENI	1.5	43.0	28	8	26.7	5.2
2)	MATOMELA	1.3	45.0	33	9	24.0	5.5
3)	NZULU	1.9	33.5	16	5	-	5.2
4)	KWANKWEZI	1.7	64.3	36	10	26.0	5.1
5)	KAULELA	1.7	50.0	28	8	27.2	6.1
6)	M'THONHLI	1.5	53.0	35	10	28.9	6.0
7)	FT. PEDDIE LOCATION	1.9				-	6.6
8)	D'URBAN MISSION STATION	1.9				-	5.9
9)	NEWTONDALE MISSION STATION	1.8				-	4.3

Table 2 confirms the very 'traditional' picture to be expected where the social relationships of pastoralism are still dominant. The number of huts per homestead varied between 5 and 10. Where the homesteads were small the number of cattle in each homestead was also small. However, the fall in the number of cattle per homestead was not always proportionate to the decrease in the number of people, and sometimes an area generally having small homesteads enjoyed a higher ratio of cattle to people than other areas of larger homesteads. Thus Zulu's location (no. 3) had, on average, homesteads consisting of only 5 households, with an average of 33.5 cattle per homestead. This represented 1.9 cattle per capita. In Kwankwezi's and M'Thonhli's locations (no's 4 & 6 respectively in Table 2)there was an average of 10 households per homestead and the number of cattle per homestead averaged 64.3 and

53 respectively. This represented 1.7 and 1.5 cattle per capita for the inhabitants of these large homesteads.

Comparing Zulu's location, where the homesteads were relatively small, and Kwankwezi's and M'Thonli's locations where they were much larger some interesting differences emerge. Generally there seems to have been an inverse relationship between the number of polygamous households and the number of cattle per capita. Zulu's location had the highest ratio of cattle to people at 1.9 head and there were no polygamous households. In Kwankwezi's and M'Thonhli's locations 26% and 28.9% respectively of all households were polygamous and here the number of stock per capita fell to 1.7 and 1.5 respectively.

This observation suggests that the distribution of stock was still dependent on the dynamic of centralisation of control over cattle in the large homesteads of older men. This centralisation engendered the corresponding decentralisation of cattle-holdings to the smaller and more newly established homesteads of younger men. The fundamental social relations in the Mfengu community were still determined by the rules governing the acquisition of cattle and the passage of bridewealth in the arrangement of marriages. In other words, the community was still ruled by the dynamic of the lineage mode of production in the Nguni social formations. Even though most households were involved in monetary exchanges on a regular basis, these had by no means yet transplanted the pre-existing social relations of production in depth.

The high rate of polygamy in certain areas may have held advantages from the point of view of accumulation based on the pre-existing conceptions of the heads of large homesteads on the best way to acquire wealth. Because such accumulation also increased the uneveness of the distribution of livestock, however, it created pressures within the community. These pressures were conventionally expressed in the establishment by younger men of their own homesteads on fresh territory. It is important, in

analysing the transition period from one dynamic of accumulation to another, to be aware of the effects of decisions and innovations imposed by the Colonists on the internal processes of the social formation. When issues such as taxation and land surveys intervened in the delicate balance between people, cattle and the homesteads, they affected the whole class structure of the social formation.

In looking at Table 1 (ii) for innovations, the only area where a significant impact was being made was in transport riding. A large number of wagons had been purchased, 42 in all, amongst 1 592 men, or 1 wagon for every 37 men. This was quite a high figure if looked at in terms of homesteads, being 1 wagon for every 7.3 homesteads. The capital investment in a wagon, trek chains, harnesses and the training of trek oxen was large - of the order of 65 pounds. This represented a considerable investment. (14) Such investment was encouraged during the 1851-53 war in which Mfengu were one of the main providers of transport to the British Army, for which they earned from 12 shillings and sixpence to 15 shillings per day. (15) The other object of investment was guns, with 770 being noted in the census, or very nearly 1 gun for every 2 men.

What is clear from this description of the Peddie Mfengu in 1854 is that prior to the cattle-killing there was no significant tendency to investment in agriculture or in sheep farming. Investment of surplus cash derived from work in the locality on Colonial farms and from the sale of grain was invested in wagons and guns and in the purchase of cattle.

Prior to the cattle-killing, the only areas in which agriculture had overtaken pastoralism in relative importance were the mission stations. The mission settlements were however by no means entirely Mfengu. They had mixed populations with many Xhosa also absorbed into them. As with ploughs, a disproportionate number of the wagons were the property of people residing on the mission stations, 11 out of 42 or 26%. The presence of transport is an

important determinant of the ability to market many small surpluses, and such means undoubtedly existed in the hands of Mfengu transport riders prior to the cattle-killing.

Brownlee observed that the people residing on the mission stations purchased wagons and ploughs as soon as they acquired the funds, while very few ploughs or wagons were purchased outside of the mission stations. So impressed by this distinction was Brownlee that he wrote:

> "This is the more remarkable in as much as numbers of Kaffirs who have for many years lived in the Colony, where they have learnt to plough and drive wagons, as well as to perform other useful occupations, having by their industry obtained a competence in the service of Colonial masters, are at present living among their countrymen, following all their heathenish practices. This remark may with peculiar truth be applied to the Fingoes ..." (16)

Brownlee's observation reinforces the conclusion drawn from the analysis of the 1854 Peddie census. Although the Mfengu (and the Xhosa communities) enjoyed a high degree of trading contact with the Colonial economy and some households had members engaged in wage labour, the reproduction of the domestic household was not yet regulated by the Colonial economy. In this sense, as Maclean always suspected 'they were not yet defeated.' More or less autonomous African communities still regulated their economic activity according to their own laws of accumulation of wealth.

The imperatives of the old mode of production were still being asserted - with its emphasis on the accumulation of cattle and bridewealth exchanges and the ideology of chieftainship. Young men and others who had dispersed into the Colony were continually drawn back to it and were still seeking to accomodate their economic aspirations in terms of its framework.

Brownlee's observation quoted above also implies that the knowledge of new techniques and new ideologies suitable to competitive participation in commodity markets and monetary accumulation existed, at least for some. What was missing was some key event to trigger the latent transformation of the relations of production and to integrate domestic household production with the Colonial economy. For this the ideology of the old mode of production had to suffer a defeat of equal magnitude to the setback already suffered up to 1853 as a result of war, with the loss of cattle and land that this had entailed.

Before Mfengu and Xhosa agriculture could be integrated more largely with Colonial commodity markets there had to be a fundamental transformation of the ideological component of the mode of production coupled with the most severe economic compulsion. While the cattle-killing provided this it is important to see that it was not the only stimulus at work in the Mfengu communities. The implementation of Grey's plans further supported the transformation of Mfengu agriculture and it is therefore important to see how these plans were received by the Mfengu.

The first important development directly to effect Mfengu productive potential was the movement of people to the Crown Reserve from Peddie and Fort Beaufort. 857 Mfengu households moved into the Crown Reserve from Peddie during 1854. (17) Their numbers were soon supplemented by an influx of Mfengu and others leaving Mhalla, and from across the Kei. By June 1856 there were 1 052 households comprising 5 297 people in the Crown Reserve.

In Table 3 below the population of the Crown Reserve up to 1856 is given, indicating the number of separate locations, the number of households and the total population.

Table 3 : Population of the Crown Reserve 1856 (18)

LOCATION	AREA	NAME OF HEADMAN	HEADS OF FAMILIES	NUMBER OF HUTS	NUMBER OF PEOPLE	QUIT-RENT Pounds	Sh.
NCWAZI	FORT COX	JAMELA	26	36	153	18	-
NCWAZI	FORT COX	JIKELANA	52	60	362	30	-
NCWAZI	FORT COX	ZIBI	79	96	422	48	-
AMATOLA	FORT COX	HLAMBISO	64	89	182	42	10
BURNSHILL MISSION	FORT COX	JONAS	29	30	224	15	-
IZELE	IZELE POST	XENXE	181	204	741	102	-
IZELE	IZELE POST	TINSILANA	138	163	631	81	10
BUFFALO	K.W.T.	NGUHLE	107	137	554	68	10
TBANDODA	FORT HILL	DODANA	59	88	336	44	-
GULU	KEISKAMMA HOEK	TONTELA	43	59	245	29	10
GULU	KEISKAMMA HOEK	ULANA	42	50	260	26	-
GWILI GWILI	KEISKAMMA HOEK	MHLEHLE	33	50	196	25	-
GWILI GWILI	KEISKAMMA HOEK	JAMA	34	45	208	22	10
PEELTON MISSION	YELLOW WOODS	NELE	54	54	240	27	-
BALASI MISSION	K.W.T.	TUSI	19	21	113	10	10
GOQEBE MISSION	K.W.T.	MASINGATI	19	19	117	9	10
PERIE MISSION	PERIE	LOSHE	39	51	233	25	10
DÖHNE MISSION	DÖHNE	LUDUME	14	14	80	7	-
		TOTAL	1 032	1 266	5 297	632	-

From Table 3 it can be seen that 1 032 families comprising 5 297 people had left Peddie and Fort Beaufort districts by July 1856. This must have significantly reduced pressure on productive resources in those locations. It appears that the number of polygamous households established in the Crown Reserve was around 18.5% of the total number of households. This relatively low rate of polygamy indicates that a large number of those who moved to the Crown Reserve were drawn from the younger households who were seeking to establish themselves in a more favourable position. Just before the outbreak of the cattle-killing, therefore, a considerable improvement in the agricultural position of the Mfengu had occurred.

In 1855, as part of a report on the Mfengu, the Special Commissioner Henry Calderwood prepared a census of the Mfengu districts in the Colony. It is of importance to look at Calderwood's figures in more detail because he provided one of the only estimates of land actually under cultivation.

Table 4 provides us with some guidelines for understanding Mfengu attitudes towards the plan for land survey which Grey was to introduce.

In Table 4 the values have been expressed in per capita form wherever possible, and the rate of polygamy calculated as for the Peddie census.

Table 4 (i) : Mfengu Districts in the Colony (excluding Peddie) according to Calderwood's Census of 1855 (19)

LOCATION	HEADMAN	POPULATION MEN	WOMEN	CHILDREN	TOTAL	PERCENTAGE OF POLYGAMOUS HOUSEHOLDS	PEOPLE PER HOUSEHOLD
VICTORIA	LUZIPO	103	115	220	438	10.43	4.25
	MAVUSO	144	153	249	546	5.88	3.79
	JWABENI	113	133	227	473	15.03	4.18
	JOBE	25	29	49	103	13.79	4.12
	SIKUNYA	26	23	45	94	-	3.61
	CWACWA	135	57	113	305	-	2.25
	VABA	44	50	86	180	12.0	4.09
	LOVEDALE MISSION	21	29	49	99	-	4.71
	T O T A L	611	589	1038	2238		3.88 (Average)
TYHUMIE	MABANHLA	300	279	493	1072	-	3.51
	QUALO	111	79	201	391		3.52
	VELA	57	52	68	177	-	3.10
	T O T A L	468	410	762	1640	-	3.40 (Average)
FT BEAUFORT	BOOY FUSHA	72	91	211	374	20.87	5.19
	KATANGANA	42	42	116	200	-	4.76
	SLINYA	90	106	263	459	15.09	5.10
	JAN RUGWA	40	52	113	205	23.07	5.12
	ZAZELA	180	207	387	774	13.04	4.30
	PIET	151	198	372	721	23.73	4.77
	BANGANA	140	158	391	689	11.39	4.92
	KONDHLO	44	49	122	215	10.20	4.88
	T O T A L	759	903	1975	3637	14.67 (Average)	4.88 (Average)
TOTAL		1838	1902	3775	7515		

Table 4 (ii) : Mfengu Locations in the Colony (excluding Peddie) showing Total Land Cultivated - July 1855

LOCATION	HEADMAN	EXTENT SQ MILES	ACRES CULTIVATED	ACRES PER WOMAN	ACRES PER HOUSE-HOLD	CATTLE	SHEEP	PLOUGHS	WAGONS
VICTORIA	LUZIPO	21.5	258	2.2	2.5	1200	48	3	8
MISSION	MAVUSO	10	360	2.3	2.5	1390	63	6	10
	JWABENI	10	282	2.4	2.4	1480	150	3	3
	JOBE	5	63	2.1	2.5	400	150	3	1
	SIKUNYA	5	65	2.8	2.5	350	37	-	-
	CWACWA	10	338	2.1	2.5	800	457	2	6
	VABA	5	110	2.2	2.5	1100	100	2	2
	LOVEDALE MISSION	2.5	53	1.8	2.5	106	-	2	2
	T O T A L	69	1529	-	-	6826	1005	21	32
TYHUMIE	MABANHLA	25	750	2.6	2.5	3600	232	2	1
	QUALO	14	278	3.5	2.5	1000	50	2	3
	VELA	9	128	2.4	2.5	593	37	1	1
	T O T A L	48	1156	-	-	5193	319	5	5
FORT	BOOY FUSHA	-	34	0.02	0.4	1381	261	-	1
BEAUFORT	KATANGANA	-	29	0.69	0.69	301	2	-	-
	SLINYA	-	45	0.42	0.5	696	18	-	3
	JAN RUGWA	-	29	0.55	0.72	413	149	-	1
	ZAZELA	7	450	2.1	2.5	1790	133	1	2
	PIET	10	378	1.9	2.5	1367	41	-	-
	BANGANA	7	350	2.2	2.5	992	3	2	5
	KONDHLO	6	110	2.2	2.5	579	272	-	3
	T O T A L	-	1425	-	-	7519	879	3	15
TOTAL		+117	4110	-	-	19538	2203	29	52

Table 4 (iii) : Mfengu Locations in the Colony (excluding Peddie) Showing Assets per Capita and per Household

LOCATION	HEADMAN	CATTLE PER CAPITA	CATTLE PER HOUSEHOLD	SHEEP PER HOUSEHOLD	HOUSEHOLDS PER PLOUGH	HOUSEHOLDS PER WAGON	HOUSEHOLDS PER GUN
VICTORIA	LUZIPO	2.73	11.60	-*	34.3	12.9	42
	MAVUSO	2.54	9.54	-	24.0	14.4	17
	JWABENI	3.12	12.38	1.3	37.67	37.6	67
	JOBE	3.80	16.00	6.0	8.3	25.0	64
	SIKUNYA	3.70	13.46	2.1	-	-	84
	CWACWA	2.60	5.92	3.3	67.5	22.5	10
	VABA	5.90	25.00	2.2	22.0	22.0	22
	LOVEDALE MISSION	1.07	5.04		10.5	10.5	40
	AVERAGE	3.18	12.37	-	25.5	18.1	43
TYHUMIE	MABANHLA	3.3	12.0	-	150	300	40
	QUALO	2.5	9.0	-	55	37	53
	VELA	3.4	10.4	-	57	57	37
	AVERAGE	3.1	10.5	-	87	-	43
FORT BEAUFORT	BOOY FUSHA	3.6	19.1	3.6	-	72	57
	KATANGANA	1.5	7.1	-	-	-	57
	SLINYA	1.5	7.7	-	-	30	38
	JAN RUGWA	2.0	10.3	3.7	-	40	25
	ZAZELA	2.3	9.9	-	780	90	95
	PIET	1.8	9.2		-	-	1
	BANGANA	1.4	7.0		70	28	3
	KONDHLO	2.6	13.1	6.2	-	15	2
	AVERAGE	2.1	10.4	-	-	34	35

In Table 4 (i) the population for each of the Mfengu districts (excluding Peddie, see Table 1 (i) above) is given. It shows a total population of 7 515. They were divided into 1 838 households with approximately 4 people per households. If this population is taken together with that of Peddie there was a total Mfengu population of 16 203 in those districts bordering the Xhosa settlements. The comparatively low number of people in each household contrasts with the 5.4 people in each household in Peddie. The number of polygamous households (in those areas where there were any at all) varied between 5% and 23% of the households. There was thus less polygamy than in Peddie where such households accounted for from 24% to 29% of all households.

This may be explained by the fact that the Victoria East, Fort Beaufort and Thyumie locations were still relatively new, only having been established since 1848. Originally they attracted the younger, less settled part of the Peddie population. Because of the disruption of war from 1851 to 1853 they had not yet had the chance to expand their numbers through the natural increase of population and the attraction of further immigrants to these areas. They thus retained a favourable demographic position up to this time. The pressure of population in these areas was further eased by the movement of many households into the newly-acquired Crown Reserve in 1855 and 1856.

From Table 4 (ii) it can be seen that there was a vast cattle population in these three districts amounting to some 19 538 cattle. With a total population of 7 515 this provided 2.6 cattle per head, a rate considerably higher than the average of 1.6 per head found at Peddie. However Table 4 (iii) shows that the cattle-holdings were not evenly distributed across the different locations in the three communities. The number of cattle per capita varied from a high of 5.9 in Vaba's location, Victoria East, to a low of 1.4 in Bangana's location at Healdtown, Fort Beaufort. (20)

It is difficult to assess to what extent the number of polygamous

households in the different locations accounted for the variation. Among the men in this census were counted many unmarried men who had recently been initiated but were in fact still part of their fathers' households. This inflated the number of men, and as initiations happened in batches it could have had a large effect on the census. There appear to have been fewer polygamous households in these areas compared to Peddie. In Table 4 (i) it can be seen that polygamous households - one hundred and eleven - occurred most frequently in Fort Beaufort - accounting for 14.67% of all households. The 44 which occurred in Victoria East accounted for only 7.5% of all households and there were apparently none at all in the Tyhumie valley area, but this latter result is almost certainly influenced by an inflated figure for the number of 'men'. The number of cattle per capita nevertheless reflects this order of precedence with 2.06 in Fort Beaufort, 2.88 in Victoria East and 3.16 in Tyhumie. This reinforces the finding that the number of cattle per capita tends to vary inversely with the number of polygamous households in a particular community. It also affirms the conclusion that even in the Mfengu communities the process of accumulation of wealth was still controlled by the dynamic of the pre-Colonial economy. The Colonial economy was not yet the dominant force in the internal organisation of production in these communities.

As in Peddie, there were few signs of investment in either agricultural equipment or sheep. In the whole of Fort Beaufort there were only 3 ploughs, and the approximately 611 households in Victoria East had between them only 21 ploughs. Only 1.5% of all households possessed ploughs. Investment in sheep had hardly begun, with most households probably having none at all, while a small number had managed to acquire medium sized flocks. The number of sheep per household was so small that it can be safely disregarded when considering its contribution to household income. The only area where investment had taken place was in guns and wagons, both of which had been stimulated by the war conditions which had prevailed since 1848.

Up to July 1855 All the Mfengu communities appear to have enjoyed a generally high cattle to people ratio and this in itself would have been enough to sustain a fairly large population. In addition they occupied good agricultural land. According to the census each household cultivated 2.5 acres. In fact it is very unlikely that each household cultivated exactly this amount. While some would have cultivated less than this, down to 1 acre, say, many would have cultivated much more than this. Certainly all the polygamous households would have cultivated anything from 5 to 12 acres depending on the amount of labour available.

The uneveness of the distribution of stock and arable land led to some households experiencing a shortage of good arable land. Their reluctance to cultivate poor land, unsuited to being farmed without irrigation, created a land shortage. This pressure on arable land resources was particularly acute in Fort Beaufort where 244 households, comprising 1 238 people, were in fact living on the commonage and carving out arable lots from the grazing area, thus reducing the pasturage. (21)

The high cattle per capita figure indicated that the lung-sickness had not yet struck in these districts by January 1855. Its imminent outbreak in the course of the next 18 months was rapidly to alter this picture. The Mfengu, who up to this point had depended on their cattle were to find themselves without cattle and confronted by thousands of starving Xhosa refugees from the cattle-killing who wanted to buy grain. This was to prove a lasting impetus to the change in the distribution of land usage from pastoralism to arable agriculture. The remainder of this section will examine this process in detail and explore the political evolution that was working concommitantly to transform Mfengu domestic economy.

Between January 1855 and June 1856 the lung-sickness (which had first been reported in the King William's Town district in August 1853) swept through the Mfengu districts having its most severe outbreak in the Crown Reserve area. (22) From there it was

reported by June 1856 that the disease had accounted for nearly all Mfengu cattle. (23)

Grey's plans for surveying allotments, granting title to the land and grouping the landholders into villages was first made known to the Mfengu at that point in 1856, when the effects of the disease were most intense. At a meeting of chiefs and headmen at Keiskamma Hoek in the Crown Reserve Maclean informed them:

> "Sir G. Grey has determined to allow you to hold your lands on the same terms on which land is held in the Colony by the white man, that is to divide such land as will now be granted to each location into the same number of lots as there are persons paying the hut tax and to grant to each tax payer, on certain conditions, a lot with title which will make such lot the property of the said tax payer for ever ..." (24)

The conditions announced by Maclean for the occupation of the land were not so out of the ordinary as to cause concern amongst his audience: the land could not be alienated without permission of the government; the hut tax would continue to be paid annually; the lot would be forfeited for any act of 'disloyalty' committed by the holder; the holder of an allotment might not reside in any other place in the Reserve. Maclean further explained that residential land would be granted separately in compact villages of 20 huts each under a headman. The headman was to assist the Resident Magistrate in the collection of the hut tax and in return would receive 20 pounds per annum. This having been said, Maclean then dropped his bombshell:

> "The extent of each lot to be granted to each Fingoe hut tax payer has been determined by the Governor to be two acres ..." (25)

As soon as he had finished Ulana from Thymie asked, "Will two acres be sufficient for us?" To which rhetorical question Maclean replied, "Yes". But this bland assurance did not satisfy Ulana.

His first objection was that such title abolished the chieftainship, "because each man will be chief over his own two acres." Maclean could only reply that they would still be chiefs over their people "in what was good" but not in "what was bad". Ulana finally ended the the exchange with "these are your customs not ours"!

Objections were also expressed with regard to villagisation. Mabanhla observed: "we cannot live together in villages except in war". Jama from Gwili valley commented: "This is the first act of oppression that I have known from the Government ... you are killing by cutting up my land in this way, my knees are broken ... I think it looks suspicious, we have enough land now and we can change as we wish, besides if a man has more than one wife he may want to give a garden elsewhere for the other ..."

The question of being able to change the piece of ground cultivated was essential. With existing agricultural monocropping of sorghum and maize, land continually lost fertility and required a fallow period and rotation. Maclean's reply to the chiefs' objections was that they (at least Mabanhla) had asked for security of tenure. The tenure which they had asked for, retorted Mabanhla, was title to "a tract of land - not one cut up ..." The meeting closed on an ambivalent note. Mhlambiso speaking for the chiefs told Maclean:

> "I am under the Government and will do as they wish ... our hearts are sore at present because this change seems to us oppressive ... we will wait and see and then if we are not satisfied we will speak to you about it." (26)

In this way the first systematic steps to undertake the survey of land and the granting of titles to land that had always been allocated by the chiefs was begun. The matter was taken back to the various locations and the demands of the Mfengu were sent to Maclean in a letter a few weeks later.

The principle of a registered title to the land was accepted by the chiefs, but they made it clear that 2 acres were insufficient. In a joint letter to Grey two chiefs demanded 8 acres:

> "Give us 8 acres so that we can live, we have many thing to cultivate, kaffir corn, mealies, wheat, oats and potatoes, we say these things are too many to attempt to cultivate on so little ground." (27)

The wide variety of crops mentioned in the letter were in fact very sparsely cultivated outside the mission station communities. Nevertheless it is of importance that the chiefs couched their demand for greater allotments of land in terms of the agricultural potential of a large allotment. It indicates that, at this time when cattle were very scarce, even prior to the outbreak of the cattle-killing, markets for grain were rapidly being expanded and there was a conscious realisation of the need to expand the agricultural base of domestic production. It must be remembered that at this time less than 4% of all Mfengu households possessed ploughs and wagons.

The Mfengu were not alone in questioning the viability of the proposed 2 acre allotments. It seems that even Maclean had his doubts about the limited extent of the proposed allotments. (28) Writing from the Pirie Mission Station, the Rev. John Ross expressed the general sentiment when he wrote: "It quite surprised me to learn that they are to have only two acres each. I can scarcely believe it." He was convinced that "... they have twice that quantity under cultivation, some have more." (29)

The main focus of Mfengu opposition came from Mhlambiso in the Crown Reserve. He now enjoyed the added prestige of being generally recognised as the most senior Mfengu headman following the death of Njokweni. As 1856 wore on the need to increase agricultural cultivation to raise money for the hut tax and other necessary articles became more pressing. Ayliff wrote that "corn was, as a result of the lung-sickness their only means of living

so that 3 acres per family was a minimum." (30)

Mhlambiso informed the Rev. Dacre who had been appointed to investigate the size of holding to be given, that 2 acres per wife would be sufficient in good seasons, but that in dry seasons, and in the case of a man in charge of orphans or with more than one wife it would not be sufficient. He then pointed out to Dacre a piece of garden land measuring three acres which he regarded as the minimum acceptable land allocation. (31)

He also raised the question of men who would soon be marrying and would require land. Dacre recommended in his report that land should be granted in accordance with the then existing distribution in proportion to the number of wives and that a certain number of erven be reserved to allow for those who would shortly marry. He emphasised to Mhlambiso that no additional land would be available to a man who took a second wife after the allotment had been made. The question of the effects of this on providing land for a future increase in population was not raised. It was clear from the Colonial State's point of view that no provision or allowance was to be made for this. Proletarianisation was the intended outcome of the policy. Dacre expressed this exactly in his report to Maclean:

> "The smaller the erven consistent with the maintenance of the existing people - the sooner will the children of the holders be driven to seek employment in the Colony or among the neighbouring farmers." (32)

This was not the end of Mhlambiso's opposition to the villagisation and allotment schemes and the threads of this story will be picked up at a later stage, for no sooner had the Reverend Dacre finished writing his report, than the effects of the cattle-killing were to be felt in the Mfengu locations, creating an unprecedented market for grain which temporarily swept aside all talk of limiting the amount of land under cultivation by Mfengu producers. It is to the immediate effect of this development that we now turn.

II The Effects of the Cattle-Killing on Markets for Grain

Even before any officially designated markets were established by the Colonial State, the Grahamstown Journal reported:

> "It is not generally known that a great trade is carried on at Alice between the Kaffirs and Fingoes. Large quantities of Mielies and kaffir-corn are daily sold to the Kaffirs by Fingoes, the market price being three pence per quart ..." (33)

While the Journal thought the trade a good thing it hastened to assure its readers that this did not mean an 'alliance' between Mfengu and Xhosa. (34) We will deal more fully with the events of the cattle-killing episode in the next section. At the moment it is important to be aware that the cattle-killing was actually a series of episodes relating to politics as much as to prophecy, that extended from the spring sowing season of 1855-56 through to the same period of 1858-59. It cropped up in various manifestations and took hold in different areas at different times during the whole of this period.

The cattle-killing started with the arrival on the scene of a group of prophets in the Gqunukwebe district of Phato and Kama. The first consequence was the failure of cultivation in the Gqunukwebe district in 1855-56. This failure was also ascribable to intense drought. It is impossible to tell whether the drought preceded the prophecy prohibiting cultivation or vice versa. At all events it appears that many people in Phato's country did not even put seed in the ground, which indicates that prophecy had something to do with crop failure.

Crops were withered in many parts of the Ciskei in 1855-56. This would by itself have led to a critical shortage of grain by the winter of 1856 and the prevalence of hunger which would have forced many people to buy grain. The drought, which was most severe in the coastal regions occupied by the Ndlambe and

Gqunukwebe, was much less severe in the Crown Reserve and in other high lying areas occupied by the Mfengu.

The market opportunities created by the hundreds of starving Xhosa seeking to buy grain were consciously anticipated by some Mfengu producers. Prophecies prohibiting cultivation had been prevalent since the spring of 1855 and those (such as the Mfengu) who did not believe in them could well have foreseen that hunger would soon ensue as belief in the prophecies spread. In addition increased cultivation by the Mfengu was necessitated by the loss through lung-sickness of most of their cattle. Increased amounts of grain were required both for domestic consumption and for sale to meet the demands for payment of the hut tax. Of course, no one could have anticipated quite how vast the local demand for grain would suddenly become.

In late 1856 and the first few months of 1857 the combined effect of drought, lung-sickness amongst the Xhosa cattle, and prophecy achieved the total disruption of production in the majority of Xhosa households. Through 1856 many Mfengu households had already been adapting their production to these changing circumstances. By as early as October 1856 the Grahamstown Journal reported that:

> "The Fingoes ... are ploughing extensively and are now selling their corn to the Kaffirs at renumerative prices ..." (35)

Evidence of the trade in grains in the last quarter of 1856 also came from the magistrate, Reeve, who noted:

> "A great many Kafirs of Kama's tribe passing this place from the Reserve with quantities of seed corn and mealies which they have received from the Fingoes ..." (36)

That the extent of cultivation in the 1856-57 season was greatly increased in apparent anticipation of the consequences of the cattle-killing, which had begun a few months earlier, is strongly supported by a report from Healdtown, Fort Beaufort in December 1856:

> "The crops of Indian and Kaffir corn in this settlement promise to yield a first rate return, far surpassing last season, and that after almost wholly supporting a population of 2 500 souls - for milk was very scarce nearly all the cattle having died of lung sickness. Already nearly 1 000 muids have been sent to Fort Beaufort and Grahamstown for sale. The Fingoes are beginning to find their best market is to sell to the Kafirs at Fort Hare so that the vast sums of coin in possession of the Kafirs will come into the Colony through the Fingoes who will not fail to make them pay for their folly in believing the lies of Umhlakaza ..." (37)

There were several advantages to Xhosa purchasing from other African producers. Firstly their proximity to the markets, and secondly the much more competitive price. Before the boom in prices caused by the effect of the cattle-killing on the markets for grain, the price in the Xhosa locations was half that on the Colonial markets. Brownlee wrote to Maclean:

> "I have hitherto been able to purchase corn at 7 shillings & sixpence the 180 lbs, whereas its market price at King William's Town has long been above 13 shillings." (38)

As the effects of the cattle-killing began to be felt and the reserve supplies of grain held by the believers in the prophecies were exhausted, so the conditions favouring those with a surplus of grain to sell intensified. The price of grain began to rise.

Because the cattle-killing was so drawn out, there was in fact plenty of time for Mfengu and other non-believers in the prophecies to plant extra quantities of grain in anticipation of this potential market. As a correspondent for the King William's Town Gazette observed late in 1856:

> "Never have the Fingoes launched more boldly and

largely, throughout the Colony, into agricultural speculation ... " (39)

As the situation in the Xhosa locations worsened it became clear that some steps on the part of the Colonial State would have to be taken to avert death through starvation. Some of these are well-known particularly the drafting of tens of thousands of Xhosa men, women and children as workers on the Colonial farms. However the decision to establish three markets specifically for the marketing of Mfengu and Xhosa grains is less well-known and, as shall be seen, probably at least as important.

The Colonial State specifically favoured creating conditions under which the needs of starving Xhosa could be met out of production by the non-believer Xhosa and Mfengu. This was seen as the most efficient way of preventing the Government itself having to foot the bill for relief food supplies. Food would either be purchased or families would be forced onto the Colonial labour market.

Disclosing just how much grain was sold by Mfengu producers to the Xhosa during the time of the cattle-killing, there has survived a very valuable series of market statistics of all the grain sold at the markets established in July 1857 at Line Drift, Ebb and Flow Drift and Fort Montgomery Williams. The first returns make it quite clear what the nature of these markets were - the figures reflect "the amount of corn sold by the Fingoes on the Native Markets at that place." (40) They were prepared by Verity who had taken over as Superintendent of the Crown Reserve from Ayliff. The statistics show that grain sales continued unabated from July 1857 through to March 1858. Table 5 gives the market returns for the whole period, indicating the weekly total sales of mealies, sorghum and beans as well as the average price obtained in each week. The returns also indicate the number of wagons which were used to transport the grain to the market.

Table 5 (i): Market Returns for Ebb and Flow Drift, Line Drift and Fort Montgomery Williams, July 1857 - December 1857 (41)

	MEALIES		SORGHUM		AVERAGE PRICE PER MUID (180 lbs)	WAGONS
	QUANTITY lbs.	VALUE L. s. d.	QUANTITY lbs.	VALUE L. s. d.	L. s. d.	
20 - 25 JULY	8 300	63 5 0	20 150	157 5 0	1 7 10	13
27 - 1 AUG	1 465	11 0 0	3 670	27 5 0	1 6 10	1
10 - 15 AUG	3 710	28 0 0	1 730	13 0 0	1 7 2	1
24 - 29 AUG	2 125	16 0 0	2 560	19 0 0	1 6 11	1
7 - 12 SEP	6 980	52 10 0	17 560	131 0 0	1 6 11	7
14 - 19 SEP	4 130	31 0 0	6 655	50 0 0	1 7 0	-
21 - 26 SEP	6 480	46 10 0	14 950	112 10 0	1 6 9	4
28 - 3 OCT	2 550	19 10 0	4 260	32 0 0	1 7 3	-
5 - 10 OCT	3 060	23 0 0	7 400	55 10 0	1 7 0	2
12 - 17 OCT	2 960	22 0 0	7 170	54 0 0	1 7 0	-
19 - 24 OCT	1 430	11 0 0	2 960	22 0 0	1 7 0	-
26 - 31 OCT	2 265	17 0 0	9 100	68 10 0	1 7 0	3
2 - 7 NOV	3 380	30 0 0	7 300	66 0 0	1 12 5	1
9 - 14 NOV	4 305	36 0 0	14 450	115 0 0	1 9 0	4
16 - 21 NOV	5 670	49 0 0	16 350	145 0 0	1 11 9	6
23 - 28 NOV	2 830	27 0 0	8 840	84 0 0	1 14 3	2
30 - 5 DEC	3 960	35 0 0	10 110	85 0 0	1 10 9	3
7 - 12 DEC	1 990	15 0 0	5 600	42 0 0	1 7 0	2
14 - 19 DEC	3 980	33 0 0	6 450	52 10 0	1 9 7	3
TOTAL	71 570	565 15 0	167 265	1331 10 0	1 8 4 (average)	53

Table 5 (ii): Market Returns for Ebb and Flow Drift, Line Drift and Fort Montgomery Williams, 26th December - 12th March 1858 (42)

	TOTAL QUANTITY (lbs.)	TOTAL VALUE L. s. d.	AVERAGE PRICE PER MUID L. s. d.
26 - 2 JAN	19 620	145 13 0	1 6 2
3 - 10 JAN	15 740	144 3 6	1 12 2
11 - 17 JAN	11 260	102 6 6	1 12 10
18 - 23 JAN	15 470	134 3 0	1 11 10
24 - 30 JAN	13 395	117 6 9	1 11 4
1 - 7 FEB	11 350	103 5 0	1 12 3
8 - 13 FEB	6 700	64 12 6	1 14 3
14 - 20 FEB	5 665	55 9 9	1 15 6
21 - 27 FEB	5 370	49 15 6	1 13 7
28 - 6 MAR	4 835	43 17 9	1 12 3
7 - 12 MAR	4 100	36 14 0	1 12 7
TOTAL	113 505	997 7 3	1 12 3 (average)
TOTAL GRAIN SALES 20 JULY 1857 TO 12 MARCH 1858	352 340	2 894 12 3	1 9 7 (average)

One of the first points to be observed is the exceedingly high price per muid of 180 lbs which was maintained throughout the period for which the markets were in operation. It must be remembered that these markets were instituted at the height of the cattle-killing. The final date set for the manifestation of the 'New People' predicted by the prophet Mhlakaza was in mid-February 1857. While some people had been without cattle and had to trade for food for many months prior to this, many cattle were finally killed in the days immediately preceding the predicted resurrection. Demand must therefore have been intense between February and July when the statistics begin.

Between February and July, prior to the completion of the harvest, sales were taking place informally at different points in the Crown Reserve. This was confirmed in a report from Reeve who observed in April:

> "A market is now established at Fort Hare for Caffres purchasing from the Fingoes, it is now unnecessary that Caffres get passes to buy food in the Fingoe location ..." (43)

However this unofficial market was not entirely satisfactory and Reeve soon wrote:

> "I have been induced to grant a very few passes on the grounds of food purchases on account of the outrageously high prices demanded by the Fingoes at Fort Hare ..." (44)

It will be remembered that when Brownlee purchased grain for rations as part of the wage to workers on the early road-building and other projects in 1854, he paid only 6 shilling per 180 lbs. (45) This was regarded as the rock bottom price at which it was possible to obtain grain. By April 1857 the price of grain on the King William's Town market had jumped to 1 pound 12 shillings per muid. (46) A high point in the price of grain was reached in August 1857 when sorghum fetched 2 pounds and 1 shilling per muid at King William's Town. Comparatively, it can be seen in Table 5 (i) that in August the average price per muid for Mfengu grain on these local markets was 1 pound 6 shillings and elevenpence, fully 14 shillings cheaper than the prevailing price in King William's Town. Nevertheless these were really astronomical prices and it would indeed have been strange if the Mfengu had <u>not</u> been motivated to take advantage of them.

The total amount of money injected into the Mfengu locations mainly as a result of the market for grain must have been considerably more than the 2 894 pounds 12 shillings and 3 pence reflected in Table 5 (i) and 5 (ii). (47) Some Mfengu wagon owners took grain into the interior, selling it up the Kei, and they obtained even higher prices as distances from the main markets

increased. (48) On these trips they were also purchasing cattle and horses brought from across the Kei. (49) In addition some grain must have made its way to the King William's Town market where higher prices were to be obtained. (50) However, because of the relatively small number of wagons then available, it is safe to conclude that the bulk of Mfengu grain marketed in this period was channelled through the main markets dealt with in Table 5 above.

III The Analysis of Market Statistics for Mfengu Grain Production 1857 - 1858

If we are adequately to conceptualise the significance of these market statistics we have to move beyond being over-impressed with the quantitative picture which emerges from the data at specific points in time. Data on market-related phenomena are more obvious and easily recorded, precisely because the function of a market is to relate together and concentrate a myriad individual transactions. Because of the 'obviousness' of market-related transactions, it is easy to overlook the stage of production which necessarily precedes any activity on the market.

The conditions under which production takes place are defined by the relations of production. For every mode of production the constitution of the relations of production may be generally determined, specifying the forces of production, the relationship between producers and non-producers and the form of the unit of production. However because of lack of data it has very often been difficult to gain concrete information on the dynamics of the production units, the struggle to achieve adequate reproduction of the production unit, and the differentiation and class antagonisms which develop in response to this.

It is possible to use market statistics, if they are sufficiently comprehensive, to determine certain aspects of the production

process and to reveal the contradictions which they so often conceal.

In trying to move beyond the merely quantitative aspects of market - related phenomena it is necessary to subject existing approaches to both an empirical and a theoretical critique. If market-related phenomena such as statistics of quantities of grain marketed are to be useful then it is necessary that these overall statistics should as far as possible be disaggregated. By this is meant that we should ask certain simple questions concerning the data. How many potential and actual producers contributed to the overall result? What was the likely contribution of each producer? Over what seasonal time period was the produce in question produced? Were the surpluses of a purely 'economic' nature or were they actual surpluses above and beyond all subsistence requirements? Above all we have to look closely at the political conjuncture and establish what its effects were on the growth of the markets being examined.

For the moment it is necessary to confine the critique to the empirical level. The method used here will be applied again at later stages of the analysis in which a theoretical critique will be developed which relates the inferences drawn from a critical examination of market statistics to our total knowledge of the relations of production of the social formation.

Most of the grain reflected in the statistics was produced by Mfengu. Tables 1,3, and 4 reveal that there were 4 462 households in the key Mfengu areas of the Crown Reserve, Peddie, Fort Beaufort and Victoria East. Obviously not all of these households would have participated in this production to an equal extent. Is it possible to gain any idea of how production was actually distributed?

A clue is given by looking at the number of wagons used to deliver grain noted in the returns. Where no wagons were used the returns usually specify that the grain was delivered in "small

quantities". Table 5 (i) is in fact a condensed table drawn from the separate returns for each week, for each of the three markets. By referring to the individual returns it is possible to calculate how much of the grain was delivered in such small quantities. Calculating from these daily returns from which Table 5 (i) was derived it was found that 91 850 lbs of grain were brought to the market up to December 1857 in small quantities without the use of wagons. (51) This represents 38.4% of the 238 835 lbs of grain brought to the three markets between July and December 1857.

The loads brought in a single day in small quantities varied between a minimum of 10 lbs of sorghum (Thursday 17th December 1857, Line Drift) and a maximum of 1 900 lbs (Friday 21st November, Ebb and Flow Drift). On the average, over the 114 days that the market operated between July and December 1857, the daily amount delivered in "small quantities" without the use of wagons amounted to 805 lbs. Individual loads of between 10 and 180 lbs were common. In contrast, in the same period 53 wagon loads of grain were brought to the markets, carrying a total of 146 985 lbs or approximately 2 773 lbs per load. Wagon loads of as little as 660 lbs (7th September 1857, Ebb and Flow Drift), and as much as 3 550 lbs (Monday 7th December 1857, Line Drift) were received.

Much of the grain in these big loads must also in large measure have been made up of the proceeds of many producers. As the later censuses conducted in Fort Beaufort in the 1860s revealed, the ownership of a wagon was invariably associated with the ownership of a plough. (52) Although we cannot tell if the wagons and ploughs shown in Tables 1 and 4 above were owned by the same individuals, the evidence from subsequent periods would indicate this to be highly likely. As there were only 68 ploughs and 100 wagons shared amongst the 4 462 households it is quite likely that most of them were owned by the same individuals who would also have been in possession of the oxen necessary to drive them. Those few individuals who owned wagons and ploughs might have been in a position to produce grain on a larger scale, and some of the smaller wagon loads of between 600 and 1 500 lbs could have been the produce of one or two cultivators only.

The small number of producers capable of producing on a large scale, and the large amount of grain delivered in small quantities of between 10 and 180 lbs reinforces the conclusion that many producers were in fact involved in creating the overall result depicted in the market returns. The total amount of grain sold between July 1857 and March 1858 would have represented sales from two seasons - that of 1856-57, and the beginning of the 1857-58 harvest. The fact that sales from two harvests were reflected in the returns supports the conclusion that many households participated to varying extents in the sale of grain. If we assume that every Mfengu household participated to some extent in the production of grain for the market this would mean that in the period July 1857 - March 1858 each household marketed 79 lbs of grain.

If we allow that each household had on average 2.5 acres under cultivation, as suggested in Table 4, this would give a total of 11 155 acres under cultivation. (53) On this basis 31.6 lbs was brought to the markets for each acre under cultivation. This fairly low result is quite realistic and it would not have been beyond the resources of most Mfengu households to achieve this rate of surplus. If each household produced 79 lbs of marketable produce at the average price of 29 shillings per muid or approximately 2 pence per lb, this would have been worth 14 or 15 shillings depending on when it was marketed - the grain marketed in January-March 1858 being slightly more expensive.

It so happens that this amount just covers the hut tax of 10 shillings per hut and horse tax of 2 shillings with a few shillings left over. There was therefore, because of the tax, every incentive for each household to produce at least sufficient to realise 12 shillings through the sale of grain. The data seems to fit this scale nicely and further supports the suggestion that production consisted of a mass of small producers with small surpluses most of which went on paying the hut tax. Looking at how the grain was marketed it can be suggested that Mfengu production at this stage consisted of a mass of small producers

marketing surpluses somewhere between 50 to 100 lbs each and a few larger producers who were most likely the owners of the ploughs, trek oxen and wagons as well.

We referred above to the need to distinguish between surpluses above subsistence requirements and what may be termed purely economic surpluses. All produce brought to a market for exchange for cash, functions on that market as a commodity. From the point of view of its status as a commodity no one is in the least bit interested in whether the produce being sold is a surplus above the conventional subsistence requirements for the reproduction of the direct producers. The economic surplus is that part of total product of the household not retained for domestic consumption. However in the case of many household production units it may only be possible to bring forward this 'surplus' by reducing the amount retained for their own consumption. While economically this was still a 'surplus' it had in fact only been achieved by selling part of what was usually retained for domestic consumption.

That this was occurring in the Mfengu grain sales and that many producers were stampeded into selling because of the high prices and because they had no other source of money to meet the hut tax was suggested in one report from Peelton Mission Station:

> "A quantity of corn was sold by the people of the station as the price obtained was high. I think it induced many to sell more corn than they should have done ..." (54)

There is a strong suggestion that much of the grain marketed during this period was merely an economic surplus and not a surplus above 'subsistence needs' however this is conceived. The magistrate Chalmers observed that in the Crown Reserve some Mfengu:

> "were proceeding into the Colony for service ... in a very destitute state as they sold their corn to the Kaffirs during the time of starvation ..." (55)

In addition it is necessary to allow for the fact that in any given year grains from the previous harvest and from the current

production could be marketed. In this way the capacity for producing what looks at first like large surpluses might depend on the product of two harvests. When looked at in this perspective the 'very large' quantities that were produced appear no more than barely adequate to meet the needs of the community. But these were boom years, exceptional in every sense. What would have happened if prices had fallen to their previous levels? Production would then have looked far from prosperous.

For the 4 500 Mfengu households in the immediate vicinity of the Xhosa it is clear that the potential capacity existed, under optimal conditions, for most to be able to meet their cash needs from their own production. From the outset, however, there were factors tending towards the accumulation of advantages and disadvantages between households.

In fact, far from being 'prosperous', the Mfengu after nearly 20 years in the Colony were under pressure. The stage had been reached where they had either to expand production to meet the cash requirements (imposed by the Colonial State and to recoup the losses associated with lung-sickness), or emigrate from their established locations to fresh territory. In the event both of these options were to be utilised, because the cattle-killing, by displacing the Gcaleka in the Transkei, created an area into which Mfengu sub-colonisation could proceed. This movement was in turn to be of the greatest significance for the subsequent development of commodity production amongst the remaining Mfengu and Xhosa locations in the Ciskei. (56)

While the benefits of the opening of the local grain market may have been thinly spread, they were far-reaching precisely for this reason. Some households were undoubtedly able to enter a phase of monetary accumulation and investment in cattle, sheep, ploughs, wagons and (most importantly) land. Private land ownership was a new element introduced in the aftermath of the cattle-killing when it became possible for Mfengu to compete for the purchase of agricultural lots made available by the State.

The effect of the cattle-killing was to begin a new period of differentiation between households, based on the accumulation of money and the investment in ploughs and sheep. The 'revolution in their circumstances' long awaited by Brownlee had arrived.

IV The Cattle-Killing - Economic Effects on the Xhosa

It was stated at the beginning of this analysis that developments within Mfengu had to be placed within the context of Xhosa dominance in the Ciskei as a whole. It is wrong to look at the two groups in isolation, and the cattle-killing more than any other event had the effect of drawing them into a common economic universe. The impact of the cattle-killing on the market for grain has been dealt with. It was certainly a sellers' market, affecting in the first instance those in a position to produce and market grain. But the Xhosa for their part had to be able to purchase it. Where did they get the money?

We have already commented on the propensity for hoarding silver coin which had been observed from about 1853 onwards. This tendency had apparently continued unabated and the road works, service in the Colony, and trade remained sources of cash. (57) As the lung-sickness took its toll amongst the Xhosa cattle the sale of the hides of the diseased and dying cattle rapidly became the most important source of cash income. Many households had their small reserves of coin added to in this way. The influx of coin in the second half of 1856 caused a minor trade boom on the frontier, which was in fact encouraged by the prophet Mhlakaza at one stage. The Grahamstown Journal observed in a report from King William's Town late in 1856:

> "A good number of picks have been bought by the Kafirs during the last few days .. there are hundreds of Kafirs who visit this town daily and lay out large sums of money with the traders .. (58)

The extent to which money had penetrated into all commodity transactions was witnessed in the following report in the Journal:

> "a large portion of the trade carried on with them is for money instead of useless trinkets. With money you can now buy from the Kafir anything he has for sale, and this extends far into the interior ... (59)

In the period preceding the general starvation which started to become serious late in March 1857, most Xhosa households had accumulated a small cash reserve. With the onset of large scale cattle-killing from about August 1856 onwards the amount of hides sold increased dramatically. Although the price obtained was low, the sheer numbers involved must have put quite a bit of cash into Xhosa hands. While the Xhosa had in many cases lost every other means of barter, the one thing they did generally possess was money. It is important to emphasise the extent to which the Xhosa were saved from even worse loss of life in the starvation that followed the cattle-killing, by the possession of small sums of money - the product of past hoarding - with which they were able to buy food. Reeve, magistrate with Kama, commented:

> "It has come under my notice that several of those who have presented themselves before me have been in possession of considerable sums of money always carefully concealed ... (60)

It is clear from this evidence that the penetration of money and commodity exchange had become a familiar experience in the Xhosa chieftaincies. As shall be seen, the subtle influences worked by these forces over the Xhosa economy were as much a reason for the failure of the political project behind the cattle-killing as were the non-materialisation of the prophecies themselves. In order to understand the extent of this penetration it is necessary to look further into how the cattle-killing itself rapidly expanded the sphere of operation of trade, money and commodity production.

When the prophecies of Mhlakaza and the injunction to kill cattle were first spread it was initially forbidden for people to sell

their cattle. After messengers from Mhalla had been to see the prophet it then became known that the sale of cattle or of their hides was to be allowed. Within ten days of this change becoming known in July 1857

> "a most extraordinary number of Gacaleka cattle were sold at King Williams Town, as low as 11 shillings has been taken for a cow and 15 shillings for a full grown ox." (61)

Contradictory orders subsequently appeared, but these emanated from local prophets that arose in Ndlambe territory. These young female prophets specifically ordered the destruction of money, as money would no longer be needed after the fulfilment of the prophecies. (62) By the time these orders came to be given most cattle had already been slaughtered or sold. Besides they did not have much impact outside of the Ndlambe area. Elsewhere people followed the words of Mhlakaza and Sarhili. (63)

The cattle-killing proceeded in waves with many peaks and valleys which were determined by the complex political manoeuvering associated with it. This extended from July 1856 through to late 1857, with the two peak periods of killing being in July-August 1856 and again in February 1857, although peripheral effects continued for a much longer time. From about August 1856 the practice of selling cattle rather than slaughtering them became prevalent. One observer noted:

> "During the past week, cattle which a short time ago would have realised three or four pounds, have been sold for something less than the value of the hides ... a native man drove some fifteen or sixteen oxen and cows to East London and offered them for sale at a nominal price, but was unable to dispose of them. Instead of offering them at a more ready market, as one would naturally suppose, he drove them to a neighbouring hillock, slaughtered them, merely flaying the carcases and disposing of the skins at the greatest immediate advantage ..." (64)

At this time the Gcaleka, Ndlambe and Gqunukwebe were principally involved in the killing of cattle without much participation of the Ngqika under Sandille. Hides were brought to King William's Town for sale, from where it was reported:

> "eight hundred have been purchased in a single day ... and with the money they have received in return they have purchased axes, knives, etc ..." (65)

At East London mostly Gcaleka cattle were being brought for sale and the same trade was ensuing. (66) At the same time, as if in almost deliberate counterpoint to the general trend, there were reports of Ngqikas purchasing Gcaleka cattle. Sandille purchased oxen which he gave to people on the mission stations to be trained to work for him, the report adding "Sandille's wish being to have a wagon and oxen to put on the road to earn money for him." (67)

Sandille's action at this time indicates that many people were continuing with their normal economic activity. The prophecies of Mhlakaza operated in an economic environment that was already changing. The prophecies had to take account of the presence of the Colonial economy and were in part an attempt to overcome the influence that it was already exerting. Some had an openly opportunistic attitude to the prophecies:

> "It appears that a number of Siwani's people proceeded to the Gacaleka territory in order to see the prophet ... These devotees endeavoured to combine worldly advantage with the performance of what they evidently considered to be a religious duty. Accordingly a considerable number of cattle was purchased by them during their stay, with which they returned to their own country, declaring that the animals had been raised from the earth by Umhlakaza and presented to them ... Siwani compelled these men to surrender their cattle and this created a division in the tribe." (68)

In Cape Town in July and August 1856 it was not yet realised what was happening in the Ciskei. Grey was aware of the presence of lung-sickness in Xhosa and Mfengu cattle and assumed that the vast

quantities of hides being purchased by traders were a result of this. Indeed the killing of cattle because of infestation by lung-sickness was a major motivation for the slaughter of cattle. Culling was the most effective way to control the spread of a disease such as lung-sickness amongst the cattle. This was well-known to the Xhosa, and it is quite possible that initially Mhlakaza was only providing an additional reason for a large scale culling of infected cattle necessitated by the disease amongst the stock.

As early as October 1856 Grey received a report from a trader, one Mr Scott at King William's Town, described as "a very intelligent merchant" which showed:

> "about 130 000 hides, believed to be principally those of cattle which had died from lung-sickness have been exported from this province since the appearance of that disease, although previously the article of hides had only formed a very inconsiderable article of export ..." (69)

Scott estimated that the 130 000 hides exported through East London between January 1854 and August 1856 weighed 1 303 000 lbs. and were worth 14 000 pounds. If he included those exported through Port Elizabeth and those purchased for local consumption the estimated total weight of hides purchased was 3 909 000 lbs worth 42 300 pounds. (70) If these estimates are even approximately correct the combined deaths of cattle through lung-sickness, through preventative culling, and through slaughter in accordance with the views of the prophet would have led to an enormous influx of money to the Xhosa.

In considering the number of cattle that died up to the time of the cattle-killing and during this period, it must be taken into account that the number actually exported was only a small proportion of the number that died. In many cases the skins were simply discarded because of distance from the market or were used by the Xhosa themselves. Nevertheless the impact of lung-sickness and the beginning of the prophecies of Mhlakaza are inextricably

interconnected. It is possible to pose the question whether the prophecies would have arisen at all had it not been for the effect of the lung-sickness. This question cannot be answered definitively, but there is no doubt that the lung-sickness was a crucial pre-disposing factor contributing to the other causes of the desperation that beset the Xhosa.

A Table was prepared by Grey showing the number of cattle which had died from lung-sickness in the herds belonging to certain chiefs. It is of questionable accuracy, but it indicates, if nothing else, the extent of Colonial awareness of the strain the Xhosa economy was under at the time of the cattle-killing.

Table 6: The Number of Cattle which had Died of Lung-Sickness Belonging to certain Chiefs - September 1856 (71)

Delima (son of Phato-Gqunukwebe)	about	60 out of	70
Phato (Gqunukwebe chief)	"	2400 out of	2500
Basi	"	200 out of	200
Paku	"	2 out of	25
Xaku	"	130 out of	150
Klaas	"	9 out of	9
Cobus Congo (Chungwe, Gqunukwebe)	"	130 out of	150
Vaso	"	60 out of	70
Stock (Stokwe - Mbalu chief)	"	110 out of	110
Sandili (son of Stokwe)	"	10 out of	-
Piet Congo	"	20 out of	20
Kanani	"	20 out of	20

As late as November 1856, when the cattle-killing was widespread, Brownlee reported that:

> "The Gaikas have been averse to purchasing the cattle of the Gacalekas, in consequence of many of them having lung sickness, they being afraid that they might introduce the disease among their own cattle ..." (72)

As the cattle-killing was well underway by this stage, this indicates that consciousness of the cattle-killing was paralleled by consciousness of the dangers of lung-sickness.

Some of the 'unbelievers' - those who were opposed to the prophecies of Mhlakaza - tried to separate the issues of culling due to threat of lung-sickness and of slaughter in response to the prophecies. In Kama's location a headman, Sityi, stated:

> "The people do not kill their cattle on account of hunger. They do it in obedience to what "Umhlakaza" tells them. The cattle are not all dying of the lung sickness, nor are they killed for the purposes of making "karosses" for the women. If so, why are the hides carried for sale?" (73)

Earlier the magistrate with Mhalla had tried to explain the increased cattle-killing in the Ndlambe location by pointing out "that this was the time of the year when they kill oxen to make clothes for their wives", thus emphasising how little the Colonial authorities initially knew about the cattle-killing prophecies. (74)

The role of the prophecies of Mhlakaza in the growth of the cattle-killing were kept secret as far as possible from the Colonial authorities. In the Gqunukwebe location, where resistance to cultivation and the slaughter of cattle first began in the Ciskei, the Chief Phato told a magistrate:

> "That his people are many of them killing cattle for food for their children and for no other reason, that he is entirely without food ... that he is going to Umhalla's country to buy mealies and corn." (75)

Similarly many Gcaleka denied that they had heard of Mhlakaza:

> "To the question why they were killing so many cattle, they were answered by the Gacalekas, that it was because they were afraid of the lungsickness". (76)

Finally from St. Marks Mission Station in Gcaleka country the Rev. Waters reported that "Kreli is killing on account of lung sickness". (76)

It seems likely that killing associated with the lung-sickness occurred simultaneously with that of the prophecies. When cattle had to be killed in any case because of infestation by lung-sickness this could have been declared a sacrifice in accordance with the wish of the prophet Mhlakaza. At least this would have softened the loss of prized animals with the thought that they would be resurrected if the words of the prophet came to pass. In August 1856, at the height of the first wave of killing, Lamont, one of the superintendents of public works at Keiskamma Hoek, reported that:

> "People are still killing cattle infected with lung sickness ... but at those places where the disease has left 10 or 12 out of all the cattle and places where it has not reached yet, there are the people ... who appear to me to have stopped killing ..." (78)

The question of the interrelation of the various causes of the cattle-killing will be considered more fully in the next section. Here we are primarily concerned with the consequences of the cattle-killing for the transformation of the Xhosa economy. From the aforegoing evidence it is clear that from the sale of hides of slaughtered cattle, whatever the reasons for the slaughter, a large quantity of cash was placed in Xhosa hands. While hides exported between January 1854 and August 1856 as reported by Scott consisted of cattle killed both as a result of lung-sickness and in response to the prophecies of Mhlakaza, the hides sold in the subsequent period are certainly due mainly to Mhlakaza. Between 1st January and 30 April 1857 a further 30 873 hides weighing 1 543 650 lbs. were exported through East London alone. These hides were valued at 23 144 pounds. (79) In the period following this and up to June 1857 a further 118 000 lbs. of hides worth 2 950 pounds was exported. (80) The average price varied from three and a half pence per lb. when cattle were plentiful, rising to 6 pence per lb. when they were scarce by mid-1857. The price obtained for most of the hides which were sold was under the average price in 1856 of 5 pence per lb. If the hides weighed on average about 50 lbs. each, then the value of a single hide could

have varied from anything between 14 shillings and 6 pence and one pound 5 shillings, although many hides offered for sale must have been lighter than this.

The result of these sales was that many Xhosa had money with which to purchase grain, and this accounts directly for the length of time over which the cattle-killing was able to extend. In June 1957 Reeve observed:

> "Large quantities of corn are everyday bought by Kaffirs, showing that there is still money amongst them ..." (81)

The trade with the Mfengu for grain became increasingly visible. One observer noted:

> "50 - 60 women laden with hides full of mealies passed in the direction of King William's Town and this morning three parties of women numbering between 40 and 50 moved up the hill leading to the Quilli basin ... women coming and going with grain ..." (82)

How the sale of hides from slaughtered cattle affected the ability of the Xhosa households to buy grain and feed themselves depended to a large extent on how the cattle were distributed between the households. It is possible to gain some idea of how the cattle were actually distributed by referring to the 1848 census of the Xhosa. The census reveals that the basic distribution of cattle was very uneven between households and homesteads and it is clear that not all households would have been able to derive much income from the sale of hides. (83)

The basic distribution of cattle for all Ngqika households recorded in the 1848 census revealed an average of 3.9 cattle per household. The maximum number of cattle in any household was 160 and the minimum number was 0 which was also the modal level. Only 20% of all households had above 5 cattle while correspondingly 80% had less than 5 cattle. The median number of cattle was 2. An analysis of the census reveals that the top 20% of the households accounted for the majority of the cattle. From the small amount

of cattle held by 80% of the households it can be seen that the distribution of cattle was very skew between households.

In terms of the problem of the sale of cattle due to the combined effects of lung-sickness and the Mhlakazian prophecy it is clear that at least 20% of the households could survive for a long time by strategically spacing the rate at which cattle were killed and sold, and buying grain with the proceeds. By contrast about 80% of the Xhosa households had insufficient cattle to achieve this and would be quickly exhausted after the slaughter of even one beast. The 1848 census showed that 14.5% of the households had only 1 head of cattle and those with 2 head accounted for 12.2%. The very uneveness of cattle-holding was an important factor in accounting for some of the difficulties encountered by the Mhlakazian movement.

From this consideration of the value of the hides disposed of by the Xhosa taken in relation to the average price of grain sold by the Mfengu, it can be seen that it would have been possible to realise the price of about 100 lbs. of grain by the sale of a single hide. Those households with more than 5 cattle could survive for many months in this way. Those with no cattle or only very few animals - less than five say - would have no option but to seek other ways of obtaining grain during the long wait, between July 1856 and February 1857, for the fulfilment of the prophecies. Initially, before the people were forced to turn to labour on the Colonial farms, they resorted to selling anything of value that they possessed.

Some of Sandille's people resorted to the selling of thatch to the German Colonists who had begun to settle around the Stutterheim area in 1856. (84) By early 1857 reports were appearing of people selling 'jack-chains', beads and all kinds of ornaments at a fourth of there former value in order to eke out an existence. (85) More importantly many people even sold their guns.

> "At one of the trading stations near this town four guns have been given by the Kaffirs in exchange for food." (86)

In February 1857, when the killing of cattle was reaching its peak and traders in Butterworth were purchasing 1 000 hides a day, it was also reported that "the women were selling their ornaments freely, those bought a few weeks ago being sold at a third of what it cost them ..." (87)

The sale of their guns was of course by far the most important loss to the Xhosa after the loss of the cattle. The Colonial State naturally encouraged the purchase of the guns. The Rev. H. Keyser at Peelton spent over 50 pounds purchasing 20 stand of arms and was continually being offered guns for sales. (88) In this trade too there was Mfengu participation. Ayliff reported Mfengu arms purchases particularly in the Izeli district. (89) Reeve stated that:

> "the sale of arms to the Government has also been the means of supplying many families with food ... I have purchased 22 stand of arms, and have always given a good price, as I consider this Government measure an excellent way of affording relief ..." (90)

As far as the Colonial State was concerned the cattle-killing itself was an internal Xhosa affair in which they would not interfere. The official attitude was expressed in a letter from Brownlee to Maclean, where he reported that he had told Sandille at a meeting:

> "that they need be under no apprehension that the Government would meddle with Umhlakaza. It grieved the Governor to see the Kafirs thus destroying themselves, but he would not interfere with them so long as they were destroying their own property ..." (91)

Despite the high-sounding tone adopted by Brownlee, the Colonial officials naturally did everything they could to turn the cattle-killing to their advantage and viewed it in the light of their political and military struggle with the Xhosa. Nevertheless Maclean issued instructions to the magistrates to purchase corn from those "as might sell it at a low price" to be

held for relief purposes. (92) By as early as August 1856 there was a shortage of grain in Maqoma's location and the magistrate Lucas reported that many of Maqoma's and Botomane's people were buying corn from the Gcaleka. (93)

Apart from some small laying-in of stocks, the Colonial State made some attempts to supply seed and implements to those who wished to sow. This activity was mainly aimed at those small groups of people who defied their chiefs in not slaughtering their cattle. The first group of these 'unbelievers' who settled around Brownlee were:

> "exceedingly anxious to have their oxen trained for the plough ... two have purchased ploughs and others will do the same as soon as they have the means ..." (94)

These were the people to whom the Colonial State extended it's assistance:

> "Some of the people hire out their oxen to work for their more civilised brethren and I have lately assisted two of them with money for the purchase of a wagon, which is now employed on the road between this and King William's Town ..." (95)

There was a shortage of seed in many locations as a result of the severe drought in the 1855-56 season. This would in any case have curtailed cultivation. Those who wished to cultivate were restricted both by a lack of seed and the injunctions of the prophet against cultivation. Many people who had desisted from cultivation mainly because of the prophet gave as a reason, when pressed by Colonial officials, that they were short of seed. This situation motivated the Colonial State to distribute some seed but these efforts were limited and insufficient. In practice only small amounts were expended and these usually went to selected individuals who had served the magistrates in some way:

> "According to your instructions that I should do whatever I could in the way of ploughing, distributing implements of husbandry and seed to

> those desirous of cultivating their lands ... I have incurred an expenditure of 1 pound & 9 pence. One of the ploughs I have purchased I have given to 'Jofa' who has cultivated most extensively ..."(96)

Ultimately, after much prevarication the magistrates became more actively involved in the distribution of seed. In Sandille's location a total of 1 800 lbs of seed was distributed - from 6 to 10 lbs to certain households. This was not a very generous scale of aid and many received none at all. A concession was later made that Brownlee could grant passes to certain trusted Ngqika (paid headmen, police, and approved women) to go to the Crown Reserve to purchase seed, which was normally forbidden. (97) Owing to the absence of so much of the population in the sowing season of 1857-58, those that remained and who possessed sufficient seed were encouraged to bring more land under cultivation than usual. The competition for seed became intense and in late 1857 it was reported that Xhosa coming to the markets in search of seed corn were leaving empty-handed:

> "the Fingoes bring but little corn for sale and the Kafirs will not be able to cultivate so extensively as they would wish..." (98)

The depopulation of most of the Ciskeian chiefdoms, after the starvation induced by the cattle-killing was fully developed, stimulated the agricultural production of the remaining households. The people who remained after the general exodus to the Colony were reported to have broken up more ground than had previously been brought under cultivation:

> "The people are exerting themselves to the utmost in breaking up ground and many are digging in the hope of obtaining seed before the season is over ..." (99)

This was seen by some Colonial officials as an important moment for the transformation of agricultural practices. Just at the time when Mfengu grain sales were at their peak, it was reported that cultivation had been resumed on a wide scale by those who remained in Sandille's location:

> "As it is too early for sowing the crops which they usually cultivate, I am giving them wheat, peas and lentils which I purchased for distribution ... If the Kafirs generally were disposed to cultivate the above named products it is important to encourage the thing by a distribution of seed, as this will eventually tend greatly to the prosperity of the country, and we can have no better opportunity than the present for the introduction of any innovations ..."(100)

There is no doubt that the immediate aftermath of the cattle-killing saw some of the households which had survived the devastation begin to adopt new agricultural practices - a process partly induced by necessity and partly by the influence of the aid distributed by the Colonial State.

The distribution of seed and the possibility of cultivating increased acreages because of the absence of most of the population led to the first general emergence of ploughs amongst the Xhosa. Whereas before the cattle-killing there had been scarcely any ploughs in use except that of Soga and one or two given as presents by the Colonial State, now there were reports that:

> "Four Kaffirs (<u>not</u> including residents on Missionary Stations) have ploughs and have amongst them 24 span of trained oxen. These are now actively engaged for their owners and others. By next year I expect that as many more ploughs will be purchased and that oxen will be trained ..." (101)

Just as Brownlee had distributed ploughs to his favourite co-operative headmen, Gawler, with Mhalla, gave Mjuzu a plough and he had 18 oxen trained for it. Similar gifts were made in Phato's Location by Vigne. (102)

Innovation was not only apparent in the variety of produce cultivated and the use of ploughs. Sheep farming also suddenly started featuring more prominently. As if heralding the beginning of a new era in production the King William's Town Gazette

reported:

> "We are informed that Mr Perks jun. has lately received, by way of Queenstown, two bales of wool in the grease from sheep bred by Tambookies; the staple is lengthy, but the quality is rather coarse. We believe this is the first Kaffrarian growth of the article that has been transmitted to the Colony ..." (103)

The seed and grain that were distributed and the ploughs that were given away were only the final stage in driving a wedge between those who had cultivated and not killed their cattle and those who had participated to one extent or another in the prophecy. The importance of this distinction in creating a group of Xhosa more immediately involved in the adoption of an agricultural and commodity base for domestic production cannot be overemphasised.

There was however an additional avenue of change to which we have already alluded. This was the growth of wage labour both within the Xhosa and Mfengu locations and of course on the Colonial farms in the wake of the mass population exodus after the failure of the prophecies. The growth of labour for wages in cash or in kind, which grew directly out of the cattle-killing further revealed the contradictions which had emerged in the Xhosa social formation. Attention will first be focused on the growth of wage labour within the Xhosa locations by large producers who had not participated in the prophecy, as it is generally less well known and because it holds important theoretical implications for subsequent analysis and discussion.

While the slaughter of cattle was still reaching its height it was reported that people who had found employment hoeing the ground for "Native Christians" were being forced to desist because this was in conflict with Mhlakaza's orders. (104) As the full effects of the crisis were felt, it became apparent that this new relationship was cropping up fairly widely. Inevitably it was amongst the larger concentrations of unbelievers and the Mfengu that it was most prevalent.

Interestingly, the initial appearance of wage labour in Xhosa domestic production was more prevalent amongst the Gqunukwebe of Kama, who were generally a small and not much respected group. Reeve reported:

> "A good number have had their friends registered by me to work, with the understanding that they should receive in some cases a small wage, and in all cases at least their support, but that these would have to work for a given time, and I have explained to the parties making these contracts that I should consider them liable to imprisonment ... if they left their employment without permission ... The number employed is ... perhaps 250 ..." (105)

Such 'wage work' contracts were also encouraged on the mission stations and the effect of the increased labour availability was that:

> "at Mr Sargent's Station alone nearly double the amount of land is already cleared and planted than was under cultivation up to the end of November last. The cultivation is still increasing ..." (106)

When the extensive crops of 1857 came to be harvested in 1858, A.M. Chalmers, who had succeeded Reeve, reported that many:

> "gain a livelihood by working for those whose crops are so plentiful as to require their employing hands to gather them in ..." (107)

Wage labour within the locations for other household production units remained limited. Nevertheless its emergence at this stage must be considered as part of the overall transformation wrought in the aftermath of the cattle-killing. Before going on to consider the far greater extent of wage labour on the farms in the Colony it will be useful briefly to sum up the analysis so far.

Several distinct developments have been outlined that may be regarded as part of the immediate impact of the explosion of the cattle-killing. These developments all tended towards

differentiating types of Xhosa and Mfengu production units in terms of changes in their productive activity and the organisation of production. They were briefly:

1) the growth of the grain trade and the production of marketable surpluses;
2) the sale of cattle and hides and the extensive commercialisation of cattle transactions;
3) the sale of other commodities (e.g. ornaments) which widened the net spread of money transactions within the domestic economy;
4) the adoption of the plough;
5) the increase in the area of land cultivated by those who survived and remained in their locations after the cattle-killing;
6) the adoption of a wider assortment of crops;
7) as a result of the foregoing the emergence of the possibility of hired labour within Xhosa domestic production.

All of these factors working together lead to the conclusion that the development within Xhosa and Mfengu domestic production of new relations of production based on small commodity production and monetary accumulation had begun. There can be no doubt that amongst certain of the Mfengu, the non-believer Xhosa, and on the Mission Stations the conditions were now right for the development of a 'larger farmer' kulak type class. These developments will be considered in Chapter 9 below.

Once again however it is necessary to return to the hard earth of the Ciskei and remind oneself that those on the threshold of this new class formation were but a small minority of the mass of people in the Ciskei. As we saw with the Mfengu, (who have to be considered in relation to the mass of Xhosa without whom their elevated economic position would not have been possible) the total conditions for the development of this new class, which was by no means exclusively Mfengu, must be set within the context of the effects of the cattle-killing upon the mass of households who were impoverished and destroyed in this period.

V The Cattle-Killing - The Experience of Wage Labour and its Effects

The response of the Colonial State to the starvation in the Xhosa locations was to encourage, wherever possible, the mass emigration of the Xhosa to take work on the Colonial farms. The resultant depopulation of the Ciskei was itself the most far-reaching consequence of the cattle-killing. (108)

As a result of the depopulation consequent on the cattle-killing the Xhosa were to lose more land than they had lost in either the 1848 war or the 1853 war. It is therefore particularly important to examine the extent of the depopulation, and its effects on the participants. Ultimately the monetary value of the extended periods of wage labour were more valuable even than the sale of the hides of the cattle, and the collective experience of mass (though temporary) proletarianisation permanently changed the relationship of the Xhosa domestic production unit to the capitalist economy. From then on an element of wage work was to become an increasingly accepted part in the composition of domestic production.

It is in this sense that the cattle-killing laid the foundation for an economic structure based on migrant workers and drew the entire social formation into the sphere of the developing capitalist economy of the Colony. Relationships constituted within the Colonial economy were irreversibly introduced within the Xhosa domestic production unit, so that while it eventually regained and retained its different appearance (huts, cattle kraals, commonage, no fences etc) these basic constituents were held together by economic relationships not originally found within them. Domestic production based on family labour was from then on increasingly a part of a single economic entity, shaped by the growth of the Colonial capitalist economy in its process of transition to a position of dominance over the whole of South Africa.

Like the cattle-killing itself, the movement of Xhosa into the Colony began before the prophecies of Mhlakaza started to have an effect on the Xhosa homesteads. The agricultural season of 1854-56 was a poor one. Drought was prevalent and the effects of certain other minor prophets who preceded Mhlakaza and had prohibited cultivation, all served to restrict the amount of grain harvested in 1856.

The result was an increased interest in opportunities for earning money on the Colonial farms. In May 1856 Reeve reported:

> "Within the last three weeks a great desire has been manifested by the people for work. I attributed this to the cold weather as the demand for blankets is large. Besides this the crops have been but small, which together with the loss of cattle has left many families anxious for employment." (109)

These people often found Colonial employment less than attractive. Reeve received "many just complaints made of the non-payment of wages." (110) Often wages were paid in goats or cattle, which were then confiscated by the Field Cornets in the Colony because the passes of the workers had not been endorsed to certify that the stock was their property.

The large demand for workers was apparent from the beginning of 1856. Some magistrates like Reeve were particular about the contracts they registered, refusing to register contracts in which the wages were too low. Others were less discerning, leading to reports of wages of 15 shillings or a cow for six months work. (111) Reeve noted that the workers going into the Colony at this stage were generally between the ages of 17 and 25 years. He estimated that a "good master" paid 6 shillings and 6 pence to 10 shillings per month. (112)

In terms of a proclamation of September 7th 1855 issued by Grey it was required that:

> "If any person shall employ a native otherwise than as a day labourer, he shall make application to the Commissioner of the location to which the native

> belongs ... No native shall pass into the Colony without a pass issued by the Commissioner of his division at a cost of 1 shilling" (113)

This was the first large scale pass system enforced against the Xhosa and it required the presence of the Colonial State in the Xhosa territory to enforce it. Mfengu, as citizens of the Colony (i.e. British Citizens) were not required to carry such passes and could move freely within the Colony. The racist nature of the system was revealed by the necessity to issue all Mfengu with "Certificates of Citizenship" which they had to carry at all times, the purpose of which was, the Attorney General explained:

> "in substance a pass calculated to prevent the bearer from being apprehended and dealt with as a wandering Kafir ..." (114)

With free movement thus restricted and employment strictly controlled it was possible for the various magistrates to have a good idea of the number of people leaving for employment. However the sheer numbers of Xhosa who left for employment placed a severe strain on the system and, in so far as it was ever intended as a check on abuses by Colonial farmers and other employers, it soon ceased to function as such. In practice farmers would simply write to the magistrate requesting a certain number of workers. The magistrate would form these into a party with others heading in the same direction and send them off on foot under a 'conductor', or in other words, a guard. The guard would see them to the places to which they were to be sent. The 'contractual' formalities were in this way purely administrative measures between the farmer and the magistrate.

A sophistication was introduced into the basic system with the establishment of a "Central Office" for the registration of those proceeding to the Colony for work and for clearing all applications for workers coming from farmers. (115) In each application the prospective employer was to state "the kind of labour required, the terms, both as to wages and length of

service; and whether the wives, or the wives and families can accompany the labourers ..." (116)

Some of the intended workers did not appreciate the benefit of the system:

> "The Kafir servants of Mr Puller brought me three men and one woman to be registered for Mr Walton, upon my asking the parties whether they were willing to go, they said they had been told by the man who came to fetch them that I would be able to tell them what wages they were to receive ... but this was not the case ... they then said they would not go as there was always some difficulty in the Colony if everything was not settled previous to their leaving ..." (117)

There were certainly many others who could not afford to be selective about the conditions under which they entered employment. Inevitably reports were received of labour recruiters simply gathering people together and then distributing them, at a fee, to Colonial farmers. (118)

The Cape Parliament sought to pass a bill (known as the "Kaffir Employment Bill") which would have made it impossible for workers to be indentured for "short periods" of from 1-3 years, only recognising labour contracts of from 3-5 years. Maclean had the sophistication to see the negative consequences of this and actively compaigned against it, arguing that it was:

> "taking advantage of the short term food scarcity, without considering the real conditions prevalent in Kaffraria and the disincentive to labour that this would ultimately come to represent ..." (119)

Some Colonists openly exploited the situation and saw in the destitution of the Xhosa an opportunity for the introduction of scarcely disguised forms of slavery. Eilleen Dowsley writing in 1932 found that:

> "It is true that to-day some of the aged Natives in the Transkei tell how, as children, they were taken

to Graaff-Reinet, put up to auction and sold". (120)

The matter was raised in the columns of the 'Argus' and freely debated, some in favour of such 'altruistic' acts and others against this trafficking. Grey acknowledged that labour recruiters were guilty of abuses, especially one Mr Hart who took "inhabitants of Kaffraria into the Colony as labourers disposing afterwards of their labour under some system of bargaining for the same ..." (121) There were many others who evaded the system of registration and passes. Mullins reported "Boers coming into the district (Gcalekaland near Butterworth) and hiring as much as 50 people at once ..." (122)

The real 'champion' of Colonial employment for the Xhosa was not Maclean but Richard Southey. (123) He wrote to Maclean:

> "The Civil Commissioner of Albany has at the present time applications from his own and neighbouring divisions for about 6 000 Kafir servants of both sexes. More than he can or has been able to supply ..." (124)

Southey was particularly enthusiastic about the big demand that existed even for children and the aged:

> "There appears to be scarcely any limit to the demand for them in all parts of the Colony ... all that you can forward will meet ready employment at fair remuneration ..." (125)

This assessment of the willingness of Colonial employers to take on children was soon confirmed when such applications began arriving on Maclean's desk in large numbers:

> "The Civil Commissioner for Swellendam states that 800 to 1 000 workers would find immediate employment, especially juveniles, boys and girls from the age of 10 to 15 years ..." (126)

How 'fair' the remuneration was is unclear. What was so significant in the mass exodus into Colonial employment was its forced character. Xhosa had long resisted working on the Colonial farms because the wages were unattractive compared to the possibilities for obtaining cash through trade. The demand for

labour had existed in the Colony for many years and the shortage of labour had been a factor holding up the development of Colonial agriculture. However, the demand had been at a rate of pay that could not compete with alternative sources for obtaining cash. Now people were forced to accept these wages en masse. Before the cattle-killing, wages of 10 shillings per month were fairly common. Now they dropped to half that. By mid-1857 the rate of pay for adult males was registered as 5 shillings per month plus food and for females 2 shillings plus food. Children were to receive 2 shillings and 6 pence per month, plus food, for boys and 2 shillings, plus food, for girls. (127)

In early 1856, before the cattle-killing had any effect on employment the Rev. Dacre thought that low wages were the main reason for the labour shortage:

> "the unwillingness of the colonists to pay a fair amount of wages to a black man (the result perhaps of the old slave system, which led colonists to regard the Native as a mere beast whom they were to catch and work) together with too often defrauding the Native of his due ..." were cited as the main reasons." (128)

It was not that wage rates or labour conditions changed, but it was compulsion on the Xhosa that forced them to accept the conditions of employment offered in the Colony because of the collapse of the domestic economy.

Mhlakaza in his prophecies and associated injunctions specifically forbade the taking of employment in the Colony - unity was essential to the prophecies. As we have seen he also forbade working for other Xhosa or Mfengu. Such work was an obvious sign of disbelief and doubt, which was the worst threat to the fulfilment of prophecies. (129) Mhlakaza apart, the chiefs themselves were very unhappy about the growing likelihood of a massive efflux of people to the Colony. Most deaths due to starvation took place in June-July because of the opposition of chiefs to the dispersion of their people into the Colony. (130)

Sarhili was in fact trying to get those who had left for the Colony to return. As will be seen later this is of the utmost significance in unravelling the intentions and motivations behind the cattle-killing. The dispersal of people was more of a threat to the chiefs than was even the loss of the cattle. Because of the expectations of the fulfilment of the prophecies many people held out against taking work for as long as they could. In the first months of 1857 the supply of labour from the Xhosa locations could not meet the demand. Even Brownlee could not find 250 men to work on public works. As a result, stated Capt. Roberts, "farmers cannot get labourers under the usual wages ..." (131)

As an incentive to take work Maclean authorised that those who registered for work should be fed at state expense. (132) However, such relief, while it probably kept many from dying of starvation, was not necessary as an inducement to labour as by the time it was introduced the effects of food scarcity had set in. From late July the number seeking work became a veritable flood. Brownlee reported:

> "Want amongst those who have destroyed their cattle has now arrived at the highest pitch" (133)

When those still remaining at their kraals were asked why they did not go into the Colony for employment:

> "some replied that they did not know how to work and were afraid ... they would be beaten by their masters, others replied in the most apathetic manner, that there was no help for them, and if they died they died, while some stated that they were already too weak to travel ..." (134)

As the Colonial officials only distributed aid to those who registered for work, many people simply died in their kraals. There was for example Qola. He arrived at the Döhne, where Brownlee had his office. Brownlee wished to send him into the Colony to work but he replied that he had never been in service and that he would rather die of starvation than go into service and be beaten. He returned to his kraal and died there. (135)

Two months later Brownlee estimated that:

> "on an average four have died at each kraal." (136)

He regarded this estimate as being conservative, the real number being certainly higher than that. By October he reported:

> "From Butterworth Drift to the Thomas River all the country on each side of the Kei is now uninhabited, with the exception of a kraal here and there containing a few individials who cannot long continue to drag out the miserable existence they now lead ..." (137)

VI The Extent of Depopulation of the Xhosa Locations - A Consideration of the Census Data

The 1848 Census revealed 1 090 homesteads (kraals) in the Nqgika district and 2 709 homesteads in the Ndlambe district, a total of 3 799 homesteads. (138) On Brownlee's estimate of four deaths per homestead this would mean that approximately 15 196 people had died of starvation as a result of belief in the prophecies. Admittedly the 1848 census did not represent the total Xhosa population of the Ciskei. Many people had not yet returned from their places of refuge at the end of the war. It found 61 855 people in the Ngqika and Ndlambe groups together. Writing shortly after the census was taken Brownlee and Maclean estimated that 70 000 was closer to the actual population. (139)

Taking an average of 16.29 people in each homestead there would have been an additional 498 homesteads if the estimated population of 70 000 is accepted. The total number of homesteads would have been 4 297. Allowing four deaths per homestead the maximum death toll would then have been 17 188. This estimate of the total number who died is very much more realistic than that given in some sources which indicate 22 000 deaths. (140)

In examining the impact of the cattle-killing on Xhosa homestead size and population it is worth observing that many homesteads

contained far fewer than the average of 16.29 people. 25% of the 1 090 Ngqika homesteads had less than 13 people in them. However the bulk of the population lived in the larger homesteads. In the Ngqika district 12 330 people, or 46.7% of the total Ngqika population, lived in homesteads with over 32 people in them. The weighting of the population in the larger homesteads accounts for the high average number of people per homestead. The Grahamstown Journal and other Colonial lobbies for agricultural interests probably wished to exaggerate the number of deaths in order to provide evidence in support of their claim for further grants of Xhosa land on the ground of its permanent depopulation.

Between 1st January and 30th April 1857, 5 093 people officially entered Colonial service. The main districts to which they were sent were Somerset East (1 064), Victoria (684), Fort Beaufort (559) and Queenstown (455). (141) Between 1st May and 31st July a further 3 615 adult males, 3 599 adult females, 3 391 boys and 3 444 girls, (a total of 14 049) were registered for service. (142) The combined total to the end of July was in fact 19 239 (there were discrepancies in the figures for the first period). The largest outflow of people was in April and May. Lucas, in Maqoma's location, observed that during April he sent 673 people to the Central Office in King William's Town and a further 963 in May (143). Between August 1857 and January 1858 a further 9 826 Xhosa were sent into service. (144) This gave a total number of workers in the Colony of 29 065.

Of the 4 328 workers sent to the key agricultural districts of Alexandria, Albert, Bedford, Fort Beaufort, Richmond, Peddie and Victoria (for which statistics are available) in the period 1857-58, 56.1% went on 1 year contracts, 10.3% on 2 year contracts, 12.1% for 3 years, 2.9% for 4 years and 18.9% for 5 years. (145) The number of workers who were indentured for 5 years is important. They would have had a greater chance to accumulate stock and would clearly become more integrated with wage work than those on a one year contract. The significance of workers who stayed for a relatively long time on the Colonial farms should be emphasised. They were to prove to be the key to

the reacquisition of stock by many Xhosa households impoverished by the cattle-killing. Approximately 19% (or 5 500) of the 29 000 workers contracted stayed on the farms for a period of 5 years.

Nevertheless those on one year contracts were in a large majority. These people clearly intended to work only as a way of tiding them over until the 1858-59 planting season, when they would return to their homesteads (where this was possible). Despite these qualifications the diminishment of population was large and many homesteads were never able to re-establish themselves. It is important to gain some idea of how many homesteads were likely to have been destroyed, and how many in fact survived while only some of their members participated in wage work. Because of the large scale loss of land that followed the cattle-killing particularly for the Ndlambe, who lost land around East London, and the Gcaleka, it is imporant to dispel the idea put out by the Colonists that the land was empty.

If, as our analysis from the sources suggests, 29 000 entered the Colony in search of employment and 17 000 died this would make a total diminution of population of 46 000 in 1857-58. It will be useful to compare this calculation with the offical reports of the number of people remaining in the Ciskei, revealed in the various censuses called for by the Colonial State in 1857 and 1858 to investigate the extent of the decrease in population.

The offical census estimate of the numer of people in British Kaffraria on the 1st January 1857, before the massive efflux began, was 104 721 comprising 3 842 kraals. (146) This drastic increase in the probable population over the 1848 figure of 70 000 can be accounted for in a variety of ways. (147) One reason is that a large number of Gcaleka, who were not included in the 1848 census because they lived outside British Kaffraria, had moved into Mhalla's location in the intervening years, which could account for the over 100% increase in that area. In addition Kama had returned from his exile in the Queenstown district to British Kaffraria as part of the peace settlement of 1853. This accounted

for a part of the 12 938 people living in his location in January 1857.

These two factors can account for only a part of the 34 721 increase in population over 1848 claimed by the census. Suspicion that the total population claimed for British Kaffraria in January 1857 was inflated is increased by the fact that the number of homesteads in that census was stated as 3 842 which is an increase of only 43 homesteads over the 3 799 revealed in the 1848 census itself and is actually 455 homesteads less than the 4 297 that we estimated must have existed if a population of 70 000 in 1848 is accepted. This discrepancy between the large increase in population claimed in the 1857 estimates and the small increase in the number of homesteads suggests some deliberate over-estimation on the part of the Colonial Officials.

In comparing these results with those obtained on the 31st July 1857 after the main efflux of population, the number of homesteads is shown to have dropped to 1 725 and the population to 37 399, from the population of 104 721 in January of that year. This indicates a decrease of 67 328 or 62.5% in the total population. However it must be remembered that we could account for only a 46 000 decrease in population based on a scrutiny of the original returns of the number who went into the Colony and Brownlee's estimate of the number who died per homestead.

Allowing a maximum possible decrease of 50 000 people through death and migration, the decrease of 67 328 claimed by the Colonial State would still leave 17 328 unaccounted for.

It is a possibility that some of this number could have gone to Thembuland or to other Transkeian chiefdoms as refugees. However, it is unlikely that the discrepancy could be explained in this way. There is no evidence of such a migration having occurred and the arrival of 17 000 refugees in any Transkeian chiefdom would certainly have aroused some comment. The most likely explanation remains an attempt on the part of the Colonial Officials to overstate the extent of the depopulation of the territory.

This is further suggested by looking at the decrease in the number of homesteads over this period. It was observed that in 1848 there were probably 4 297 homesteads, each with an average of 16 people. The census estimate of January 1857 claimed a population of 104 721 people living in 3 842 homesteads. This would have meant an average of 27.25 people per homestead. This is a dramatic increase, and whilst land pressure had been increasing there can be little doubt that this was actually the result of the inflated population estimate. By July 1857, according to the official census, the population had decreased by 62.5% to 37 339. The number of homesteads is stated as having decreased by only 44.89% to 1 725. The number of people per homestead was then 21.6.

The relatively much smaller decrease in the number of homesteads compared to the large decrease in the number of people shown in the two official censuses of January and June 1857, is entirely what would be expected. The head of a homestead would, wherever possible, have tried to retain some presence at the site of the homestead in the hope of re-establishing it in the future. If the number of homesteads declined by 44% then over 55% of the homesteads in British Kaffraria were still occupied <u>after</u> the worst outflow of people had occurred.

It must be remembered that the figures presented for the population of British Kaffraria in January 1857 were <u>not</u> the result of a census taken at that time. They were purely retrospective estimates drawn up in response to Maclean's demand for such information in August 1857. There was thus ample time for the Colonial State to discover that in their weakened state the Xhosa could no longer resist, and that large tracts of the land could safely be taken from them. To justify this, the State wished to create the impression that the land was 'empty'.

The Colonial press took up the theme with a vengeance. The Grahamstown Journal (quoting the Rev. Birt who was actually actively opposed to grabbing any land at Xhosa expense), claimed that 50 000 had died of starvation and 40 000 entered into

service! It strongly defended the occupation of the "vacated territory" by "needy, industrious Englishmen". (148) In fact as has been shown the territory was far from empty, even if calculations are based on the suspect official censuses.

However, if we revise the official figures in accordance with more reliable estimates a clearer picture of the extent of depopulation emerges. If an average of 20 people per homestead is assumed and 4 000 homesteads are allowed, the total population in January 1857 may be put at approximately 80 000. The decrease of population to approximately 37 697 by the end of June 1867, would then be 42 303, a figure much closer to the actual number, (46 000) that are known to have left British Kaffraria for the Colony or who had died up to the end of 1857. The population decrease of 52.8% indicates a fair picture of the proportion of the population permanently or temporarily displaced by the cattle-killing. Nearly 50% of the population remained. A great many of the migrants were known to be on short contracts and due to return after only one year. The 17 000 dead represented 21.25% of the likely population as at January 1857. In such circumstances the country could not reasonbly be regarded as 'vacant' or 'empty'.

The next census estimates were given in December 1857. (149) From this it can be seen that the number of homesteads had further declined to 1 291. However the total population had increased slightly from 37 229 to 37 697. This had the effect of increasing the number of people per homestead from 21.5 to 29.1 This was caused by the influx of refugees into the locations of Siwani and Kama, the leading non-believer chiefs. Since July there had been an efflux of 5 311 people, mainly from the Gqunukwebe location and from the Ngqika under Oba and Anta. This would account for the decreased number of homesteads combined with the increased size of the remaining homesteads. Population was being redistributed from small homesteads to larger ones.

This increasing concentration of people in larger homesteads is of some importance. It was caused in the first instance by many

people who were destitute joining homesteads of those who had not believed in the prophet. Its subsequent effect must have been to increase the intensity of exploitation within the domestic production unit and encourage the breaking up of larger areas of ground for cultivation. This would therefore also have been an inducement for the production of crops for the market, although such production would not have been an indication of 'prosperity'; it would be a result of the impoverishment of many homesteads and their inability to persist as independent production units. This finding belies Brownlee's observation that:

> "As a rule in famine the poorer classes are those who suffer the most, but in this case there was no difference between the highest and lowest" (150)

Although many leading members of the patriarchal establishment in the Xhosa locations died of starvation, there does seem to have been a tendency for the large homesteads to persist, sometimes on an increased scale but most often much reduced in size. Smaller homesteads, by contrast, broke up and were extinguished.

The other major area of employment, apart from the Colonial farms, was on the Government sponsored works which were begun in 1855. In this area there was a dramatic increase in the number of men employed. In January 1857 there were 591 men employed on seven projects: the Thomas River watercourse and 6 road-building projects. (151) At the height of the expectations for the fulfilment of the prophecies the number employed fell to 493. In April it had increased to 1 194 and additional projects were begun, such as the building of a "Native Hospital" at King William's Town. The number of employed finally peaked by the end of July at 2 105 employed on 19 projects.

The rate of pay on the works had been reduced to 4 pence per day since 1857 on Brownlee's initiative:

> "I think a reduction in the rate of pay necessary that the people may see that they are the losers in

> consequence of strikes and further that we may be enabled to employ more men than we could at the present rate." (152)

As in the agricultural sector, the influx of labour for short term employment on the public works had a depressing effect on wages. Before the cattle-killing Mfengu seeking work were shunning the Government works because they were able to achieve wages of 1 shilling and 6 pence to 2 shillings and 6 pence per day working for farmers or in the towns for shopkeepers. (153)

From the total amount of employment generated as a result of the cattle-killing it can be seen that a massive monetarisation of the Xhosa economy was occurring in which every household was affected. While the immediate impact of the cattle-killing was enormous, its long term 'fall-out' was of even greater consequence. It has already been indicated how the response to the food shortages created the conditions for the emergence of a larger farming class. In the aftermath of the cattle-killing almost all the important elements that were to shape the future development of domestic production were introduced. In subsequent chapters we will examine the manner in which the different trends in commodity production, the differentiation of household production units and wage labour developed from this point.

(1) Bundy, C. The Emergence of a South African Peasantry. Heinemann, (1979) p. 51.

(2) G.H. 8/24, Audit Office Cape Town, Statement of Hut Tax derived from Fingoes in each Division of the Colony from 1849, 17th November 1854.

(3) Cathcart, Sir G. Correspondence. London (1856) p. 302.

(4) Government Notice, King William's Town. 8th March 1853.

(5) Du Toit, A.E. The Cape Frontier - A Study of Native Policy with Special Reference to the Years 1847-1866. Archive Year Book (1854) p. 82.

(6) Moyer, R.A. 'The History of the Mfengu of the Eastern Cape 1815 - 1865.'. Unpub. Phd. Thesis, S.O.A.S. (1976) p. 223 and p. 391.

(7) B.K. 24, Ayliff to Maclean, 16th June 1856.

(8) Ibid. In 1855 of an expected revenue of 600 pounds only 400 pounds were obtained.

(9) Moyers, R.A. op.cit. p. 232.

(10) Ibid. p. 391.

(11) G.H. 8/24, Census of Fingoes Residing in the District of Peddie, 31st July 1854.

(12) Each man may be taken as representing a married man and equal to one household. The number of 'men' may tend to be overinflated because some single men may be counted amonst them. The advantage of this census is that 'children over the age of 16' are counted separately thus reducing the possibility that a large number of single adult males are included among the 'men'.

(13) See Chapter 1 above for a full treatment of the mode of production in the Xhosa social formation.

(14) B.K. 90, Memo by Sir George Grey, "Estimated Costs of outfit for a farm in British Kaffraria", 15th December 1856.

(15) B.K. 90, Brownlee to Maclean, 17th August 1854.

(16) Ibid.

(17) G.H. 8/23, Ayliff to Maclean, 1st July 1854.

(18) B.K. 24, Ayliff to Maclean, 16th June 1856.

(19) G.H, 8/27, Statistical Returns of Fingoe Locations in the Divisions of Victoria, Fort Beaufort and Queenstown. July 1855.

(20) Excluding Lovedale Mission Station, where the number of cattle was even lower.

(21) In Table 4 (i), (ii) and (iii). The locations of Booy Fusha, Katangana, Slinga and Jan Ragwa were all located on the Fort Beaufort commonage. Table 4 (ii) reveals the limited extent of land cultivated by these households because the other residents objected to their encroachment on the commonage. As it was, they occupied 137 acres of pasturage for fields alone.

(22) B.K. 65, R. Taylor to Maclean, 21st August 1853.

(23) B.K. 24, Ayliff to Maclean, 16th June 1856.

(24) B.K. 24, Maclean to Grey, 17th July 1856.

(25) Ibid.

(26) Ibid.

(27) B.K. 90, Vela and Ubota to Maclean, 30th July 1856.

(28) B.K. 24, Maclean to Grey, 17th July 1856.

(29) B.K. 90, Ross to Maclean, 15th July 1856.

(30) B.K. 24, Ayliff to Maclean, 5th August 1856.

(31) G.H. 8/32, Rev. Dacre to Maclean, 17th May 1857.

(32) Ibid.

(33) Grahamstown Journal, 20th December 1856.

(34) Frontier Colonists were still nervous about the possibilities of a Xhosa alliance with the Mfengu. This possibility had been briefly explored between them in 1854. See Chapter 5 above.

(35) Grahamstown Journal, 11th October 1856.

(36) G.H. 8/29, Vol II. Reeve to Maclean, 27th September 1856.

(37) Grahamstown Journal, 27th December 1856.

(38) King William's Town Gazette, Grey to Maclean, November 1856.

(39) Ibid.

(40) C.O. 2951, Vol IV, Secretary to Lt. Governor to the Colonial Secretary, 21st July 1857.

(41) Table compiled from CO 2948/49/50, Secretary to the Lt. Governor, Letters Received, Verity to the Colonial Secretary, July to December 1857.

(42) CO 2950, Tainton to Southey December to March 1858. 1 Muid equals 180 lbs. A muid was a conventional measure still in use in the Cape throughout most of the 19th century. 1 Muid = 4 Schepls., 5 Schepls = 3 Imperial Bushels. 3 Imperial Bushels = 60 lbs. See Cape of Good Hope Blue Books 1860. Money, Accounts, Weights, Measures; Corn Measures Definitions p 5.

(43) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 1st April 1857.

(44) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 3rd April 1857.

(45) See Chapter 5 above.

(46) King William's Town Gazette and Border Intelligencer, 25th April 1857.

(47) This total includes 810 lbs of beans delivered to the market in July, November and December which realised a total of 7 pounds and 12 shillings.

(48) B.K. 29, Tainton to Maclean, 29th October 1857.

(49) B.K. 89, Tainton to Maclean, 20th October 1957.

(50) B.K. 24, Campbell to Maclean, 4th June 1856. The new Superintendent of the Crown Reserve reported in one instance 22 bags of corn weighing 4 595 lbs were sent from Keiskamma Hoek to King William's Town. See Campbell to Maclean.

(51) C.O. 2948/49/50/, Verity to Colonial Secretary, July-December 1857. Tainton to Southey, December - March 1858.

(52) C.O. 3026 and C.O. 3163, Census of Fort Beaufort and Healdtown Mfengu 1861 and 1869.

(53) This is of course an underestimate as many houses, especially those with ploughs, and polygamous households had more than this under cultivation.

(54) B.K. 91, Lt. Lucas to Maclean, 26th August 1857.

(55) B.K. 2, Chalmers to Maclean, October 1858.

(56) See Chapter 9 below for the full story of post Cattle-Killing population movements.

(57) See Chapter 5 above.

(58) Grahamstown Journal, 2nd October 1856.

(59) Grahamstown Journal, 11th October 1856.

(60) B.K. 23/86, Reeve to Maclean, 30th September 1857.

(61) G.H. 8/29, Vol II, Gawler to Maclean, 25th July 1856.

(62) G.H. 8/31, Vigne to Maclean, 1st February 1857; Brownlee to Maclean, 2nd February 1857.

(63) See also Chapter 7.

(64) King William's Town Gazette and Border Intelligencer, 14th August 1856.

(65) Ibid.

(66) Ibid., Report from Herbert Vigne, 4th September 1856.

(67) Ibid., November 13th 1856.

(68) Grahamstown Journal, 13th September 1856.

(69) Grey, Sir G. Correspondence, Grey to Labauchere 3rd October 1856, after a report from Mr Scott to Ayliff, 25th September 1856. pp. 148-49.

(70) Scott's figures include the total of hides exported from the beginning of 1854. As has been indicated there was in this period a large upswing in trading activity and a large amount of money was spent by Xhosa in the stores at King William's Town and elsewhere. By 1857 when the market sales at Line Drift etc began much of this money had already been spent.

(71) Grey, Sir G. op.cit. p. 149.

(72) Grahamstown Journal, Brownlee to Maclean, 13th November 1856.

(73) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 5th August 1856.

(74) G.H. 8/29, Vol II, Gawler to Maclean, 14th July 1856.

(75) G.H. 8/29, Vol III, Vigne to Maclean, 19th July 1856.

(76) G.H. 8/29, Vol II, Brownlee to Maclean, 8th July 1856.

(77) B.K. 90, Rev. Waters to Maclean, 14th October 1856.

(78) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Lamont to Maclean, 13th August 1856.

(79) G.H. 8/32, Port of East London. Returns of exports for the period 1st January to 30th April 1857, compiled by Matthew Jennings.

(80) G.H. 8/32, Vol III, Port of East London. Returns of Exports for the period 1st May to 30th June 1857, Customs House, East London.
30 873 hides weighing 1 543 650 lbs. would allow an average weight of 50 lbs. per hide. Contemporary evidence from tanners confirms that an average cow hide weighs 30 kgs (66 lbs) and an ox hide up to 40 kgs. (50 lbs).

(81) G.H. 8/32, Vol II, Reeve to Maclean, 15th June 1857.

(82) G.H. 8/31, Capt. Fraser to Major Douglas, 24th February 1857.

(83) C.O. 6155, Returns of the 1848 Census of the Xhosa. All references to the Census of 1848 are to this volume.

(84) B.K. 23/71, Brownlee to Maclean, 20th July 1857.

(85) King William's Town Gazette, 7th February 1857.

(86) Ibid. 7th March 1857.

(87) B.K. 89, Statement made to Maclean, 5th February 1857.

(88) B.K. 91, Rev. Keyser to Maclean, 25th June 1857.

(89) B.K. 24, Ayliff to Maclean, 28th March 1857. See also G.H. 8/32. Reeve to Maclean, 4th June 1857.

(90) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 30th September 1857.

(91) Grahamstown Journal, Brownlee to Maclean, 5th August 1856.

(92) B.K. 82, Lucas to Maclean, 25th August 1856.

(93) B.K. 82, This observation shows that the trade in grain was not only between Mfengu and Xhosa, but also between Xhosa who had grain and those who had none.

(94) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 11th August 1857.

(95) Ibid.

(96) Ibid. Brownlee to Maclean, 21st July 1857.

(97) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 11th September 1858.

(98) C.O. 2948, Vol I, Tainton to Southey, 5th October 1857.

(99) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 12th October 1858.

(100) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 20th July 1857.

(101) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 1st September 1858.

(102) G.H. 8/32, Gawler to Maclean, 8th June 1857. See also ibid., Vigne to Maclean, 25th July 1857.

(103) King William's Town Gazette and Border Intelligencer, 3rd January 1857.

(104) G.H. 8/341, Brownlee to Maclean, 31st December 1856.

(105) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 30th September 1857.

(106) Ibid.

(107) B.K. 86, Chalmers to Maclean, 11th April 1858.

(108) Kingon, J.L. 'The Economics of East Coast Fever', The Christian Express, Vol. XLV, (1915), pp. 152-153, and Vol. XLVI, (1916). p. 10. Kingon stresses the effect of the cattle-killing on redistributing the population.

(109) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 7th May 1856.

(110) Ibid.

(111) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 4th June 1856.

(112) Ibid.

(113) Laws and Regulations of British Kaffraria. Cape Town (1869). Proclamation, 7th September 1855.

(114) C.O. 2948, Opinion of the Attorney General, 16th January 1858.

(115) British Kaffrarian Government Notice, King William's Town, 7th November 1856.

(116) Ibid.

(117) B.K. 80, Edye to Maclean, 11th January 1858.

(118) B.K. 2, Taylor to Maclean, 19th April 1858.

(119) Cape Annexures. A.H. 16, 1857. Maclean's Reply to the Committee's proposal. 30th May 1857.

(120) Dowsley, E.D. 'An Investigation into the Circumstances Relating to the Cattle Killing Delusion in Kaffraria 1856-1857.', Unpublished MA thesis UNISA 1932. p. 46. Statement by "Seeko Nqamnqa" in possession of the author.

(121) Ibid. p. 46. Quotes letter of Travers to Maclean, 19th April 1858.

(122) Mullin's Diary, Sunday 21st 1857. Cory Library unpublished Manuscript. Typescript kindly supplied by Prof. N. Charton.

(123) Widely believed to have been responsible for the death of Hintsa.

(124) A.H. 15, 1857, Southey to Maclean, 30th May 1857.

(125) Ibid.

(126) B.K. 7, Rawson to Maclean, 9th July 1857.

(127) G. 39, Return of numbers employed. King William's Town, 20th May 1657.

(128) Dowsley, E.D. op.cit. p. 123.

(129) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 1st May 1857.

(130) G.H. 8/32, Maclean to Capt. Travers, 5th July 1857.

(131) Ibid.

(132) G.H. 8/32, Maclean Circular of 10th June 1857.

(133) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 20th July 1857.

(134) Ibid.

(135) Brownlee, C. Reminiscences of Kafir Life and History. Lovedale, (1916). p. 156.

(136) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 1st Ocotber 1857.

(137) Ibid.

(138) C.O. 6155, Census of the Xhosa, 1848.

(139) Imperial Blue Books, August 1857, pp. 42-43.

(140) Burton, A.W. Sparks From the Border Anvil, King William's Town (1950) p. 74. Burton claims 22 000 deaths and 30 000 cattle killed.

(141) G39, Return dated King William's Town, 20th May 1857.

(142) Ibid. Government Notice Number 265, 1857.

(143) B.K. 82, Lucas to Maclean, 30th May 1857.

(144) A.H., Vol 22 of 1858.

(145) Ibid.

(146) G 5 1858, Statement of Probable Number of Kraals, Population and Firearms in British Kaffraria as on 1st January and 31st July 1857, as requested per circular of Chief Commissioner. 1st August 1857.

(147) It must be remembered that the 1848 census was a physical count with a detailed census roll. These later census figures are purely 'eyeball' counts or estimates.

(148) Grahamstown Journal, 24th July 1858.

(149) B.K. 70, Population Returns British Kaffraria 1857, Ft. Murry. 1st January 1858.

(150) Brownlee, C. op.cit. p. 156.

(151) G.H. 8/31, Returns of Public Works. n.d. 1857.

(152) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 21st January 1857.

(153) B.K. 24, Ayliff to Maclean, 13th March 1856.

CHAPTER 7

THE FINAL STAGE OF RESISTANCE - JUNE 1856 TO 1863

I The Conjuncture within the Chiefdoms

The growth of monetary transactions in the period up to 1857, and their relationship to poverty, dispossession of land, cattle sickness and wage labour has been examined. We also briefly mentioned the great ideological and political crisis that the peace settlement of 1853 and the system subsequently imposed by Grey induced. It is now possible to examine this crisis in greater detail.

The response to Grey's initiatives has to be seen at two levels. First there was the response of the different chiefs to the immediate issue of the arrival of magistrates and the receipt of regular payments. Secondly there was the more complex response of the mass of homesteads to the entire process of the dissolution of the powers of the chief and the old relationship which they had enjoyed with the chief and his councillors. This second level is, for us, the more important and indeed it serves as the critical context in which the actions of the chiefs must be judged. Again it will be found that the responses of the chiefs form one of the main surviving guides to the conditions and sentiments of the homesteads.

There can be no doubt that poverty and the economic crisis of the chieftaincy favoured the introduction of Grey's plans. Both Maclean and Brownlee were sceptical of Grey's intentions. Faced with his blind determination they had to proceed as cautiously as they could. Maclean maintained his view that the reversal of the Cathcart policy, granting internal autonomy to the chiefs, would lead to war. Maclean's assessment was again reiterated in early 1855 when he wrote:

> "I have seen no reasons to alter the opinions I expressed ... previously as to the general expectations of war among the Kaffirs generally and as to the war designs of many among them, and especially among the Chiefs ..." (1)

Maclean actually understood that the interventions of Stockenstroom and Stretch with the chiefs (in encouraging them to await the arrival of Grey to press their land claims on the new Governor) had in fact bought time for the Colonial State.(2) As to the implementation of Grey's plans it was, in Maclean and Brownlee's view, only the favourable conjuncture determined by the ravages of the lung-sickness amongst the cattle that made the chiefs interested in the schemes. The lung-sickness was without doubt the 'thin edge of the wedge'.

> "... for while this lasts it will be useless for the Chiefs to endeavour to revive a war spirit, and the losers of property will be more disposed to labour and hire themselves out and thus a beginning be made - and the wedge introduced - but we must not be too sanguine on the <u>immediate</u> effect of this loss in changing the Kaffirs from a pastoral to an agricultural people, the habits and peculiarities which lead them to be cattle herders, are of several centuries growth ..."(3)

To which assessment Brownlee added:

> "Before the Kaffirs will accept of Sir George Grey's plans there must be a revolution both in their circumstances and sentiments." (4)

Maclean had certainly pinpointed a key aspect of the process of dissolution of the old mode of production: that the traditional mechanisms of accumulation and the social, ideological and political relationships which regulated them could no longer withstand the pressure of a new world of accumulations, one which was based on wage labour, commodities and money. He was also aware, however, that the incorporation of some measure of these elements of the capitalist mode of production does not overnight

turn every Xhosa into a capitalist frontiersman or a proletarian. On the contrary, those social, ideological and political relationships of the old mode of production that survive and are incorporated into the new structure exercise a crucial power in shaping the form in which the elements of the capitalist mode of production are assimilated.

The 'revolution' was to come in the shape of the cattle-killing movement. One of the spurs to the cattle-killing movement was the introduction of the magistrates themselves. The acceptance of the magistrates by the chiefs was induced by necessity, yet, far from answering to the needs of the chiefs, it forced them to look for ever more desperate solutions to their plight.

Lt. Reeve and Captain Gawler were seconded from the army for appointment as magistrates in August 1855. At this stage the full nature of the plans for surrendering to the Colonial State their internal autonomy and the right to operate their own court, had not yet been made known to the chiefs. The first disclosures to the chiefs were made unofficially in September 1855. At a chance meeting at Döhne, Brownlee informed Sandille that the Governor was anxious "for the better government of the people" and that he was to give them salaries, "that the Chiefs should not derive their revenues from fines and confiscations." (5) Maqoma was first informed in a similar way.

Sandille's only immmediate reaction was to enquire whether Tola, Xoxo and Oba would also receive salaries, as otherwise they would be "a tax on his income, while he had so many brothers and councillors that he would find it difficult to supply them all from the allowance ..." (6)

On the 9th October Maclean officially informed Sandille of the proposals. He was to receive 96 pounds per annum personally and a further 180 pounds to be distributed among the councillors who assisted him in his duties. In return he was to continue to administer justice within the tribe, but all fines imposed by his court had to be surrendered to the Colonial State. All cases

could go on appeal to the magistrate appointed to reside with them. (7)

It was decided to take the matter back for further discussion before any decision was given. Before communicating these views Sandille did manage to query with Maclean the honesty of Grey's proposals, enquiring "why if Sir George Grey could change what Sir George Cathcart had conceded to them [in regard to internal autonomy J.L.] why can he not change what the former Governor had done with regard to land, and restore their country to them ..." (8)

At the same time similar announcements were made amongst Ndlambe chiefs under Mhalla. At once the internal divisions amongst the chiefs came into play with various attempts being made to secure sectional interests. The first communications accepting Grey's terms came from those chiefs who had most actively collaborated with the Colonial State; Kama, Pato and Siwani. Siwani acted with particular alacrity because most judicial cases had,in any event, been going to his brother Seyolo's court. (9)

One particular point of concern among the chiefs was the case of fines imposed for homicide or murder. These cases were of particular ideological significance and the ability of the chief to decide on them was symbolic of his power over his followers. The Colonial State accepted Mhalla's demand for some control over such "blood-fines" and it was agreed that, as heretofore, fines imposed in such cases would go to the injured party, widows or children rather than to the Colonial State. (10) With that agreed, Mhalla accepted his magistrate and Major Gawler was seconded to reside in Ndlambe territory.

The chiefs were undoubtedly aware of the implications of accepting salaries and it is most likely that they were motivated by economic necessity, by the pressures that were every day crowding in on them, demanding that they perform the functions of a chief as the Xhosa had always understood and expected it, or make way for that greater power that then hung over them all.

How far chiefs were prepared to go in projecting a situation of economic need amongst their followers is illustrated by an incident during Grey's visit to the frontier in late 1855.

Sandille met Grey at Döhne on the 17th September. Brownlee reported that the following exchange took place between them:

> "Sandille came alone to Grey and stated he was greatly in need ... He stated that he needed money, blankets and buttons for four of Sandille's wives, who had new cloaks, but who had no buttons to put on them ..." (11)

This private appeal should not be taken literally. It does indicate that the chiefs were caught in the grip of a scarcity of appropriable surpluses so acute that any solutions - even that offered by Grey which was a surrender of all the concessions won by the 1850 - 53 war, were worth it to them.

In early December Maqoma sent to Sandille saying:

> "Sandille has acted well in receiving the Governor's proposal. I am also willing to receive it. But does Sandille understand what he is about to do? Hitherto we have been British subjects in name, henceforth we will be subjects in truth. Is Sandille prepared to meet the Governor at all times, and in all places; is he willing now to meet the Governor in Grahams Town? After he has once received the Governor's money, he must no longer talk of his fears, but must obey in everything. Does Sandille know that the English over the water are at war? Is he prepared to go with his men and help the English, if asked to do so? I am ready. Let Sandille well consider what he is doing. Let him not be tempted by the money, and afterwards become a liar to the Government." (12)

Sandille was the most reluctant of all the chiefs in his acceptance of the salaries. He was influenced by the opposition of senior councillors, amongst them Soga and Holo. Maqoma's actions are somewhat more difficult to understand. It seems as if he wished to push Sandille into refusing to accept the system, but fully intended accepting it himself, possibly with a view to ousting Sandille as chief of the Ngqika. In all events his aim certainly remained to free himself as much as possible from Sandille's authority and attract as many followers to himself as he could. In December Maqoma was conspicuously absent from a meeting of chiefs convened by Sandille which decided to accept Grey's scheme provided only that Brownlee was appointed as the magistrate. (13)

The reason for Maqoma not being present at the meeting soon became clear. In January 1856 he held a private meeting with Maclean at which he argued very strongly for being allowed a separate magistrate other than Brownlee. This fact became the key question in the power struggle between Sandille and Maqoma.

Whilst Sandille wanted the maximum number of chiefs to receive salaries so that they should not be a burden to him, he wanted the minimum number of magistrates (14). He also realised that Brownlee was considerably more accommodating than any new and untried representative of Colonial authority that might be imposed on them. For Maqoma, on the other hand, every incentive existed for seeing a proliferation of magistrates, as this weakened Sandille's position.

Maqoma made it clear to Maclean that while he desired to be paid he also desired to be separate from Sandille. However, there was another and more deep-rootedly significant aspect which emerged in Maqoma's meeting with Maclean. Maqoma informed Maclean that the decision of the Ngqika chiefs to have only Brownlee as their magistrate was invalid without his presence at the meeting; that

the chiefs who had attended the meeting had sent a message to Sarhili informing him of all the developments and of Maqoma's absence from the meeting, and that Sarhili had replied:

> "that he had never heard of any word left by Gaika to decide such questions without Macoma's word. Macoma was charged with the care of the Gaika - and that Kreli was not satisfied with Sandille's message as I was not present at the meeting ... " (15)

While Maqoma put his absence from the meeting with Sandille in a highly diplomatic light when he spoke to Maclean, his attitude towards Sandille was considerably more radical than this. Already in October, when Maqoma had missed the previous meeting held by Sandille to discuss the proposals, he had instructed his councillors to discuss the matter without reference to Sandille because:

> "The Gaika had no Chief, he therefore did not wish to take any part in Sandille's deliberations" (16)

This amounted to frank rejection of Sandille's authority.

As for Maqoma's attitude towards Brownlee, he told Maclean that he wished for a:

> "clever and experienced man as a magistrate. I do not want a fool ..." (17)

If Sandille would reject the proposals, Maqoma would accept them. If Sandille accepted them, then Maqoma would demand a separate magistrate. Either way Sandille would be forced to react to Maqoma's manoeuvering.

Maclean's attitude to all this typically illustrates the intentions of the Colonial State in the powerplay in which it was engaged with the Xhosa chiefs. On the one hand he dismissed Maqoma's attitude as "an instance of Kaffir duplicity which need not surprise us"; on the other hand he recognised that "in this case the ends desired by Macoma are the same with our own ..." and recommended that a separate magistrate be appointed for Maqoma. What Maclean understood by desiring 'similar ends' as Maqoma he

made clear in a letter to Brownlee:

> "we do not want centralisation among the Kaffirs but division." (19)

While Maclean may well have been correct in supposing that he was supporting the cause of "division" in agreeing to Maqoma's demands for a separate magistrate, it is possible that in his enthusiasm he overlooked a more profound countercurrent of centralisation. He overlooked, that is, the significance of Maqoma's subtle use of Sarhili (who as chief of the Gcaleka was ideologically the supreme Xhosa chief) to override the authority of Sandille. For while real unity between the Gcaleka and Ngqika was impossible under Sandille, who was the heir of Ngqika's defeat of Gcaleka ambitions in the 18th and early 19th centuries, it was potentially possible under Maqoma who could assume a more independent line of policy free from the influence of the old councillors still under the sway of Ngqika, (such as Soga, for example). (20)

The split between the Gcaleka and Ngqika in the time of Phalo had been necessary to expand the physical basis of the mode of production; to provide fresh pasture and land for residential and agricultural purposes as well as hunting. (21) To meet the ultimate threat posed by the establishment of the Colonial State over them, the Xhosa required something more than the tactical military coalitions that characterised the wars of 1835, 1846 and 1850. It required the reunification of the Xhosa nation and this was not something that could be done without major ideological reshaping of the entire perception of the structure of the Xhosa chieftaincy in the eyes of the mass of Xhosa.

The Xhosa chieftaincy had, since the end of the 1851-53 war, been looking for new solutions to the problems that had been plaguing it since the beginning of the century - the steady encroachment of the Colonists. Some chiefs had decided to ally themselves irrevocably with the Colony. However, no powerful chief had done so. They sought to continue resistance but in fundamentally different ways. An early indication of this was evident in the attempts made in this period to forge an alliance with sections of

the Mfengu.

The Mfengu alliance plans were seen and dismissed by Colonists as merely another attempt to instigate a war party; one which was bound to fail because of what the Colonial State saw as its generosity and good faith to the Mfengu (22). As shall be seen later, the Mfengu, or parts of them, did not see or experience it that way. For the moment it is necessary to draw attention to the alliance attempt and emphasise the key features in it: first the roles played by Sarhili and Maqoma which predate subsequent co-operation between them; secondly, the fact that certain chiefs, especially Mhalla and Phato, were clearly in a mood for radical departures from past practices. This mood certainly relates to the immediate build-up to the cattle-killing.

Much dissatisfaction had been developing in that part of the King William's Town district, known as the Crown Reserve, occupied by Mfengu. The area was former Ngqika territory confiscated in terms of Cathcart's settlement of the 1853 war.

One major section of the Mfengu, the Amazizi under Njokweni, had sympathised with Sandille in the conflict with the Colony. They had intermarried with the Ngqika extensively. (23) The Amazizi chief, Njokweni, was one of the most established and powerful of the Mfengu chiefs. He desired to foster closer relations with the Xhosa, particularly with Sarhili. After the war of 1836 an important Councillor of Njokweni's, Dodwana, was flogged in public at King William's Town for an alleged theft. He was so incensed at this treatment that he left the Colony and returned to Sarhili. There he became a very powerful councillor of Sarhili's. (24) Thus a direct ambassadorial link existed in the 1850s between the Amazizi and Sarhili. Dodwana succeeded in persuading a number of Njokweni's people to return to Sarhili across the Kei.

Immediately after the war of 1853 missionaries amongst the Amazizi started attacking their customary practices on purely legal grounds i.e. that they were Colonial citizens dependent on the

Government and must therefore obey Colonial law in all things, outlawing 'witchcraft' (by which missionaries meant all forms of divination and diagnosis) and dances, and observe Colonial dress, codes etc. This climate encouraged Njokweni in his idea of an Amazizi-Xhosa alliance. The means for fostering this alliance was intermarriage, especially by the chiefs. Thus Njokweni tried to marry a daughter of Sandille (25). This report does not make it clear if any marriage was contracted or not. Tainton implies that the marriage was only forestalled by Njokweni's death in 1855. Mhalla did actually marry a Mfengu woman from his area at this time.

In addition, meetings between Sandille, Mhalla and groups of Mfengu definitely took place. (26) Maclean emphasised Sarhili's role in setting up these meetings. The young Chief Oba was interested in Njokweni's plans and it seems from this as if the idea of the alliance was tactical and not military, (which would also explain why Special Commissioner Calderwood - appointed to investigate rumours of a Xhosa-Mfengu military alliance - failed to find one). Njokweni discussed the possibility of his approximately 2 000 followers and their cattle moving into the Ngqika district where there was no room for them; the Colonial State might thereby be forced to allow an extension of the locations and Xhosa reoccupation of their old territory. (27)

It is perhaps significant that in Maclean's report on these meetings Sandille is said to have addressed the Mfengu as Abambo which is a more proper designation than the pejorative "Mfengu" which was attributed to them by the Xhosa at the time of the Mfecane. These diplomatic manoeuverings were indicative of the attempts being made to find new solutions to old problems that were then taking on their final and critical dimensions.

The introduction of the magistrates in April 1856 came at a time of great economic hardship and political confusion. Within the Colonial State Maclean was not convinced that Grey's scheme could work. He still felt a strong allegiance to Cathcart's line of

policy granting internal autonomy to the chiefs, and he wrote a long memorandum to Grey outlining the origins of that policy, in February 1856, just two months before the magistrates were to be installed. (28)

Within the Xhosa chiefdoms we have mentioned the tensions that existed between Sandille and Maqoma. To these must be added suspicions that existed within Mhalla's territory, between his sons, and the general hostility of all chiefs who resisted Colonial domination towards the collaborating chiefs such as Kama and Siwani. As has been emphasised throughout this discussion, the positions adopted by the various chiefs were determined by the internal struggles within their chiefdoms, and that varying degrees of collaboration were, of economic and political necessity, to be found within all chiefdoms. However the broader distinctions remained between those who put national interests above local ones and Xhosa unity above other considerations - and hence had been prepared to risk all in active resistance, and those who were happy to profit out of the consequences of such conflict and even lend logistical and military support to the Colonial armies.

The interplay of these cross-cutting contradications was further revealed with the arrival of the magistrates. They were, it should be remembered, the first official representatives of the Colonial State to live in, and observe events in, the various chiefdoms since the appointment of Maclean and Brownlee after the 1848 war. The very earliest reports of the cattle-killing and associated prophecies came through these magistrates and indeed it is hard to separate the initial receipt of payment by the chiefs, the loss of power through the imposition of the magistrates, and the onset of the cattle-killing.

II The Magistrates with Ndlambe, Mdushane and Gqunukwebe

It will be remembered that Maclean was appointed commissioner with the Ndlambe of Mhalla after the 1848 war. His appointment as Chief Commissioner to succeed Mackinnon soon removed him from direct intervention in Ndlambe affairs. With the arrival of Major Gawler as magistrate it was possible for such interventions to be reinstated.

Grey had emphasised to Maclean that the success of his scheme depended in large part on the quality of the individuals selected for the job. As we have seen, Maqoma was also reluctant to have a 'fool' imposed on him! In the light of this mutual assessment of the importance of the right individual it is an amusing, if tragic, touch that Major John Cox Gawler was selected to preside over the Ndlambe and deal with their chief Mhalla. (29)

Relationships were stormy from the start. Mhalla tried very hard to avoid getting Major Gawler, indicating that, like all other important chiefs, he had sources of information that had let him know what he was in for. Mhalla prefered Richard Tainton who had been a civil commissioner at King William's Town. (30) However, the chiefs had conceded that the Governor would appoint the magistrates and in the end the need for the salary overcame his misgivings about Gawler. (31)

No sooner had Gawler arrived in April 1856 than the first full-scale dispute arose between Mhalla and Gawler. Mhalla wanted to have the payment of the ten councillors in his hands. Gawler naturally supposed he should act as paymaster. Mhalla alleged that Gawler was paying certain councillors twice. In the end Gawler prevailed. (32) There was an obvious loss of patronage involved in the question of control over payment of councillors. Councillors served for only a few days or even for only one day at the Great Place. There was continuous movement, coming and going from the chief's homestead. The attempt to delimit ten individuals who would be paid for their services at the Great

Place was a drastic departure from the way the chief's court had normally functioned.

In Mhalla's hands the monthly payment intended for ten councillors would most probably have been spread directly over more than twice that number of individuals. As it was the money was still disbursed, but now through the medium of ten influential men selected by Gawler. This clearly undermined Mhalla and was an ongoing cause of resentment against the whole system of payment.

The situation was not helped by the fact that initially Brownlee had allowed Sandille to disburse payments to his ten councillors. (33) Mhalla's relationship with Sandille was an uneasy one. While there was no open hostility between them Gawler found:

> "it is a prevailing opinion among the Kaffirs that if Umhalla were to die, Sandilli would attempt to usurp the Chieftainship. Sandilli is daily endeavouring to gain over those of Umhalla's people who live near him and there are many of Sandilli's and Macoma's people living in the middle of Umhalla's country. Tola and Umfundisi for instance. These men give Umhalla no little anxiety ..." (34)

Mhalla's position differed from Sandille's in that he was approximately 66 years old in 1856 and had adult sons, some of whom supported him and others who had aspirations of their own. Sandille was only 36 years old and was still confronted by numerous internal barriers to his authority in the form of older, wealthy councillors of his father's generation. (35)

There is evidence that Mhalla did in fact exercise the sort of control over the homesteads that would only, typically, be found with a strong chief at the peak of his power. Gawler reported that work on his house (Waterloo Huts) had been delayed because they "do not allow ox-wagons into the country." (36) Previously Mhalla had stopped Mfengu trying to leave his chiefdom with their cattle. (37) This apparent ability to control the movement of people and cattle indicated a far deeper level of control over

homesteads than existed with Sandille.

As important as Mhalla's relationship with Sandille, was that with Sarhili. There were many Gcaleka families under prominent councillors of Sarhili living in the Ndlambe area.
These people were all relatively recent immigrants, (post 1848), who were attracted by the large, open and fertile tracts of country between East London and the Kei River that Mhalla dominated. (38) With this mix of Ndlambe, Ngqika and Gcaleka all living in the same area the contradictory needs of the various chiefs were bound to emerge.

The feeling of the times, and the nature of particular struggles that emerged as the effects of the imposition of magistrates were felt, are revealed in the following case.

Three Gcalekas living under a petty chief 'Giddie' living in Mhalla's country stole a number of rifles from some Mfengu. Gawler wished to organise a party to go and retrieve the stolen rifles, take the thieves prisoner and confiscate ten head of cattle as a fine. Mhalla was not keen to get involved because "The Fingoes are Government people and therefore the guns are Government Guns ... moreover the thieves belonged to another Chief and he did not like interfering ..." (39).

After threats and inducements from Gawler, which it seemed to Mhalla were virtually sanctioning him to confiscate the property of the Gcalekas for himself, he organised a raiding party. Whereas Gawler wanted a small party for what he saw as a police operation, Mhalla provided a raiding party of 80 armed Ndlambe and Mfengu under the command of one of Mhalla's sons, Siwani.

From the outset it was clear that the force was not at all interested in assisting Gawler and was simply putting on a show for his benefit. When they approached the homestead of the suspected thief, its head barred the way with a rifle saying that "Gawler, the Government and Umhalla might go and be hanged ..." On receiving this insult Gawler attempted, unaided, to burn the

man's huts, but the thatch had been dampened and it would not take fire. Amid clouds of smoke Gawler then gave orders to take the cattle from the kraal. This was done - at which the homestead head defended himself with his rifle, while the other men of the homestead escaped into the bush. As Gawler and his force moved off with the cattle the men of the kraal fired on them again. The response to this offensive was devastating. As Gawler put it:

> "I looked round and saw my rear guard in a heap running down the hill ... leaving me and the cattle in the presence of the two thieves..."

The thieves then re-took the cattle and disappeared, firing all the time on Gawler and the remmants of his column:

> "We ran for about a mile and a half - the only danger was what was made by running in a mob like a flock of sheep ... I laid hold of them, used my knobkerrie on them, shouted to the Chiefs, asked them to stop for a moment to count their pursuers, called them women and boys without effect. When a good mile had been put between the parties we halted and it was the general opinion - loudly upheld - that it had been a 'great fight' ..." (40)

In fact the entire attempt by the Colonial State to usurp the rights of chiefs to appropriate fines was initially obstructed by means such as the carefully nurtured chaos illustrated above. In this situation the power of influential councillors and homestead heads with local followings was greatly increased. This is illustrated in the denouement to the debacle of the stolen rifles. When Gawler demanded the fines and the thieves from the Chief Giddie the latter sent a message to Gawler informing him:

> "I am a little Chief, Mhalla is a little Chief and you are a little Chief and neither he nor you had any business in my country ..." (41)

In the end Giddie only delivered the fine after the head of the homestead involved, one Gubenguwa, had been taken prisoner by Maclean, who had subseqently become involved. In fact it appears that Gubenguwa enjoyed a large local following and 'Giddie' was not strong enough to arrest him. These conditions, prevailing amongst the mass of homesteads as a result of the weakening of the power of the chiefs with the arrival of the magistrates, are helpful in understanding the spread of the belief in cattle-killing at this time. As we shall see it was a movement that first spread spontaneously amongst the masses before being sanctioned by the important chiefs.

The immediate effects of the introduction of the magistrates did not eliminate 'dual-power', that of chiefs and the Colonial State. Rather it sharpened the contradictions between them. The control of the homesteads was clearly the key factor in this conflict. Where this control now lay was not clear, least of all to the participants in the conflict. The chiefs' acceptance of monthly salaries did not automatically change the realities of their power. As in the example quoted above, it made the exercising of it very circuitous and created definite opportunities for relatively insignificant figures such as 'Giddie' and Gubenguwa to take initiatives of their own.

This obscuration of lines of authority and the break up of clear power alliances within and between chiefdoms, combined with underlying economic hardship, were necessary conditions for belief in the prophecies that were to give rise to the cattle-killing in the second half of 1856. The insecurity prevailing throughout Xhosa territory was not therefore only a subjective experience, it was a real obscuring of effective authority. In such situations the way is always open for ideological solutions to problems of power to assert themselves from the base of the social formation, in this case from the mass of homesteads.

1856 dawned inauspiciously for the Xhosa. The summer rains were late and drought threatened. If it didn't rain soon the land

would be scorched and few crops would survive. Gawler reported that there was:

> "an almost universal blight upon the Kaffir corn which I have noticed from King William's Town to to the Kwegha and heard of as being in most other places ..." (42)

If conditions were unsettled in the Ndlambe territory in the first half of 1856 they were paralleled by even more ominous signs elsewhere. In a report from Kama's country the magistrate, Reeve, observed:

> "I believe the crops were not so extensively planted this year as the last ... I am given to understand that a prophet last year said that they need not plant, as the Russians would come and fight against us - this woman belonged to "Siwani's" tribe but resided for a time in "Kama's" country. Kama ordered her to leave his tribe ..." (43)

Shortly after this Kama received messages from Sarhili enquiring about the prophecies. At the same time, independently of Reeve, Brownlee reported:

> "I was aware some time since that several Doctors had arisen lately amongst the Hlambis, but until lately I did not know of the extent of the influence they had exerted. Cultivation in Pato's tribe through the instrumentality of the Doctors has been almost universally neglected this season. Pato himself is said not to have cultivated and does not appear to have exerted his influence in inducing his people to cultivate; what his object may have been I do not know ..." (44)

Phato's people had been particularly severely hit by the lung-sickness and Brownlee observed that "many of his people are in great destitution having lost their cattle." (45) The only

reason Brownlee could see for this move on Phato's part was to show more clearly to the people "the folly of listening to the deceptions of the Doctors." As this statement shows, Brownlee (a great 'expert' on Xhosa affairs) had not the vaguest notion of the impending cattle-killing prophecies even as their earliest manifestations hovered directly over him. If this was so for Brownlee, who had a good command of Xhosa language and many informers, it was even more marked with the other recently appointed magistrates.

Brownlee found that the failure to cultivate in the 1855/56 summer season was fairly widespread, affecting also Toise, Siwani and Mhalla. Kama and Siwani, who were both collaborating chiefs dependent on Colonial support for their positions, did all in their power to induce people to cultivate. The problem they experienced was that their power did not extend very far, even within their own locations. Much of Kama's territory was settled by Ngqika loyal to Sandille or Maqoma, while many of Siwani's people stayed with him out of necessity only, their true loyalties being with his popular half-brother Seyolo.

The site of the first prophet was in Kama's country. She was the wife of a councillor of Kama's, Bula, and predicted Kama's return to 'heathenism' as well as that of all those Xhosa who had converted to Christianity. She also claimed:

> "that the white men will be destroyed because the wrath and curse of God are on them, for putting to death his son. The Kaffirs are to be the favoured race, and that they may not want when the white men are swept from the face of the earth, an inexhaustible supply of skins, carcasses of all kinds of wild animals as well as ornaments and beads of every description will be provided for the wants of the Kaffirs ..." (46)

She urged the Xhosa to lay aside their witchcraft in order that the good time might come. This prophetess was not alone. The prophetess who Reeve earlier reported had been expelled from

Kama's country was now residing with Stokwe. She began prophesying around December 1855 and was said to be the wife of Petsheni of Stokwe's tribe. She prohibited cultivation and directed the Xhosa to kill their cattle as more would be provided. They should purchase axes to make kraals which at the appropriate time they would find filled with cattle. (47)

These prophets also claimed that the Russians had defeated the English (in Crimea) and would soon come to the assistance of the Xhosa. The prophets are specifically reported as not having urged the Xhosa to rise against the Colonists "but have induced the belief of external aid." (48) Brownlee also reported the presence of prophets in Mhalla's and Seyolo's territory. Thus in essence, by May 1856, the central theses of the prophecies leading up to the cattle-killing had already been in circulation for some months. What they lacked was any overt support from any of the major chiefs.

It is from these reports of Brownlee's that the origins of the persistent view of the Colonial State that Moshoeshoe was behind the cattle-killing movement can be found. In the form in which he presented it at this time, it was a far more plausible observation than the fantasy into which it was subsequently developed. Brownlee simply noted that events between the Free State and Moshoeshoe would influence Sarhili and Sandille in their attitudes to war with the Colony at that point. This was certainly true. (49)

The drought deepened and the prospects for the 1856 harvest diminished. (50) By May it was starting to take its toll - people were coming to Reeve and the other magistrates and appealing for work. For the first time there was a distinct inclination to accept work in the more distant Colonial districts of the Midlands. Up to this point the existence of the public works had rendered it unnecessary to proceed far into the Colony in search of work. The reluctance to proceed to the Colony was partly what had motivated Grey to institute the 'public works' as a means of introducing wage labour and money more generally.

In recognition of the changing labour supply, in January 1856 Grey authorised a reduction in the rate of pay on the works from 1 shilling per day without rations to 6 pence per day with rations. (51) In part this was probably motivated by the grain scarcity that was beginning to be felt. There was some resistance to this from the Keiskamma Hoek area where workers had refused to work at the lower rate "although any number could be attained at the old rate ..." (52) The desire to sustain the wage rate of 1 shilling per day was also in evidence in the Ndlambe district where repair work on the road between East London and Line Drift was stopped because of a dispute over wages. This work employed 50 people per day.

It is important to appreciate, therefore, that the movement of workers from the Ciskei to the Colony had already begun from the most depressed areas such as that of Kama, before the cattle-killing commenced. The effects of the cattle-killing in this respect, as in so much else, vastly aggravated an already existing situation. Drought, the lung-sickness, the intrusion of the magistrates and the destitution caused by war all contributed to the appearance of the first millenarian prophets of the new dawn in those regions which had been most severely affected by the impact of Colonial conquest and of the Colonial economy. In July 1856, reviewing this combination of circumstances Maclean wrote:

> "Under the circumstances it would be natural to expect in any country that there would be acts of desperation ..." (53)

Once the principle that an external agency would come to their rescue had gained credibility amongst the people, it mattered little if the agency was named as the "Russians", or ancestors, or anyone else.

III The Magistrates and the Ngqika

Lt. Lucas was appointed as Maqoma's magistrate and arrived in King William's Town in April 1856. There were now five magistrates,

Gawler with the Ndlambe, Herbert Vigne with Phato, Reeve with Kama and Siwani, Lucas with Maqoma and Botomane, and of course Brownlee with Sandille, Anta and Oba.

From the outset the magistrates in the Ngqika district were viewed by the chiefs as a means for continuing pressure to be put on the Colonial State. This became apparent at the meeting in April when Lt. Lucas was introduced to Maqoma and Botomane as the magistrate responsible for implementing the new system of control.

After Maqoma had been formally introduced to Lucas and the salaries they were to receive in lieu of the fines and court fees that they had previously appropriated were outlined, Maqoma rose and addressed the crowd:

> "When I told Maclean I was ready to receive a Magistrate and money, I said I wanted land also ... " (54)

As if indicating the extreme caution with which they viewed the entire operation, one of the Colonial representatives asked Maqoma if that was the condition on which he would receive a magistrate. To which he replied:

> "No, but I asked Maclean to tell the Governor I wanted land. What is the Governor's answer?"

The honourable gentlemen were considerably taken aback at this bluntness on Maqoma's part. After Ayliff informed him that the Governor would not make land concessions, Maqoma welcomed Lucas with the following admonition:

> "We hope the Magistrate will mix freely with our people, and not permit pride to prevent their gaining access readily to him, and that he will submit our requests at all times to the Governor. When he gets to know us we will give him the histories of the different persons who have had to rule us, and those whose character we admire we will tell him to imitate. Maclean has spoken for the Hlambies and secured for them all good

> locations, we expect this officer will speak for us, and get us more land ..."

At this, consternation increased amongst the assembled worthies and Maqoma pushed home the advantage:

> "He must ask, ask and never tire, and never say 'The Governor has refused, I cannot ask again!' He must continue to ask." (55)

When Ayliff, Lucas and the Rev. Keyser reached Botomane they found an even more sceptical response from the aged chief. Botomane at once seized on the central difficulty of the system:

> "What do we get the money for? We know that you as a Government Officer have regular duties to perform but for which you are paid, but what are we to be paid for?" (56)

To which Ayliff responded:

> "for governing, on behalf of the Governor, the Queen's subjects of your tribe."

Botomane:

> "Is that all, do not let me deceive myself. I have known you for many years, tell me truly is there nothing that will come after we have taken the money?"

Botomane's and Maqoma's responses reveal the deep mistrust with which they entered formally into Grey's new dispensation. They viewed Lucas as a negotiating instrument for carrying on the struggle for repossession of Xhosa lands. A few days after his arrival, Maqoma and Botomane wrote a joint letter to Grey. They requested that Xhosa interpreters be attached to Lucas and also informed Grey:

> "The new Resident we have nothing to say of, and the money we say nothing of; but where then is the land we can live together on? It is not with our consent - we take it through compulsion, for if we refused it, you would think we wished to fight with you Sir!" (57)

As this letter makes clear it was by no means avarice or collaboration that led the chiefs to accept Grey's system, but rather economic and political necessity grounded in an all too accurate assessment of Grey's intentions. It was with deep unease that the system was introduced. As if looking for the re-assurance of a bygone era, Botomane (who was old enough to remember Ngqika's regal meeting with General Janssens) asked:

> "Who is Lucas? Is he a gentleman? Is he a wise man, is he a chief in his own country? We Chiefs like to be associated with Chiefs ..." (58)

IV The Growth of Prophecy

Almost immediately after the magistrates had been introduced and their effect had begun to be felt by the chiefs, the growth of the prophecies already in circulation became evident. To some extent the introduction of the magistrates and the appointment of paid councillors nominated by them was the catalyst which brought together the ingredients of the cattle-killing. To this extent Grey, and his scheme for the introduction of magistrates which once more removed the internal autonomy of the Xhosa chiefs and their supporters over their subjects (as with Smith's scheme prior to the 1850-53 war), was responsible for the consequences which ensued. This was tacitly recognised by some Colonial observers, just after the main drama of the killing had passed:

> "His Excellency's system, which raises a power that interferes between the Chiefs and their people appears to have worked well during this past year. How far this system helped to precipitate the crises through which the colony has now happily passed, we need not now discuss ..." (59)

The opposition to the magistrates was intensified by a crucial elaboration of the basic system introduced after the chiefs had accepted the scheme. Each location was divided up into 'convenient groups of kraals' and over each group a 'headman' was

appointed with a detachment of unarmed police under his orders. Grey authorised the appointment of ₰100 "first class" headmen at 12 pounds per annum each; 200 "second class" headmen at 9 pounds per annum and 700 assistants at 6 pounds per annum each. All of these were to be appointed, dismissed, and paid by the magistrate. (60)

This innovation did indeed "raise up a power which interfered between the chiefs and their people." The entire system of magisterial authority was therefore, as in 1848, an unacceptable degradation of the power of the chiefs, in a situation where the combatant chiefs still undoubtedly enjoyed the monopoly of political legitimacy and the balance of economic power still lay within the Xhosa homesteads and not yet in Colonial economic hegemony.

The Chiefs had already seen that even near-unity of all the Xhosa, and considerable Khoi support in the 1850-53 war, were insufficient to defeat the Imperial armies. A new form of unity was needed. We have already mentioned the intense pleasure with which the news of Moshoeshoe's defeat of Cathcart at Berea was received by the Xhosa. The differences between the political organisation of Moshoeshoe's kingdom and the Xhosa must have been obvious to all. Our approach to the cattle-killing will be based on the hypothesis that, if it had any underlying motivation at all, it was intended as a renaissance or reformation of the Xhosa state. In practical terms it was intended to remove the political obstacles to a united Xhosa State that had existed since the time of Phalo. Certainly the latest attack on their position by Grey heightened the already present realisation of the need for a new solution to the problems of Colonial domination.

In early 1856 the Ngqika chiefs were still trying to assert their control over the land against the pretensions of the magistrates. Any opportunity in which authority could be asserted was seized upon as symbolic and strategic testing of the strength of the magistrates.

In Sandille's location the clearest demonstration of this was provided by his successful attempt to extract an annual rent of 10 pounds per annum from the Rev. Allen of the Church of England mission station, St. Johns, for land occupied by the mission. (61) When Allen demurred to pay, Sandille threatened to cut off the supply of firewood and water to the station which he said was his, and to leave his councillors at its entrance there to prevent any Xhosa or European from working on the station. In response Allen gave up 10 pounds.

In March, scarcely a month after the installation of the magistrates the first reports of new prophecies being made by a niece of a prophet in Sarhili's country were received. (62) Sarhili at first did not react to her prophecies which were initially no different from those already in circulation to the west. In June 1956 Sarhili sent envoys to make enquiries at the homestead of the doctor Mhlakaza concerning the prophecies or, more accurately, the visions of his niece Nongqawuse. As a result of these enquiries Sarhili killed his first cattle in accordance with these prophecies, thus lending tacit support to the visions. (63)

In trying to gain a clearer understanding of what the cattle-killing was about we must move away from past perspectives which have started out from a strong set of unexamined and unjustified assumptions. One group of assumptions stems from the explanations put forward by the Colonial officials themselves, that it was primarily aimed at the preparation of a military 'combination' of the chiefs to defeat the Colonists. Most writers who have commented on the cattle-killing, and of course Theal, have accepted this conventional wisdom. (64)

In this version the 'culprit' is usually presented as Sarhili and Mhlakaza as his willing agent. The alternative to this has been to stress the belief in witchcraft and to make the Xhosa cosmology the villain - with its national doctors, animist religion and general belief in prophecy and divination. This view is well represented in A.W. Burton's imaginative recreation of the

prophecies of Mhlakaza. (65) A variation on this theme has been to look at the cattle-killing through a contemporary academic lens and regard it as a pure millenarian movement. (66)

Finally of course there is the view of Xhosa commentators and writers themselves, although they have generally not taken up a firm position on the movement. Soga, in answer to the question of what underlay "this piece of folly..." as he put it, while rejecting the military conspiracy theories, side-steps the question:

> "It is singular that Natives can never give a reason for the perpetration of this terrible act. To a question of the motive is always given the answer "asazi" (We cannot tell. We do not know.),and apparently in sincerity." (67)

A.C. Jordan quotes a tradition recorded by Rabusana in his anthology 'Zemk 'iinkomo Magwalandini' told by William Gqoba who was 17 at the time of the cattle-killing. (68) While much of what Gqoba says is of interest, he is clearly concentrating on certain key events and has condensed the time scale of other events to suit his narrative purpose. Essentially he evokes 'sincere belief' in the wonders foretold by two young visionary girls who gained the ears of the leading chiefs as the cause of the cattle-killing.

As we shall see, this version, while it contains probably the most authentic account of the details of Nongqawuse's visions, does not take account of the myriad events that occurred in the more than six months prior to the "Great Disillusionment" when the prophecies finally failed to materialise, or what happened after this.

Dealing first with the military theories, these were elaborated in the exceedingly voluminous official and private correspondence among the Colonial officials during the cattle-killing itself. Brownlee expressed them again to the Native Affairs Commission of 1865:

> "The reason of the cattle-killing was the recovery of their lost territory, in case of war there should be no encumbrance. The scheme failed in consequence of some Chiefs not having entered into the matter, and more particularly because Sandille ... held back and did not finally destroy his cattle until the other tribes were broken up and dispersed. So far as I am able to ascertain Kreli was responsible for it. He took advantage of it at any rate. I don't believe Umhlakaza was the author of it. He made certain professions of inspirations and it struck the Chiefs that his inspired words might be made use of for political purposes ..." (69)

This was the official explanation. Yet Brownlee himself developed his doubts. In his memoirs he wrote:

> "after thirty years, I do not feel quite so certain that there was this plot ... no one who took an active part in the cattle killing, except Umhlakaza, has admitted that there was a plot. All assert that the cattle killing was made in a full belief in the predictions of Umhlakaza." (70)

There is in fact a straightforward reason for concluding that there was no 'plot' immediately to attack the Colony. As all the magistrates repeatedly reported, there were no signs of any preparations for war anywhere in evidence. Maclean reported in July 1856 that he could not "discern any system of combined action has been formed." (71) Brownlee reported early in 1857 that the people had a firm faith in the promises of the prophet and that the common people were led to believe that they were to take no part in the destruction of the Colonists, but that they were to be annihilated by Sifubasibanzi (literally "the Broad Chested", the spiritual leader of the "New People" who were to arise). (72)

The absence of preparations for war was one of the most remarkable

features of what was taking place. Indeed the very requirements of the prophet necessitated a great deal of domestic labour in and around the kraals. According to Gqoba's version of the prophecies, the chiefs of the 'New People' that were to arise from the dead ordered the people to make "big new granaries", that were suddenly to be filled with corn; erect new huts and make many doors; and make new milk sacks for receiving the milk of the new cattle which were to be provided. (73) Many believers in the prophecies did these things, activities which cannot be carried on in war time when the kraals have to be cleared and people made ready to move. So the official theory of the Colonial Officials elaborated after the event, is obviously discredited. At the same time the sincerity of the Xhosa belief in a millenarian solution to their political problems is emphasised.

However, to accept the entire episode as a simple (or a complex) millenarian delusion (even without invoking the 'cauldrons of witchcraft') suffers from the weakness that it fails to account adequately for the overt role played by political aspirations in the cattle-killing. Although the agency of the prophecies was external aid, delivery from suffering produced through 'supernatural' intervention, the extremely concrete nature of the political action taken in association with the prophecies and the struggles that ensued after them indicate that the prophecies in practice operated to enhance the political position of certain chiefs quite independently of the interventions of 'Sifubasibanzi' and his son 'Napukade'. Furthermore that the chiefs were aware (or should have been aware) and conscious of this 'second level' on which the whole movement could be construed is only to credit them with quite normal perception - a faculty which we know men like Maqoma, Mhalla and Sarhili enjoyed to an enhanced degree.

Granting the 'sincere belief' of most Xhosa (including the chiefs) in the validity of prophecies, an alternative explanation has to be derived by synthesizing the various active or innovative elements of the movement with the objective economic and political circumstances in which they occurred and the class position of the various agents of the drama.

We have already indicated that the objective economic and political circumstances, with drought and cattle disease on the one hand and Sir George Grey's interventions on the other, were conducive to the utmost insecurity for both the ordinary homesteads and the chiefs. What we have now to look at is who put forward the various elements of the drama, what the positions of these agents were, and how the interaction that resulted revealed the fundamentally contradictory position of these agents, caught between the Xhosa social formation and the broader Colonial capitalist economy which was engulfing it. In this way we may be able to see that the cattle-killing was indeed a political movement (as the Colonial State maintained) but one not aimed in the first instance at the elimination of the Colonists by military force. Rather it was aimed at the fundamental reorganisation of the Xhosa state to provide a basis for future political and therefore also military action against the Colony. This we will argue was the underlying intention or motive of the chiefs' involvement in the cattle-killing. This is the only explanation capable of taking into account all the various levels of conflict and belief on which the cattle-killing drama was played out.

A.W. Burton has put the following words into the mouth of Mhlakaza and indicates quite accurately the subjective background to the prophecies. Mhlakaza, perched on a high vantage point surveying the plains and valleys in all directions, proclaims:

> "I am not surprised at Sarhili who is sullen and greatly worried over the tribulations of his people. On yonder plains I see a few wretched cattle, and land that has become so poor and barren that even our young men find no happiness in the bare subsistence derived from the poor harvests. Our Chiefs and their prophets must do something to uplift and satisfy our discouraged and unhappy people." (74)

Belief in the prophecies of Mhlakaza spread first among the people of Phato, Siwani, Kama and Maqoma. The way the prophecies were communicated was essential to their initial impact. It was a

grassroots movement which spread by personal communication of the revelation amongst the masses. The chiefs who subsequently supported the prophecies were in large measure only ratifying what most of their people had already begun.

The prophecies coming from Mhlakaza were initially spread by word of mouth rather than any official pronouncement from the chiefs. A trader on the Kei for example, overheard his guide telling the people of a kraal that, when at the coast he saw people and cattle come from the sea to the shore out of a great ball of fire. (75)

The people on the Keiskamma, (i.e. those in Siwani's, Kama's and Phato's locations) where prophecy had abounded since the previous summer, were the first to kill any cattle in response to Mhlakaza's appeals. (76) For them more than anyone else Mhlakaza's communication of Nongqawuse's visions was nothing more than a more sophisticated and authoritative version of what they had already heard for nearly a year. (77)

The earliest reaction from chiefs came in the form of strident opposition to the movement by the collaborating chiefs Siwani and Kama who forbade any cattle killing (78). However even chiefs who subsequently became the most ardent supporters of the movement were sceptical at first. Mhalla reportedly sent to Phato saying:

> "He has already accepted a magistrate and that he did not think any notice ought to be taken of Kreli's messages." (79)

The spread of the movement was not dependent on chiefly sanction. On the contrary, "the Gaikas and Umhalla's people, in compliance with Umhlakaza's orders, are fast killing their cattle" despite the vacillation and even opposition of chiefs such as Sandille, Oba and Anta. (80) Gawler asked a son of Mhalla known as 'Smith' if Mhalla was going to kill his cattle, and received the reply, "Oh, go near the Bashee, they are killing plenty, but the news is not strong enough for us to kill ours." (81) Others adopted a pragmatic attitude to the prophecies, "my father and mother are

dead and I shall wait until I see them among the Russians before I kill my cattle ..." (82)

The first reports received by Maclean of Mhlakaza's prophecies arrived early in July 1856. (83) His informers told him that the prophet Mhlakaza had a niece Nongqawuse who was the medium for communicating with representatives of a 'New People' who included all the great Xhosa chiefs and doctors of the past, expecially naming Mlanjeni, Ngqika and Hintsa, who would arise and destroy the whites. Before this could happen the Xhosa had to sacrifice all their cattle and throw away all bewitching matter. Nongqawuse also told that those who died from snake bites and drowning will not again be restored to life - but those who die by the gun or assegaai will rise again from the dead. (84)

Sarhili sent messengers to all the chiefs officially informing them of what was going on at Mhlakaza's kraal. These messengers were around at least from the 1st of July. The message they brought was reported like this:

> "Strong people ... forefathers of the Kaffir Chiefs and also many of the common people who died in former times ... these people will assist the Kaffirs in driving all the whites out of the land, the cattle at present possessed by the Kaffirs are bewitched and they must sacrifice them for others which will be obtained from this New People ..." (85)

It is important to note that the affliction of the cattle with lung-sickness (bewitching) was directly linked in the prophecies with the motivation to sacrifice them.

In response to Sarhili's messages Sandille reportedly replied that Mlanjeni had made promises similar to Mhlakaza and had brought on a war of which they had now had enough. (86) Soga claimed that the Thembu chief Joyi and the Bomvana chief Moni sent to Sarhili a terse message condemming Mhlakaza's prophecies:

> "Cattle are the race, they being dead, the race dies." (87)

Initially Phato was the only chief who openly supported the movement and this is consistent with the attitude he had been adopting for months previously. He sent a messenger to all chiefs urging them to support the action. For Kama, his alienated half-brother, he sent a special message that he should give up his charms and bewitching matter (as the prophets required) "which has been the means of making you a Great Chief though not the son of the Great Wife ..." To which Kama replied that "a copy of the Bible was the only charm he could send." (88) Among Phato's people a great many cattle were killed in July and many people disposed of charms that they had kept.

Throughout July, ordinary households sent emissaries to Mhlakaza's kraal to enquire the news, and the movement spread rapidly. The wave of cattle-killing quickened especially in Ndlambe territory despite magisterial assurances that "the prophet has excited little or no interest here ..." (89) This misinformation was the result of a closing up of sources of information on what was occurring. The supporters of Mhlakaza were beginning to attempt not to associate or fraternise with those who did not believe. (90)

With the great extent of mass involvement the ability of chiefs to oppose it decreased. Mhalla, Maqoma and Phato were first to respond to the popular mood. When Sarhili wished to encourage Ngqika support for the movement he sent 3 oxen to Maqoma with an injunction to "purify himself". (91) This overt support for Maqoma demonstrated Sarhili's hostility to Sandille.

Phato, who for months had denied any political involvement with the various prophets that had been around, first broke the ice and openly stated his feelings:

> "In other wars he was rich, and had reason for remaining at peace, but now being poor he wishes for a change."(92)

As the movement became more widespread so its political character as a movement of resistance developed. Cattle were being killed

and ownership of cattle was the foundation stone on which all social relations in Xhosa society were built. It was inevitable that the destruction of the cattle should reveal the cleavages between the various groupings around the different chiefs.

Within every chiefdom the same conflict emerged. Every chiefdom became internally split between those who supported Sarhili and Mhlakaza and those who rejected both. Where the chief was against the movement, powerful heads of homesteads split the chiefdom, virtually becoming chiefs themselves on the basis of their support for Sarhili. Where the chief supported the movement, some arose to oppose him.

Here we have to observe an important distinction. Where a councillor or homestead head opposed the chief in supporting the movement, he drew the masses with him and left the chief isolated. Here we find the young councillors and heads of homesteads most vigorous in their support of the movement. The impoverished young men were the ones most directly involved in supporting Sarhili. Where councillors opposed the chief by opposing the movement it was usually his oldest councillors, those with most power and wealth and usually some of the chief's sons who led the dissent.

The distinction which we shall try to demonstrate is crucial to understanding the cattle-killing as a mass action of the poorest, most impoverished and desperate strata of the Xhosa chiefdoms. The young married men with a few cattle placed in their hands by an older head of homestead or by the chief; the head of a small homestead with no room to expand on the hard and unfertile ground to which they were now confined; these were the type of men who led and responded most enthusiastically to the movement.

By early August Brownlee reported that Mhlakaza's influence had spread "with astonishing rapidity". (93) In late August Mhlakaza claimed that large numbers of the 'New People' were gathering at the mouth of the Kwelera River. This announcement spurred another wave of killing. Gawler significantly observed:

> "Within the last few days the lower orders in this District have taken to cattle killing ... I am not aware of any influential person having yet commenced it ..." (94) (emphasis added.)

Brownlee noticed that many "indigent adherents of heads of kraals" had killed their stock or quit their residence at the kraal thus breaking up relationships of economic dependency and rendering them free to lend political support where they wished. (95)

After this enthusiastic beginning the movement subsided in September and October. The cause of this ebb was in the vacillation exhibited by Sarhili himself. Sarhili reportedly sent a message to Mhlakaza "intimating that should the cattle not be forthcoming he would hear of something to his disadvantage." (96) Mhlakaza, taken aback by the threatened loss of patronage replied that:

> "he had not commanded them either to kill or to waste - as a proof pointing to his own cattle and corn which were thriving and abundant - but had merely related to them the visions of the girl as reported to him ... doubts have been raised as to the truth of the witchdoctors' promises and the slaughter of cattle has therefore ceased and no hides have of late been brought into King William's Town." (97)

The withdrawal on Sarhili's part in fact marks the point from which the movement developed from a largely spontaneous mass movement, to a movement more closely controlled by those chiefs who supported it. It therefore also marked the beginning of a period of intense struggle between those who opposed the movement and those who supported it. Those who opposed their chiefs in supporting the movement could survive with the active support for their position by more powerful chiefs. Those who opposed their chiefs in opposing the movement had to rely on support from the Colonial State and the collaborating chiefs. Hence the polarity between the two parties was starkly emphasised.

The first real obstacle to the further progress of the movement was the opposition of Sandille. This opposition was largely predictable. A mass movement initiated by Sarhili was an overt threat to the position of Sandille. His opposition was supported by the evident vacillation on the part of Sarhili himself.

Sandille was at first influenced by his own desire to do nothing that would weaken his position in regard to Maqoma, Mhalla or any other neighbouring chief. He was also influenced by Brownlee who kept up a virtually continuous presence at Sandille's Great Place. Brownlee's excursions also took him to Sandille's brother Anta and his nephew, the young chief Oba. All of these important Ngqika chiefs remained opposed to Sarhili, with the support of the older homestead heads and Brownlee.

Brownlee held a meeting with Sandille and some influential councillors opposed to the movement on the 5th August 1856. He managed to organise a strong group of councillors in opposition to Mhlakaza who arranged privately among themselves that five or six of them would remain constantly with Sandille to prevent him being influenced by anyone else. (98) The key concillors opposing the movement were Tyala, Neku, Nxokwana, Soga, Mxamisa, Kemhle and Jakala. (99)

The result of their continuous presence at Sandille's homestead was to drive away his brother Dandas and the councillors Mlunguzu, Baba and Tshongweni. To encourage this splitting of the tribe into powerfully opposed factions, Maclean obtained Grey's sanction for chiefs to retain cattle confiscated as fines from homesteads which disobeyed a chief's instructions and killed cattle or desisted from cultivation. Sandille imposed a fine of ten head of cattle on Tshongweni for this reason. (100) It is not clear if further use was made of this provision but it seems doubtful as its only effect was further to underscore the different political attitudes towards the Colonial State between opponents and supporters of the movement.

By the end of August Brownlee felt confident that:

> "the crisis may now be past ... few of them having killed more than two or three head of cattle, while the body of the people have preserved all their corn and cattle"... (101)

Although there was practically no further killing of cattle during September, attention shifted to the question of cultivation.

As with the killing of his cattle Sandille cultivated only to a small extent, but showed a desire not to commit himself too far either to one faction or the other. (102) In a similar way to the spread of the cattle-killing, the move to desist from cultivation in the 1856/57 season spread first among the masses before the chiefs took any stand on the issue. The mechanism of its operation was certainly effective:

> "It is generally believed and extensively reported that in consequence of unbelief, Bulungwa has been cursed and that the sexual parts of a woman have appeared upon him." (103)

It was also widely reported that those who attempted to cultivate would be fixed to the ground and unable again to leave their work. (104)

Sandille's reluctance to support Sarhili was matched only by his reluctance to support those of his councillors who actively opposed the movement. In September and October he officially opposed the killing of cattle. But for a chief it was not what you did officially but how much your actions were supported by the homestead heads that mattered. In truth the majority of the people were being influenced by Sarhili whose direct appeal to them over the head of Sandille was irresistible.

If Sarhili could not find active support from Sandille he could find it on the coast from Phato and Mhalla. In late September Sarhili sent a brotherly message to Mhalla urging him to destroy his cattle and grain. (105) The ferment in Ndlambe was perhaps greater than elsewhere. Mhalla's sons were divided - the most junior supporting the movement and the more senior opposing it.

The exception was Siwani* who was the first reported emissary whom Mhalla sent to Mhlakaza to investigate the prophecies. Siwani reported that he and Sarhili had gone to Mhlakaza and had been shown certain 'shadows' which were taken as confirmation of the prophecies. When the news was relayed at Mhalla's Great Place it was reported that:

> "they consider Umhlakaza's talk truthful and more acceptable than what they are told by the missionaries and not at all so incredible as some parts of the Gospel." (106)

Mhalla's eagerness to go along with Sarhili could well have been prompted by the threat perceived from Sandille. There were reports that Mhlakaza had visited Phato, which could account for the increased interest that was soon to be seen there and in Ndlambe territory. (107)

By October the alliance between Mhalla and Sarhili had been cemented. In future all communications by Sarhili to the Ciskeian chiefs were to go through Mhalla. (108) On the 4th October 1856 Mhalla had issued definite orders prohibiting cultivation and backed this up with a threat to "eat-up" any who disobeyed. (109) This was a second turning point in the political development of the movement. Mhalla was the first chief to throw down the gauntlet to his people, challenging them to support the chieftaincy or desert it for an unknown fate at the hands of the Colonial regime.

The tempestuous reaction of Gawler to Mhalla's initiatives elicited a response true to the spirit of their relationship. Mhalla reportedly remarked, "if he makes a row about it (non-cultivation J.L.), we can but go and pick away at the hills,

* Not to be confused with the collaborating Mdushane chief Siwani who was opposed to the movement.

but there is no reason we should put any seed in ..."(110). The tendency for Mhalla to rely on his younger and lesser known sons became more marked. He sent Tshatshu and a nephew of his Goqosh to the Qumbe river mouth to see the 'New People'. They reported that the people had been sighted. As a result of this report Tshatshu was "more in his father's confidence than any of the others." (111) This report led to many reports of sightings of detachments of 'New People' at the mouths of rivers.

The reliance of Mhalla on his younger sons was indirectly an appeal to all the younger men to support the chief and the movement. It had the inevitable consequence of alienating established homestead heads with large followings. Some idea of what was happening is given in a report by Gawler:

> "Umhalla now dislikes his old councillors as they are opposed to Umhlakaza's movement, but he is surrounded by a number of young second-rate councillors ambitious of distinction and ready to take their chance in forwarding any of the current nonsense." (112)

The leader amongst Mhalla's disaffected older councillors was 'Undai' who gave orders to his followers to cultivate. In the face of Undai's intransigence Mhalla sent him a message:

> "Show now, whom you are for, the Government or me.
> I dont care for the Government ..."

To which 'Undai' replied:

> "What river do you intend crossing now?
> You were once near Grahams Town." (113)

These brief glimpses into the nature of the polarisation that was occurring indicate clearly that it was following the main lines of struggle inherent in the lineage mode of production in the Xhosa social formation, especially the splitting of chiefdoms on a generational basis.

Mhalla relayed the messages he received from Sarhili and the results of his own investigations to all the chiefs except Kama, Siwani and Toise who, with the Mfengu, were purposefully excluded. Messengers arrived at Sandille's Place from Mhalla in early October with word from Sarhili to proceed with the cattle-killing. On the 17th October, all the chiefs sent representatives to hear the news at Sandille's Great Place. The replies of the chiefs came in an overwhelming vote of confidence for Sarhili which left Sandille quite isolated.

Phato's replay to Sarhili's message reveals how acutely he perceived the situation at the time:

> "This is the second year that I have not ploughed; the lung sickness destroyed most of my cattle. Sometime since I saw some people from Kreli's country, they informed me that some New People had arrived in Kreli's country, and they ordered the destruction of the cattle, I therefore killed those cattle which had been left over by the lung sickness. My people are now in want, they are dispersing into the Colony, and among other tribes. Disappointment and shame came over me, that I should receive no formal announcement from Kreli, but today I thank for his word. Though I am but a side shoot, I am a great Chief, and have many people. Kreli is our Great Chief and we look for his word." (114) (emphasis added)

The crucial point is of course the explicit acknowledgement of Sarhili (Kreli) as supreme chief. The sentiment was echoed by Maqoma in his response:

> "Kreli is the Paramount Chief ... his orders would not be disobeyed, his people had already killed their cattle, their corn was exhausted, and they were suffering from hunger, and they now looked to Kreli for support ..." (115)

Maqoma also now revealed quite clearly that for him the cattle-killing was a political action. He stated in an open meeting that:

> "their not sowing had reference to the land question, that neither his people nor himself would again sow in the country which they now occupy. Nor would they listen to anything the Government had to say as long as they were living here" (116)

The effect of Sarhili's communications with Mhalla was to bring all the important chiefs and councillors into alliance with him. It was inconceivable that Sandille could hold out against this trend of opinion. That Sarhili did not trust Sandille is shown by his anger at Brownlee's presence during the meeting at Sandille's Place on October 17th, thus making known to the Government Sarhili's appeal for support for the killing. He sent to Sandille saying that he suspected that it was because "they received a certain sum of money each from the Government which they did not wish to forfeit" that they had let Brownlee attend. (117)

The effect of Brownlee's presence at the October meeting made Sarhili feel obliged to send a letter to the Governor via Maclean, informing him officially of the "thing which speaks in my country" ordering him to inaugurate the cattle-killing throughout Xhosa land. (118)

Sandille's councillors opposed to the movement had of their own accord cultivated the whole of the gardens of Sutu, Sandille's mother, as well as those of his Great Wife. Sandille refused to enclose these gardens and forced them to stop cultivating on his behalf. These councillors were forced to leave Sandille's kraal. (119) Brownlee observed:

> "The Umhlakaza party is now dominant ... yet I feel confident that no aggressive move is contemplated, the people are led on by a strange infatuation, in the midst of their ruin, they are happy and contented and in the confidence of the fulfilment

> of their expectations, they no longer made a secret of what was at first so carefully concealed from us ..." (120)

Despite the departure of Sandille's 'unbelieving' councillors from his Great Place, he still felt so constrained as to kill his cattle only at night. Nevertheless his brother Dundas had returned to his homestead and was supporting his moves to kill his cattle. (121)

Many people were at this time sending their cattle to Toise, Kama and Thembu locations where killing (so they thought) was not undertaken. However, in these areas things were not going smoothly for the collaborating chiefs who actively supported the Colonial State. In Kama's location those of his senior homestead heads who owed allegiance to Phato quickly rebelled against the ineffectual Kama:

> "Some of the people, especially those nearest Fort Hare, received Kama very coldly and some seemed desirous to avoid speaking to him at all." (122)

Kama seems to have been almost wholly cut off from his people and his district. The main homestead heads supporting Phato and Sarhili in Kama's location were Mate, Hashe and Cabana. These men virtually cut Kama off from any influence in the location and the area had one of the highest rates of cattle-killing.

Siwani similarly battled to retain any semblance of a hold over his section of the Mdushane. The majority of the homesteads favoured his charismatic brother Seyolo. As he was in prison for his part in the 1850 war, the majority now clung to his son Bangai. Bangai considered himself a legitimate chief of the Mdushane and was determined to isolate Siwani (123). In desperation Siwani assembled as many people as he could, inspanned his oxen and ploughed his fields, saying that he did so before their eyes to show that he did not believe and that he did not become fixed to the ground. (124)

It was Reeve, in Kama's location, who first observed another important feature of the movement - that it was the women, the young married and the elderly senior women and widows alike, who were amongst the most enthusiastic supporters of the prophet. Reeve reported:

> "that fear of the prophet was the principal excuse against planting. This is principally felt by the women ..." (125)

This observation was to be repeated many times over, revealing quite clearly how the cattle-killing movement was acting as a great retort for all the contradictions of the Xhosa social formation, producing as its residue conflicts which touched the most basic relationships previously shielded from conflict by conventional forms.

Women everywhere lived for a few months in the hope of seeing their deceased husbands or fathers and of being freed from unsatisfactory marriages and labour. Maclean recognised the link between the position of women in the Xhosa lineage mode of production and their role in spreading the prophecy:

> "There are no doubt many who believe in the predictions of the prophet and the women (the cultivators of the soil) are more especially carried away by them ..." (126)

Mhalla's battle with the homestead head Undai intensified and it was reportedly Undai's senior wife who, alarmed at her husband's disobedience to Mhalla, ran away. Undai, reported Gawler:

> "undaunted works in the garden himself with his children" (127)

The question of whether or not to cultivate in the 1856-57 season became a crucial stepping stone in the attempt to unite the people behind the chiefs and Sarhili. One of the main threats facing men who continued with cultivation and refused to kill any cattle was the desertion of their wives.

In Kama's location this had occurred very widely. Kama's son Samuel allowed his wives not to cultivate for fear they would leave him. Elsewhere in Siwani's location there were reports of men forcing their wives to work in the fields at gun point. (129) Later, when the Ndlambe chief Tyali* refused to yield and slaughter his cattle, his father Mqhayi's wives came to his kraal "and cried and howled and tried to make Tyali slaughter his cattle". (130) Tyali remained resolute and refused.

The young Chief Oba who with his uncle Anta had not supported Sarhili was virtually forced into it by his mother who proclaimed that he was denying her the opportunity to be reunited with her husband Tyali. (131)

By the end of 1856 all the major chiefdoms where the chief did not actively support the movement had been divided into distinct factions involved in an internal power struggle. This struggle emanating from Kama's and Siwani's locations affected also those chiefs who did support the movement who had also to cope with their own dissenting minorities.

The trend in the formation of these groups was clear. Mate in Kama's location was a young son of Phato and Bangai in Siwani's locations must have been extremely young indeed - in his early twenties at most - as his father Seyolo was only in his early forties. Conversely, those most opposed to the movement were the old established homestead heads, Undai, Tyala, and their cohorts. The main supporters and opponents of the movement were therefore grouped along the main lines of class struggle in the Xhosa lineage mode of production - that is between opposing generations. As Brownlee observed:

> "The Development of Krili's plans does not seem to meet with great favour from the older more influential portion of his tribe ..." (132)

* (The son of Mqayi the minority Ndlambe chief and therefore a fanatical 'unbeliever', being one who had nothing to gain by supporting Mhalla who had after all deprived his father of the chieftaincy)

It was of added significance that the women, who were closely involved with the causes of the intergenerational struggle, also supported the movement most vociferously in those areas where the chiefs opposed it. Whatever the ultimate motivations of the chiefs and the people (and these are to some extent separate questions) it seems clear that the way the movement spread, and was implemented by young men and women and the heads of small homesteads, supports our earlier theoretical assessment of the inner nature of the dynamics of the Xhosa lineage mode of production. (133)

(1) B.K. 415, Col. J. Maclean to Sir George Clerk, 17th March 1855.

(2) For Stretch's comments to the chief see Chapter 5 above.

(3) B.K. 415, Maclean to Clerk, 17th March 1855.

(4) G.H. 8/27, Brownlee to Maclean, 27th September 1855.

(5) Grey, Sir. G., Correspondence of Sir George Grey to Secretary of State for Colonies. London (1857). Brownlee to Maclean, 27th September 1855. p. 108.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid. Maclean to Grey, 9th October 1855, p. 109.

(8) G.H. 8/27, Brownlee to Maclean, n.d. October 1855.

(9) Seyolo was in prison for his part in the war of 1850-53 at this stage, which gave Siwani an additional advantage.

(10) G.H. 8/27, Maclean to Grey, 3rd October 1855.

(11) Grey, Sir G. op.cit. Brownlee to Maclean, 27th September 1855.

(12) Ibid. Brownlee to Maclean, 6th December 1855. The reference to Sandille's 'fears' is, amongst other things, to his fear of Colonial treachery after he was taken captive by Col. Bisset in 1846 under false pretences. Sandille subsequently failed to appear at meetings called by both Smith and Cathcart and was reluctant to trust the honesty of Colonial Commanders.

(13) Ibid. Maclean to Liddle, 12th December 1855.

(14) G.H. 8/28, Brownlee to Maclean, 11th May 1856. Brownlee notes Sandille's vehement opposition to the appointment of a separate magistrate for Anta.

(15) G.H. 8/28, Statement by Maqoma to Maclean at Fort Murray, 21st January 1856.

(16) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II 1852, private unofficial letter, Brownlee to Maclean, 17th October 1855.

(17) G.H. 8/28, Maqoma's statement to Maclean, 21st January 1856.

(18) G.H. 8/28, Maclean to Liddle, 31st January 1856.

(19) G.H. 8/28, Maclean to Brownlee, 17th February, 1856.

(20) Peires, J.B. The House of Phalo. Ravan (1981). pp. 48-53.

(21) For the theoretical background to this see Chapter I above.

(22) G.H. 8/27, Calderwood to Maclean, July 1853.

(23) N.A. 176, Tainton to Secretary of Native Affairs, Charles Brownlee, 13th June 1877. Tainton's responses to a long series of questions put to him by Brownlee about this period form an important source.

(24) Ibid.

(25) G.H. 8/25, Secret Report to Maclean, name of source not stated, 24th October 1854.

(26) B.K. 10, Maclean to Liddle, 17th October 1854.

(27) G.H. 8/26, Brownlee to Maclean, n.d. February 1855.

(28) G.H. 8/28, Maclean to Grey, 15th February 1856.

(29) The entire course of Mhalla's relationship with Gawler was marked by open ridicule of him personally which even extended as far as the playing of practical jokes on him. The remarkable thing about Major Gawler was that he never seemed to appreciate when he was being made fun of, ascribing it always to an anthropological curiosity.

(30) B.K. 10, Maclean to Liddle, 22nd November 1855.

(31) Even Kama had indicated to Maclean that he wished to choose his own magistrate. Grey, Sir G. op.cit. Maclean to Grey, 3rd November 1855. p. 112.

(32) G.H. 8/28, Gawler to Maclean, 24th April 1856.

(33) G.H. 8/28, Gawler to Maclean, 24th April 1856.

(34) G.H. 8/28, Gawler to Maclean, 28th April 1856.

(35) See Maclean, J. Compendium of Kaffir Laws & Customs, Grahamstown (1906). See memo by Brownlee, January 1855 as the best guide to the ages of the chiefs.

(36) G.H. 8/28, Gawler to Maclean, 28th April 1856.

(37) G.H. 8/25, Brownlee to Maclean, 13th August 1853. "Mukopiya, a Fingoe, had 11 head of cattle and all his grain seized by Umcoto, a son of Mhalla, for attempting to leave the location without Mhalla's permission."

(38) The 1848 census of the Ndlambe revealed a large percentage of people in Ndlambe territory were of Gcaleka origins.

(39) G.H. 8/28, Gawler to Maclean, 19th April 1856.

(40) Ibid.

(41) Ibid.

(42) G.H. 8/28, Gawler to Maclean, May 13th 1856.

(43) G.H. 8/28, Lt. Reeve to Maclean, 7th May 1856.

(44) G.H. 8/28, Brownlee to Maclean, 11th May 1856. This report of Brownlee's, coming as it did nearly two months before the cattle-killing prophecies themselves appeared and four months before killing commenced in earnest in September, is crucial to an understanding of the movement. It is strange that more attention has not been paid to his observations.

(45) Ibid.

(46) Ibid.

(47) Ibid.

(48) Ibid.

(49) For the most thorough debunking of various theories held by the Colonial authorities on the origins of the cattle-killing movement, particularly on the role of Moshoeshoe and the 'Chiefs plot' theory in general, see Peires, J.B.: 'The Late Great Plot : The Official Delusion Concerning the Xhosa Cattle Killing 1856-1857.' Unpublished draft ms. kindly shown to me by Dr. Peires.

(50) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 5th February 1856.

(51) G.H. 8/28, Reeve to Maclean, 4th February 1856.

(52) Ibid.

(53) G.H. 8/29, Maclean to Grey, 17th July 1856.

(54) B.K. 82, Ayliff to Maclean, 22nd April 1856.

(55) Ibid.

(56) Ibid.

(57) Grey Collection. S.A.P.L. G. 10c 13 Ms. letter and translation of letters from Kaffir chiefs to Sir George Grey 172a/6.

(58) B.K. 82, Ayliff to Maclean, 22nd April 1856.

(59) Cape Frontier Times, December 2nd 1857.

(60) Rutherford, J. Sir George Grey 1822-1898. A Study in Colonial Government. Cassel, London (1961) p. 356.

(61) G.H. 8/28, Brownlee to Maclean, 20th May 1856.

(62) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 12th December 1859.

(63) Ibid.

(64) Dowsley, E.D. 'An Investigation into the Circumstances Relating to the Cattle Killing Delusion in Kaffraria 1856-1857.' Unpublished M.A. Thesis UNISA (1932). p. 113. Peires convincingly argues that Grey, assisted by some of Maclean's despatches, managed to twist the reality of Xhosa belief in the prophecies of Mhlakaza into a fabricated 'plot' by the chiefs to invade the Colony to justify his own intended attacks on the Xhosa.

(65) Burton, A.W. Sparks from the Border Anvil. King William's Town (1950). pp. 1 - 102.

(66) Keller, B.B. 'Millenariaries & Resistance : The Xhosa Cattle-Killing'. Journal of Asian & African Studies Vol. XIII, numbers 1-2. January-April 1978.

(67) Soga, J.H. The AmaXosa. Lovedale 1931. p. 122.

(68) Rubunsana, W.B. 'Zenk 'iinkomo Magawalandini'. Lovedale Press 1966. (Abridged) Translated by A.C. Jordan. Towards An African Literature: The Emergence of Literary Form In Xhosa. Univ. California Press (1973) pp. 69-75.

(69) Brownlee, C. Evidence to the 1865 Native Affairs Commission, March 30 1865. See also G.H. 8/31, Maclean to Grey, 20th March 1857. "In this delusion which has caused so much and such prolonged excitement here, superstition was made a means to a political end, and that end was combined war on the white races ..."

(70) Brownlee, C. Reminiscences of Kafir Life and History, Grahamstown, (1906). p. 142

(71) G.H. 8/29, Maclean to Grey, 17th July 1856.

(72) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 5th February 1857. See also G.H. 8/29, Brownlee to Maclean, 22nd October 1856; G.H. 8/30, Lucas to Maclean, 29th November 1856; and G.H. 8/31, Lucas to Maclean, 11th January, 1856.

(73) Jordan, A.C. op.cit. p. 71.

(74) Burton. Sparks from the Border Anvil, King William's Town, (1950). p. 5.

(75) G.H. 8/29, Information Communicated to Maclean, 18th July 1856.

(76) B.K. 23/71, Brownlee to Maclean, 12th December 1856.

(77) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Maclean to Grey, 28th July 1856.

(78) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Maclean to Grey, 17th July 1856.

(79) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Brownlee to Maclean, 8th July 1856.

(80) Ibid.

(81) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Gawler to Maclean, 30th June 1856. While this could be another example of 'disinformation' being fed to Gawler, in fact 'Smith' remained opposed to the movement throughout, which lends credence to his statement.

(82) Ibid.

(83) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Maclean to Grey, 17th July 1856.

(84) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Information received by Maclean, 4th July 1856.

(85) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Brownlee to Maclean. 1st July 1856. Brownlee submitted his first detailed report to Government on the prophecies on the 28th June, but this report contained no mention of messages from Sarhili. See Brownlee, C. op.cit. p. 28.

(86) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Gawler to Maclean, 14th July 1856.

(87) Soga, J.H. op.cit. p. 122.

(88) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Information received by Maclean, 7th July 1856.

(89) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Gawler to Maclean, 14th July 1856.

(90) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Maclean to Grey, 28th July 1856.

(91) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Lucas to Maclean, n.d. August 1856.

(92) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Brownlee to Maclean, 9th August 1856.

(93) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Brownlee to Maclean, 9th August 1856.

(94) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Gawler to Maclean, 30th August,1856.

(95) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 4th January 1857.

(96) B.K. 89, Information received by John Maclean, 10th August 1856; B.K. 10, Calderwood to Maclean, 2nd August 1856.

(97) King William's Town Gazette and Border Intelligencer, 21st August 1856.

(98) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Brownlee to Maclean, 28th August 1856.

(99) Brownlee, C. op.cit. p. 148. G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Brownlee to Maclean, 31st August 1856.

(100) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Brownlee to Maclean, 2nd September 1856.

(101) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Bronwlee to Maclean, 22nd August 1856.

(102) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Brownlee to Maclean, 21st September 1856.

(103) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Brownlee to Maclean, 9th August 1856.

(104) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Brownlee to Maclean, 21st September 1856.

(105) G.H. 8/29, Brownlee to Maclean, 27th September 1856.

(106) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, 7th September, 1856.

(107) B.K. 10, Information received, 2nd August 1856.

(108) G.H. 8/27, Vol. II, Gawler to Maclean, 8th October and 19th October 1856.

(109) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Gawler to Maclean, 7th October 1856.

(110) Ibid.

(111) Ibid.

(112) G.H. 8/29, Gawler to Maclean, 14th August 1856.

(113) G.H. 8/30, Gawler to Maclean, 17th November 1856.

(114) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Brownlee to Maclean, 19th October 1856.

(115) Ibid.

(116) B.K. 82, Lucas to Maclean, 26th October 1856. In Lt. Lucas's opinion the whole movement was a form of passive resistance to obtain more land.

(117) B.K. 89, Information received by Maclean, 22nd October 1856.

(118) B.K. 140, Kreli to Maclean, 3rd November 1856.

(119) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Brownlee to Maclean, 13th October 1856.

(120) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Brownlee to Maclean, 19th October 1856.

(121) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Gawler to Maclean, 24th October 1856.

(122) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Reeve to Maclean, 15th October 1856.

(123) B.K. 80, Hawkes to Maclean, 15th March 1857.

(124) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Hawkes to Maclean, 8th October 1856.

(125) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Reeve to Maclean, 15th October 1856.

(126) G.H. 8/30, Vol. III, Comment by Maclean on Gawler's letter, 3rd November 1856.

(127) G.H. 8/30, Vol. III, Gawler to Maclean, 17th November 1856.

(128) G.H. 8/31, Reeve to Maclean, 31st January 1857 and 5th February 1857.

(129) G.H. 8/31, Vigne to Maclean, 1st February 1857.

(130) G.H. 8/31, Vigne to Maclean, 1st February 1857.

(131) G.H. 31, Brownlee to Maclean, 25th January 1857.

(132) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 25th January 1857.

(133) See Chapter I above.
This refers principally to the crucial interaction between control over women and cattle and the struggle to establish homesteads.